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This thesis is an examination of the social construction of the social 
response to a social problem. The social problem is refered to as 'domestic 
violence' and the social response refers to the police response.
The first chapter of the thesis constructs a theoretical approach grounded 
in the sociology of knowledge. Drawing on some of the classical sociological 
literature, the ideas of historians and philosophers of science, political 
philosophy and current social theory the concept of T inguistic-authority- 
struc tu re ' is synthesized. Subsequent chapters apply the theo re tical 
framework that this concept implies to illuminate the unfolding history of the 
issue of domestic violence. The versions of the social problem as they were 
articulated on different institutional sites (including the Women's Refuge 
Movement, social science, the law, the police and several others relevant) 
from the late-1960s to the mid-1980s are traced in the second third and forth 
chapters.
The thesis documents the international trade in information about the issue. 
Of cenral importance is the importation of a deterrence paradigm emergent 
from an experimental project conducted by police researchers in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota. The im portation of these ideas was partly in strum en ta l in 
persuading police policy makers in Great Britain to announce policy changes 
regarding the policing of doemstic violence.
This formation of a paradigmatic police response to domestic violence is 
located at a historically low ebb in the legitimacy of British Policing. The fifth 
chap ter charts the history of post-war British Policing. Drawing on 
sociological accounts of operational policing, and the relevant criminological 
literature, this chapter illuminates the emergent political contestability of the 
police institution. The sixth chapter shows how, in this context, the policy 
regarding the policing of domestic violence was generated.
Two chapters, seven and eight, are concerned with the actual police 
response to calls for service regarding interpersonal violence and in 
particular violence between cohabiting partners. These chapters make use of 
sem i-structured interviews with police officers and an analysis of police 
paperwork procedures to illuminate police practices with regard to these calls 
for service.
The two remaining chapters continue the historical analysis up to the end 
of the 1980s.
For Bill and Roseanne Sheptycki 
and Sarah Phillips 
whose support made my work possible
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I began research into the issue of violence against wives in 1986. My 
interest had been piqued by media coverage regarding the phenomenon 
which was quite prevalent at that time. I wanted to find out what was 
behind that media coverage and why the issue was framed in the way that 
it was. It must also be said that I was sympathetic to the feminist struggle 
against male violence. However, my intellectual background was in the 
philosophy of the social sciences, and so I could only think to frame my 
approach to the research problem in that way. My problem was to see how 
the issue of domestic violence was socially constructed. When I began the 
research I had no idea about the issue, I did not know its history or its 
development. Nor did I realize how complicated defining the problem could 
get.
In order to grasp how the issue of domestic violence was constructed I 
found that I had to embark on a very ambitious programme of reading. 
Initially I began by unraveling the social scientific debates on the nature of 
what was variously conceived of as 'wife battery', 'woman abuse’, 'family 
violence', 'domestic violence' and a plethora of alternative terminology. In 
so doing, I found myself confronted with the politics of feminism, with 
which I had not engaged since my days as an undergraduate at the 
University of Saskatchewan in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Unravelling 
these debates was a very complicated task, but no more difficult than 
coming to grips with the history, politics and practice of post-war British 
policing. Broadly speaking, what had to be addressed were three separate 
bodies of literature: feminist work on violence against women, social 
scientific investigations of family violence and the sociology of the police. 
Each area of reading comprised several ways of 'knowing' and there were 
blind spots within each as well as confusing overlaps between them. All
were central to the issue and I had to come to terms with each. At times I 
felt myself to be swimming in books.
At the same time, as a Canadian in Britain, I found myself deeply 
immersed in a culture which was not my own, which implies a considerable 
learning experience in and of itself. I had much to learn about recent British 
history which meant reading yet more books. As a foreigner in the U.K., I 
also wanted to gain access to a world usually hidden from the general 
public, something which takes great patience. It is difficult to remember the 
confusion of those early days now. At the beginning I made many mistakes 
and had many false starts. I wanted to tap into the interface between the 
social scientific enterprise and police policy formation. This entailed 
cultivating relationships with many people including refuge activists and 
women in the women's movement, social scientists and local government 
officers, police officers and many others. This was a very slow process, but 
necessary in order to gather the data that seemed necessary to write the 
thesis I had in mind.
As I have said, my intellectual background is located in the sociology of 
knowledge, and something should be said about how I chose to organize the 
data that was eventually amassed. Such a philosophical approach is a 
somewhat unusual one in criminology, although important contributions to 
the discipline have been made within the paradigms of symbolic 
interactionism and phenomenology and, of late, Foucault has become 
something of a minor hero in criminology's pantheon. However, the former 
approaches tend to focus attention on individual social actors and I wished 
to explore a broader historical movement. Accordingly, my theoretical 
approach needed to be aimed at a nebulous space between individual social 
actors and social structure. At the same time, many of the criminologists
who invoke the name of Foucault tend to eschew the rigours of sociological 
field work and, as the ethnomethodologists would say, I wished to 'get my 
hands dirty'.
I had no readily available criminological tradition which fitted my exact 
needs, but my desire was to take a sociology of knowledge perspective and 
focus it on a concrete sociological problem. The theoretical approach 
elucidated in the first chapter is my answer to this need. The theory is 
developed through a discussion of some of the classical sociological thinkers 
as well as the work of some historians and philosophers of science, political 
scientists and social thinkers. I also illustrate the discussion with several 
practical examples in order to make it accessible to readers with no specific 
interest in theories of knowledge. The central category developed in this 
chapter is the notion of 'bounded discourses' or 'linguistic-authority- 
structures'. This approach could be called 'discourse analysis', but it owes as 
much to classical sociology and contemporary English speaking thinkers like 
Anthony Giddens and Thomas Kuhn, or even the emigre Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, as it does to Michel Foucault and his colleagues.
The chapters that follow are an application of this theoretical outlook to 
the concrete problem of what has been called wife battery. The terminology 
and ideas developed in the first chapter are woven through the data 
providing the subsequent chapters with a structure. However, rather than 
risking an over-emphasis on the theoretical analysis and a correspondingly 
repetitious analytical jargon, I decided to allow the unfolding history to take 
precedence over the philosophy. Some of the theory and analysis is thus 
left implicit. This is most evident in Chapter Five, where a chronology of 
post-war British policing is offered. For reasons explained in that chapter, it 
was not feasible to rigorously apply the theoretical framework to the
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question at hand. Instead, what is supplied is a less problematic chronology. 
A project which applies the sociology of knowledge approach developed in 
Chapter One to the general discourse of policing politics and practice remains 
to be done.
Chapters Two, Three and Four, as well as chapters Nine and Ten, delve 
into the articulations of the issue of domestic violence on a number of 
institutional sites including women's refuges, social science, the police 
institution, the media and several others that are relevant. They give a 
sense of the historical development of the issue as it went through various 
permutations, as it was articulated on different institutional sites and as the 
problem was continually defined and re-defined. The contestability of the 
definition of the nature of the problem and the competition to provide the 
authoritative vocabulary to explain it, together with prescriptions for 
practical intervention, is seen as providing the motor for this historical 
development. In Chapter Three, attention is paid to how the issue was 
articulated in the North American context as distinct from the developments 
in Britain. However, the separation cannot easily be maintained as the 
transatlantic trade in 'facts' about violence against wives is considerable. 
Much of the thesis concerns itself with tracing this trade.
Chapter Six shows, in detail, how the issue was constructed at a specific 
historical conjuncture in London during 1986. It is here that the 
developments of North American social science are crucial, particularly 
insofar as they involved the policing of the violence. This was a key 
moment in policy formation, when representatives from many institutions 
constructed a dominant paradigm for the social response to what was 
termed 'domestic violence', based around the concepts of 'criminalization' 
and 'deterrence'. The two chapters that follow assess the practical
repercussions for ground level policing that came as a result of those policy 
decisions.
Chapters Seven and Eight, in which this assessment takes place, show 
the application of an analysis of discourse in a rather different mode. In 
those chapters what is discussed in the operations of ground level, or front 
line, police officers. The context is no longer a broad and unfolding history, 
rather the discourse under examination is confined within a bureaucratic- 
militaristic hierarchy. However, the vocabulary employed by individuals 
within a social structure remains the entry point for analysis and, as will be 
made evident in those chapters, the mutability of the categories of language 
is no less apparent.
Having examined police practice with relation to violence between 
intimates, the concluding two chapters pick up the threads of articulation 
about the issue from where they were left in 1987. In these chapters the 
continuing unfolding of the issue is shown and some indication of possible 
future developments is given. In conclusion, the impact of the issue on 
police policy and practice is assessed, but it is acknowledged that the history 
is on-going and makes definitive conclusions somewhat problematic.
I should mention something about the title pages for each chapter 
which may be seen as somewhat disconcerting. As I was sifting through the 
data that I had gathered, examining the different ways that wife battery 
was constructed, I became increasingly aware that I had ignored the 
discourse of the batterers themselves. This seemed to be a significant blind 
spot, particularly when representations of such violence are so prevalent. 
Consequently, I felt that in order to illuminate this facet of the problem, 
some space had to be given to this particular discourse and I hit upon the 
idea of culling songs about wife beating from my own record collection.
v
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The fact that I did not find it difficult to find ten songs on the subject is 
testimony to my taste in music. I grew up listening to Rock and Roll and 
returned to that music's roots in Blues, Country and Rhythm and Blues as a 
young man. Within those traditions of music there are many examples of 
misogyny, as I suspect there probably are in many other musical traditions. 
Writing down those lyrics made me confront my own version of what it is to 
be a man, it also made the wife beater a concrete person. For those reasons, 
if for no other, it seemed important to include them. The songs construct 
violence towards women within the context of a monogamous 
heterosexuality and from a male point of view. In them, the perplexity of 
men; their convictions, worries, justifications and fears about their violence 
towards 'their women' are evident. It is also evident that much violence is 
commonplace, petty and mean. Perhaps the best retort to these men is Janis 
Joplin's: "Each time I tell myself when I think I've had enough, I've got to 
stand up and show that a woman can be tough."
The ideas and help of many people went into this thesis for which I own 
a great debt. I am grateful to Rod Fotheringham who, in the difficult early 
days, offered me a role model and also encouraged me to apply abstract 
ideas to a concrete problem. It is doubtful that I would have had the 
courage to pursue that goal without his example. I must also thank Ben 
Bowling whose consistent good humour and willingness to listen provided a 
dependable sounding board that prevented me from getting out of tune. I 
could not have kept up the rhythm of work without his help. Paul Rock 
allowed me to forge my ideas against his formidable intellect and I thank 
him for his forbearance. Brian Maclean made a crucial intervention and 
John Lowman taught me much about the real world of criminology - both 
deserve recognition. I should also like to thank Robert Reiner, David
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Downes, Seema Ahluwalia, Alice Sampson and the others who attended the 
Crime and Deviance Seminar at the LSE during my studies there. 
Additionally, I would like to thank the students and staff who attended the 
graduate students seminar in the sociology department at the LSE from 
1989-91 and those in attendance at the Politics of Racism Workshop at 
Birkbeck College during the same years. Participation in all those forums 
was enlivening, encouraging and educational. I would also like to thank 
David Cowell and Susan Edwards, both of whom were of great help in 
facilitating my understanding of police paperwork and helping me gain 
access to a secret social world. Thanks also go to the many police officers 
who took the time to speak to an academic. Both Malcolm Young and Betsy 
Stanko provided me with valuable feedback on parts of the thesis and their 
insights are much appreciated. Lastly, I would like to thank the women who 
work so hard to help the victims of male violence in Britain. I met only a 
few but I have great admiration for them all. In particular, I would like to 
thank Sandra Horley and the other women at Chiswick who helped me so 
much. I would also like to thank the women from other refuges and 
projects, too numerous to mention by name, whom I met during the course 
of this research. In particular I would like to thank Dianne, June and Rita, 
who gave me valuable information on resources available for refuges in this 
country. I have striven to recover their history, the history of the refuge 
movement. It is my hope that, in so doing, the movement will be propelled 
towards new achievements.
I'd rather see you dead little girl 
than see you with another man 
You better keep your head little girl 
You won't know where I am 
You know that I'm a wicked guy  
I was born with a jealous mind  
I can't spend m y whole life 
tryin ' to make you tow the line 
Let this be a sermon girl 
I mean everything 1 said 
You that I'm determined girl 
and I'd rather see you dead 
You better run for your life i f  you can little girl 
Hide your head in the sand little girl 
Catch you with another man that's the end  
Little girl.
John Lennon
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Chapter One
In troduction
The term 'discourse analysis' has become a somewhat fashionable 
term amongst academics over the past decade. It is important to clarify 
the use of such a term and unpack the theoretical and conceptual baggage 
that comes with it before commencing to employ it in sociological analysis. 
All the more so because of a seeming paradox that confronts anyone who 
would look upon the categories of language and make them problematic; 
that paradox being that in order to analyse the terms of discourse we must 
employ discursive tools. It is not self evident what is to be gained by 
tackling this apparent contradiction. In this chapter I will show how a 
critical approach to discourse offers sociology something more than the 
mere production of 'facts' and goes beyond wallowing in this paradox.
The obvious starting point would be to ask the question: how shall 
we conceive of 'discourse'? On this question the whole idea of discourse 
analysis depends, for if it is thought of in the way that it often is, that is as 
natural, neutral and immutable, then it is not immediately obvious that it 
makes sense to speak of an analysis of it at all. A useful analogy has been 
drawn by the linguist Paul Chilton which addresses this issue. He points 
out that it makes little sense to speak of criticizing rocks or trees - except, 
in so far as rocks or trees are being thought of in the context of some 
human agency. That is, it seems ridiculous to say that one is being critical 
of rocks, unless one conjures up a context in which rocks are a rockery, a 
barricade, a building or some such. A plausible context for criticism 
depends on the ascriptions of intention to a human agent. Rocks can be
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seen either as natural objects or they can be instruments of human action. 
To criticize rocks in the former sense does not mean anything, in the latter 
sense a critical analysis can be quite meaningful. Analogously, one can 
consider what it might mean to criticize discourse conceived as either a 
natural phenomenon or a form of human action. What would it mean to 
criticize discourse in the first sense - that is, as a natural phenomenon, a 
given and unchangeable characteristic of the human species? The answer, 
it would seem, is not a lot - no more than it does to criticize rocks in a 
similar way.1
What would it mean on the other hand to criticize discourse as the 
instrument of human action? It seems clear that this would be tantamount 
to criticizing the action itself. To extend the analogy of the built 
environment further, a given 'language scheme1 constitutes the house in 
which thought dwells. Like the buildings which we erect and in which we 
live, discursive structures shape our lives. Both structures are created by 
human agency, but long after the structures have been raised they go on to 
shape our lives in ways not foreseen. Seen this way, a critical approach to 
language amounts to an analysis of reified human activity. Discourse, seen 
as an analogue of crystalized social relations, weighs heavily on the course 
of human action and places limits on the possibilities of historical 
development.
To use the metaphor of a 'language structure' is to come dangerously 
close to the claim that language determines thought, a view known as the 
'Whorfian hypothesis' (after the American linguist B.L. Whorf). This is a
2
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Chapter One
notoriously difficult claim, and before we proceed it would be useful to 
examine it in order to disengage the metaphor of a 'language structure' 
from this deterministic contention. By way of illustration I want to 
consider communication between persons who speak different languages. 
It seems obvious that if the terms of our discourse totally determined and 
delimited the thoughts we could think this would have specific 
implications for communication between people who are immersed in 
entirely different languages. For example, it has been said that there is no 
word for deterrent in the Russian language.2 That is, the Russian language 
does not have a word simultaneously expressing meanings like 'inspiring 
fear' and 'holding back an aggressor'. This does not mean that Russians 
cannot paraphrase the notion quite adequately. But the Whorfian 
assumption can lead to some extremely unhelpful conclusions.3 In an 
illuminating article an American strategic analyst concluded: 'This failure 
to be able to express in Russian the essential notion of the concept 'to 
deter' has naturally been reflected in a similar failure to express correctly 
in Russian either 'deterrent' or 'deterrence'" other than by complicated and 
remarkably clumsy phrases. The tangled knots of verbiage have hindered 
"a proper understanding of the concept of deterrence" in Soviet strategic 
thinking.4 According to this argument the Russian mind cannot think 
deterrence properly because it cannot say deterrence properly.
It happens that this particular linguistic lesson was taught to the 
citizens of the United States by Ronald Reagan during his presidency. The 
implications of the lesson were that the people of the Soviet Union could
3
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not understand the position of the United States with respect to its nuclear 
deterrent and, by implication, have a far more aggressive attitude with 
regard to their own military capabilities. In line with Whorfian reasoning 
Soviet inability to understand American strategic thinking is a natural one 
because they do not possess the necessary linguistic categories to 
comprehend the subtle strategy of deterrence .
Clearly it is not impossible for people to think around the pre-coded 
concepts of their language. It is not impossible for them to resist the 
compulsive nature of individual analytical categories; neither does it seem 
that language structure is a total machine the parts of which describe the 
determination, influence or control of thought. It is possible, however, that 
some speakers, probably many speakers, will not think round the language 
they use in some contexts, and that they will not resist the demands of 
specific analytical categories. Instead of making absolute claims about the 
necessary determination of all thought by all aspects of language, it is 
more useful to ask which parts of language influence which speakers, in 
which contexts and to what degree.
In our example of deterrence it might be more fruitful to ask 
questions about the nature and context of the political rhetoric being used 
to justify the strategies of the major and minor players. Much of the 
difficulty raised by the Whorfian hypothesis can be cut through if, instead 
of focussing on the relation between discourse and thought, we focus on 
the relation between individuals and groups in communicative exchange. 
In order for such an approach to be sociologically grounded we must take
4
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Chapter One
cognizance of the institutional context, the systematized social relations, in 
which our language takes its shape. In the case of our example; 
consideration of the language of 'deterrence' would have to proceed from 
an understanding of the military-industrial institutions of both countries 
as well as the context of the world state-system as the basis of 
institutionalized communicative exchange. At this point I am getting far 
ahead of the discussion. The point I am trying to make is simply that an 
analysis of discourse which claims to be sociological does not start with 
abstract claims about the determining role of language in human thought. 
Having taken some steps to disassociate this discussion from considerations 
of linguistic determinism I would like to turn to some of the relevant 
classical sociological literature in order to further locate the discussion.
Conceptions of consciousness 
in Classical Sociology
Approaches to knowledge as based in institutionalized contexts and 
systematic social arrangements are not new in sociology. The idea that 
classifications, logical operations and guiding metaphors are given to the 
individual by society can be traced back to the founding fathers of the 
discipline and beyond. For example, in arguing for the social basis of 
'knowledge', Durkheim says of the general analytical categories of 'time', 
'space', and the like that:
They [the categories of time space and causality] represent 
the most general relations which exist between things;
5
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Chapter One
surpassing all our other ideas in extension, they dominate 
all the details of our intellectual life. If men do not agree 
upon these essential ideas at any moment, if they did not 
have the same conceptions of time, space, cause, number, 
etc. all contact between their minds would be impossible, 
and with that, all life together. Thus society could n o t 
abandon the categories to the free choice of the individual 
without abandoning itself...There is a minimum of logical 
conformity beyond which it [society] cannot go. For this 
reason, it uses all its authority  upon its m em bers to 
forestall such dissidences...The necessity with which the 
categories are imposed on us is not the effect of simple 
habits whose yoke we can easily throw off with a little 
effort; nor is it a physical or metaphysical necessity since 
categories change in different places and times; it is a 
special sort of moral necessity which to the intellectual 
life what moral obligation is to the will. 5
Durkheim is concerned to tell us here that even the most abstract 
analytical categories could not function as they do if they were not based 
in a concrete social context. There are no words if there are not men and 
women to speak them. Further, the human species is a social species and 
this leads Durkheim to a decidedly materialist formulation of the relation 
between ideas and social structure. He argues that the individual, and 
with him (or her) their ideas are not an existential given but are, in fact, an 
historically emergent social creation:
We believe this is sufficient to answer those who think 
that they can prove that in social life everything is 
indiv idual because society is made up only of 
individuals. Undoubtedly no other substratum exists. 
But because individuals form a society, new phenomena 
occur whose cause is association, and which reacting 
upon the consciousness of individuals for the most part 
shapes them. This is why, although society is nothing 
without individuals each one of them is more a product 
of society than he is the author. 6
6
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Chapter One
The idea that 'new phenomena occur whose cause is association' may 
be somewhat misleading. I do not think that it was Durkheim's purpose to 
postulate a time when humans were not social and that they developed 
'association' at some point in the development of the species. What he is 
interested to argue is that the causal arrow in the analysis of social 
phenomena should be drawn from productive relations and structural 
linkages between people to moral or legal systems of thought; that is 
'consciousness'.
If this sounds like a particular Marxian formulation it must be said 
that on this point Durkheim and Marx were not so far apart. The metaphor 
I have in mind from Marx is that of the 'base-superstructure'. Of course, 
Marx's own explanation is more robust than such a simple notion could 
ever imply. For example in The German Ideology he states:
The p ro d u c tio n  of ideas, of conceptions, of 
consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with 
material activity and the material intercourse of men, 
the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the 
mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the 
direct efflux of their material behaviour. The same 
applies to m ental production as expressed in the 
language of politics, laws m orality , relig ion , 
metaphysics, etc. of a people...consciousness can never 
be anything else than conscious existence, and th e  
existence of men is their actual life p ro cess ...m en , 
developing their material intercourse alter, along with 
their actual world, also their thinking and the products 
of their thinking.7
7
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Chapter One
These are very abstract formulations and there is a need to draw out 
the nub of both Durkheim's and Marx's argument. I would like to do this 
by way of a brief historical illustration.
A brief historical example
In 1929 the the Infant Life (Preservation) Act was passed. The act 
made it an offence to act 'with intent to destroy life of a child considered 
capable of being bom alive'. The only caveat to this was in cases where it 
was considered that the mother's life was at risk. The wording of the act 
went further to explain that 'evidence that a woman had at any material 
time been pregnant for a period of 28 weeks or more shall be prima facie 
proof that she was at that time pregnant of a child capable of being born 
alive.' In 1967 David Steel piloted the Abortion Act through parliament 
which gave women access to free legal abortions. The upper time limit set 
continued to be that provided by the legislation of 1929.
The passing of the 1967 Abortion Act set up the terms of debate 
between political lobbies for and against abortion. The anti-abortion lobby 
began its campaign in earnest in 1968, unveiling the now famous photo of 
an unborn child sucking its thumb. The fundamental tenet of the anti­
abortion lobby was that life began at conception. In this respect the 
language employed by the lobby was not just 'anti-abortion' but 'pro-life'. 
This rhetoric was employed with concerted effort throughout the 1970s, 
but successive attempts to revise the bill failed.
8
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The antithesis of this position came to refer to itself as 'pro-choice' 
rather than 'pro-abortion' for obvious reasons. The rhetoric of this lobby 
centered on 'a woman's right to choose'. Rather than disputing when life 
begins, the language mustered focused on the right of women to control 
their bodies. The point was often prefaced by stating that 'nobody likes 
abortion b u t ...', followed by an assertion of women's individual rights to 
choose what happens to their bodies. The afterward was most often about 
a return to back-street abortions should the law be repealed. On occasion 
pro-choice lobbyists could be heard to argue that the right to choose 
extended passed the 28 week mark, although it is hard to find evidence of 
anyone arguing for abortion rights to be extended very far into the third 
trimester.
In 1979 when John Corrie attempted to introduce a Bill in parliament 
under a Tory government which had no predisposition to defend the 1967 
Act the stage was set for a serious political confrontation. The pro-choice 
lobby was successful in mobilizing a great deal of support to maintain the 
existing legislation. The National Abortion Campaign, formed in 1975, was 
successful in cultivating influential allies including the TUC and the Labour 
Party. A public demonstration to which an estimated 80,000 people came 
was organized by the NAC with the TUC.8 Corrie's bill ran out of time in 
parliament; the government did not give it any more time and it fell. The 
demonstration and the fall of the bill confirmed that public consensus was 
in favour of a woman's right to choose, although at the same time there 
was also evidence that this consensus did not extend to 'the right to choose'
9
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beyond the 28 week mark. The notion of a Tate abortion’ was fixed in 
public discourse and this seemed to ensure that, although the ’pro-life1 
lobby could never be vanquished altogether it could be held at bay. The 
moral debate seemed set to continue in perpetuity, politically maintaining 
the convention that abortion is legally available before 28 weeks gestation, 
but after that, with few provisos, it is against the law.
However, between 1979 and the end of the 1980s there were two 
important shifts in medical knowledge and technical ability. Medical 
technology developed to allow for the survival of premature babies bom 
considerably earlier than 28 weeks. Parliament again debated the issue in 
1988, after what became known as the 'Carlisle baby case'. It was claimed 
that in July of 1987 a baby of 21 weeks gestation was born alive and 
survived for three hours following an abortion at the City General Hospital 
in Carlisle. ’Pro-life’ campaigners demanded that an inquest be held and 
that the doctors responsible for the abortion be prosecuted. The facts of 
the case remain the subject of much medical dispute, yet it is certain that a 
small percentage of extremely premature babies can now survive. The 
new barrier seems to be hovering around the twenty-fourth week prior to 
which the lungs of the fetus are too underdeveloped to breath, yet this too 
is uncertain. Currently, scientists are researching substances which can be 
used to coat the lungs and enable them to absorb more oxygen. The 
validity of the 28 week mark, established in 1929, is being eroded by 
improvements in the field of medicine which deals with premature births.
10
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While research and changes in medical practice have altered the 
viability of an under-developed fetus outside the womb, innovations in 
embryo research have also been affected the abortion debate. The Human 
Fertilization and Embryology Bill, which concerned Parliament some 
twenty three years after the Abortion Act was passed, put forth the claim 
that embryo research should cease after 14 days because this is the stage 
at which the 'primitive streak1 develops. This is widely regarded as the 
beginning of the individual development of the embryo, since it is the 
latest stage at which mono-zygotic twins can develop. It is also the stage 
at which the nervous system begins to develop.
Together these innovations in medical practice and research have 
shifted the terrain of the debate decisively. The advocacy of a 'woman's 
right to choose' has become increasingly untenable in a society where 
medical research and practice seems to be on the threshold of being able to 
sustain life from conception. The viability of the fetus outside the womb, 
enshrined in law in 1929 at 28 weeks, has been superseded by medical 
science. The delicate balance of public consensus between the two 'pro' 
lobbies, a balance that maintained the 28 week distinction has begun to 
crumble. But it has not shifted due to a victory by one or the other 
position. The battle was not decided by the terms of the discourse; the pro- 
choice versus pro-life dialectic. Rather, changes in institutional practice of 
the medical profession have given rise to a new situation in which the 
terms of discourse of what is an essentially moral argument, dissolve.
11
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What this example is intended to show is that an analysis of analytical 
categories, in this instance the notion of 'late abortion', the '28 week mark' 
etc., can not take place without considering the institutional practices 
which concretely generate them. An adequate discourse analysis will 
encompass both the categories of human understanding and the practical 
engagement that gives rise to that understanding.
Back to the Classics
It seems to me that both Marx and Durkheim agree on an important 
point and this historical example bears this out. The point is that what 
they call variously consciousness, ideas, conceptions, and the like is, in 
some sense a reflection of social organization. This is, however, a 
somewhat one-sided view of their thoughts on the matter, particularly in 
the case of Marx. In his early writings, up to and including The German 
Ideology, Marx wanted to assert his conviction that consciousness is not 
independent of social and material conditions against idealist philosophy 
and, simultaneously, that consciousness is more than a passive reflection of 
reality against the mechanistic materialists of the eighteenth century.9 His 
materialist conception of history posits a dialectical relationship between 
consciousness and the social/material with the latter providing the motor 
for the dialectic in the first instance.10 Durkheim is also concerned to 
avoid the twin pitfalls of mechanical materialism and idealism. He takes 
pains to emphasize that his premise is one involving the dynamic interplay 
between the 'substratum' of society and 'collectively evolved ideas'. He
12
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states, using a characteristically biological analogy, that "the conscience 
collective is something other than a mere epiphenomenon of its 
morphological basis, just as individual consciousness is something other 
than a simple efflorescence of the nervous system."11
Altogether, these are both subtle and compelling form ulations 
particularly in the case of Marx who can be read as having a specific 
discourse theory. This is evident because, although Marx did not provide a 
comprehensive title to the seven notebooks that comprise the Grundrisse, 
in a letter to Lasalle dated 22 February, 1858 Marx indicated that he had a 
title in mind, namely, ’Critique of the Economic Categories'.12 By economic 
categories, Marx meant the basic concepts employed in political economy. 
It would seem that the analysis of discursive categories is not that new. 
Marx's analysis of capital proceeds as an analysis of the concept of capital. 
He states that "the exact development of the concept of capital [is] 
necessary, since it [is] the fundamental concept of modem economics .. ."13
While Marx intended his major work to be a critique of certain 
concepts and what gives rise to them, this is not really the case with 
Durkheim. What is made problematic are what he sees as the underlying 
social institutions. He develops his own 'language scheme' for articulating 
his own preoccupations. This is not intended as a criticism. When 
Durkheim offers us notions like 'the division of labour', 'organic' and 
'mechanical solidarity' or 'collective consciousness’ he offers a pertinent 
and systematic view of the social order. However, Durkheim does not ask 
the question as to what gives rise to his own 'language scheme'. In the
13
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final analysis his assertions about the basic structure of society 
determining the structure of human thought were nothing more than the 
product of his own 'language scheme', a discourse which he evidently 
views as unproblematic. The important thing to note here is that this 
formulation assimilates knowledge and its categories into an underlying 
structure and tends to negate the active role of the ideas themselves and 
to diminish the practical involvement of human subjects in the formation 
of consciousness.
Be that as it may, Durkheim still reminds us of the necessity to ground 
our own thinking sociologically. Without so doing we run the risk of 
developing a view of language which sees words using people as weapons 
in the battle of discourses. E.H. Carr reminds us of the same point when 
he wrote that the perspectives of historians and social scientists are 
themselves "rooted in a social and historical background." Carr goes on to 
say that he ventures to believe:
that the historian who is most conscious of his ow n 
situation is also more capable of transcending it, and 
more capable of appreciating the essential nature of 
the differences between his own society and outlook 
and those of other periods and other countries than the 
historian who loudly protests that he is an individual 
and not a social phenomenon. Man's capacity to rise 
above his social and historical situation seems to be 
cond itioned  by the sensitivity with which h e 
recognizes the extent of his involvement in it.14
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What both Durkheim and Marx agree on, at least, is that it is quite 
useless to consider the nature of consciousness or ideas outside their 
context in a form of social life. That form of life could be labeled a group, a 
community, an institution, a society, a culture or a nation. This is the basis 
from which to begin to make language problematic but no more. Of course, 
it can be said that since there is no way of conceiving of social life outside 
of language and since abstract notions such as ’institution’ or 'society' are 
themselves linguistic categories, we are no closer to overcoming the 
paradox than when we began. This is a line of thought often pursued by 
thinkers who follow a radical discourse theory and it is something that I 
would like to address here.
Readers may recognize that 'form of life' is a notion contributed to this 
area of discussion by Wittgenstein. In truth a great deal of confusion has 
been generated by Wittgenstein's contribution, not least because of the 
abrupt turn-around that he executed in the middle of his academic career. 
In his earlier work, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus he began by 
assuming that all words have one purpose and that they all get their 
meaning in one way - a way that can be stated in terms of a logical 
calculus. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein contended that meaning arises 
when the logical 'simples' of language are combined so that they 
correspond to nonverbal facts. To understand a sentence is to understand 
its constituent parts.15 However, in his later philosophy Wittgenstein 
makes the observation that what appears to be the meaning of a word in 
one context does not necessarily carry over to its use in another. He
15
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abandons the idea that words can have precise meanings in an abstract 
sense, the meaning of a word becomes its use. "The sentence gets its 
significance from the system of signs, from the language to which it 
belongs."16 For Wittgenstein, at this point in his intellectual development, 
to understand a sentence was "to understand a language".17 He went on to 
say, at this point, that:
As a part of a system of language, one might say, the 
sentence has life. But one is tempted to imagine that 
which gives the sentence life is something in an occult 
sphere, accompanying the sentence. But whatever 
accompanied it would for us just be another s ig n .1**
This is precisely the paradox that we must confront. Wittgenstein 
makes an attempt to grasp this nettle in developing his notion of 'language 
games'. The use he makes of this term indicates that language owes its 
form, at least primarily, to the use people make of it, that is to the way the 
words they use in social intercourse are connected with and facilitate 
specific actions and expectations. The rules immanent in a particular 
language game are the rules of a 'form of life', that is, of a socially induced 
and instituted form of behaviour.
For the later Wittgenstein to learn a language is to be able to 
participate in the 'form of life' the language depends on and is itself 
instrumental in specifying and perpetuating. His starting point remains 
language, but it is understood in the context of something else; a 'form of
16
®®©@[fl©tira©tta[/og ©fl©©®^©® ^ qt]©D^ ©B©
Chapter One
life'. However, many readings of this body of work fail to make this 
explicit, instead, analysis focuses on the language game. Rather than 
treating an analysis of discourse as intimately bound up with the 
embeddedness of language in a concrete form of life, that which gives rise 
to language really is assigned to an occult sphere. The result is that the 
categories of language are examined as reified objects in themselves. This 
is understandable because Wittgenstein himself seems to take language 
games as his point of departure.
The essence of the problem is to treat categories as grounded. 
Analysis inquires into the form of life which provides the context for a 
given set of analytical categories and, indeed, gives rise to them in the first 
place. Concepts can never really be known in terms of other concepts, to 
try and do this is to fail to recognize the contingency of meaning. 
Sociological analysis calls attention to the reflexivity of language; that 
concepts are only knowable in terms of a form of life and a form of life can 
only be expressed with concepts. Language is, itself, essentially incomplete 
since it always presupposes a form of life.19
On a practical level, it seems to me that the way to proceed is with the 
self-awareness that Carr recommends. To do this is to ground the analysis 
concretely. The problem is that such an analysis is not feasible using 
concept like form of life, which is too vague to get us very far. In order to 
address this limitation I would like to turn our attention to some thinkers 
in the philosophy of science because I believe that they provide the 
necessary specificity that is required.
17
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The Contribution of Philosophers 
and Historians of Science
Historians and philosophers of science have made significant inroads 
in the discussion of the relationship between language and social actors. 
Consider the point made by Ludwig Fleck earlier this century:
Cognition is the most socially-conditioned activity of 
man, and knowledge is the paramount social creation.
The very structure of language presents a compelling 
philosophy characteristic of that community, and even 
a single word can represent a complex theory...every 
epistemological theory is trivial that does not take the 
sociological dependence of all cognition into account in 
a fundamental and detailed manner.2*1
This is broadly in accord with the materialist sentiments of Durkheim 
and Marx. Fleck introduces several terms of his own for talking about the 
relationship between the social and the discursive. The most important of 
these are 'thought collective' and 'thought style'. For Fleck the 'thought 
style' sets the preconditions of any cognition and it determines what can 
be counted as a reasonable question and a true and false answer.21 It 
provides the context and sets the limits for any judgement about 'objective 
reality'. Much of what counts as history in the history of science has 
focused on the evolution of 'thought styles', that is; new modes of 
reasoning that have their own specific beginnings and trajectories. The 
merit of Fleck's approach is that it attempts to grasp this type of history in 
a sociologically grounded way. For Fleck, the history of science cannot be
18
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written without an understanding of the interconnectedness of the 
’thought style’ and the 'thought collective'.
Thomas Kuhn's notions of 'paradigm' and 'scientific community' are 
similar.22 A 'paradigm' provides not only the terms of reference on which 
to judge the appropriateness of answers to scientific questions but also the 
appropriateness of questions to be asked.23 Similarly, the 'scientific 
community' is comprised of individuals who marshal themselves around 
the 'paradigm' and utilize its analytical categories to further their own 
projects.24 He introduces the idea of periods of what he calls 'normal 
science' when a particular 'paradigm' dominates the thought of a particular 
'scientific community'. "Normal science", Kuhn tells us, predicates itself "on 
the assumption that the scientific community knows what the world is 
like." He goes on to say that the success and survival of a specific 
paradigm "depends on that community's willingness to defend that 
assumption, sometimes at considerable cost."25
Incontrovertible facts are not what compel the history of science along 
its course. Fleck showed that it took four centuries before scientific 
advances in other fields were important enough to establish a definitive 
distinction between different diseases originally clumped together as 
venereal. For him "such entrenchment of thought proves that it was not 
so-called empirical observation that led to the construction and fixation of 
the idea" 26
For historians and philosophers of science like Kuhn and Fleck what is 
needed is "a new vocabulary and concepts for analysing events like the
19
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discovery of oxygen."27 That vocabulary, as Kuhn states in his 1969 
postscript to the second edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , 
is built around notions such as 'paradigm’ and 'scientific community'. "A 
paradigm is what members of a scientific community share, and  , 
conversely a scientific community consists of men who share a 
paradigm."28 This apparently vicious circle is broken by Kuhn who states 
that:
Scientific communities can and should be isolated 
without prior recourse to paradigms; the latter can  
then be discovered by scrutinizing the behaviour of a 
given community’s members. If this book were being 
rewritten, it would therefore open with a discussion of 
the community structure of science, a topic which has 
recently become a significant subject of sociological 
research and tha t historians of science are also 
beginning to take seriously.2 9
A scientific community is not difficult to pin-point, Kuhn tells us, 
because the practitioners in a given community, to an extent "unparalleled 
in most other fields, have undergone similar educations and professional 
initiations" and in the process "have absorbed the same technical literature 
and drawn many of the same lessons from it." Only after making sense of 
the social network that comprises a given 'scientific community' is it logical 
to examine in detail the 'puzzle solving' that it is engaged in. In this way 
'pre' and 'post-paradigm' periods can be identified, as well as 'normal 
science' and 'scientific revolutions'.30
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Both Kuhn and Fleck attempt to make language problematic within 
specific institutional contexts, that is, the context of the scientific 
community in which specified discursive practices arise. This is both the 
strength and the weakness of their approach. It is a strength because 
rather than mounting their own projects within science using the terms of 
that science, or using categories standing in opposition to those terms, they 
abstract themselves from the whole process. In so doing they develop 
intellectual tools for understanding the relation between the terms of 
discourse employed and the specific scientific communities which evoke 
them. By illuminating the dynamics of that relation they uncover the 
history of the science under study.
This is also their weakness because their projects are bounded by, 
what is for them, the unproblematic nature of these 'communities1 or 
'collectives'. In the context of their respective projects the notions of 
'scientific community’ or 'thought collective' remain simply given. This 
makes some sense within the context of their own work and, although 
Kuhn acknowledges that the fringes of a given 'scientific community' are 
difficult to pin down, they can proceed quite adequately with what, for 
them, is an "intuitive understanding" of their respective terms. However, 
if we wish to apply similar notions to a more diffuse social phenomenon, 
ones which cannot easily be seen as the exclusive realm of certified 
experts, a notion like 'thought collective' or 'scientific community' becomes 
less easily manageable.31
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Still, this discussion of the philosophy of the history of science has 
given us some analytical categories of our own for conceptualizing 
discourse. The perspective offered by Kuhn and Fleck is a theory of 
discourse which makes real active human beings the vantage point from 
which to view their discursive practices and hence the historical process. 
In this sense, what might be called discursive conditions, become an 
extension of who people are and what they do, rather than the reverse. By 
viewing language in this way we can understand discourse as an 
historically emergent social creation with historical implications of its own.
Viewed in this way language becomes much less than radical discourse 
theorists would have. Abstract analytical categories are not the universe 
of all that is knowable and, in analysing the terms of discourse we are not 
confined to an analysis of words. These philosophers of science have 
shown us that discourse is intimately bound up with the practical day to 
day activity of human beings, activity which is social. Their analysis 
focuses attention on individuals and groups in communicative exchange. 
At this point I would like to take this understanding away from its limited 
focus on groups of easily identifiable experts and broaden the analysis to 
include the larger social formation. In doing so I think the dialectic 
between discourse and practice, between language schemes and 
institutionalized social relations, will remain a focus of concern. In order to 
broaden the canvas I will press into service the ideas of some political and 
social philosophers.
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Deconstruction and the 
politics of language
Several attempts to examine discourse in its socio-political context and 
within the realm of diffuse historical changes have been made. Perhaps 
the most sophisticated and influential of these attempts was made by 
Michel Foucault. Foucault first outlined his theoretical approach to these 
problems in detail in The Archaeology o f Knowledge , a notoriously 
difficult text. In it he is concerned with the ways in which discourse 
shapes our apprehension of the social world. An illustration of both his 
writing style and his reasoning can be found in the following passage in 
which he concerns himself with the formal divisions of the Academy:
We must question those divisions or groupings with 
which we have become so familiar. Can one accept, as 
such, the distinction between the major types of 
discourse, or that between such forms or genres as 
science, litera ture, philosophy, religion, h istory, 
fiction, etc., and which tend to create certain great 
historical individualities. We are not even sure of 
ourselves when we use these distinctions in our own 
world or discourse let alone when we are analysing 
groups of statements which, when first form ulated, 
were distributed, divided, and characterized in a quite 
different way: after all ’literature ' and 'politics' are
quite recent categories which can be applied to 
medieval culture or even classical culture, only by 
retrospective hypothesis, and by the in terplay of 
formal analogies or semantic resemblances; but neither 
literature, not politics, nor philosophy and sciences 
articulated the field of discourse, in the seventeenth or 
eighteenth century, as they did in the nineteenth 
century. In any case, these divisions - whether our 
own, or those contemporary with the discourse under 
exam ination - are always them selves reflexive 
categories, principles of classification, normative rules,
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in stitu tionalized  types: they in turn are facts of 
discourse that deserve to be analysed beside others; of 
course, they also have complex relations with each  
other, but they are not intrinsic, autochthonous and 
universally recognizable characteristics.32
"Discourse", Foucault informs us somewhat cryptically, "must not be 
referred to in the distant presence of the origin, but treated as and when it 
occurs." That treatment should take account of the rules of classification 
that are being employed when a given analytical category is evoked.
So, where is the possibility of conceiving of a critical approach to 
discourse? Foucault's answer is demonstrated in his account of the advent 
of modern medicinal science around the end of the eighteenth century. 
According to him the old 'superstitious1 medicine made perfectly good 
sense of disease in terms of a discourse which has been banished and long 
forgotten. Its banishment has made it easy for us to imagine this medical 
'revolution' as a triumphant breakthrough, but in doing so we would be 
mistaken. Foucault explains that the old discourse framed disease against 
a dominant assumption of life and against such, disease shows up as a 
counter-life, an evil, a negative force. In the eighteenth century a 
discourse of disease seen as the invisible 'other' of the visible human body 
was replaced by a positive conception, as a positive object for a positive 
science to study. It is no coincidence that the end of the eighteenth 
century also sees the emergence of pathological anatomy, the practice of 
opening up bodies in order to inspect the organs. This practice can, of 
course, only be carried out on dead bodies. In this respect the 'new'
24
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discourse frames disease against the dominant assumption of death. As 
Foucault puts it: "Disease breaks away from the metaphysic of evil, to 
which it had been related for centuries; and it finds in the visibility of 
death the full form in which its content appears in positive terms.33 For 
Foucault the revolution is not the advent of clearsightedness:
It is as if for the first time for thousands of years, 
doctors, free at last of theories and chimeras, agreed to 
approach the object of their experience with the purity 
of an unprejudiced gaze. But the analysis must be 
turned around: it is the forms of visibility that have 
changed; the new medical spirit...is nothing more than  
a syntactical reorganization of disease in which the 
limits of the visible and invisible follow a new 
pa ttern .34
In this view the object that modem medical science studies no longer 
appears as something natural and obvious; on the contrary it literally has 
to be carved out of the body. Nor can we say that this object was always 
there waiting to be discovered, rather, it had to be created by a certain 
practice - the practice of pathological anatomy- and a certain way of 
speaking - in terms of separate and static internal organs.
This is a practical example of Foucault's analytical approach and it 
seems quite clear that for him discourse is not simply to be considered 
what is spoken or written. Discourse is not mere words, free floating 
analytical categories, rather, it is the complex inter-relation, a dialectic, 
between language and practice. In his more theoretical writings Foucault 
employs very abstract metaphors. I think that in his more concrete 
investigations it can be shown that the ideas he is playing with are not
25
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antagonistic to those of Kuhn or Fleck, indeed, I believe he was asking 
fundamentally similar questions.
The obscurantist style adopted by Foucault in the Archeology o f 
Knowledge and elsewhere, which both attracts and repels English speaking 
readers, is used for two reasons. The first is that Foucault perceived the 
need to avoid being labeled a 'Structuralist'; a categorization which he 
evidently rejected, not least because he wished to "disturb the tranquillity" 
with which such analytical categories are employed. The second reason is 
less deliberate. Foucault is concerned with much broader historical themes 
than either Kuhn or Fleck. The history of 'sexuality', or 'the clinic', or 
'discipline' is a much broader project than a history of the discovery of 
oxygen; requiring a broader conceptual framework. Foucault rejected 
'totalizing history', explicitly stating he is not interested in "the categories 
of cultural totalities (whether world views, ideal types, the particular spirit 
of an age in order to impose on history the spirit of an [this] age."35 In 
trying to develop a theoretical approach which can avoid the consequence 
of being easily labeled and, at the same time, provide a theoretical basis 
for writing what he termed 'general history', infuriatingly imprecise 
metaphors such as 'underlying unities' or, more vague still, 'surfaces of 
emergence' are employed. We are told in the Archeology o f Knowledge, 
that the task of the thinker who is concerned with the nature of discourse 
is to show that abstract analytical categories "do not come abou t  
themselves, but are always the result of a construction the rules of which 
must be known and the justification of which must be scrutinized." As
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such "we must define in what conditions and in view of which analyses 
certain of them are legitimate; and we must indicate which of them can 
never be accepted in any circumstances."36
I believe that Foucault has a similar problem with the terms of 
discourse reified by institutional affiliation that Fleck and Kuhn have. He 
states that :
the question posed by language analysis of som e 
discursive fact or other is always: according to what 
rules has a particu lar statem ent been made, and 
consequently according to what rules could o ther 
similar statements be made? The description of the 
events of discourse poses quite a different question: 
how is it that one particular statement appeared rather 
than another?37
Here he is distinguishing his own approach to discourse as against 
mere 'language analysis'. What he is groping towards is not merely some 
kind of over-blown literary criticism, but an analysis of power.
By way of illustration we can look at how Foucault considers the 
sexuality of the child as revealed by Freudian psychoanalysis. This 
sexuality, he argues, is there to be revealed only because it was first put 
there, by a social process, during the eighteenth century. It was during 
this period that great efforts were being put into the supposed eradication 
of masturbation amongst schoolboys. A whole new literature on the topic 
of child sexuality emerged with precepts, observations, medical advice, 
clinical cases, outlines for reform and plans for ideal institutions. The end 
result of all this effort was, of course, not the eradication of it's object,
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rather an intensification. In Foucault's words: "sexuality through thus 
becoming an object of analysis and concern, surveillance and control, 
engendered at the same time an intensification of each individual's desire 
for, in, and over his body."38 In effect, the sexuality of the child was 
created by an eighteenth century discourse.
The important thing to note here is that Foucault's analysis goes 
beyond an examination of linguistic facts. The 'knowledge' of child 
sexuality is not looked at in a vacuum. Under Foucault's analysis 
mechanisms of power are illuminated, mechanisms of which 'knowledge' is 
not a mere epiphenomenon but constitutive of that power. In this respect 
he is able to show that:
The child's 'vice' was not so much an enemy as a 
support; it may have been designated as the evil to be 
eliminated, but the extraordinary effort that went into 
the task that was bound to fail leads one to suspect that 
what was demanded of it was to persevere...rather than 
to disappear for good. Always relying on this support, 
power advanced, multiplied its relays and its effects... In 
appearance, we are dealing with a barrier system; but 
in fact, all around the child, indefinite lines o f  
penetration were disposed.39
If Foucault's analysis were to confine itself to the facts of language it 
would appear that during this period the eradication of masturbation was 
the goal and the knowledge and surveillance merely the means to that end. 
In fact he goes beyond an examination of mere words to look at the social 
process of which the words are a part. In doing so he concludes that 
knowledge and surveillance were themselves the goal and that it was by
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this means that school boys were incorporated into a complex network of 
power.
The analysis of discourse does not separate out the effects that the 
sociological basis has on the primacy of this or that metaphor. Foucault's 
approach is to document how institutions harness informational processes 
to the task of establishing themselves. At first reading this would seem to 
deny that individuals are capable of thinking around the pre-coded 
categories imposed upon them by a particular network of social power. 
This is to overstate the argument. What is shown in Foucault's historical 
work is that in marking its own boundaries the instituted community 
affects all lower level thinking (that is, thinking by individuals) so that 
persons realize their own identities and classify each other according to the 
logic of institutional affiliation. Foucault's analysis focuses on individuals 
and groups in communicative exchange and disregards spurious questions 
about the relation between thought, abstractly considered, by language. 
His analysis of discourse is intimately bound up with an analysis of 
practice, indeed at times it seems that for him they are the same thing.
Towards a sociological
approach to discourse
Foucault leaves us with a particular problem, however and that has to 
do with the nature of the history that he is writing. The problem is that he 
paints on a very broad historical canvas. The transformations, dislocations, 
and discontinuities he identifies are, to an extent, made evident by an
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economy of scale. What would be the effect of turning this type of 
analysis, an analysis which has been focused on historical dislocation, to 
history as we live it 7 The possibility of seizing a specific historical 
conjuncture, especially one of sociological minutiae as it is in the making, 
runs two great risks. The first is a tendency to focus discussion on 
structural tension or institutional fracture in order to provide an historical 
vista. The second tendency is to focus on phenomenological detail in order 
to provide an account of history which creates the space for conscious 
human subjects.40 In the absence of easily visible historical fractures it is 
all the more difficult to seize what Giddens calls 'the double hermeneutic,; 
that is the reciprocal relation between these two reductions (structure and 
agency), because we cannot be sure when a dislocation has occurred and 
hence cannot be sure of our own perspective. The point of revelation, that 
point at which the spurious sovereignty of a past thought style is revealed, 
provides Foucault with a hook on which to hang the 'double hermeneutic'. 
There is no such hook when we try and comprehend history in the making.
This is a theoretical problem as well as a methodological one. If the 
project of discourse theory conceives of language in relation to the form of 
life (scientific community, thought collective, network of social power) 
which it both reflects and constitutes, it is very important to create the 
conceptual space for individuals to use this language creatively. Foucault 
argues that the subject is constituted in discourse, but in order to have a 
theory which can account for historical change our conception of discourse 
must also allow for subjects so constituted to then use the terms of
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discourse to achieve desired and specified ends. This particular point has 
been made by Anthony Giddens. He introduces us to the notion of the 
’duality of structure’, by which he means that "social structures are both 
constituted by human agency, and yet at the same time are the very 
medium of this constitution."41 According to Giddens, language, at both the 
syntactical and semantic level, might be considered as an example of 
structure.
The point has often been made that specific analytical categories have 
no fixed meaning and, hence, are subject to manipulation by social actors. 
It has been best made made by political philosophers, perhaps because it 
is so easy to see the rhetorical nature of purely ’political’ language. It is 
certainly not contentious to point out the manipulation of the linguistic 
categories employed in the political rhetoric of elected officials. The 
political scientist William Connolly tells us that "to examine and accept, or 
to examine and revise, the prevailing terms of political discourse is not a 
prelude to politics but a dimension of politics itself."42 He goes on to say 
that it is political because of "the ways in which the meanings 
conventionally embodied in that vocabulary [the vocabulary of politics] set 
the frame for political reflection by establishing criteria to be met before 
an event or act can be said to fall within the ambit of a given concept."43 
The central notion he employs is that of ’essentially contested concepts’ a 
concept he borrowed from W. B. Gallie. The idea of an 'essentially 
contested concept' is that analytical categories make many kinds of 
statements simultaneously and do so by formulations which often convey
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several kinds of meaning or images at once. Thus, for example the political 
categories 'conservative', 'radical' and 'liberal' are essentially contested 
concepts open to differing interpretations and fought for by competing 
interests.
The second thrust of Connolly's argument is that:
the language of politics is not a neutral medium that 
conveys ideas independen tly  formed; it is an 
institutionalized structure of meanings that channels 
political thought and action in certain directions. 
Those who simply use established concepts to get to the 
facts of political life, those who act unreflectively 
within the confines of established concepts, actually  
have the perceptions and modes of conduct available to 
them  limited in subtle and undetected ways. Such 
conceptual blinders impede the work of any student of 
politics, but they are particularly corrosive of efforts to 
explore radical perspectives on politics. For to adopt 
without revision the concepts prevailing in a polity is 
to accept term s of discourse loaded in favour of 
established practices.44
Connolly, in a way similar to that of Foucault, points to the structured
nature of political discourse. Indeed, he even borrows a metaphor from
the French structuralist Saussure to this end when he asserts that "the
concepts of politics are part of the political process itself; they give
coherence and structure to political activities in something like the way the
rules of chess provide the context that makes 'moving the bishop' and
'checkmating' possible as acts in a game of chess."45 However, Connolly
stops short of 'deconstruction' which might be wise, since the observer,
«
including the sociological one, cannot make social life available as an object 
for investigation independently of his or her own knowledge of it, which is
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often the pretence of 'deconstruction'. By investigating, the social observer 
constitutes the object or ’phenomenon' as a topic for investigation and, 
inevitably, must engage in political battles over definition. Hence, to assert 
the contestablility of meaning is not an assertion of the arbitraryness of 
meaning. The contingency of meaning is not a terminus, beyond which 
rational debate ceases, but a starting point, a challenge to articulate and 
defend a particular definition, and with it a particular practice. That is 
politics and that is history.
What Connolly's conception of political language does is insist that 
individual actors manipulate the terms of discourse to achieve desired and 
specified ends, that is, they play politics. By acknowledging the essentially 
contestable nature of most analytical categories (and here I wish to include 
the analytical categories of administrative rationality, as well as more 
overtly political concepts; something which Connolly is loath to do) he 
opens up the space in which historical change can manifest itself. Without 
this, discourse can only be seen as structurally determining and social 
actors merely the pawns of their analytical categories. By widening our 
understanding of 'discourse' to include the operation of the 'essential 
contestability' of abstract analytical categories and elevating the discussion 
beyond the terms of politics to include the linguistic ensembles of more 
mundane social practices we begin to have a sociologically grounded 
discourse analysis.
By including in our understanding of the structured nature of 
discourse the notion of the contestability of concepts we can see the
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possibility of grasping history in the making in the absence of an easily 
discerned historical dislocation and without recourse to phenomenological 
reductionism. This is where the merit of a sociologically grounded 
discourse analysis shows itself. As the classical sociological thinkers have 
pointed out consciousness is a product of socially organized activity and it 
is at the same time an instrument of human action. By conceiving the 
discourse problematic in this dual sense we can grasp the double 
hermeneutic in the absence of an easily discernible historical disjuncture. 
If we make the analytical categories marshaled in the process of moving 
history forward problematic and show how some definitions achieve 
common currency and others are submerged we can show how issues are 
historically transformed by conscious human actors within the confines of 
institutionally bound linguistic ensembles .
In the articulation of history, in the production and reproduction of 
specific thought collectives, we can trace the dialectical development of 
what have been termed formalized languages, paradigms and the like. In 
any such bounded discourse the most important words are those which 
establish analytical categories. The decision to employ this or that 
analytical category (patriarchy or bureaucracy, for example), is the 
decision to entertain specific possibilities and alternatives. At the same 
time any closed definition involves, albeit unconsciously, the obviation of 
other possibilities. Thus, any set of abstract analytical categories that may 
be identified can be said to constitute a Tinguistic-authority-structure'. 
This concept is, more or less, synonymous with other concepts I have
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introduced intended to denote 'formalized languages'. The concept of a 
'hnguistic-authority-structure' attempts to take cognizance not only of the 
definitions of each element within the linguistic ensemble and their 
various interconnections and determinations but also the images, meanings 
and perspectives which are excluded by that discursive formation. Power 
is understood, in this sense, as the authority to define. The point is that, 
when particular definitions rise to prominence they illuminate certain 
possibilities and obviate others.46
It must also be remembered that, because abstract analytical 
categories are contestable, each element as a constituent in a specific 
linguistic-authority-structure will make many kinds of statements 
simultaneously and do so by formulations which often convey several 
kinds of meaning at once. This gives specific discursive practices a fluidity 
which often belies their structured nature. Yet any such bounded 
discourse remains structured because it is intimately and dialectically 
bound up with social practice, that is: structured social relations.
What I have characterized variously as 'scientific community', 'thought 
collective', 'institutional site' 'network of social power' or, more broadly 
still, 'form of fife' are structured social relations which both produce and 
are the product of their own linguistic-authority-structure.47 By defining a 
particular problematic in a particular way, by authorizing legitimate 
questions and their answers as well as submerging those deemed 
illegitimate, a given network of power not only constitutes the problematic 
as an object, it also constitutes itself. These linguistic ensembles can,
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therefore, be considered the material expression of the historical process 
brought about by human agents competing over the meanings of terms 
within and between linguistic-authority-structures. An analysis of 
discourse predicated on these assumptions means there is no need to 
unwind Giddens' double hermeneutic and assign one the role of 
determination since both strands are observed simultaneously and history 
can be seen in its complex determination.
The Problem Ahead
The phenomenon I wish to address in my thesis is both specific and 
diffuse. It comprises patterns of social decisions that can be precisely 
identified and delimited, which arise within and between concrete and 
specifiable institutional contexts. My analysis is similarly specific and 
diffuse: the problem of 'domestic violence' will be examined through an 
investigation of the decision-making processes that concretely generate it.
Conceptually and methodologically, this investigation draws upon a 
broad tradition in sociology, what could be called a sociology of knowledge 
problematic. It is an investigation of language structures, what I call 
linguistic-authority-structures, at a number of specific locations: the so- 
called battered women's movement, the social scientific community, the 
police institution, the social work institution, the legal profession and 
others all play host to competing definitions of the issue. In referring to 
these linguistic ensembles I am acknowledging the centrality of language
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in the social processes that organize the phenomenon of wife battery, but I 
am also asserting that there is more at stake in this field than 'mere 
words’. The language that police officers, or social scientists, or refuge 
activists use are much more than collections of documents or disembodied 
exchanges of legal, scientific or political 'talk'. They are structures of 
knowledge through which members of these groups understand and decide 
things. They are structures of social relationship which establish different 
obligations and authorities for different categories of person (in the context 
of policing such categories as victim, offender, police officer and judge 
spring to mind). They are impersonal forms, existing independently of any 
of these persons 'as individuals'. They are historical and political 
frameworks of social organization, that make some social actions possible 
whilst precluding others. If this seems like unnecessarily complicated 
verbiage a straightforward example may cut through to the main point: 
when police officers told me "It's the system" they said so from 'inside' a 
'hnguistic-authority-structure'.
In trying to speak of these language structures and still take into 
account the essential contestability of abstract analytical categories I am 
trying to build a sociological version of the history of the social response to 
spousal violence. The recordable, analysible and competing definitions 
produced within the many interested organizations give concrete access to 
this, and the documents and pronouncements produced by them therefore 
provide the substantive material of my study. In the course of the thesis I 
will assemble various bodies of sociological studies, media accounts, legal
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statutes, police reports and statistics, and so on, some of which I will cut up 
and examine in quite minute and surgical detail. But this ’analysis of 
discourse’ is not intended as simply ’literary criticism'. It is an analysis 
that belongs to the concrete world of serious everyday decisions. It is an 
attempt to make sense of how patterns of decisions can arise; to identify 
the constraints that preclude other (perhaps better) decisions from being 
made and to question what would have to be changed before this ’system' 
could operate differently.
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I got you baby 
like a fish out on a line 
I can real you in darlin'
'most any time 
I got m y brand on you 
I got m y brand on you 
There ain't nothin' you can do 
I got m y brand on you
McKinley Morganfield
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In troduction
In this chapter I want to begin charting the historical threads which 
merged to produce the present interest in the policing of domestic 
violence. Many historical treatments of the subject of domestic violence 
begin with a brief consideration of the ancient world. These accounts point 
out that such violence is not a recent phenomenon and that it has not 
always been considered a social problem. The most frequent example 
from ancient history seen in the literature is that of Roman society in 
which husbands had the authority to chastise, divorce or kill their wives 
for engaging in behaviour that they themselves engaged in daily.1 It has 
been pointed out that the word 'family' is derived from the Roman 
'familia', which signified the totality of slaves belonging to an individual 
male.2 The wife was considered part of this totality and the husband was 
expected to ensure that she conformed to the parameters of that role, 
apparently violence was an accepted means to that end.
Such accounts usually go on to describe the 'ideology of male 
dominance' making unsystematic use of documentation available from a 
variety of historical epoches including the prehistoric, ancient and 
medieval. The conclusion arrived at is that the history of wife abuse is 
long and dishonourable. The effect is to create the impression that wife 
battery is a trans-historical phenomenon and that Patriarchy, reinforced 
by coercion, is an overarching social form. Much of this literature does not 
discuss what evidence there is of women's resistance to male domination. 
Such evidence is thin on the ground and is easy for all but the most 
specialized of scholars to miss. The result of allowing the history of 
resistance to be submerged in this manner is to produce a one-sided view
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of Patriarchal domination. Having said that, I do not intend to provide the 
reader with an account of this submerged history. The inclusion of the 
'facts' of ancient history does little to improve our understanding of recent 
developments in the social response to violence against wives and it is 
with these that we are concerned with here.
What we are interested in here is the near past, but leaving out 
several thousand years of history does not make choosing a starting point 
a simple decision. For example, there are legitimate reasons for beginning 
the discussion in the nineteenth century; the suffragette movement at the 
turn of the century certainly warrants attention. However, I wish to leave 
this out of the discussion as well, even though the period is well 
documented and the social historian need not produce a one-sided history. 
It seems to me that two intervening world wars, together with the myriad 
changes that accompanied them, make for a considerable break in 
continuity and that this is a good reason to begin the account in the post­
war era.
Within that time frame the issue of violence against wives has been 
conditioned primarily by what has been termed the 'Refuge Movement', 
the 'Battered Wife Movement' or the 'Battered Women's Movement'.3 It 
was the foundation of Refuges, the first in this country being Chiswick 
Women's Aid, which made violence against wives an issue for public 
discussion in the post-war period. The invention the Women's Refuge was, 
of course, intimately bound up with the progress of the 'women's liberation 
movement'. It has been said that the publication of The Feminine 
Mystique in 1963 signaled the birth of that movement.4 In it the author 
launched a polemic against "the problem without a name":
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It was a strange stirring, a sense of dissatisfaction, a 
yearning that women suffered in the middle of the 
twentieth century in the United States. Each 
suburban wife struggled with it alone. As she made 
the beds, shopped for groceries, matched slip cover 
material, ate peanut butter sandwiches, chauffeured 
Cub Scouts and Brownies, lay beside her husband at 
night she was afraid to ask even of herself the silent 
question: 'is this all?'5
However, it was not the malaise experienced by middle class house 
wives which, alone, led to the birth of that movement. The crucible of the 
Civil Rights Movement and the anti-Vietnam War protests in the United 
States helped shape the women's movement there. In Britain the 
campaigns of CND and the politics of the 'Left' helped forge the women's 
movement. Political struggle over many issues was acute during the 
period. It was in the context of struggles for racial equality and student 
demands for a 'democratic society' that Stokely Carmichael was purported 
to have said, during a meeting of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating 
Committee, that the only position for a woman was 'prone'.6
This particular statement is central to the mythology of the time and it 
may have even been said. What is certain is that the politics of resistance 
during those years created the space for something called the 'women's 
movement'. It was during this period women began to get together in 
what were termed 'consciousness raising groups'. The talk in these 
discussion groups ranged over the whole field of women's experiences; 
their feelings about themselves and their loved ones, their jobs, their sex 
lives. Of course, women had been talking about these things for a long 
time, but consciousness raising groups were not intended to be 'hen 
parties'. The slogan was 'the personal is political' and participation in such
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discussions was intended to foster the development of political conclusions. 
It was explained in the first issue of Spare Rib Magazine that:
In the Spring of 1971 some of the members of the 
Chiswick's women's liberation group became tired of 
just talking about the causes of women's oppression.
So they formed another group which they called 
Women's Aid setting out to assert women in need of 
active help (sic). (Spare Rib No. 1 July 1972)
It is with the birth of Chiswick Women's Aid the story of the issue of 
violence against wives can properly begin.
The First March on Chiswick High Road
The establishment of the first women's refuge in the world has been 
recounted in Scream Quietly or the Neighbours Will Hear.7 The women's
group which formed Women's Aid did not initially consider the issue of
violence against wives. The centre which they established was certainly 
not intended to be a service for battered wives. In fact the first campaign 
they embarked upon was one directed against the rising prices of 
foodstuffs in highroad supermarkets. The strategy was a simple one:
On a Friday morning a member of the group visited 
each of the six main supermarkets in Chiswick High 
Road taking a note of the prices of basic foods like 
eggs, butter, cheese bacon and sugar. On Saturday 
morning the name of each superm arket and the 
comparative prices were chalked up on a blackboard 
which was carried up and down the High Street. The 
blackboard stopped outside each supermarket so that 
the staff could see what was going on. Most of the 
shoppers supported  us but the su p e rm ark e t 
managers were, not surprisingly, hostile. Some 
wrote to the local papers, and others threatened to 
take us on personally. (Spare Rib No. 1 July 1972)8
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The next active campaign carried out by these women was the 
organization of a protest against legislation which cut off the provision of 
free school milk. This effort culminated in a march of some five hundred 
women and children (and one cow) down the Chiswick high road. Their 
efforts to fight for continued provision of free milk were, largely, 
unsuccessful. However, by this time they had achieved national notoriety 
and, more importantly the keys to a small house in Belmont Terrace.
Pizzey explained in Scream Quietly how the role of the house in 
Belmont Terrace slowly evolved. It was not immediately apparent to the 
women involved that there was a need for a service for battered women. 
Beaten and bruised women began to trickle in, in need of shelter and 
protection from violent husbands, with no money and no place to go. As 
these women arrived Chiswick Women's Aid evolved into something really 
new: a Women's Refuge.
An overview of the coverage of the issue of wife battery in Spare Rib 
Magazine during those first few years reveals something of the priorities 
of activists like Pizzey. Between July of 1972 and the end of 1975 the 
magazine published forty two issues, which included 12 major articles on 
the issue of violence against wives.9 These articles taken as a whole, tend 
to direct attention to the growth and health of the refuge movement. Two 
articles cover issues relevant to the law as it regards battered women, a 
third discusses how women can get legal possession of the 'matrimonial 
home', and a forth is an editorial which relates the issue of women having 
to leave homes who are confronted with the chronic housing problems of 
urban London. The eight remaining articles are concerned with the need 
to expand refuge provision and the troubles of maintaining those that had 
already been established.
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In addition the magazine is peppered with announcements from 
groups trying to establish new centres. Here are some examples from the 
February 1974 issue (No. 20):
Brixton W o m e n * s
Aid 01-274-0552 
house for b a t t e r e d  
women and children , 
the  w om en  a re  
applying for status as 
a registered charity in 
order to raise money. 
Run on a self-help 
basis, with w e e k ly  
meetings to d isc u ss  
management of place 
and problems, weekly 
se ss io n  w ith  a 
solicitor. U rg e n tly  
needs practical help.
Islington  
Women's Aid
Plans for a house are 
going ahead. To find 
out more about what 
is happening contact 
Family Service Unit, 
2 Sherboume Rd. N7 
Tel. 01-609 1212
In the first few years of the movement, the most pressing concern 
was the need for money and volunteer help to expand refuge provision. 
Activists spent a lot of time and effort trying to obtain support for these 
measures. It was reported in 1975 that when Leeds Social Services 
Department officials refused an Urban Aid grant to Leeds Women’s Aid for 
a battered women’s refuge they had established six months previously it 
merely strengthened their resolve to "underline their ties with the 
Women’s Movement" (Spare Rib no. 33 March 1975). The popular image of
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activists in the women's movement at that time was of bra burning 
'women's libbers', but the women thus caricatured were less interested in 
burning underwear and more preoccupied with the establishment of more 
and better refuge provision, the need for which their detractors were loath 
to admit. The idea of Women's Refuges, staffed by women for the benefit 
of women provided these activists with their reason for being. An 
underlying theme was that already existing agencies, social services being 
frequently mentioned, should have been doing this work but were not. 
Indeed, it was argued that state agencies could not be depended on to do 
so. Pizzey's own accounts of contact with various agencies on behalf of 
individual women reiterates this point may times. In her words "It would 
probably take a Charles Dickens to do full justice to the labyrinth of 
indifference, red tape, callousness and simple incompetence that exists 
between people in need and so many of the agencies that are meant to 
help them from the DHSS to the NSPCC.10
Connected with this issue was a philosophy about the organizational 
structure of women's centres. Pizzey herself professed a profound dislike 
of 'red tape' but she was not alone in asserting that the basis of 'feminist 
practice' should be collective and non-hierarchical. All of the women's 
centres established in the community during this period were based on a 
discourse centred around notions of 'collective decision making' and 'self 
help'. This philosophical reasoning, together with the p rac tica l 
interventions with which it was associated, was to remain a central 
consideration of British feminists involved in the issue of battered wives 
until well into the 1980s.
Directly connected with the need for more refuge provision was the 
issue of housing. At the time London suffered from chronic housing
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problems, a problem which persists. Refuges that were established were 
frequently squatted buildings and women moving on from refuges often 
squatted new accommodation because local housing authorities were 
unable, or unwilling, to help. Housing was a central theme in the 
articulation of the battered woman’s plight:
Since speculation in land and property forced house 
prices up, and changes in the law gave tenants in 
private rented accommodation more rights, housing 
in the private sector has become scarcer and  
scarcer, and rents more and more impossible. A two 
room flat let in London averages £20, a bedsit at £10.
These factors have helped push the housing 
problem on to the shoulders of local authorities and 
have revealed the real chaos of housing provision 
in Welfare State Britain. Women make up a large 
section of those who suffer extremes of hardship in 
this state of affairs - single women, women whose 
families have grown up, women whose families 
have broken up, gay women whose choices do no t 
include family life. Council housing policies 
focussing on the family as a basis for allocation do 
not answer their needs. (Spare Rib No. 40 Oct. 1975)
Activists knew well that women leaving home because of battering 
had the almost insurmountable task of setting up new accommodation for 
themselves. In such a situation their standard of housing, along with their 
income level, usually plummeted. Waiting lists for council houses were, 
and continue to be, impossibly long. Homeless persons have to run the 
gauntlet of homeless hostels, bed and breakfast accommodation or short 
life council properties (usually decaying, sub-standard tenements and 
houses due for demolition). Confronted with the question ’why do battered 
women put up with the violence?' activists were very likely to point to 
these realities and scoff at the idea that such women had any choice. Erin 
Pizzey reiterated the point in Scream Quietly:
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As for the reaction, 'A lot of them like it', I've never 
met anyone who experiences this sort of violence - a 
broken jaw or a fractured spine - and wants to stay 
with it. No one wants to pay that price for a 
m artyr's role. Most often it is a case of like it or 
lump it. That's the Catch-22: if the women put up 
with violence it's assumed they like it. In reality 
they stay and put up with it because they have 
nowhere else to go. Because they stay and put up  
with it they are assumed to like it and so they are 
blocked from finding somewhere else to go. So they 
stay and put up with it and it's assumed they like it. 
Many thousands of women are enclosed inside this 
vicious circle.H
In the years up until 1975 the central preoccupation of the activists 
involved with the cause of battered women was the need for refuge 
provision and, in the longer term, access to proper housing for women who 
needed to leave violent men. Activists, most notably Erin Pizzey, skillfully 
used the channels of communication open to them. The media, in the first 
instance the local Chiswick paper The Brentford and Chiswick Times, and 
later national papers, radio and television, were fed information which was 
eagerly snapped up. A television documentary film about Chiswick 
Women's Aid (made with the help of Pizzey's husband who was, then, a 
television producer) was shown nationally and, while more voluntary help 
was forthcoming, this publicity also guarantied a major increase in the 
number of appeals for help.
At this time there was some agitation by officials in statutory agencies 
about the need to 'study the problem' in order to determine its extent and 
the demand for such services. The activists attitude to this response was 
that the refuges themselves were evidence of the demand. They noted 
that "courage fearlessness and a healthy disregard for bureaucracy are 
obviously needed to set up a Woman's Aid Centre for battered wives." 
(Spare Rib No. 24, June 1974) The women involved in the movement were
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inclined to view local authorities1 responses as a delaying tactic typical of 
the attitudes they expected from representatives of the State. After all, 
when individual women victims of male violence went to the DHSS, or the 
local housing officer, or social worker or police officer they were 'referred 
on', told 'its not our job' and asked to wait until something could be done. 
The activists did not expect anything different when they approached the 
State collectively. In Manchester a local group squatted a refuge. This was 
done in cooperation with the local radio and television networks. This 
demonstration succeeded in gaining a promise of a permanent house from 
the director of social services in front of television cameras. (Spare Rib No, 
24, June 1974). Erin Pizzey advised delegates at a conference sponsored 
by Chiswick Women's Aid held at South Bank Polytechnic in South London 
to "choose a nice house, preferably belonging to the council, move in with 
battered mothers and children; they most certainly can't turn you out - 
ring us if they try."
Of course, women involved in the movement did not limit themselves 
to these guerilla tactics. They also sought to lobby Parliament and a 
dossier of cases involving violence against wives was publicly handed to 
the Prime Minister. This was followed by a series of questions in the House 
to various senior government members.12 Some of the questions were 
directed towards the various recourses available to the women concerned. 
Such a line of enquiry was welcomed by the refuge activists because, at 
least according to their logic, that directly led to a discussion of the need 
for more refuges. Other questions were asked, however, which were not 
welcomed so enthusiastically, questions to do with the 'prevalence of the 
problem'.
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At this time there was no question of being able to give any accurate 
estimate of the extent of the problem. For example, an analysis of demand 
on police resources was reported in New Society in 1973. Punch and 
Naylor analysed telephone calls to the police in three Essex towns over a 
fortnight. Of some 980 calls, 11% involved domestic disputes. However, 
there was no way of determining how many of these calls involved 
assaults and there was some question as to how many of these calls would 
represent serious instances of violence by husbands on wives. (New 
Society, May 17 1973: 358) Matrimonial Courts data were also considered 
to be unreliable because the general categories of 'cruelty' and 
'unreasonable behaviour' were deemed to cover too wide a range of 
behaviour to be considered valid measures of the incidents of wife 
battering relationships.13 Not surprisingly the need to delay the 
introduction of measures to address the problem of battered wives until an 
accurate estimation of the prevalence of the problem was made was 
viewed, by refuge activists, as another delaying tactic by the State. Those 
questions in the House did, however, bring social science into the 
discussion of the issue.
The role of Social Science
Social scientists played a limited role in the articulation of the issue at 
this time.14 In the early 1970s there were relatively few women in social 
science involved in issues of practical concern to feminists, and there were 
even fewer men. However, social-scientific investigations were carried 
out, mostly on a fairly small scale. The work of social scientists at the time 
tended to divide up the problem into two distinct questions. The first 
being directed towards what could be accomplished in terms of
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’preventative measures’, counseling and ’reintegration’. This line of 
questioning was given priority over the second which involved questions 
about what to do when the relationship had clearly ended.15
Six general areas were identified as in need of an overhaul in order to 
improve the official provision of services by statutory agencies.16
1) Improve the level of provision. This amounts to 
'm ore of the same', but it was argued th a t a 
considerable increase in the num bers of social 
w orkers, m arriage g u id an c e  c o u n s e llo rs , 
psychiatrists and others was needed to allow more 
time to deal with case loads.
2) Improve the formal liaison between agencies 
involved. It was pointed out that there were many 
agencies to which women in battering situations 
would tu rn  and that these did not n e c e ssa r ily  
operate in the same way. This meant that the roles 
of different agencies concerned may lead them to 
seek to resolve the problem in diametrically opposed 
ways. A parallel was drawn with the tensions 
between doctors, social workers, and police dealing 
with cases of battered children.
3) Broaden the functions of some of the agencies 
involved. Suggestions were made that the police 
recognize their 'social service role' Suggestions 
were also made that casualty departm ents in 
hospitals should probe the source of injuries, 
including the background suicide attem pts and 
should make more positive steps to link 'su spect 
cases' with social work su p p o rt. It was 
acknowledged that suggestions like these challenge 
the trad itional agency functions and  c o u l d  
consequently evoke a negative and conservative 
response.
4) The provision of new forms of organization were 
also put forward. Suggestions for a new 'family 
court' to rationalize the different ju r is d ic tio n s  
dealing with the family and its problems and to 
simplify their diverse powers and limitations were 
made. It was also suggested that the DHSS m ight 
establish an 'interdisciplinary team ' dealing with 
preparation for parenthood which could develop 
programs on child and wife abuse.
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5) Improvement of m aterial provision for women 
who have to leave violent men. It was recognized 
that housing was of central importance. At the same 
time it was felt that prioritizing the housing needs 
of battered women would create a problem because 
they are only one group competing for scarce 
housing resources. The implication was that more 
housing would have to be provided, but no programs 
were ever officially begun.
6) Provision of financial support, which was linked 
with the need for housing provision. One concrete 
p roposal was the  G uaran tied  M aintenance 
Allowance, in which the collection of maintenance 
from the batterer would be carried on by the state, 
thus the default or inability to pay would not lessen 
the provision for the woman and children forced to 
flee a battering situation. However, it was pointed 
out that men who batter often suffer from severe 
problem s of th e ir  own, inc lud ing  alcohol 
dependence and /o r mental health problems. Since 
financial provision for battered women was linked 
to the need for consideration of response to the 
'other parties involved' such proposals did not get 
very far.
Erin Pizzey had offered a critique of the services available through 
existing agencies in Scream Quietly. Social services, the police, social 
security, the hospitals, mental hospitals, doctors, marriage guidance 
counsellors, the probation service and health visitors all came under her . 
guns and none did too well. The broader women's movement was also 
largely unimpressed with efforts made by state agencies in those early 
days. Feminists talked about 'battered wives'. They had a simple answer 
to the question what is to be done? That answer was: 'build more women's 
refuges'. As we have seen, they had developed tactics, some of them 
confrontational, to implement this strategy. Social scientific research 
carried out within the confines of psychological paradigms or social 
administrative discourses did not have one single analytical category; 
'battered spouses', 'violent relationships' 'pathological personalities' and
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many others were put forward as competing explanations. However, 
regardless of the category of explanation employed, social scientific 
discourse aimed, primarily, at ’reintegration' and 'prevention', that is: the 
maintenance of what feminists defined as 'the patriarchial family unit'.
In the middle of the decade the first real twists in the history of the 
debate about domestic violence took place. This was the year that a split 
in the refuge movement came to the surface. It is also the year that 
central Government really became involved in the issue. The Report of the 
Select Committee on Violence in the Family, produced in that year, set the 
stage for new legislation in 1976 and 1978. From this time forward 
violence against wives is no longer the virtually exclusive realm of an 
apparently united Women's movement. New ways of talking about the 
violence began to come into the public sphere. Some of these new 
'languages' came from unexpected sources and the contest for meaning 
reached new heights.
The Split in the refuge movement
and its consequences
The most significant change of 1975 was the split that occurred in the 
refuge movement. It is difficult to reconstruct this historical moment, 
even now some fifteen years later there are gaps in the record which have 
not been unearthed. What is certain is that the movement developed 
nationally throughout 1974-75. Over 25 Women's Aid groups were 
represented at the first national meeting in London in the spring of 1974. 
By the time of the second meeting in 1975, 82 groups had been 
established, with 25 refuges.17 At these meetings the activists were
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attempting to forge an institutional base from which to further their goals 
but as they got closer to formalizing a structure it became evident that 
consensus was impossible to achieve.
The first meeting in 1974 was a successful media event but very little 
business was actually discussed. The second conference, held in the 
Congregational Church Hall in Chiswick, London on the first and second of 
February 1975 was a more business-like affair. Representatives from all 
over England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland met together at the Hall at 10:30 
on that Saturday morning. Most were women, but there were also five or 
six men from various support groups. At the time it was reported that 
"there was an agenda prepared, with suggestions for workshops and 
representatives joined whichever group most interested them in one of the 
small rooms or comers available."(Spare Rib No. 34, April 1975) The items 
discussed in these small groups included the problem of battling with local 
authorities for recognition. The report of the meetings in Spare Rib makes 
it clear that the activists did not generally regard representatives of local 
government as supportive of their efforts. But, the discussion was not 
limited to complaints of getting short shrift by the Town Halls. There was 
also talk on a number of practical issues including counselling techniques 
for helping husbands change their behaviour. Activists were also 
interested in finding out how to form legal housing associations as a means 
of overcoming the accommodation shortage. The main event, however, 
came on the second day.
Sunday was spent in plenary session. There was only one issue to 
discuss; the structure of the organization. The question of a role for a 
National Coordinator was discussed first and it was agreed that all groups 
were part of a ’National Women's Aid Movement' and that a 'National
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Coordinator’ was needed. In principle it was agreed that an office with a 
central management was needed to disseminate information between 
groups, to concentrate pressure on a national level on the DHSS and other 
organs of the central government and to coordinate Urban Aid grant 
applications. However, the details of the organization could not be worked 
out on the day. Instead, it was decided to convene a further conference of 
delegates, one from each of the 83 groups in existence, to meet in 
Manchester in March 1975, as an assessment committee to discuss the 
position of National Coordinator, put up nominations, discuss funding and 
hear reports.
It is here that the record becomes patchy. It is certain that the 
general philosophy of the movement was guided by the principles of the 
Women's Movement more generally. The federation was conceived to be 
broadly based, with egalitarian and diffuse forms of work and 
organization. Autonomy for local groups was a central aspect of this 
organizational approach. Emphasis on local power within a non- 
hierarchical political form was perceived to be the best way of 
emphasizing the experiences of women. There was an explicit ideological 
conviction that connected the notion of 'hierarchy' with the notion of 
'patriarchy'. Certainly, the activists came by their dislike of hierarchy 
honestly, they had seen at first hand how individuals could be shunted 
around between offices in the labyrinth of the hierarchical State. Such 
experiences could only foster an anti-State sentiment. However, this was 
not articulated in anarchist terms, rather, it was described in the terms of 
feminism, hence the connection between 'State' and 'Patriarchy'.
It is likely that Erin Pizzey, by virtue of the fact that she was so 
personally visible at the national level, fought and lost a political battle on
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this issue. She was described, a decade later, as "a combative and  
articulate character, an inspired egoist who moved mountains by somehow 
seeming more mountainous herself."18 It may simply be that the majority 
of those present decided to raise the mountain to afford a view of the foot­
hills. Erin Pizzey was too visible and much too personally powerful, for 
activists who believed in non-hierarchical organization and 'consensus1 (or, 
perhaps, 'democratic') decision making to verify as National Coordinator. 
What ever the reason, Pizzey was not affirmed National Coordinator. In 
rejecting her for that position the battered women's movement was 
fractured.
Pizzey counter-attacked swiftly. In the aftermath of the conference 
she wrote to local authorities advising them to scrutinize all applications 
for grant aid from groups wishing to set up new refuges, in case they 
propagated 'women's liberationist ideals'.19 This is somewhat ironic given 
that only ten months previously she had been advocating just these ideals, 
including those of collective decision making and militant action like 
squatting refuges. In fact she had called herself a feminist on the very 
first page of Scream Quietly. Feminist or not, Pizzey piloted Chiswick 
Women's Aid off in its own direction and the majority of the other refuges, 
under the banner of the National Women's Aid Federation, were left 
without their most recognizable spokesperson.
Up until that time Pizzey had been the most visible personage in the 
struggle on behalf of battered wives. Her name was synonymous with the 
refuge movement. She was one of its most successful fund raisers and 
certainly one of the most seasoned organizers. To the public of the time, 
Pizzey provided a 'face' for the movement. The basic batdes to establish 
more refuge provision still had to be carried on after the split. Women's
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refuges continued to be established, but the heady days of the Movement 
were gone, what was left was a battle on all fronts; against local 
government, the DHSS, and central government. The National Women's Aid 
Federation was still dedicated to creating living space for women who 
needed to leave violent men and the skirmishes they engaged in centred 
almost solely around attempts to establish new refuges. However, they 
were, by this time, losing favour with the media.20
To take a particular example, on March 15th 1976 the Grimsby 
Borough Council voted to evict women from a house they had set up as a 
centre for battered women (Spare Rib No. 46, May 1976) The council 
argued that they could not support anything 'illegal', the group had 
squatted the house and an example had to be made of them. Refuge 
activists had been discussing the possibility of starting a refuge with the 
council for two years before it had come to this confrontation. Grimsby 
Borough Council had been approached in 1974 about providing premises 
for a battered women's centre. They had agreed at the time that there was 
a need for such a facility but stated that it was not the responsibility of the 
Borough Housing Committee and suggested that the matter be pursued 
through the local social services. Instead the women's organizers went a 
step further and approached the council in Cleethorpes, the adjoining town. 
A joint meeting including Grimsby Council and the local Social Services was 
set up at which all of the officials acknowledged the need for such a 
service. However, only Cleethorpes Council agreed to take any 
responsibility.
After some time a house, 383 Grimsby Rd., Cleethorpes, was suggested 
as a centre. The building had been standing empty for nine years and the 
council had bought it five years previously. The Housing Committee
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supported the choice, but the full council turned it down. The women's 
group and its supporters met on February 8th, 1976 and decided to take 
matters into their own hands. At eight o'clock in the morning the next day 
group members occupied the house The ensuing fight between the 
activists and the council lasted one month. But the issue being fought over 
had changed subtly, it was not about the need for a refuge, or where a 
refuge should be or, indeed anything to do with battered women. After 
two years of arguing with councillors, who agreed in principle that a refuge 
was needed but could never agree to offer the necessary resources, the 
activists had taken direct action and the issue, as far as councillors were 
concerned, became the illegal occupation of council property. During the 
early weeks of March sympathetic councillors went to the centre to 'plead' 
with the women to give up the occupation so that they could argue the 
case more strongly in council. The occupiers turned a deaf ear to the 
pleading, after all the women had been waiting since 1974 for local 
government to 'come up with the goods'. A petition with 1,700 signatures 
was presented to the Mayor of Cleethorpes, but the effort was in vain and 
on March 15th a Possession Order was implemented, ending the 
occupation.
However, the years following 1975 were not without success for the 
activists. The Report of the National Women's Aid Federation at the end of 
1977 stated that there were "98 Women's Aid Groups of which 88 have at 
least one house." NWAF had tripled its resources in two years and if the 
resources of the independent refuges are included in the figuring, 
provision for women who needed to leave violent men had quadrupled 
nationally. The period is full of stories that illustrate the slow progress of 
expanding refuge provision.
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For example, there is the story of the establishment of a refuge in 
Canterbury. (NAWF Report Dec., 1977) A large house had been squatted in 
1975. Originally in the hands of the Official Receiver, the occupiers 
originally made an effort to obtain a License to Occupy which failed. The 
second effort to gain rights of occupation was to purchase the house 
outright, to this end £3,500 was raised over one year. Unfortunately, for 
the activists, the house was bought over their heads and they were evicted 
in November of 1976.
In order to put pressure on the council to come up with an alternative 
property, the activists refused to run down the numbers of women housed 
in the shelter. The new house provided was much smaller than the 
original and the activists began to raise the necessary £30,000 needed to 
buy a house outright, rather than remaining dependant on the local state. 
It was apparent to the organizers in Canterbury that they had less than 
total commitment from local officials but they did have some success on 
other fronts. During this same period Kent County Council provided two 
small houses, for which rent had to be paid, to be used as half-way 
accommodation. By national standards Canterbury had accumulated quite 
extensive facilities.
Setting up a network of tangible support for victims was a modest 
success in Canterbury, not so in Guildford.21 There women had been 
legally offered a squat, keys and all. A small four bedroom house with no 
bathroom, cold water only and an outside toilet was established as a 
women's refuge. The occupiers were 'unofficially' allowed to stay there 
until the house was needed for re-development, which was to be only a 
matter of months. There the activists took the decision to do everything in 
a legal manner in order to strengthen their position when it came time to
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negotiate for a permanent refuge. The police, gas board and other relevant 
agencies were informed of the establishment of the shelter. In their report 
they stated that:
One reason for telling the council you’re squatting 
is that if you're evicted you can get (if you play your 
cards right) good press publicity.22
The activists reported that their brief occupation of the refuge was 
marked by harassment from hidden enemies. On two occasions council 
workmen 'accidentally' boarded up the house. Embarrassed councillors 
explained that it was routine for workmen seeing an empty council house 
to board it up. The shelter's occupants were dubious and asked how this 
could happen twice when possessions were obviously lying around the 
premises.
Before this harassment became an issue of central concern the 
Guildford refuge was moved to different premises. The house they 
squatted was ideal for a refuge, three stories high with two kitchens and 
ample facilities. It was the property of the Charity Commission, the 
borough councillors being trustees, with a covenant to be used for the 
benefit of the children of the borough. Previously it had been used as a 
probation centre and at the time there were plans to rent it out as office 
space. The council estimated getting about £7,000 per annum. Refuge 
activists pointed out that money gained from previous renting had not 
been used for children of the borough and felt justified their own 
occupation of the house. Their point was that a women's refuge perfectly 
matched the conditions of the covenant.
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The battle for possession began immediately. A housing official came 
around on the first day of occupation (a Sunday) arguing that the occupiers 
were taking bread from the mouths of children. Despite sympathetic press 
coverage (there were four editorials in local papers advocating that the 
occupiers should be given possession) the local council was extremely 
hostile. Again the issue was not providing resources for victims, everyone 
agreed to this in principle, the issue was the 'irresponsible attitude of the 
Women's Aid group' in illegally occupying council run property. According 
to the NWAF report councillors were particularly incensed because the 
occupiers had chosen such a good house.
It was explained to the occupying refuge activists by a council solicitor 
that, in order to placate angry councillors, he was putting an eviction order 
in motion, but that it would not necessarily come to the occupiers being 
thrown out. The eviction order was not an idle threat. In the eleventh 
hour the activists organized a campaign to halt the eviction, but it went 
ahead, with national press coverage. All that was salvaged was some 
promise from the council for help in housing the nine women and twenty 
one children in the refuge at the time. To add insult to injury, the house 
remained empty afterwards until the decision, some six months later, to 
carve up the house into flats.
What these accounts from the time reveal is that, having identified 
beaten wives as a political and social issue, feminist activists set about 
trying to develop a response to the perceived needs of the victims. In 
conditions of chronic housing shortage the single most important need was 
perceived to be refuge facilities. Activists formulated a response to wife 
battery predicated on the assumption that they would be able to provide 
living space for battered wives and their children. In this they came into
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contact with local housing officials who were the state representatives in 
charge of housing allocation. Accounts of attempts to establish refuges 
indicate that these officials were not as cooperative with these efforts as 
they could have been. The apparent reluctance of officials to act prompted 
’direct action' by many activists, meaning that they occupied council 
property, in many cases illegally. Activists felt justified in doing so in 
many cases because the property that they occupied had been vacant, 
sometimes for considerable periods. They became increasingly embittered 
by the lack of action by the local state and viewed pronouncements to 
consider action with increasing suspicion. When local government officials 
and activists met talons locked. The dynamic they were trapped in could 
only be a vicious downward spiral.
The split in the refuge movement followed by the consolidation of the 
Women's Aid Federation seems to be accompanied by a reversal of 
perception of the issues in the media. The independent refuges, of which 
Chiswick was (and still is) the most well established, continued to play 
their part in providing a service to women victims of violent men. But, 
aside from the libellous attacks made by Pizzey against the WAFE, the 
voice of Chiswick was somewhat muted. The activities of the WAFE 
continually brought them into conflict with local government and the 
media generally seems to have been growing progressively less inclined to 
paint a positive picture of the activists' struggle. Meanwhile, central 
government was beginning to move on the issue.
The Select Committee Report
The broad discourse of feminism was beginning to have some 
considerable effect by the mid-1970s. The pressure that the refuge
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movement was placing on local government was intensified by national 
press coverage and these combined to pressurize central government. 
During the period when the refuge movement was fighting to expand its 
service and waging its internal ideological battles central government was 
preparing its own response to the issue. This emerged in the form of the 
Report of the Select Committee on Violence in the Family. The committee 
drew on the views of many interested individuals and institutions. 
Representatives of battered women (some victims of male violence 
themselves), the legal profession, the police, the DHSS, the medical 
profession, psychologists, sociologists all contributed to the discussion. Not 
all of this discussion fit in well with the views of the women’s movement. 
For example the testimony of a number of physicians was directly 
contradictory:
I think there are occasions in certain levels of 
society in which the woman is prepared to take a 
fairly regular black eye and looks upon it as a kind 
of evidence of virility in her husband. (Select 
Committee on Violence in Marriage 1975: 209)
I think we have also got to recognize in many of 
these families there is a sado-masochistic sort of 
polarization. (Select Committee on Violence in 
Marriage 1975: 173)
This kind of formulation of the problem, usually typified by the notion 
of 'family violence', is at odds with the formulation of activists in the 
refuge movement. There was, and continues to be, a tendency among 
these professionals to comprehend the violence as fights between 
individuals, often pathologising it. Health care professionals, and indeed 
many other professionals who come into contact with such violence, tend 
to regard the violence as fights between man and wife, as a purely
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personal thing between two people. Accordingly, what they do in their 
own home is their business and if they want to beat each other up it is also 
their business. Given the view that the violence is purely personal, and 
pathological, there is little that these professionals feel that they can do.
The committee did hear evidence from 'battered women' as well and 
this stood in stark contrast to the evidence of these professionals. For 
example 'Mrs. Z' recounted being stripped naked and beaten with a wet 
towel by her husband and his friends. When asked 'had she ever been 
raped?' she replied:
No I had to give in to what they wanted because I 
was so scared (Select Committee 1975: 25)
While feminists were trying to argue that forced sexual intercourse 
was an integral part of wife abuse which involved the use of coercive 
power by men on women bound in a patriarchal, monogamous and 
heterosexual relationship, men from the medical profession were using a 
different conceptualization which personalized the conflict.
The police were also canvassed for their views on the issue and, again, 
their conceptualization was at odds with the feminist analysis. The police 
also tended to personalize the violence. Evidence submitted by the 
Metropolitan Police Department stated that:
Whereas it is a general principle of police practice 
not to intervene in a situation which existed or had 
existed between husband and wife in the course of 
which the wife had suffered some personal attack, 
any assault upon a wife by her husband wh i c h  
amounted to physical injury of a serious nature is a 
criminal offence which it is the duty of the police to 
follow up and prosecute. (Select Committee 1975)
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In general the police regarded violence between husband and wife in 
the same way that the medical profession did, that is as fights between 
individuals. They were seemingly incapable of seeing the problem in the 
same way that feminists did; as a problem of structured asymmetries of 
power. The police understanding also involved the distinction between a 
'criminal' assault, which involved a high degree of injury and a simple 
'offence' which may involve a degree of injury but basically boils down to 
a matter between two persons, one of whom may elect to take the matter 
to court.
Some recommendations came out of the Committee Report that 
pertained directly to policing practices. Chief Constables were to:
review their policies about the police approach to 
domestic violence. Special instructions about this 
difficult and and delicate subject should be given to 
all new recruits, and regular w ritten guidance 
should be issued by the Chief Constable in the form 
of advisory leaflets. (Select Committee 1975)
However, such a suggestion could not be forced upon the police due to 
the traditional understanding that each chief police officer is independent 
with regard to operational matters.
Recommendations by the Committee resulted in few changes in 
operational policing.23 However, one small in-house project was initiated 
by the Bedfordshire police. This is important, because up until that point 
the documentary evidence from Britain does not show any concerted 
interest in the policing of violence against wives. Certainly feminists had 
pointed out what they saw as the callous attitude of police officers 
attending to calls concerning women victims of violent men. However, 
feminists had not put any organizational effort into lobbying for changes in
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police practice. It is not until the publication of the Select Committee 
Report that the documentation shows any such interest in altering policing 
practices.
The Bedfordshire Police monitored reported cases of domestic violence 
from February 1 to July 31, 1976. This was the first time in the history of 
British policing that the operational tactics employed in responding to 
violence against wives was ever explicitly considered. The investigation 
followed police accounting procedures and determined that, over the 
period of the study, 228 calls for assistance were made resulting in 104 
arrests (36%). The remaining cases were dropped because the victim did 
not wish to press charges. It seemed only reasonable to conclude that 
arrest should not be pursued when the victim did not wish to press 
charges herself and police remained largely uninterested in assessing their 
own role in dealing with the violence. The police were to remain 
impervious to criticism and intractable in their practices until the middle 
of the 1980s.
The Select Committee's Report did, however, affect policing practice in 
one way. The Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act (1976) 
and the Domestic Proceeding and Magistrate's Court Act (1978) were two 
pieces of legislation which passed as a result of the Report. The Committee 
had paid special attention to the law as it related to wife abuse. In the 
course of the investigation it had been determined that both the civil and 
the criminal law contained substantial faults. It was perceived that the 
Offences Against the Person Act (1861) contained the necessary legal 
powers to start criminal proceedings against men who assaulted their 
wives, but that these were seldom used. (Select Committee, 1975: 380)
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The Civil Law, as it related to battered women, was also found to have 
practical difficulties. Two types of injunction were available: non­
molestation orders (which prohibited pestering or the use of violence 
against the applicant) and exclusion injunctions (which, if granted, 
effectively allowed sole occupancy). However, these could be obtained 
only if related procedures, such as divorce or judicial separation, were 
already being proceeded with. In addition, these orders could only be 
enforced by court bailiffs who only worked regular office hours.
Recognizing that an improvement in the law could be of material 
assistance to the victims of domestic violence, the committee 
recommended that:
If the criminal law of assault could be m ore 
uniformly applied to domestic assault there seems 
little doubt that it would give more protection to the 
battered wife. If the enforcement of civil law could 
be made more satisfactory, a man who had beaten 
his wife once might well be prevented  from  
repeating his crime.(Select Committee, 1975: xvi)
In addition, the Finer Report, another Parliamentary report issued in 
the same year concerning itself with one-parent families, recommended 
that changes in the Civil Law brought about by new legislation represented 
the most appropriate way for women victims of violent men to secure long 
term housing.24
Consideration by Central Government gave the issue of battered 
women over to the higher reaches of the criminal justice system. Although 
there were some suggestions that innovations in police procedures should 
be sought the resulting efforts did not amount to a great deal. The issue 
was more easily translated into the language of the civil law, however, and 
this did affect police practice. It also affected the WAFE and individuals
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dealing with the violence on a more personal level. It is worth looking, 
briefly, at the nature of the debate as it was conducted on the terrain of 
the civil law.
The application of civil law
The resulting legislation looked very promising on paper. However, it 
has been noted that "following the introduction of any new statute there is 
a process of interpretation by the judiciary when the intentions of the 
legislators and the compatibility of the provision of the new legislation to 
existing precedents are established."25 The 1976 legislation permitted any 
county court to make orders:
a) restraining the respondent from molesting the 
applicant or a child living with the applicant;
b) excluding him from the home or a specified area 
in which the home is situated; or
c) ordering the respondent to allow the applicant 
back into the home (DVA, s. 1 {1})
The law was liberalizing in one respect in particular. It extended the 
legislation to include people cohabiting but not married. In addition, 
Section 2 included a novel provision. It allowed judges to attach a power 
of arrest to any order. This could be done when it was shown that the 
respondent had caused actual bodily harm to the applicant or children and 
it was considered likely that he may do so again. When attached the 
power of arrest did not compel officers to arrest in instances where there 
was a breach of an injunction, opting for much softer wording stating that 
police officers may arrest. The wording of this section produced particular 
concern. It was felt that increasing police involvement in domestic
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violence would overburden already stretched resources and, further, there 
was uncertainty about whether it was proper for police to be involved in 
such cases.26
Resistance to the implications of this legislation was evident over the 
following years, particularly in the context of limiting the availability of 
ouster injunctions. For example, in the case of Elsworth vs. Elsworth in 
1979 the fundamental question of whether it was really necessary for 
either party to leave was raised. Further, in the case of Walker vs. Walker 
(1978) it was asked, if yes, who should it be? These decisions make it 
evident that the courts were concerned to find a way of 'reintegrating1 the 
estranged couples if at all possible.
Despite the fact that there was provision for injunctions to be issued 
without the presence of respondents in court the judiciary were extremely 
wary of granting them in such circumstances. In the appeal of Masich vs 
Masich (1977), the presiding Judge, Lord Justice Sir Roger Ormrod, went so 
far as to remind solicitors that such applications were an abuse of the 
process of the court and that such applicants could, in future, find 
themselves liable for court costs. He later argued, when hearing Ansah vs. 
Ansah that all such applications "should only be made in an emergency 
when the interests of justice or the protection of an applicant or child 
clearly demands immediate intervention. Such cases are extremely rare 
since any urgent application can be heard on two days notice on either 
side." (Ansah vs. Ansah 1977)
In addition, these injunctions were defined by judges as only a short 
term solution. This meant that any injunction granted lasted only three 
months. The origin of this interpretation is that ouster injunctions do not 
alter property rights and they were not allowed to interfere with them.
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This was argued by Lord Salmon in the case of Davis vs. Johnson (1978). 
He stated that it was difficult to imagine "that it could ever be fair, save in 
the most exceptional of circumstances, to keep a man out of his own flat or 
house for more than a few months."27
Juridical interpretation limited the applications of injunctions in 
another way as well. Lord Justice Ormrod argued in the case of Spindlow 
vs Spindlow (1979) that decisions were to be made in the best interests of 
the children and that this may, in rare circumstances, effect property 
rights. A year later in the case of Harding vs. Harding he stated that "it is 
the primary responsibility in these cases to ensure that the child or 
children have the best home that the two adults can provide and the 
interests of the adults must take second place to the interests of the child." 
(Harding vs. Harding 1980)
Laying out some of the case history of the application of this 
legislation is a very abstract exercise. The literature that grew up around 
the implications, uses and abuses of this legislation, especially within the 
discipline of law, is immense. In many ways it deserves explicit 
consideration on its own, but this is beyond the boundaries of this thesis. 
Reaction to the application of this legislation by academics can be 
documented.28 What follows is a brief review of this discussion.
Three distinct positions can be identified when this literature is 
examined. The first of these identified the law as only one of many social 
services that battered wives may turn to for assistance. As such it was felt 
that the law should be made as ’efficacious as possible' for the victims of 
violence within the home.29 It was suggested that this efficaciousness 
depends as much on judicial discretion as it does on careful wording of the 
law. In such cases victim's definitions of what is 'unacceptable violence'
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should take priority and legal action should stem from victims’ accounts, 
feelings and needs.30 According to this view the law is not seen as a 
panacea:
Legal compulsion, through court orders or prison 
sentences, will not solve the problem which has 
caused the violence in the first place, nor may it 
even p reven t fu rth er m anifestations of t h e  
violence. Indeed it may in fact, as has been amply 
documented, only exacerbate the woman's situation 
and lead to further violence against her for having 
sought legal help, a factor which may explain only 
too well her reluctance to pursue a legal rem ed y  
which she had already initiated.31
The limitations of legal practice were the starting point for this line of 
reasoning. Legal resources were to be devised and utilized to provide a 
satisfactory service to the user as part of a wider response by other 
interested agencies. The passing of the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial 
Proceedings Act (1976) and the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates 
Court Act (1978) was seen by some as an improvement in the legal 
provision for battered women. However, it was also felt that the law . 
needed simplifying:
To this end there is a need for a system of family 
courts. The many recommendations for a system 
have so far gone unheeded. Such a system would be 
as informal as possible and would have a greater 
chance of emphasizing the social problems which 
lie behind domestic disputes, including cases o f 
dom estic violence and provide the necessary 
welfare and advisory service from social workers as 
well as an improved legal service. The courts would 
exercise both civil and criminal jurisdiction so th a t 
the appropriate  remedy in each case could be 
considered within one system.3 2
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The possibility of a Family Court is also the key to the second line of 
reasoning regarding legal intervention in cases of domestic violence. The 
Finer Report was presented to Parliament in July 1974. This report was an 
investigation of one parent families and their relationship with the legal 
system. The second line of consideration does not emphasize women’s 
views of the violence in the way that those arguing for ’efficaciousness’ 
did. Rather, the Family Court was conceived by some to be a treatment 
centre for sick marriages:
What is wanted in a progressive society is not only a 
mortuary for dead marriages but a creative hospital 
service for sick marriages and even a preventive 
service that may help to eliminate the trouble at the 
start just as inoculation has largely rid us of 
diphtheria.33
We can see two separate questions being asked here. The first is an 
attempt to utilize the civil law and services available through other 
statutory agencies and voluntary bodies to meet the needs of women who 
clearly need to escape from violent marriages. The second seeks to 
resuscitate families which have been broken down by violence, and sees 
efforts by the State as aimed at providing preventative and remedial 
measures.
The relationship between violence against women and the legislative 
innovations of the mid-seventies was formulated for the third time a 
decade later. The argument by this time was that, not only were the new 
legal interventions not a panacea they were an 'ideological mask' which hid 
the underlying power relations of a male dominated society.34 By the time 
that this analysis was formulated the limitations placed by Judges on how 
this legislation was used were very clearly in evidence. At the turn of the 
decade it seemed that the DVMA (1976) and the DPMCA (1978), together
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wit±L the Housing and Homeless Persons Act (1977) did not provide a 
viable route to permanent housing for most women.35
The legal innovations of the mid-seventies took the issue of ’domestic 
violence' onto the terrain of the civil courts. They did not provide an 
'instant fix' for women victimized by their intimate male partners. Indeed, 
it seemed that in the hands of judges and legal professionals the problem 
was more likely to be seen in terms of how to 'reintegrate' families rather 
than in terms of how to provide housing and other necessary services to 
women forced to leave their homes by violent men. These innovations in 
legal discourse were put on the books at roughly the same time that the 
refuge movement split. The statutes were being tested in the courts over 
the same period that activists were occupying disused council dwellings. 
Altogether there was a great deal of dust and confusion but, at the end of 
the decade, several social scientists were poised to make major 
contributions to the discussion. Perhaps this would clarify what needed to 
be done. In Britain the most important contributions, that is the most 
thorough, scholarly and widely read, were to come from an avowedly 
'feminist' perspective.
British Social Science and Feminism
at the end of the decade
At the end of the 1970s social scientists in Britain began to contribute 
to the public discussion on violence against wives in earnest. There is no 
doubt the people carrying out the analysis referred to themselves as 
'feminist'. The title and dedication of Rebecca and Russel Dobash's book on 
the subject attests to this. Its full title was: 'Violence Against Wives; A 
Case Against Patriarchy'; and it was dedicated to "all women who struggle
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individually and collectively against the violence and oppression from 
which they suffer." In the same period the Women's Aid Federation of 
England, with cooperation from the Department of Environment, also 
published a study of refuges and housing provision for battered women 
entitled 'Leaving Violent Men'.
The latter book elaborated the themes already well established 
amongst refuge activists; the need for more and better refuges and the 
long term housing needs of women who need to leave violent men. By this 
time this political strategy had a history of nearly a decade. However, 
Binney, Harkell and Nixon's study was an important contribution because it 
made the case in terms accepted as legitimate by social science, rather 
than the anecdotal and impressionistic manner in which refuge activists 
had previously made their case. This research report was drawn up in the 
traditional social science form, with details of sample selection, 
representativeness, interview schedules, graphs and tables. The concern 
was almost entirely with women's housing needs and the involvement of 
statutory agencies in catering to them. One set of questions were asked of 
women's experiences of the police which showed a very low level (64% of 
the sample deemed it not useful) of satisfaction with police intervention.
Most of the findings and recommendations centered around refuge 
provision for emergency accommodation and housing provision for the 
longer term. According to the study the number of refuges in England 
stood at about 150 at this time. These accommodated an estimated 11,400 
women and 20,850 children per annum. At any given time approximately 
900 women and 1700 children were housed in these emergency shelters. 
It was pointed out that the amount of refuge space available at the time 
(1978) was one sixth the level recommended by the Select Committee
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Report. Funding was seen to be a problem, with too few refuges existing 
on too little money. It was felt that the refuges had demonstrated the 
need for continued service and the recommendation was that new and 
more permanent funding arrangements should be arrived at. Long term 
housing needs were also assessed and it was determined that women 
suffering violence in the home who had need of refuge provision would go 
on to need permanent housing of their own. The survey showed that 43% 
of applications to councils for housing for battered women had been 
refused and where they had been accepted, long delays and further 
obstacles confronted women before they were rehoused. Only 44% of 
women leaving refuges were moved to Council property although twice 
that number had applied.36
This particular research, which was begun in 1978 and not published 
until 1981 reiterates the points made by feminists active in the refuge 
movement from its inception. It was aimed at legitimating the strategy 
embarked upon by the women at Chiswick at the beginning of the decade 
and went a long way to establish the need for better and more refuges as 
well as raising the issue of the long term housing needs of women who 
needed to leave the men who batter them. In this way there is nothing 
new here. However, it was also one of the first attempts to articulate these 
concerns using social scientific terminology and in this respect it is a new 
development.
More powerful still was the 'case against patriarchy', articulated by 
Rebecca and Russel Dobash. Social science had intervened very 
dramatically during this period in the United States, as we shall see in the 
next chapter, but none of it had the analytical depth of the Dobashs' work. 
By the end of the 1970s a plethora of opinions on wife beating had
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emerged. The most prevalent way of thinking about the issue still dealt 
with it as a purely individual problem. The Dobash's work placed 
battering firmly within the context of the unequal power relationship 
between men and women bounded by matrimony and the expectations of 
a monogamous and heterosexual relationship. In this sense it is a 
’feminist1 work.
'Violence Against Wives' examined the experiences of one hundred 
battered women in Scotland. It also concerned itself with the practices of 
'helping agencies’ as well as the entire criminal justice system.37 What 
emerged was a sophisticated understanding of battering. The Dobash's 
research depicts the violence as part of an ongoing process. They are not 
concerned so much with specific incidents, rather they show that violent 
relationships have a history. The interventions of the State, through 
'helping agencies', housing agencies, the police and the the judiciary 
emerge as moments in that history. Slowly and painstakingly the case 
against Patriarchy is built up. The case focuses on the institution of 
marriage, propped up by organs of the State through agencies as diverse as 
the DHSS, the NHS, the police, the courts and local government. The 
analysis shows how these institutions form a self reaffirming chain which 
binds women in unequal power relationships in marriage, relationships all 
too often backed up with naked coercion. That chain is Patriarchy.
The Dobash's work broadened the feminist discourse on domestic 
violence considerably. One of the ways this was done was by gaining the 
cooperation of the police in research on violence within families. What had 
been, up to that point, largely undeveloped criticisms of the police were 
articulated in detail. In the light of their analysis the institution of policing 
was seen unfavorably. The police were merely a part of patriarchy as a
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whole. Their practices were shown to be of very little help to women 
victims of violent men. Indeed, policing practices were revealed as placing 
women at further risk, as actually contributing to the on-going 
victimization of battered wives. They based these claims on an 
examination of over three thousand official records of police interventions. 
Of course they did not limit their examination to the machinations of police 
officers. Other institutions, most notably the 'helping professions', were 
also examined. They too emerged as guilty parties.
'Violence Against Wives' represents the consolidation of the discourse 
begun at the beginning of the decade by refuge activists. In many ways it 
is a reflection of Pizzey’s Scream Quietly in the mirror of social science. 
The key themes of: the massive prevalence of wife battery; details of the 
nature of the attacks; the psychological oppression; the long years that 
victims endure the torture; victims being re-victimized by the helping 
institutions; all are explored within the rubric of social-scientific 
investigation.
At this time in the United States developments in social scientific 
investigation were taking a somewhat different, although no less dramatic, 
turn. That, along with the vagaries of the American refuge movement, is 
the subject of the next chapter.
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You act like you don rt listen 
Whenever I talk to you  
You think that you ought to 
do anything you want to do 
You gotta be crazy baby 
You just gotta be out of your mind 
As long as I'm payin' the bills 
I'm payin' the cost 
I’ll be the boss
B.B. King
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Introduction
The formal establishment of Chiswick Women’s Aid in 1972 marked 
the beginning of a chain of events which were felt just as deeply in the U.S. 
as they were in Great Britain. Discussion of the problem of battered wives, 
and violence against women more generally, was to be international from 
the very beginning. In this chapter I want to discuss some of the 
developments in the American dialogue. Of greatest importance for the 
story is the input of social scientists. American researchers began to 
produce voluminous accounts of the phenomenon very early on in the 
decade, indeed, much more than was the case in the U.K.. While the efforts 
of social scientists were substantial, activity amongst feminist refuge 
activists, professional social workers and professionals in the criminal 
justice system as well as other state agencies was no less in evidence. It is 
necessary to give some indication of all of these developments if the later 
emergence of influential American innovations and strategies for action 
are to be seen in historical perspective.
The emergence of the problem
in the USA
The refuge movement in the U.S. articulated similar concerns to that 
prevalent in the U.K.. There was a distinction made by many American 
activists which involved a radical separation between the State on the one 
hand and 'feminist activists' on the other. Betsy Warrior, one 
spokesperson who emerged for the American refuge movement, said in 
1978 that "if you want to do things the respectable way there's so much 
that you can't do - you can't get a licence for this, you can't do that and if 
you always wait for a legal way you don't have the money for a lawyer.’
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(Spare Rib No. 76 November 1978) However, refuges could not be 
squatted in the United States as they could in Britain. One of the first to be 
established in the U.S. was Transition House which was set up in 
Cambridge Massachusetts. It was established without help from the state 
or the federal government, instead the organizers solicited donations from 
private individuals. This was accomplished by sending mimeographed 
letters to, what was described as, the 'women’s community'. Typical of the 
initial phases of any 'grass-roots' effort the pledges that came in were 
small. It was reported that some people sent only crumpled one dollar 
bills or coupons for free milk, while others donated furniture or old 
clothing. Some had only good will to offer, and letters of encouragement 
were often received and sometimes published also in mimeograph form. 
In this way Transition House managed to scrape together enough money to 
establish itself and an income sufficient to pay its rent without recourse to 
State funding.
However, state agencies were not slow on the uptake and by 1978 
their influence was considerable, if not all encompassing. Some activists 
who had engaged in the movement from its inception viewed this 
negatively. As Warrior explained:
I have heard from groups and individual women in 
many parts of the country, who, on the brink of 
establishing their programmes for battered women, 
or having just received funding, find their w ork  
coming to a standstill through the interference of 
traditional institutions, government agencies o r 
professionals. Though these agencies have shown 
little or no concern for battered women in the past, 
the smell of money is an overpowering incentive 
for them. Often they step in after all the hardest 
work is done and attem pt to place their people in 
positions of control. Another tactic is to obtain 
thousands of dollars in funding to do a "study" to see 
if the problem exists or if a shelter is needed. If this
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money was simply used for a refuge, evidence of the 
need would be quickly demonstrated through use of 
the facility. (Spare Rib No. 76 November 1978)
At least some battered women's advocates were inclined to view the 
participation of state agencies with suspicion.
State bureaucrats and many social scientists were inclined to see 
things differently. It has been explained elsewhere that, as a consequence 
of the emergence of the 'New Deal' as a response by the State to the Great 
Depression, social science had taken on a special role in the U.S.. The 
State's involvement in 'social welfare' activities, principally with regard to 
unemployment, during the depression era marked the advent of applied 
social science in the formulation of public policy.1 In the 1950s American 
policy and politics was further affected by the 'sciences' of psychology and 
sociology. There are many examples of previous projects inspired by 
applied social science. For example, based on such applied research The 
Warren Commission had concluded that the segregation of black and white 
school children detrimentally effected the form er's educational 
development. This led to the decision to desegregate public schools and 
thereby afford equal opportunities to all children. The 1960s reflected a 
broadening of these trends in the application of, what Foucault referred to 
as, the 'soft sciences'. President Kennedy's 'War on Poverty' and the 
establishment of nationwide 'Head Start' programs in first half of that 
decade were the most obvious examples of this.
However, the use of social scientific knowledge was broadened in 
another way during the 1960s. As the decade progressed an emerging 
concern with 'effectiveness' shifted the focus of social scientific 
investigation. The shift meant that it was no longer sufficient to 
implement improvement programs and simply assume that they would
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work. The programmes of the 1960s also had to prove that response 
strategies had achieved pre-established goals. That is to say, not only did 
they have to work, they had to produce results according to cost-benefit 
indices. This was evidenced by President Nixon's Economic Opportunity 
Message to Congress in 1969 in which he cited the results of a 
Westinghouse Learning Corporation evaluation which showed that "the 
long term effect of Head Start appears to be extremely weak."2
It is in this context that the issue of violence against wives emerged, 
from feminist campaigns, as a concern for social science. It is interesting to 
note that the issue of child abuse had become an object for applied social 
science some ten years earlier, but in that instance the issue never entered 
the realm of public debate as a contested matter. Rather, the issue of child 
abuse emerged fully formed onto the public terrain straight from the 
discipline of psychology. As such, the issue was conceived of, from the 
outset, as a problem of individual pathology.
Explicitly feminist articulations of both wife and child abuse 
contributed to the growing realization that violence take its toll on family 
life and even raised some questions about the 'inherently violent nature' of 
the institution. Problems that had previously been seen as confined to the 
realm of the personal and private were put under close public scrutiny. 
Social problems that had emerged during the preceding fifty years and 
which had met with a State response, problems such as poverty and 
discrimination based on race and class, laid the ground for a widespread 
readiness to address yet another problem that had seemingly always been 
there: violence against women.
State agencies advertised their willingness to provide resources on 
which activists in the community could build. According to the perception
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of state officials federal funding could help put in place an infrastructure 
for managing the response to the problem. 'Grass roots' activists did not 
always see this as helpful. Funding changed the nature of the community 
response by professionalizing it. Further, such funding was not guaranteed 
in perpetuity. The worry of battered women's activists was that federal 
funding would lead to the establishment of a costly infrastructure 
dependant on government money. When that source of cash dried up so 
would the refuge network. The conflict between the perceptions of grass 
roots activists and State actors is evident in a letter to the Chairman of the 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (1978) reproduced on the following page in 
full.3
Precisely how much money was channelled into these efforts is 
uncertain. The secondary literature does not contain any figures and the 
records that I have managed to find are too patchy for me to offer an 
estimation. There is no doubt that the American government, through one 
state organ or another, put a significant amount of money and resources 
into dealing with 'battered women and families'. In 1978 the Civil Rights 
Commission Report listed 315 Agencies providing services specifically for 
battered wives. In 1983 another large volume aimed at compiling the sum 
total of services available to battered women, which also included papers 
contributed by some important social scientists working in the area, listed 
approximately 1300 such agencies. It would be a mistake to take these 
comparisons at face value because there is no way to ensure that these two 
lists are exhaustive. However, the fact that the 1983 compendium could 
contain four times more agencies than its counterpart half a decade earlier 
is an indication of substantial growth in the prevalence of institutionalized
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Feb. 3, 1978
Dear Chairman Flemming:
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in the 
Commission's Consultation on Battered Women. I 
believe it was a very productive session not only for 
the Commission, but for all who attended.
After discussing my presentation with Ms. Jeannie 
Niedermeyer of the Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration, I think it important to clarify one 
po in t that, she tells me, might have b e e n  
misunderstood.
LEAA has been responsible for funding excellent, 
innovative programs for victims and witnesses of 
crimes. LEAA funds such programs, like project 
Turnaround in Milwaukee, with the understanding 
that within a few years, local government will have 
to decide whether to continue the programs. Thus, 
when I emphasized that the securing of federal 
funds was only 'half the battle' and that s u c h  
program s die without continued efforts by the 
advocates for battered women, I was emphasizing 
the need for efforts by the advocates in their local 
communities. It would be ironic if advocates for 
battered women scapegoated LEAA for the end of 
programs that would not even have begun without 
LEAA. If that point is not abundantly clear from the 
record of my remarks, I would appreciate the entry 
of this letter in the record of the Consultation.
Again, my sincere thanks to the Commission for its 
concern for battered women and families.
Sincerely
Charles B. Schudson 
Assistant District Attorney
responses to what had, previous to the battered women's movement, only 
been experienced as an individual problem.
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This is important to remember in both the North American and British 
contexts and it needs to be reiterated. Contrary to the view propounded 
by the LEAA the issue of battered women was brought to light as a 
widespread social problem in the early years of the 1970s by the efforts of 
activists in the women’s movement. Previous to their political activity, 
there was knowledge of the problem; knowledge held by a few specialists, 
usually in the medical and psychiatric professions and, perhaps, some 
awareness of the problem among police researchers. However, this 
knowledge never elevated the violence to the level where it could be 
viewed as a widespread social problem. It was seen instead as a problem 
of a few individuals, a pathology. Political activists who took women as 
their political constituency, that is feminists, elevated the violence to a 
social problem. They viewed their activity as political and it was very 
clear, to some of them at least, that part of the problem was the state 
agencies who had, for so long, been able to ignore the issue. Some 
feminists viewed state representatives as jumping on a bandwagon which 
feminism had made. The perception was that, not only were professional 
managers of the state jumping on the band wagon but, once on, they were 
inclined to change the music the band was playing. However, it is also true 
to say that some feminists felt that certain state organs could be used to 
redress the issue of violence against wives. They found a complex 
machinery that had been used to develop responses to earlier social 
problems ready for their use.
The efforts of those feminists will be discussed momentarily. Before 
doing that I wish to outline some of the differences between the 
conceptions of applied social science and refuge based feminists. One of 
the clearest indications of the different tunes people involved were playing
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is the issue of estimations of the size of the problem. For activists in the 
refuge movement, clear quantification was never a priority. For them, 
establishing refuges was the primary consideration, and any evidence that 
such facilities were in demand would be shown by the numbers of women 
coming to seek help. Representatives of government agencies thought 
differently and were unwilling to put money into programmes without 
answering a whole host of questions: why do men beat women; do women 
beat men; are its causes psychological or do they emerge from social 
conditions; why do women stay? The main issue, however, was the "size" 
of the problem.
In response to these questions a whole branch of social science, was 
built up to provide these answers to policy makers. As we have already 
seen, in Britain at the end of the 1970s systematic investigation into the 
problems of violence against wives was avowedly feminist in orientation. 
Accordingly, attempts to articulate the problem were built around the 
analytical category of 'patriarchy'. By and large these investigators, like 
the refuge activists themselves were committed to the strategy of refuge 
provision as the social response to the problem. Social scientists in the U.S., 
particularly those at the Family Research Laboratory at the University of 
New Hampshire, were not committed to such a strategy nor did they 
operate with the concept of patriarchy. Rather, they were committed to 
the research methods of an abstracted empiricism which had its own 'non­
political' discourse.
American social science measures
the extent of the problem
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The dimensions of this 'social problem' were massive and it was 
during this period that the first estimates of the prevalence of violence in 
American households came to light. Some of the first efforts were put into 
looking at official figures in hope of developing an estimate of immediate 
demand for services. In 1979 Donna Moore listed some examples from 
official statistics as an indication of the scope of battering:
Kansas City, Missouri, 1976. The Police Department 
revealed that 90% of the city’s family homicides had 
been preceded by at least one call to the Police 
Department, and in 50% of those cases the police had 
been called five or more times.
Washtenaw County, Michigan. Thirty-five percent 
of all assault cases are wife assault.
Dade county, Florida. Over a nine month period,
1,000 cases of battered women were handled.
Montgomery County Maryland, The Wife Assault 
Task Force handled 650 incidents during its first 
year of operation.
Michigan. One county reported 42.4% of all assault 
complaints in a five month period were wife assault.
Brooklyn Legal Services, 1976. Fifty seven percent 
of the women filing for divorce complained o f 
physical assaults for approxim ately four years 
before seeking divorce.
Cleveland Ohio, 1971. Thirty-seven percent of 
females filing for divorce complained of physical 
abuse when filing.
Marvin E. Wolfgang studied 588 cases of crim inal 
homicide in 1958 and concluded that 87% of all 
female victims were slain by males and 85% of 
female offenders slew males The p re d o m in a te  
reasons for such murders were sex, love and family 
m atters. Wolfgang stated th a t slayings with 
excessive degrees of violence predom inate in the 
home and are most likely to involve a spousal 
relationship in which the wife is the victim of the 
husband's brutal beating.
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Donald T. Lunde reported in Psychology Today in 
1975 that approximately 40% of homicides in the 
United states are spouses killing spouses.
Nationwide estimates predict that up to 60% of 
American Families will experience in terpersonal 
violence during the course of a relationship.
The latest study by Straus et al. found violence in 
28% of all American Families. Leonore Walker 
estimates that violence occurs between 50% of all 
American m arital partners.
Nationwide, the FBI estimates that wife abuse occurs 
three times as frequently as sexual assault, and they 
further estimate that it is reported less than 10% of 
the time. This would mean that wife abuse occurs 
approximately every 18 seconds somewhere in the 
United States.4
"The latest study" was the work of the Family Research Laboratory 
established at the University of New Hampshire in 1975. This work was 
quite possibly the most influential contribution to the public discourse on 
the problem since the 'discovery' of the problem by 'feminist activists'. 
Straus and his colleagues conducted a National Family Violence Survey 
1975 which was the first attempt to use survey technology on a national 
scale to investigate violence in intimate family settings. This social 
scientific measure of the prevalence of the violence was more than just an 
estimation of the size of the problem. The work of Richard Gelles, Murray 
Straus and Susan Steinmetz and its impact on future developments can 
hardly be underestimated.
Straus' work begins with the assertion that 'wife beating' is a political 
rather than 'scientific' term.5 In order to cleanse his research of politics 
he eschewed such terminology and employed instead an invention of his 
own: the Conflict Tactics Scale. This is an ascending continuum of violent 
acts that includes:
(1) Threaten to hit;
(2) throwing, smashing, hitting something;
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(3) throwing something at other;
(4) pushing, shoving, or grabbing;
(5) slapping;
(6) kicking, biting, or hitting with fist;
(7) hitting or trying to hit with something;
(8) beating up
(9) threatening with a knife or a gun; and
(10) using a knife or a gun.
This instrument was employed on a "demographically representative 
national sample" of the American population in the mid-seventies and data 
were obtained to reflect the yearly incidence of violence perpetrated by 
men and women in a family setting.6 The rough estimate produced was 
that 1.8 million wives were beaten by their husbands per annum in the 
U.S.. At the time they stressed that their estimate was below the true 
figure. Curiously, when all of the data were examined women, as a group, 
appeared to be more violent than men. The researchers felt compelled to 
conclude that "the old cartoons of the wife chasing the husband with a 
rolling pin or throwing pots and pans are closer to reality than most - and 
especially those with feminist sympathies - realize."7
To paraphrase William Connolly, to examine and accept, or to examine 
and revise, the terms of a discourse is not a prelude to politics but a 
dimension of politics itself. The type of empiricism employed by Straus et 
al assumed an atheoretical and objective approach to 'reality1. The 
definition of the violence employed by Straus and his colleagues, which 
gained its most concrete form in the conflict tactics scale, was as hotly 
contested as any political term ever was. Leonore Walker pointed out, in 
response to Murray Straus' presentation before the U.S. Commission on 
Civil Rights that:
I disagree with Straus1 definition of wife abuse. He
limits battering behaviour to discrete units of
physical abuse which is nice and neat for data
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collection as it is relatively easy to count broken 
noses and black eyes. But it is too narrow to permit 
real understanding of the problem.**
Walker was keen to introduce her own concept of 'psychological abuse' 
into the debate at this time. She wanted to widen the understanding of 
women's oppression beyond neat points of violence floating in a sea of 
otherwise normal family life, which could be counted, and show that acts 
of violence against women was part of an on-going cycle of violence. 
Objections to Walker's kind of redefinition have been made on the grounds 
that expanding the notion to include 'psychological violence’ makes the 
term too elastic, that is it makes the scope of social problem too wide for 
effective intervention.
While it may be both fruitful and practical to delve into this debate, 
the point I wish to make is a different one. The 'scientific' definition of the 
problem put forth by the New Hampshire School turned domestic violence 
into 'incidents' and this had practical consequences for their conclusions. 
Faced with a counting procedure that showed women as more actively 
violent than men Straus and his colleagues were quick to conclude that the 
problem of 'domestic violence' is essentially about 'family violence'. 
Dobash and Dobash pointed out that "contentions of this nature make sense 
and doubtful sense at that, only if one adopts a definition of physical 
violence that is so gross as to be trivial, including everything down to the 
once in a lifetime shove or push."9
As it turns out the empirical findings of the researchers upholding the 
'family violence' thesis did not even support their conclusions. Richard 
Gelles, a close colleague of Straus', conducted a study which was 
specifically designed to examine marital violence. His findings showed that 
husbands were much more likely to be violent than wives and a quarter of
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the violent husbands in his sample assaulted their wives on a regular 
basis. Some women in his study did strike their husbands, but there was 
an important difference between the types of violence used by men and 
women. Women seemed to use a rather restricted range of physical force 
(on the conflict tactics scale) whereas husbands employed a wide range of 
techniques and seemed more likely to use the more severe forms of 
violence. Gelles also found that men often used the threat of violence as a 
means of controlling their wives1 actions yet such a technique was never 
employed by women.10 Dobash and Dobash had this to say about Gelles' 
research findings:
These results were quite interesting and we would 
argue that they point in an unequivocal direction, 
but unfo rtunately  Gelles fails to grasp th e ir  
significance. Although he emphasized that violence 
seemed to be a rather common occurrence in m any 
homes, a frequently noted observation, he noted but 
failed to emphasize and understand the significance 
of a second and, to our minds, just as clear pattern: 
the use of physical force between adults within the 
family was not random ly d istribu ted  betw een 
husbands and wives but was systematically directed 
at women.11
It hardly needs to be pointed out that, by using the analytical tool of 
'patriarchy' and more or less committed to the strategy of the refuge 
movement, the Dobashs' were bound to be critical of the New Hampshire 
research which seemed so obviously antithetical to such an approach. 
However, one does not necessarily need to depend on this particular 
analytical category in order to arrive at these criticisms. The main 
problem with the research was that there was never any attempt by either 
Straus or Gelles to situate the object of their analysis in a social process. 
Their abstracted empiricism never took them much beyond the violent
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'incident1. They were criticized at the time, and the criticism still holds, for 
taking only a fleeting glance at a complex and on-going behaviour.
The studies reviewed here are evidence of the extensive efforts to 
gather quantitative incidence data. Many people questioned the need for 
this quantification. According to many battered women's advocates such a 
concern reflected a presumed need to know 'how much' when 'how much' 
was not really the problem. It was also pointed out that such research is 
expensive in terms of both time and money and did not directly contribute 
to establishing mechanisms for responsing to the violence. Be that as it 
may, the application of the soft sciences in this way was inescapable. More 
importantly, in terms of the development of the issue, it had a very real 
impact on how the the problem was conceived and understood.
The battered husband syndrome
the biggest mistake
Susan Steinmetz, a member of Straus' research team, created a world 
wide media storm in 1977 when she began to publish articles about "the 
battered husband syndrome" claiming that 250,000 American husbands 
were battered by their wives every year.12 Steinmetz's research findings 
were the result of the application of overly abstract methodological 
assumptions. It is not exactly clear how she arrived at the estimation of 
250,000 battered husbands. However, as Mildred Pagelow points out, it is 
likely that it occurred in the following manner:
"...From her Delaware sample of fifty seven intact 
couples with two children, Steinmetz identified four 
wives as victims of serious assault. Based on an 
estimated county population of 94,000 couples and 
converting to rates per 100,000, she calculated that 
this represented 7,016 female victims per 100,000
97
Chapter Three
NterGIn] ^335®!?!!©®® [5)©^ 7®D®p(jcfD®[nlQ© Bm fifa©  (DO ©©® MG’©®
population. Then comparing her own data against 
police reports of twenty-six cases of spouse assault 
(twenty four women victims and two men victims), 
and calculating that 'only about one out of 270 
incidents of wife-beating are ever reported to the 
authorities', she concludes that although there were 
no husbands as victims of serious assault among the 
study population, in two of the cases reported to the 
police the victim was the husband. If the same 
degree of und er-rep o rtin g  was p resen t for 
husbands, then one could suspect that 540 incidents 
(540/100,000) occurred in New Castle County during 
1975. 13
This may be how Steinmetz produced an estimate of the number of 
cases of husband battering despite the fact that she failed to find even one 
case of husband battering in her own "stratified quota sample of normal 
American families".14 Pagelow also pointed out that the table Steinmetz 
provided is both incomplete and inaccurate. Apparently, three categories 
of the most potentially dangerous types of violence ('beat up spouse', 'push 
down' and 'choke'), all of which were engaged in more by men than by 
women, were omitted. In addition the sample size Steinmetz provided 
seems to vary from publication to publication and with it the rate at which 
wives engage in 'pushing, shoving and grabbing' the only category of 
violence that wives exceeded husbands in.15
The divisive question of male versus female victims at that particular 
time affected efforts to increase the funding and provision of resources to 
female victims of family violence. At the Congressional hearings many 
witnesses carefully chose words describing battered women as 'battered- 
spouses' and substituted 'domestic violence’ for 'wife-beating' in order that 
the social problem not be identified as a 'women's issue' and hence hamper 
their efforts.
Thus, it can be seen that the application of social scientific measures of 
'the problem' not only tended to reduced the dominant conception of the
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issue to one of 'incidents', that is, moments of violence in an otherwise 
tranquil and normal existence, it also had the very real effect of purging 
questions of asymmetries of power between men and women from the 
discussion. Instead, gender neutral analytical categories, for example 
'domestic violence', rose to prominence.
A problem for policing?
There was an awareness in American Police departments about 
violence behind closed doors at this time and the social sciences were 
applied here as well. The framing of the issue on this institutional site was 
as different from feminist conceptualizations of the problem as it was from 
that of the New Hamphire social scientists. From the police perspective 
such violence was an issue because operational police officers were 
directly enmeshed in it's everyday reality. The awareness of the problem 
was documented from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports for 1974 which 
showed that one out of five police officers killed in the line of duty died 
dealing with violence between spouses16. Police research had documented 
the patterns of police responses to, what was termed 'family violence' calls. 
Parnas concluded that the Chicago Police received more calls concerning 
'family conflict' than they did concerning murder, aggravated assault and 
battery, and all other serious crimes combined.17 A study by Field and 
Field of police and court dispositions in Washington D.C. revealed that of all 
the assault cases involving strangers or unrelated people, 75% resulted in 
arrest and court adjudication, whereas only 16% of all cases involving 
assaults in the family ended in arrest and trial.18 In addition in cases 
involving spouses the charges were invariably misdemeanours and not 
felonies. Studies in Boston and Chicago told similar stories.19
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Such statistics, showing a low likelihood of arrest in cases of ’family 
violence', did not prompt the implementation of arrest measures as formal 
policy, far from it. The experimental tactical innovations in policing at the 
time encouraged the use of mediation, that is getting the couple to 'talk 
their problems out', which in all likelihood actively discouraged the use of 
arrest. A highly publicized demonstration project teaching special 
counseling skills for 'family crisis intervention' was put in motion in during 
this period.20 This approach, built around notions of 'family violence' and 
'intrafamily murder' sought to intervene to help couples 'sort the problem 
out'. The idea of police using counseling techniques in instances of violence 
between spouses had much in common with the dominant thinking in 
social science at the time; that is, it was predicated on the idea of 
'reintegration'. Arrest was not perceived to be a constructive option in this 
regard. A decade later the next generation of police researchers would be 
concluding the exact opposite, that arrest was the best option. Further, and 
perhaps curiously so, this realignment of policy in favour of arrest would 
not challenge the dominant assumption of 'reintegration'.
It should be pointed out that the police and shelter activists during 
this period were using quite different analytical categories for describing 
the nature of the problem. To the feminists the problem was a social one: 
'wife battery', and the strategy was to help victims of violent men escape 
their tormentors. The police, on the other hand, were responding to 
individual 'family violence calls' and they needed techniques for calming 
down quarrels. Their tactics were based around mediation techniques 
taught to them by social psychologists. The two bodies of knowledge seem 
to inhabit different worlds. The words used have different connotations 
and, like the Red Queen in Alice in Wonderland said: "when you've said a
100
Chapter Three
NlQorfiln) u^ijQ©i?D©®[fii ®©w®D@[p)iM](g[A)Q© Bdtq PB©©®^©®
thing, that fixes it, and you must take the consequences." Different words 
have different consequences.
American Social-Scientific Feminism
While Straus and Gelles were producing their research findings and 
the police were experimenting with ’social work' other social scientists, 
most of whom were women and all of whom attached to themselves the 
label 'feminist', were also contributing to the public discourse on the issue. 
Significantly, these women had either a background in legal studies or 
psychology. As such, they did not operate from a separate institutional 
site like the refuge activists, although they no less conceived of themselves 
as political activists taking women as their constituency. Their 
institutional connections were with the legal infrastructure and the social- 
sciences and they implemented a two pronged attack on the problem 
launched from these sites. This work had the label feminist attached to it, 
but it is evident that much of it was incorporated into the State sponsored 
research machine geared up to deal with identified 'social problems'. 
These feminist social scientists operated within the terms of discourse of 
already established intellectual communities, producing knowledge about 
the problem which also emerged at the Civil Rights Commission hearings in 
1978.
The first line of attack stemmed from a social-psychological theory of 
battering, which itself emerged from questions like: what kind of men 
batter; why do women stay; what makes men stop battering; when do 
women leave?21 This line of questioning lead to the development of the 
'cyclical theory of violence', the 'battered woman's syndrome' and the 
concept of 'learned helplessness'.22 The practical implications of this
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reasoning revolved around therapeutic techniques for 'treating' or 'curing' 
the violence. It was reported that "since an overwhelming characteristic of 
both partners seems to be a low level of self-esteem, we must devise 
means of helping each person realize that she/he is worthy of higher self- 
regard and better treatment from her/his partner."23 In addition, men 
and women were to be taught alternative ways of relating to each other, 
rather than being dependant on traditional sex-role stereo-types. Leonore 
Walker explained:
The critical element here is to break the symbiotic 
bond. What we are dealing with are not two 
independent human beings. We are dealing with a 
relationship in which the two people believe they  
can only survive if they are together. What we 
have to do in psychotherapy is teach each one of 
them to be independent people, then they may be 
able to make an interdependent relationship. Until 
each one of them feels whole and able to stand on 
his and her own, they will not be able to do it, I 
disagree with the marital therapists who say that we 
must treat the relationship. I want to treat the 
individuals within the relationship so they can  
change the nature of the relationship to a healthy 
interaction between two healthy people.24
In addition to psychotherapy for couples this model also pointed out 
the need for 'crisis intervention techniques' employed in refuges by 
trained professionals. Here again psychotherapy is seen as a way of 
restoring the self-esteem of battered women and counter-acting their 
'learned helplessness'. This can be contrasted with the views of shelter 
activists in Great Britain. At that time, British refuge activists were 
concentrating on 'self-help', 'group discussion' and 'collective decision 
making' in refuges as a means for helping women to acquire the necessary 
skills and wherewithal to deal with the world after leaving a violent
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relationship. This strategy could not generate a concept like Teamed 
helplessness’ since it depended on the efforts of victimized women to 
overcome their own problems with the help of other women who had had 
similar experiences. The view propounded in the United States, grounded 
in the practice of clinical psychology which, in turn, produced notions of 
individual pathology, constructed the issue as one involving cases of abuse. 
In the United States many feminists were concentrating on finding ways of 
making the established professional practices of psychology respond to the 
needs of battered women, rather than developing alternatives outside of 
the already existing infrastructure.
This is similar to the second prong of attack made by feminist social 
scientists at this time. This line of reasoning emerged from questions 
about the nature of criminal justice intervention. It was reasoned that 
society as a whole would not take a negative view of wife battering until it 
was perceived as it should be - as a criminal offence:
...the public must begin demanding that domestic 
violence be taken seriously by those in law 
enforcement: police officers must make appropriate 
arrests; district attorneys must learn how to take 
these cases to court and win; judges must give 
reasonable sentences to men convicted of battering; 
and  leg isla to rs m ust work with bo th  law 
enforcement personnel and women's advocates to 
write new and effective legislation regarding  
programs, civil law and criminal law which police, 
district attorneys and judges can then implement.25
That was the strategy. The tactic was to use the law against the 
criminal justice system in order to force it to adapt its practices to the 
perceived needs of battered women. This resulted in two class action suits 
against police departments being put under way in the mid-1970s. One of
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these was in Oakland California. The other, in New York, also included 
legal action against the Family Court System. Both police departments lost 
motions in court to dismiss the actions and, in July 1978, agreed to make 
basic changes in departmental policy regarding handling domestic violence 
incidents.26 The triumph was that domestic violence would be treated 
according to the same criteria used in assessing other assault cases. 
Domestic violence had been 'criminalized'. Eva Paterson explained that this 
was essential because men would not cease to batter their partners unless 
such violence was perceived as a crime. She explained that the civil law 
could be used to address the violence. However, the police were 
responsible for enforcing any court order which might come from a civil 
suit and, unless police officers were taught that it was a criminal matter 
they could not be depended upon to protect women. She maintained that 
"if the police continue to view domestic violence as a civil matter, the civil 
remedies available to the women (such as obtaining a temporary 
restraining order) will remain ineffective and the woman will be 
unpro tec ted .27 Feminist lawyers also viewed these court battles as 
propaganda victories, one such lawyer noted that "litigation can be used 
for social change. It is not a change agent in itself but rather a public 
relations tactic that gives the movement power to negotiate."28
North American Trajectories
While various experts argued about who was being victimized by what 
violence, to what degree and to what extent, notions of 'domestic violence' 
as 'incidents' or 'cases’ became entrenched in the discourse. This was the 
general trajectory assumed by applied social science in developing
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understandings of the issue. The trend was exacerbated by the discovery 
of the battered husband syndrome, simply because the most convenient 
way to refute observations like Steinmetz's was to count incidents and 
show that she got it wrong. The view of the problem as ’incidents of 
violence' was so entrenched that Straus, in response to feminist criticisms, 
could say that "there is a need to go beyond the cross sectional survey 
approach represented by the study," and get "at the processes within 
marriage which produce violence" and yet still persist in measuring 
incidents of violence.29 Despite his own caveat, Straus, along with Gelles 
and Steinmetz, went on to promote the notion of 'domestic violence 
incidents' in many subsequent research endeavours. This is their most 
lasting contribution to the public discussion of the problem.
The alternative approach that emerged, which attempted to examine 
the processes within marriage which produced violent relationships, was 
also limiting but in a different way. These social-psychological models 
produced a 'cycle of violence' thesis and the notion of 'learned 
helplessness'. Within the confines of this paradigm women victims of 
violent men were perceived of as in need of 'protection' and 'treatment'. 
When the American Family, so long viewed as the place where people 
could retreat for safety, love and solace, was revealed, by social scientific 
surveys, as an institution of violence the effect of making 'cases' of wife 
abuse problematic was to preserve the myth of the home and pathologize 
certain violent relationships. The ideal was held up of a home in which 
women and men, as autonomous individuals, participate equally in 
problem solving. The problem became one of redefining acceptable sex- 
role behaviour for both men and women so that it would not be a man's 
prerogative to beat his wife and it would not be a woman's duty to stand
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by her man, even if he treats her badly. Thus, treatment could also be 
conceived of as 're-education’.
Accordingly, refuges were seen as a very small part of a wider 
institutional response that was to resuscitate those problem families. 
Police officers, district attorneys, counsellors, shelter workers, welfare 
workers, ministers and priests, all were considered to be part of the 
solution to the problem. Contrast this with the view from within the 
'shelter movement' which operated within the confines of a much different 
discourse and which resisted being incorporated as part of an overall 
solution. The basis of the practice of the battered women's movement 
remained the idea that women had to participate in overcoming their own 
subordination; they had to be 'empowered'. The police, welfare agencies, 
the legal profession, the legislature and the family unit were viewed as 
integral parts of patriarchy and as such could not be depended on to 
empower women. The refuge movement, comprising women activists, 
non-hierarchical and collective in management, was conceived to be 
outside of the Patriarchal State apparatus and to offer the only radical 
alternative for addressing the violence.
As we shall see in the chapters that follow, the situation in Canada was 
somewhat different from either that of the U.S. or the U.K. In discussing 
the development of the victims of crime initiative in Canada, Paul Rock has 
related the importance of the 'women's movement' in spurring the victims' 
initiative forward. As he explained "women were politically consequential 
in a setting which contained no other corporate representatives of the 
victim."30 Rock goes on to observe that the women's groups consulted 
were not designed to support the interests of victims as a whole, rather, 
they were refuge activists. As such, and in common with refuge activists
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elsewhere, they did not necessarily see the criminal justice system as a 
forum for their activities. Activists concerned with battered women did 
however, lend cooperation to State sponsored schemes, although such 
cooperation was debated specifically within the terms of a radical 
separation between 'the State' and feminists who operated in what was 
variously conceptualized as 'the Community' or simply 'Society'.31 Some 
Canadian feminists sought to 'work within the system' others were more 
combative. This ambivalence did not stall progress and there was a 
vigorous growth in refuge provision in Canada at the turn of the decade. 
The evidence seems to indicate that the Canadian articulation of this issue 
managed to tread a fine line between the version of battered women's 
advocates, which stressed the fundamental need for refuge provision as a 
primary resource for victimized wives, and the versions of the soft 
sciences which sought a broader based 'reintegrative approach'.
Conclusion
This chapter overviews the various conceptualizations and changes in 
ways of talking about the issue of violence against wives in North America 
during the 1970s. The significant growth in knowledge production about 
the issue of wife battery in the United States during the late 1960s and 
through the 1970s is very evident. An annotated bibliography on violence 
in the home published in 1974 listed 190 publications, of which 88% were 
published after 1965 and 41% were published after 1971. The trend 
continued unabated and by 1987 the Family Violence Program at the 
University of Texas (functioning as a national clearing house in the U.S.) 
listed some 1500 articles in its directory.32
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More significant is the changing nature of the social response to the 
problem during this period. Initially ’domestic violence’ intervention 
strategies, such as crisis hotlines and refuges, were aimed directly at the 
victim. In 1972 the first shelters for battered women were established in 
the U.S. By 1978 the United States Department of Justice listed 310 
shelters and/or services for battered women. Five years later there were 
about 700 shelters listed in national directories.33 However, in 1981 the 
Family Violence program at the LEAA, which helped to establish many 
programs, was ended less than five years after it had begun. Previous to 
that, in 1979, it had changed its funding priorities and encouraged 
programs for battering men, rather than for battered women 34 This shift 
can be seen in both the North American and British contexts and it will be 
the task of the following chapter to trace these developments.
Then too, the interest of social scientists researching in the area of 
police policy and practice had been piqued. The development of a 
discourse on domestic violence based around the categories of police 
managerial professionalism could never have been predicted by Erin 
Pizzey or, indeed, any other member of the refuge movement, and yet this 
was to have profound consequences for how many people thought about 
the issue. This theme will be an important part of the next chapter.
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Well I'm a talkin' 'bout the midnight rambler 
Leave his footprints up and down your hall 
Yes I'm a talkin' 'bout the midnight gambler 
The one you never seen before 
I'm talkin' 'bout that cold fandangler 
did you see him jump your garden wall 
I won't give a hoot or a wamin ’
I'll stick my knife right down you throat 
'til it hurts
Mick Jagger
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Introduction
It is not possible to consider the issue of violence against wives or, 
indeed, the development of the women's movement more generally in the 
British context, without coming to terms with Peter Sutcliffe. The press 
and electronic media christened him the 'Yorkshire Ripper' and his image 
galvanized the women's movement. As a result the entire issue of violence 
against women was heated to the boiling point. This is evident from the 
changing intensity and nature of women's protest about violence against 
women. In September of 1977 Women's Aid had organized a 'week of 
action' which culminated in a march by 1500 women through Birmingham 
city centre. It was a happy occasion, the activists "shouted and sang" in 
protest demanding more refuges, houses and financial independence.1 
(Spare Rib No 64 Nov. 1977) It received some media attention, but not 
much. Three years later the street action by 'feminists' was much louder 
and they were not singing. One account described:
Going to work on Friday morning, December 12, was 
a real treat. All over north London, where I live, 
graffiti had appeared overnight on walls, doors and 
billboards showing that angry women had been 
there. At work we started to hear about actions 
Women Against Violence Against Women groups had 
taken elsewhere: paint-filled eggs thrown at eight 
cinema screens in west and south London, p o rn  
shop doors glued together in Manchester, subways 
spray-painted in Coventry ...And women in Leeds, 
Cambridge, York, Sheffield, Brighton, Central 
London, all organized their own actions for the two 
days, December 11 and 12, arranged at the Sexual 
Violence against Women conference held three 
weeks previously. (Spare Rib No. 103, Feb. 1981)
Of course, 'feminist' action was again getting national media coverage 
as they got progressively more militant.2 It seems to me that two factors
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relate to, what might be euphemistically referred to as an 'intensification 
of protest'. One is the Sutcliffe killings, which were prominent in the 
consciousness of the whole nation.3 The other is the simple fact that the 
activists were getting such little cooperation in establishing an 
infrastructure of support for victims. It will be recalled from chapter two 
that negotiations between Town Halls and refuge activists for refuge sites 
were very often turned into issues about the illegal squatting of council 
property. Whether or not activists were too hasty in their demands is a 
contested issue. The evidence indicates to me that there was recalcitrance 
on the part of local government officials which prompted the use of 'direct 
action' by activists which led to a downward spiral in the relationships 
between the two organizations.
The broad movement was strong during this period. It was divided, 
but still capable of organizing large conferences.4 The conference in 1980 
where the guerrilla graffiti attacks were planned had 500 delegates, 
making it about as large as gatherings for many professional associations. 
More conferences of similar size were held in 1981 and 1982. An 
examination of the available records of those meetings reveals that the 
issues had broadened somewhat. Those discussed included: violence 
against women in the home, rape, rape in marriage, incest, sexual 
harassment at work, pornography, fashion as violence, language as 
violence, child sexual abuse, gynaecology as violence, psychiatry as 
violence, prostitution and a host of others. There were debates within the 
movement at this time. Hyphenated 'feminisms' began to proliferate; 
'socialist-feminists', 'radical-feminists', 'Marxist-feminists', 'liberal- 
feminists' and others all contributed to the discussion, making for a 
confusing array of ideological labels and competing explanations.
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However, the broad issue of violence against women overlapped all of 
these ideological boundaries. A great deal of 'direct action' under the 
banner of 'Women Against Violence Against Women' was carried out, but 
this 'direct action' was not linked to refuge provision or, necessarily, to 
material support for victims of violence in the home. For example, a 
theoretical link was made between pornography and male sexual violence 
which made cinemas and shops retailing such material 'a legitimate target'. 
'Direct Action', went beyond sensationalist attacks with paint filled eggs 
and glue, however. It included more legitimate forms of political action 
such as letter writing campaigns to advertisers, public protests and 
petitions. All forms of violence against women were considered to be 
connected. Thus, self-defence courses for women, the establishment of 
refuges, campaigning against the pornographic representation of women, 
and for the reform of rape law as well as a variety of other concerns were 
all considered part of the same package. Most importantly, the activists 
were concerned to use the media to get the message across. The 
conferences held were not places to idly discuss feminist theory. They 
were intended to provide a forum to plan action, and plan they did. It is 
worth considering what came out of these efforts.
Pornography was especially linked with the Sutcliffe murders and 
many public demonstrations against cinemas and shops were organized. 
Several serious confrontations with the police resulted from some of the 
larger demonstrations in the last months of 1980. In Bradford on 
November 27 eleven women were arrested (but not charged) for handing 
out leaflets outside a cinema showing a film entitled: Violation o f the Bitch. 
The next night in Lewisham a march to protest a sex-murder ended 
outside a 'pom' cinema, culminating in ten arrests, some of which were for
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’assaulting a police officer’. The physical confrontation was acute. On 
December 12, three hundred women protested about sex and violence 
films being shown in the Leicester Square area, passing out leaflets linking 
pornography with the ripper murders. Here again the confrontation was 
unpleasant. Police drove a van into the crowd of women in order to 
disperse them and nine arrests were made. In those two months almost 
50 women were arrested at such demonstrations around the country. 
(Spare Rib No, 103 Feb. 1981)
Prostitution campaigns were also linked with the Sutcliffe murders, 
partly because of callous statements made by police officers in the press. 
'The problem at first", the public was told, "was that there wasn't much 
public sympathy for dead prostitutes." (The Sunday Mirror, May 10, 1981) 
An Assistant Chief Constable explained that the Ripper made a mistake 
"...Miss Whittaker, a building society clerk, was a perfectly respectable 
girl." (Spare Rib No. 83, June 1979) The press often casually reflected the 
police view, for example one editorial stated that:
"The police do deserve a measure of sympathy over 
the overwhelming task they faced, the m a j o r  
problem during the early years being apathy over 
the killing of prostitutes. Even the horrifying death 
of Jayne MacDonald, an entirely respectable young 
shop assistant, scarcely improved the situation ."
(The Times, May 23, 1981)
Prostitutes themselves did not share these sympathies and were 
organized to make their position public. They addressed the Metropolitan 
Police Commissioner in an open letter.
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To the ripper and to the police prostitutes are not 
decent, we are not "innocent victims". What are we 
guilty of to deserve such a death? 70% of prostitute 
women in this country are m others fighting to 
make ends meet and feed our children. But because 
we refuse poverty for ourselves and our children, 
we are treated as criminals. In the eyes of the police 
we deserve what we get, even death. (Press 
statement from the English Collective of Prostitutes, 
January 1980)
One of the more notable, and contradictory, developments of the 
Ripper phenomenon was the 'criticism' of sexualized violence offered up by 
the tabloid press. Feminist analysis at the time devoted a lot of attention 
to assessing the role of the media. What were they to think when the 
News of the World called for the banning of films 'depicting violence with 
sexual undertones' right next to a headline shouting:
DINNER TABLE SEX PARTIES OF THE FIREBOMB TYCOON
The July 9, 1979 issue of The Sun contained a condemnatory article 
about the serial murders. It was illustrated with posed shots of women 
lounging provocatively under street lamps. The caption read: DOLLED UP 
... for a date with death?
Women who wanted to make connections between sexual violence and 
the commercial press could easily find concrete examples:
Sutcliffe's killings not only terrified the women 
who lived in West Yorkshire; they unsettled th e  
sexual feelings of both sexs all over England. As 
Anthony Storr says in his book Human Aggression, 
"male's sexuality, because of the primitive necessity 
of pursuit and penetra tion , does contain an 
im portant element of aggressiveness; an element 
which is both recognized and responded to by the
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female who yields and submits. (The Observer, May 
24 1981)
Analysis of the role of the media was critical and it was explained that 
"within our conventional sexual mythology it is written that while it is 
unreasonable for a man to give in to his wish to molest, attack, rape and 
bash to death the nearest nubile female, it is reasonable for him to harbour 
the desire." (The New Statesman, Dec.19, 1980)
Novel forms of 'direct action' for responding to specific instances of 
violence against women were considered at this time. One such method 
was 'confrontation'. There is no way of knowing how many women used 
this tactic if, indeed, it ever was used. However, it was discussed at a 
Women Against Violence Against Women conference in 1981. The tactic 
involved identifying a particular male who was guilty of some form of 
sexual violence, anything from rape to sexual harassment, and literally 
confronting him in a large group. An account of this method being used 
was given at the conference. It involved a man who had molested a young 
girl. She had told her mother of the molestation and the news spread 
amongst her neighbours and friends. It was decided that something 
should be done about the man's attack, but the women involved were 
reluctant to involve the criminal justice system. Instead, they banded 
together and literally confronted the man on his own doorstep. Half a 
dozen women, including the young girl who was molested and her best 
friend, delivered a scripted speech stating their thoughts and feelings 
about the harassment. This was done with the knowledge of the 
perpetrators wife, although not in her presence. The conference discussion 
on this method of 'direct action' made it clear that it was considered to be 
non-violent. It was stated that "confrontations must be non-violent; it 
must not be a mimic of the assault - taking power by violence or violent
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threats."5 It was suggested that this tactic might be useful in cases of wife 
abuse, although it was acknowledged that this might not always be the 
case. What this demonstrates is that, in the midst of a panic provoked by 
the Sutcliffe sex-murders many activists were willing to consider novel 
forms of intervention and not simply evoke the criminal justice system as 
a form of revenge and, further, 'direct action1 was conceived to be a good 
way of preventing recidivism.
Non-violence was not always the rule, however. In the climate 
created by the ripper murders it was to be expected that some 
campaigners would call for more extreme measures. On this point it is 
important to be clear. Initially the ideological position staked out by most 
feminists was based on direct and collective action and non-violence. 
Although the philosophy of non-violence was not always made explicit, the 
documentary evidence suggests that punitive action against individual 
men guilty of violence against women was not on the agenda. The women 
involved simply did not discuss such alternatives. Certainly the 
documentation of the refuge movement in its first decade is notably 
lacking in such references.
At the turn of the decade things were beginning to change and it was 
announced:
BRING BACK THE ROPE CALL BY WOMEN
Bradford's Red Light girls dem anded the 
return of the death penalty. Spokesman Rose 
Ferguson, 27, said: "Hanging should  be 
brought back...If men like Sutcliffe knew that 
they might hang they would think twice"...In 
Leeds, a spokesman for Women Against 
Violence Against Women said: "We h a v e  
experienced years of stomach-churning fear 
because of this animal, but he's not the only 
one - he's just the most notorious...we want
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action now, to stamp out the growing tide of 
violence. (News of the World, May 24, 1981)
There was a confusing array of feminisms by the turn of the decade. 
There was no single infrastructure which provided both information about 
violence against women and a service to women victimized by male 
violence. In the climate of fear, and perhaps hatred, generated by the 
Sutcliffe sex-murders vocalization of the issue of sexual violence became, 
at least at times, a shrill cry. The demands of refuge activists for the 
provision of extensive accommodation for women who needed to leave 
their homes because of violence had not met with any success and the 
confrontational tactics adopted by the Women's Aid Federation to assert 
their demands in the Town Halls got them branded as 'too extreme'. As 
the issue of 'sexual violence' exploded beyond the confines of the refuge 
movement those accusations of extremism were fed. In the next section 
we will look at this dynamic.
The refuge movement 1981-1985
In the early 1980s the refuge activists were cognizant of the fact that 
attempts to address the problem with new legislation were not working. 
The Housing and Homeless Persons Act, the Domestic Violence and 
Matrimonial Proceedings Act, and the Domestic Violence and Magistrates 
Court Act were all seen as flawed in their implementation.6 According to 
women surveyed in refuges the response by all state agencies to their 
requests for help was quite poor. Women reported that agency personnel 
from Housing departments and the police responded to their complaints 
with disbelief, often stating that their requests for help were either turned
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around on them, making them into the guilty party, or interpreted as an 
exaggeration.7
Only the refuges were seen to be meeting the immediate needs of 
battered women. The provision of refuge accommodation together with 
pressure on statutory bodies to implement existing laws was undertaken 
by the refuge activists. The Women's Aid Federation (along with the few 
unaffiliated 'independent' refuges) was the only agency attempting to 
enable women to leave violent men permanently. This attempt was 
carried out in a harsh political environment which did not make it easy to 
achieve such operational goals. But their were also tensions within the 
movement.
It was reported at the Women Against Violence Against Women 
conference in 1981 that, first and foremost, Women's Aid groups provided 
Refuges: safe houses for women and their children where they could get 
away from the violence and contemplate the options available to them. 
There are many questions that a woman in such a position must answer 
for herself and the speaker, from Lewisham Women's Aid, said that refuge 
activists have to devote a lot of energy to giving practical assistance. That 
meant helping to initiate divorce proceedings, apply for custody of 
children, obtain supplementary benefit, get on housing lists, obtain 
injunctions and many other avenues of action. Activists also had to make 
attempts to keep in contact with women who elected to go back to their 
men or, in cases where women had applied and obtained injunctions, 
volunteers had to be organized to stay with the women returning to the 
matrimonial home to provide assistance when there were problems getting 
the law enforced.8
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Much time was spent by activists in Women's Aid negotiating and 
dealing with agencies and official bodies; the DHSS, Housing, and Social 
Services, both on a local and national level. This led to allegations of 
reformism. This tension between 'reformism' and 'radical action' was very 
real. The philosophy of the movement was radical, but the practical day to 
day activities immediately involved them in an area which already 
involved social workers, the police and doctors. Activists dealing with the 
practicalities of helping battered women had to address the personnel of 
these agencies in order to get them to acknowledge that women are the 
victims of violence in the home and that the attacks should be taken 
seriously. The image they were fighting was that such violence was just an 
individual family or woman's problem.
However, to at least a very vocal minority, the activities of Women's 
Aid were seen as a part of the fight against male violence more generally. 
To these women the refuge movement was a stepping stone to a society 
without male violence. They were not so concerned with the immediate 
response to particular women's needs, although that was important, rather 
they were interested in creating a social movement which could tackle all 
men's violence. The label 'violent man' seemed inappropriate to these 
women, since it was perceived that all men benefit from and aid each 
other in controlling women. This was true for all kinds of 'aggression', 
from 'sexist' jokes to the most heinous acts of violence.
None of this changed the fact that Women's Aid was dependant on 
agencies for funding and resources. Some of their members vilified such 
agencies as the 'male establishment'. This created conflict because it was 
difficult for activists to appear 'efficient' and 'credible' in terms that State 
agencies they had to negotiate with could understand. Women's Aid was
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collectively organized, the power to make decisions was diffused 
throughout the network which meant that social workers or housing 
officials wanting to talk to ’someone in charge’ were often confronted with 
what they perceived to be a ’militant group’. This led to charges that the 
activists were uncompromising, aggressive and difficult to liaise with. To 
appear efficient and credible was to be able to submit detailed budgets, 
properly audited accounts and development plans to government bodies. 
The fact of the matter is that most of the activists put no value on such 
skills seeing them as tangential to the matter at hand, which was to 
provide an infrastructure of support for victims of violent men. It is also 
an open question as to whether the activists had the necessary book­
keeping and business skills to conform to these prerequisites.
From the outside Women's Aid was perceived as too 'radical', on the 
inside it was racked by criticisms of 'reformism'. All the while, the 
momentum that had been built up in the early years was being lost. By 
the mid-80s there were two hundred refuges nationally. The peak had 
been reached. The growth in services, which had been marked in the mid 
to late-70s, was choked by lack of provision from the State and by debate 
from within the movement itself. It was during this period that Erin 
Pizzey, who was outside of the Women's Aid Federation but continued to 
run Chiswick Women's Aid, announced her theory of 'violence prone 
women'. Her pronouncements on this issue, in contrast to the radical 'anti­
man' stance of some feminists, exemplifies the wide range of views 
expressed by battered women's advocates at the time.
Very little money was placed in the hands of refuge workers and this 
also had its effect. The annual budget for Women's Aid in England during 
this period was only £100,000 which was barely enough to maintain
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existing facilities never mind expand them. Refuge provision still stood 
well below the recommendations made by the Select Committee in 1975 of 
one refuge space per 10,000 population. In order to fulfil this 
recommendation it was estimated that there would need to be 982 refuges 
nationally. In addition to inadequate provision of refuge space the refuges 
that did exist were being acknowledged as overcrowded and squalid.9
Feminist social science
While the movement lacked material resources feminist social 
scientists were providing increasingly detailed studies of women's 
victimization and their needs. One such study, undertaken by Jalna 
Hanmer and Sheila Saunders was dedicated "to women in prisons 
everywhere who are locked up for murdering violent men."10 These 
researchers were profoundly effected by the Sutcliffe slayings and their 
research was an attempt at capturing women's experience of male violence 
in its most general sense. This particular study also paid special attention 
to what the researchers regarded as the special methodological 
requirements of studying violence against women. A distinction between 
'feminist' and 'conventional' research methods was made, the latter being 
seen as wholly unsuitable for such a task.
There was at least some truth to these claims. Conventional research 
into crime victimization had relied on the victim survey, asking victims 
directly about their experiences of crime. The 1982 and 1984 surveys of 
England and Wales showed very low rates of reporting of violence against 
women.11 In the 1982 survey only one rape (attempted) was reported. 
The 1982 Scottish crime survey also noted that few cases of sexual assault 
were disclosed to survey interviewers.12 Home Office survey researchers
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readily admitted they had problems in obtaining any information about 
sexual assault and domestic violence.13
In contrast with the efforts of State sponsored crime surveys Hanmer 
and Saunders' study revealed a great deal of victimization. The differences 
in the approach to data gathering are evident from the start. For example, 
rather than trying to obtain a random sample, or a snowball sample, two 
accepted sampling procedures, they decided to interview every woman on 
seven adjacent streets. This was considered unorthodox by most survey 
researchers and, to some, not even 'scientific'. Such objections aside, the 
researchers reported a refusal rate of only 16% and they managed to carry 
out 211 in depth interviews with women about their experiences of 
violence.
The researchers were also concerned about a particular aspect of the 
survey form. This type of information gathering turns criminal 
victimization into distinct incidents; with a beginning, an end, and limited 
in space and time. Hanmer and Saunders' thinking on domestic violence, 
and violence against women more generally, meant that they were 
concerned to capture women's experience of violence as a continuous 
process. This is problematic for structured interviewing techniques since 
violence is not so easily defined when it resembles enduring conditions 
rather than particular events. Accordingly, while an interview schedule 
was designed, interviewers were trained and encouraged to take down any 
details that women might want to give which did not neatly fall into the 
categories of the questionnaire. Further, they were not compelled to stick 
to the questionnaire if it meant that they could get more detail from the 
interviewee by allowing her to talk about what she wanted to talk about. 
The interviewers were consciously sympathetic and, it was reported that
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in many instances they found themselves offering emotional support and 
advice. The result was a wealth of detail, but the data were very difficult 
to quantify and traditional survey researchers were inclined to see it as 
sloppy work.
This study gave a detailed account of method and is resplendent with 
descriptions of the environment and specific details of particular women's 
stories and perceptions. It attempts to show the prevalence of experiences 
that women perceive as threatening:
Sexual harassment accounted for three-fifths of the 
incidents and two-fifths of all women interviewed 
reported this type of experience. Threats made up a 
quarter of the incidents and were experienced by a 
q u a rte r of the women interview ed. Physical 
violence was least reported, just under one-sixth of 
all incidents and women interviewed. 14
While their attempts at quantification are confusing Hanmer and 
Saunders were good at explaining and generalizing women's perceptions:
The common strand running through these events 
is the inability of the woman to control the 
initiation of the behaviour and the subsequent 
interaction. While we did not attem pt to measure 
how frightened or out of control of the situation the 
women were, or believed themselves to be, it seemed 
that the greater the uncertainty about the outcome 
the more terrifying the encounter. We regard this 
as our first major finding as it is the only way to 
make sense of the differences betw een the  
importance women place on certain behaviours as 
against that of the police and the courts.15
Although this research reflected the broad concerns of the feminists 
about violence against women generally, the policing of violence against 
women in the home was firmly on their research agenda. Much was said 
about women's perceptions of policing practices and, although efforts at
125
Chapter Four
T H a e  T r a m t o t i k m  o f f  t t ik g  t o r n ®
quantification were problematic, the emergent picture was that police 
officers did not take women’s requests for help seriously. The authors 
detailed several women's stories, all of which illustrate that women's 
perceptions of police action were negative.
One incident described involved a young woman who awoke one night 
to find a man crouched by the foot of her bed. He left as soon as it was 
apparent that she was no longer asleep. When the police arrived they 
apparently told the woman and her parents that the man was 'a regular' 
who was difficult to catch and proceeded to relate something of his history. 
It seems that he had begun as a prowler at age 17 and, at the time of his 
incursion into the young woman's bedroom at the age of 34, he was known 
for breaking into women's homes and fondling them while they slept. The 
attending officers apparently told the victim and her family that the 
perpetrator's stated ultimate desire was to kill a woman slowly and watch 
her die and he had boasted to police that he knew the right things to say to 
psychiatrists. The police concluded that as he had not actually harmed 
anyone yet it was difficult to 'get' him.
According to the woman's account to the researchers, the man was 
eventually prosecuted, but she did not attend court and the outcome of the 
case was not reported. What the research report did detail, however, was 
the woman's feelings about the incident:
I get frightened when I am trying to get to sleep. If 
I hear a strange noise, I really believe someone is 
there. I have to get up and pu t the light on.
Initially I would just lie in bed, unable to move. I 
was just scared. I put the light on to reassure 
myself. I made myself do it, otherwise I can’t 
sleep. 16
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The researchers noted a pattern of minimal involvement by the police. 
In examples of domestic assault "the police do not arrest the man or take 
any action except perhaps to move him temporarily on", instead they "tell 
the woman that it is her responsibility to prosecute" although "the police 
have legal power to bring prosecutions in all crimes."17
Their report concluded with some recommendations for further 
research. Among them was the need for a study which would estimate the 
increase in prisons, police, courts and their officials, including the 
probation service, that would be required in order to process all known 
offenders. They also wanted studies of how the exercise of police 
discretion reconstitutes violence to women in the home as non-criminal. 
Women were perceived to be unwilling to use criminal prosecution against 
the men who abused them. Accordingly, there was a need for studies of 
why this should be so in order that the numbers of prosecutions could be 
increased. By this time policing was clearly on the agenda for feminist 
researchers looking into violence against women. If refuge activists and 
feminist social scientists were beginning to think about using state 
agencies, including the police, to organize a social response to violence 
against women, including violence within the confines of the home, there 
were feminists expert in the discipline of social administration who were 
willing to engage the practicalities of this problem.
Social administration and
violence against women
In September of 1981 the Department of Health and Social Security 
funded a conference held at the University of Kent at Canterbury which 
was organized by Jan Pahl, a member of the department. This conference
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brought together many professionals working in the area of wife abuse 
including social workers, housing managers, doctors, nurses, health visitors, 
solicitors, police officers, and social scientists. Also included were refuge 
workers from Women's Aid organizations in England, Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland as well as a few women who had actual experience of 
battering. The conference represented the convergence of these disparate 
bodies and institutions on the issue of domestic violence. Its purpose was 
to develop practical recommendations for policy and practice in the field of 
wife abuse. Accordingly, reports were given on the response of the police, 
the legal profession, social work, housing departments, and medical 
agencies to the problem. The core presentations of the conference were 
published in 1985, together with comprehensive details of a longitudinal 
study of 42 women who were forced to leave their violent husbands.18
Of particular importance to Pahl's analysis was the divide between the 
private realm of the family and the public institutions which were charged 
with responding to violence against women in that sphere. As she put it 
the "growth of the welfare state and the increased intervention of the state 
into family life have been paralleled by a growth in concern for the 
privacy of the home and for the rights of the private individual."19 She 
went on to say that:
The dichotomy between public and private must be 
of concern to those who seek to understand the roots 
of violence against wives and to those who want to 
help the victims of violence in the home. In a 
cu ltu re  which, both explicitly and im plicitly , 
assum es fundam enta l linkages betw een such 
concepts as ’woman’, 'wife', ’family’, 'home', and 
'private ', it is no accident that violence against a 
woman, perpetuated by her husband within their 
family home, is somehow seen as a different sort of 
crime from violence against a stranger in a public 
place.20
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Although the public-private distinction was of particular relevance to 
those professionals responsible for enforcing the law Pahl also stressed 
that "housing is a central issue".21 Connected with this, she noted that 
Women’s Aid was the primary agency for helping battered women. In this 
respect she did not deviate too far from the, by then, traditional feminist 
stand-point on the issue. She recognized that both in the short term and in 
the long term abused women need safe accommodation so that they are 
not forced to go on living with violent men. In connection with this she 
pointed out that funding for refuges was far from sufficient. There was 
not enough refuge space when it was provided it was often overcrowded 
and dilapidated. Also, there was evidence that local authorities were
evading their responsibilities to women victims of violent men which
meant that the long term housing needs of these women were not being 
met.
What was relatively new was a focus on changing the practices of the 
helping professions and the police. As we have seen, a critique of these 
agencies had always been an undercurrent in feminist discourse. However, 
actually thinking of changing these institutional practices to bring them in 
line with the needs of battered women was contentious. Pahl 
recommended that:
There is an urgent need for training for all those 
professionals who meet abused women in the course 
of their work. Better p rac tice  and  g rea te r 
understanding need not cost money but they do 
require determination and action. It is particularly 
im portant that those who are in a position to help 
ba ttered  women are knowledgeable about the 
relevant legislation, about women's rights to social 
security  benefits and housing, and about the 
whereabouts of the nearest women's refuge. The 
topic of wife abuse should be covered both in the 
basic training and in the in-service training of all 
the relevant professions.22
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While questions of cooperating with officials from social services and 
local government were viewed, by at least some feminists, as contrary to 
the aims of the women's movement as a whole, the need to improve the 
services available to battered women was, to the majority in attendance at 
the Canterbury conference, an overriding concern. There is no doubt that 
pressure had to be applied on local government and housing officials if 
long term housing needs, always a central issue, were to be met. In 
addition, refuge provision had also to be augmented and for this to happen 
more funding was needed. Up to this point the aims of both the 
'revisionist' and 'radical' views were much the same. It had been 
recognized by activists in Women's Aid that refuge provision could not 
adequately be provided by squatting. It was felt that such a tactic did not 
provide the security necessary to women who are in need of a rest and 
time to consider their options.23 In this respect, the recommendations 
made at the conference were not contentious.
The last recommendation dealt with the response of the criminal 
justice system and edged in the direction of criminalization as a possible 
component in the overall social response to the violence. It has already 
been shown that, from the beginning of the 1980s, there had been growing 
concern over the response of the police to violence against women. 
Feminist social scientists, who had long criticized the police as 'upholders of 
patriarchy', were beginning to see advantages in criminalizing wife 
battery. Hanmer and Saunders had explicitly introduced policing issues 
onto the research agenda but it seems that Jan Pahl was the first British 
feminist to introduce the possibility of talking about the police, not as 
'upholders of patriarchy', but as an important part of changing societal
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values regarding wife abuse. The police had, up until then been part of the 
problem, but in the early-80s they became part of the solution.
As Pahl explained, police officers exercise a great deal of discretion in 
how they implement the law. The exercise of discretion resulted in the 
partial implementation of legislation. Further, this partial implementation 
was not random but tended to reflect and reinforce particular patterns of 
social relationships. Police were considered to enforce the relevant 
sections of the criminal code when they were dealing with violence 
between strangers in a public place. When asked to deal with violence 
between intimates in private space they were disinclined to do so. A gap 
between theory and practice had the effect of making assault on a wife 
less serious than an assault on a stranger.24 Up to this point in the 
argument Pahl had not introduced anything new. The police were seen as 
’reflecting and reinforcing' patriarchy and this was something tha t 
feminists had 'known' for over a decade. What Pahl went on to argue was 
that this state of affairs diminished public concern about the problem. She 
also introduced into her argument findings from American researchers 
which showed that the use of arrest by police officers in cases of domestic 
violence had a 'positive deterrent effect'. By Pahl's reckoning this meant 
that the criminalization of wife battery would have a twofold effect. 
Firstly, it would signal to British society as a whole that wife beating was 
not acceptable behaviour that would be a critical step in abolishing the 
behaviour in the long term. Secondly, the deterrent effect of arrest meant 
that, in the short term, the needs of women victims of violent men would 
be met.
During this period British police forces had yet to come to grips with 
the problem of policing violence against wives. There was, however, a
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great deal of research being done in the United States and Canada from the 
late-70s onward. Some feminists in the social sciences and social 
administration had opened the door for that information to be let in.
Practical developm ents
in North America
While developments in the battered women’s movement in Great 
Britain owed much to publicity surrounding the sex-murders committed 
by one man, no comparable issue had emerged in the United States. The 
battered women's movement in the U.S. was never galvanized by a single 
issue. Rather, it was left to wind its way through history following it's own 
internal logic. That path was not a straight one. The movement in 
America was also inclined to fragmentation and this meant that it could 
take strange turns.
In 1977 there was an indication from feminists in the United States as 
to what kind of turns could be made. In that year in Philadelphia activists 
clearly split over issues regarding appropriate tactics for confronting male 
violence.(Spare Rib No, 63, Oct. 1977) A shelter had been established in 
1976, on collective lines after a long battle with the state for funding. The 
refuge itself was small and under-resourced but it was the first service in 
the city for women victims of male violence. Shortly after the refuge was 
established another group, the Working Group on Battered Women, was 
also set up. This small network called itself a 'socialist-feminist study and 
action group'. The study was aimed at developing a political analysis of 
violence against women and its practical work was aimed at lobbying for 
legal changes in order to afford more protection for battered women. The 
'shelter group' and the 'study and action group' proved able to share the
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territory since both shared similar understandings of what the appropriate 
political analysis should be.
Confrontation between feminists was not far away, however. It came 
with the establishment of the 'Women's Resource Network'. This group 
aimed at 'sensitizing' the police force and social workers to the problems of
battered women and there was a great deal of consequent acrimony about
this. It was explained that:
This group was started this April by one woman who 
had left a women's collective where she'd been 
working for six years. Disillusioned by collective 
action, she's developing her agency on strictly 
hierarchical lines, with herself as director.(Spare 
Rib No. 63, Oct. 1977)
Problems arose out of the Resource Network's practical program. 
Refuge activists protested that many members of the Philadelphia police 
force were involved in racial attacks which meant that they were 
incapable of delivering any kind of service to minority women. Further, 
shelter activists charged that the social services were an oppressive 
bureaucracy functioning mainly to keep people where they are, that is: in 
the ghetto, at the kitchen sink and unemployed.
When the Women's Resource Network called a conference for social 
workers and police to discuss 'wife beating' the refuge activists criticisms 
were confirmed. No attempts were made to draw in other women 
involved in the issue, nor were battered women allowed to speak for 
themselves. The refuge activists had argued that the first priority in 
addressing the issue of male violence was to listen to the victims of the 
violence. It was argued that, without such an input, the issue was in 
danger of being redefined by traditional institutions and services for
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victims would suffer as a result. This political battle was fought in public. 
The outcome of this factionalism was to undermine the credibility of 
feminists seeking to provide services for battered women, at least in some 
quarters.
This trend, evident in the late-70s, was pre-eminent by the middle if 
the 1980s. This does not mean that the refuge movement disappeared. 
Indeed, over this period it was expanding. However, it was expanding 
very slowly. By 1983 thirty-seven states had appropriated funds for 
services to violent families. Nevertheless, it was acknowledged that the 
needs of shelters and other services to violent families were still largely 
unmet. Most shelters were operating on a shoestring. This meant they 
were capable of providing only the most basic services and were turning 
away substantial numbers of women seeking assistance.25
By contrast, initiatives by state agencies were multiplying at a 
dizzying rate. Ten states had enacted legislation making spouse abuse a 
criminal offence in its own right by 1983. In twenty-one states, police 
officers were permitted to make arrests without a warrant in cases where 
there was probable cause to believe that an abuser had committed a 
misdemeanour. Most of the arrest laws passed during this period gave 
police discretionary power, but four state laws imposed a duty to arrest 
where there was probable cause. Much of the legislative effort went into 
designing forms of civil injunctions and the violation of a protection order 
was made into a criminal offence. This meant that women were not being 
helped to leave violent men, rather, they were being given 'protection1. 
Legislation was targeted to help 'violent families', rather than helping 
women to leave violent men.26
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Social scientists, only some of whom professed any allegiance to a 
feminist analysis, were very active in North America during this period. 
Ultimately their activity served to confirm that criminalization was the 
most effective way to intervene in family violence situations.
North American Social Science
and domestic violence
In 1971 it was reported that only one quarter of a sample of attorneys 
felt that police officers had proved helpful to their clients in cases 
involving wife abuse.27 Assessing the service delivery of agencies like the 
police to victims of crime became known in certain circles as a ’consumer 
approach' to the issue; an approach to service delivery to victims which 
owed more to the development of victim survey technology and the 
corresponding victim's movement than to the political activities of 
feminists. Throughout the 1970s a number of small scale studies had 
addressed the service delivery of these agencies.28 It was not until 1982 
that the first substantial development of this approach was published. 
This was a study by Lee Bowker of a sample of 146 battered women in 
southeastern Wisconsin. Briefly, the findings were that women found that 
police responded to their calls fairly quickly (an average response time of 
13.4 minutes) and were good at 'direct intervention'. However, it was also 
reported that wives requested that officers arrest in 82% of cases, yet 
arrests were made in only 14%. As a group women rated police services as 
less successful in reducing or eliminating the violence than any other 
agency including lawyers, district attorneys, social services, the clergy and 
women's groups.29
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Bowker had also asked similar questions of a different sample of 
women. His second study examined the experiences of 1,000 battered 
women, recruited nationally. It was not demographically representative 
sample, but one obtained by soliciting responses in a national woman's 
magazine: Woman's Day. The call for replies produced three pools of data. 
The first was quantitative and consisted of responses to a standardized 
questionnaire. The second was more qualitative, consisting of a set of 
letters, spontaneously submitted by many of the research subjects and 
expanding on the answers given in the questionnaires. The third set was 
also qualitative in nature and consisted of a set of case histories also 
spontaneously added by the respondents. This was indeed a very large 
pool of data, Bowker explained the details of the sample:
Of the 1,000 women studied, 927 were white, 112 
graduated from college, and 906 were legally 
married to the men they lived with. Only 253 failed 
to graduate from high school. They had an average 
of two children with the batterer, and a mean 
annual family income of $16,000 in 1982.30
Bowker reminded readers that "all of the data discussed are based on . 
the subjective observations of battered wives" and that no effort was made 
to balance the perspective with "other subjective data from police records 
or interviews with police officers" nor were they "supported by quasi­
objective observations recorded by trained social scientists."31 This 
limitation was considered to be inherent in any consumer approach to law 
enforcement or social agency service delivery. On the basis of this sample 
Bowker produced a quantification of the perceptions of battered women of 
service delivery. This is represented in the table on the following page.
It can be seen from this table that the police rate fairly low in their 
effectiveness rating, ranking fifth out of eight. In addition they are also
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seen to be the most likely agency to cause increased violence. Bowker 
made a tentative explanation of why this might be the case. Police are 
called to ’incidents of domestic violence1 at a specific point in the history of 
a relationship when emotions are running high. This intervention is 
usually a single session intervention targeted at the criminal behaviour 
itself and police officers are restricted both by the formal goal of enforcing 
the law and by elaborate codes of professional conduct.
Effectiveness o f Formal Help-Sources 
Used by Battered Wives
Formal Help Very or Somewhat Caused Increased N
Source Effective (%) Violence (%)
Women’s Groups 60 5 244
Women's Shelters 56 7 212
Lawyers 50 11 473
Social Service/ 
Counselling 47 8 537
Police 39 19 537
District Attorneys 38 17 119
Clergy 34 7 333
Physicians/Nurses 31 9 330
Table taken from Police Studies. Summer 1984
Bowker's conclusions were modest. The effectiveness of the police was 
"limited by the nature of the service offered, the point at which the 
intervention occurs, the goals of the service organization and the
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characteristics of the families with which the police become involved." The 
recommendations were more modest. He suggested that police be trained 
in verbal helping behaviour and that more time be devoted to educating 
officers about the situation of battered women in general. In addition, the 
desirability of arrest, when that action has been requested by the victim of 
a domestic assault, was also emphasized. This last recommendation was 
based on the complaints from research subjects in interviews and letters 
which detailed police inaction.
Extensive research on policing family violence was also taking place 
within policing organizations at this time. One such study, into 'the social 
service role of the police in domestic violence situations', was conducted by 
Bruce Levens and Donald Dutton in the late 1970s in Vancouver, British 
Columbia. This research, like much of the research in this area, had been 
carried out by people explicitly interested in police research. However, in 
this case, the authors began with the recognition that although "the 
principal mission of the police is frequently portrayed as reflecting a 
narrow emphasis upon controlling crime, police officers usually engage in a 
large number of social service activities that are not strictly related to law 
enforcement responsibilities."32 This study was undertaken "to review 
training programs that have been designed to acquaint the line officer with 
resources and techniques for handling domestic disputes, and to identify 
program components associated with successful police intervention 
strategies." A second component of the research set out to "describe and 
analyse the effects of crisis intervention training in British Columbia on the 
handling of domestic discord by the Vancouver Police Department during 
the first year of the local program's development and implementation."
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Levens and Dutton operated with a different definition of the issue of 
'domestic violence' than that employed by the battered women’s 
movement. Their use of the word more closely conformed to the definition 
employed by the police. It included not only husband/wife abuse but also 
the whole gamut of possible combinations of persons conflicting in a 
domestic setting. The problem with this operational definition, as far as 
activists in the battered women's movement were concerned, was that it 
tended to obscure the fact that virtually all of the assailants in these 
instances are male and most of the victims female.
The authors recognized that "domestic dispute intervention" comprises 
a "complex, multifaceted demand for service" and they did not put forth 
any simple solution. They proceed from Bard's typology of three models of 
police intervention: i) the Generalist-Specialist model, ii) the Generalist- 
Procedural Model, iii) the Specialist Model. The latter was quickly 
rejected as "an extravagant use of police personnel" The first alternative 
was rejected because of the recognition that all officers occasionally handle 
these types of situations whether they have been trained as specialists or 
not and that "the tone of police community relations is often shaped by the 
crucial role that police play when intervening in family fights, thereby 
indicating a need for all uniformed officers to be skilled in this area."
Having identified the generalist-procedural model as the one most 
appropriate these authors went on to say that improved police response 
cannot supplant the need for experienced social workers, psychiatrists, and 
psychologists. According to Levens and Dutton, police perform their role by 
intervening in the situation thereby preventing any immediate tragedy. 
After the 'crisis intervention' police can then act as a referral point into the 
network of social services. In order for this to be accomplished effectively
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it is necessary for officers at all levels of the institution to be trained in 
their respective roles vis-a-vis 'domestic violence', so that police 
dispatchers, middle management and line officers are all aware of their 
specific function as regards this, or indeed any other, type of incident.
Levens and Dutton suggested that "an effective relationship between a 
family in crisis and the social work professional may prevent repeat 
requests for police intervention, and the timely referral may prevent the 
domestic problem escalating into a more serious one resulting in severe 
injury, criminal charges, and possibly homicide." They suggested a model 
for police practice which emphasized that police response came in tandem 
with the response of other social agencies and that there was a need to 
coordinate efforts in order to make them complimentary. However, social 
service-type responses by the police were criticized at the time and the 
model of 'victim protection-offender arrest' was held up as the more 
appropriate.
The view that police response predicated on the use of arrest was the 
most appropriate in these instances was strongly argued for in the United 
States by Daniel J. Bell.33 He based his recommendations on a lengthy 
study undertaken in Ohio for urban, suburban and rural police 
jurisdictions. His sample represents a composite of 128,171 'domestic 
dispute' and 'violence' incidents reported to Ohio police jurisdictions which 
occurred between August 1, 1979 and December 31, 1981.
Bell found that arrests were made in only 14% of the cases with 
referrals to other agencies occurring 19% of the time and "no action" 
accounting for the remainder of the dispositions. Given that victims were 
killed or injured in 41% of reported 'domestic violence' incidents, Bell 
concluded that the level of arrest was far too low. He also found that
i
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police were using referrals to other agencies as a way of avoiding their 
responsibilities to victims. The findings indicated that, in cases where 
criminal complaints were initiated, there was a tendency for the police to 
provide referrals to auxiliary service agencies that were not present when 
criminal complaints were not initiated. He concluded:
The police, by not arresting the assaulter and 
referring the victim to other services, have for all 
purposes made a significant contribution to the 
continuation of violence in the victims h o m e . 3 4
The recommendations that followed were that arrest should always be 
the first consideration. Bell left open the issue of police discretion, 
however, concluding that arrests might be appropriate with felonious 
domestic assaults and that social services might be an appropriate 
disposition for some misdemeanour assaults. He stressed the point again 
and again that the social work approach, although it might have its place, 
seemed to serve as an excuse to avoid arrest, and therefore must be used 
cautiously.
According to the author, "the police must develop processes whereby 
violent domestic offenders are identified and dealt with in a manner 
consistent with the severity of their offence." Accordingly, police must be 
adequately trained to differentiate between 'misdemeanour' and 'felony' 
domestic assault cases and steps taken to ensure that police arrest in all 
cases where a 'felony' has been committed. For Bell, the most important 
aspect of the problem was differentiating between the lesser and greater 
crimes. Correct differentiation would ensure that 'felonious assault' cases 
would be classed into categories with mandatory arrest provisions. In
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addition, the reporting of all 'misdemeanour assaults' was also to be made 
mandatory thus ensuring that no call for service could slip through the net. 
In non-arrest incidents the police were to have one option: "to refer the 
offender to an auxiliary service agency for assistance." Ideally, the 
referral was to be mandatory for the offender and made by a summons 
type document. Bell also advocated that any individual placed on 
probation for 'domestic assault' should be under supervision for an 
extended period of time.35
Bell's recommendations come out of the conviction that police practices 
in domestic dispute incidents perpetuate 'domestic violence’ through 
inappropriate action, and through inaction. As a consequence "the family 
members' right to protection has been abridged by the police system's 
unwillingness to cope with domestic violence." According to Bell, the 
concept of 'protect and serve' should motivate police to protect the citizens 
against "all" dangers, whether from strangers or family members.
The debate between police researchers advocating a social service- 
type of intervention and those advocating the victim protection-offender 
arrest model was pre-empted by social scientists in both Canada and the 
United States who were asking questions about the 'deterrence value of 
arrest'. These studies are the subject of the next section. Before leaving 
this discussion behind however, it should be pointed out that the 
practicalities of organizational policing are largely left out of the accounts 
of Bowker, Bell and Levens and Dutton. These researchers take limited 
account of the organizational constraints on policing. They do not see 
policing as a reflexive social process itself, but rather, tend towards a 
dirigist model which ignores what has been termed by police researchers 
the 'occupational culture of policing'.
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Deterrence research and the policing
of domestic violence
In the early 1980s in Ontario, Canada the provincial government was 
very active in seeking a coordinated response to the issue of violence in 
the home.36 The research which examined this initiative highlighted the 
role of the police and published results which underlined the deterrence 
value of arrest. I will consider this research momentarily. Firstly, I would 
like to consider, in brief, the other services available to battered wives in 
the community.
It would be incorrect to reduce the London, Ontario, initiative an 
experiment in improved policing practices since the policing innovations 
that were introduced took place in the context of a wide ranging response 
in the community. For example, at the time research was being carried out 
to assess the police response to ’domestic violence1, a 'family consultation 
service' provided around the clock crisis intervention and informal police 
training aimed at dealing with wife battering. Specialized services in the 
community also included a Battered Women's Advocacy Clinic to provide 
legal and emotional counselling for battered women as well as a treatment 
group for men who batter called Changing Ways. Also, according to the 
Provincial Government, extensive availability of emergency housing 
through local women's shelters and provision for long term housing needs 
of women who have to leave violent husbands, were also available.37 Such 
services provided an important community context in which the police 
intervention could take place. A range of community professionals and 
volunteers, as well as the police, provided a network of services for the 
victims of wife assault.
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The policy initiative in Ontario was a holistic one since it attempted to 
address the problem of domestic violence on a wide front. Despite this, the 
evaluative research conducted on the initiatives there focused on new 
police practices, that is: the criminalization of the problem. Without a 
doubt this aspect was important and when the then Attorney General for 
Ontario, Roy McMurtry, said "...domestic violence is in the realm of other 
criminal offences and must be treated as equally serious, and not be 
regarded as solely a private family matter" he may have been the first 
man in history holding an office of comparable political power to do so.38
The Attorney General's directive, given in August 1982, marked a 
significant change in traditional criminal justice system responses to wife 
assault. Dr. Peter Jaffe, a researcher in the Department of Psychology at 
the University of Western Ontario, put the London initiative, and other 
deterrence based research, in perspective:
In London, police laying charges resulted in a 
significant decrease in charges being withdrawn or 
dismissed, contrary  to the common myth th a t  
victims would be less co-operative (in fact, victims 
were less likely to follow through with their own 
charges). In Minneapolis, a police in te rv e n tio n  
tha t involved  a rre s tin g  the  b a tte re r  was 
approximately two times more effective in reducing 
victim-reported repeat violence during a six m onth 
follow-up than police offering advice or separating 
the couple for a short period of time. The findings 
of these two studies focus mainly on the outcome of 
the functioning of the police component of the 
criminal justice system. However, they give rise to 
further hypotheses about the interaction of the 
justice system with support services available fo r 
families experiencing violence. Although th e  
implications are clear regarding the short term  
deterrent effects of police charging and arresting 
in cases of spousal abuse, the longer term effects 
have not been evaluated.3^
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In 1985 these social scientists were convinced of the 'short term 
deterrent effects' of arrest on perpetrators of 'domestic violence'. The 
questions that remained concerned the 'unintended side-effects' of police 
brought charges. These included the fear that women who might call the 
police for protection would hesitate to do so if they did not want their male 
partner charged, or that arrest would exacerbate abusive behaviour rather 
than diminish or prevent it. Readers should note, on this point, that arrest 
does not necessarily imply lengthy incarceration.
The effects of the policy change, as reported by Jaffe and his 
colleagues, were largely positive. The number of police laid charges rose 
dramatically and this was accompanied by a corresponding decrease in 
victim laid charges. A comparison between arrest rates for pre and post­
policy years can be seen in the following table.
Changing Patterns of Police Laid Charges
1979 and 1980
Year 1979 1980
Wife Abuse Assault Occurrences 444 443
Charges Laid by Police 12 (2.7%) 298 (67.3%)
Charges Laid by Victim 92 (20.7%) 22 (5%)
There were 25 missing cases here because of inconsistencies in filing procedures 
Source: Jaffe, Wolfe, Telford and Austin, 1985
Police laying charges also resulted in significant decreases in charges 
being withdrawn or dismissed. This was contrary to the worry that
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victims would be less cooperative. In fact, the research showed that 
victims were less likely to follow through with their own charges.40 The 
real crux of the matter, however had to do with the effects of arrest as a 
strategy for dealing with 'domestic violence'. Did it lower rates of 
recidivism? Did the quality of violence change? The researchers provided 
a table, reproduced here, which summarized the answer these questions.
The Nature and Extent of Violence Before
and After Police Intervention
1983 Victim responses according 12 months previous 12 months
to the Conflict Tactics Scale to intervention following
Conflict Tactics Scale Frequency (%)* Frequency (%)
N=73 n=61**
1. Threatened to hit or throw 
something at other 57 (78%) 30 (49.1%)
2. Threw, smashed, kicked 
or hit something 57 (78%) 29 (47.5%)
3. Threw something at other 40 (54.8%) 9 (14.8%)
4. Pushed, grabbed or shoved 59 (80.8%) 33 (54.1%)
5. Slapped 52 (71.2%) 18 (29.5%)
6. Kicked, bit or hit with fist 42 (57.2%) 14 (22.9%)
7. Hit or tried to hit with something 33 (45.2%) 11 (18%)
8. Beat up 46 (63%) 15 (24.6%)
9. Threatened with a weapon 18 (24.7%) 6 (9.8%)
10. Used a weapon 3 (4.1%) 1 (1.6%)
* Percent may vary from 100% and victims may not total 73 because of fluctuations in missing 
information or multiple responses to questions
** Complete data was available on 61 out of 73 subjects 
Source Jaffe et al 1985
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In this table the new police response appears to be a strong deterrent 
in the majority of cases. It indicates that not only are there fewer repeat 
occurrences of domestic violence following an arrest, but that when repeat 
violence does occur it is less severe. In their explanation of the findings 
the researchers also pointed out that the husbands most resistant to 
change were those who had witnessed violence in their family of origin or 
had been the victim of child abuse, which fitted in well with 'common 
sense1 conceptions of male batterers.
Subsequent analysis showed two interesting trends. Firstly, victims 
reported a reduction or termination of violence more often (70% vs. 27% of 
the time) when police laid charges rather than when victims laid charges. 
A second finding was that in eight cases where victims wanted no charge 
laid but the police officers persisted in charging, seven out of eight victims 
reported a reduction or termination of their husbands violent behaviour. 
Over all, when police laid charges verbal aggression was reduced by 
approximately one-third (on the conflict tactics scale) and physical 
aggression was reduced by approximately two-thirds. When Jaffe's results 
are considered there can be no other answer. Arrest lowers not only the 
rate of recidivism but also the nature and extent of the domestic violence 
perpetrated. Arrest has the concrete effect of reducing the likelihood of 
repeat offences and, when repeat violence does occur, any subsequent 
violence is of a lower magnitude. These findings and the conclusions were 
widely publicized However, there were methodological problems with 
these studies which were not considered at the time.
To begin, it is somewhat difficult to interpret some of the findings as 
they are presented. No effort was made to indicate how many women left
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their partners concomitantly with the arrest and were less likely to suffer 
repeat violence as a result. This may have affected the validity of the 
findings since, in such instances, lack of repeat violence is not entirely 
attributable to police action. There was a bigger problem, however, which 
has to do with deterioration of the sample size. The 'N’ number displayed 
in the second table is only 73. How did the researchers arrive at that 
number of cases to test?
The sample of incidents was constructed by identifying all assault 
occurrences during 1983 (a total of 2003) and screening them in order to 
reveal those instances of wife abuse (443). With the attrition of recidivists 
and victims who could not be located, a mailing list of 412 was compiled. 
In co-operation with the Chief of Police a letter requesting an interview 
was sent to those potential subjects. The initial response produced 
seventy-four interview candidates and a second mailing to 100 randomly 
selected non-respondents six weeks later provided a further thirteen 
subjects for the study. Part of the sample was used in a pre-test of the 
victim questionnaire and in some cases there was a reluctance of subjects 
to participate fully in the research process. Ultimately, seventy-three 
subjects were obtained who completed the full interview protocol.41 If the 
original sample size is taken to be 412 this means the response rate was 
only 17.7%.
In order to determine the differences between respondents and non­
respondents a comparison of the two populations on socio-economic and 
criminal justice intervention variables was made. This comparison 
indicated that the most significant difference between the two groups was 
in the area of their experiences with the criminal justice system. Women 
who did not respond or who denied requests for interviews were five
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times more likely not to have had charges laid against their assailant 
spouse.
From the report itself we know that the original sample consisted of 
412 cases. We know further that, in 73 of these cases, there were follow- 
up interviews to assess the effectiveness of the response. Of these 73 
cases 58 were instances in which an arrest was made. Calculating on the 
ratio of five-to-one it becomes apparent that out of the 339 cases where 
the victim was not interviewed approximately 55 involved arrest. Further, 
of those interviewed, only 15 cases involved an action other than arrest. 
This means that out of the original sample of 412, in 324 cases where 
there was no arrest there was no follow-up interview. It would seem from 
this that the research can not make any claims about the effectiveness of 
arrest over ’mediation' since so few of the cases in the alternative 
treatment category were captured by the research instrument. Further, 
the number of cases in the arrest treatment category where interviews 
were conducted is roughly equivalent to those in which it was not. The 
weight of the un-tested cases in which arrest was employed creates a 
possibility for a very large bias in the results.
Not only was Jaffe's response rate low, but it is also easy to see that 
the process by which this low response rate was obtained is essentially a 
process of self-selection. I would argue that it is not unlikely that women 
who suffered further and increased violence from their husbands would be 
among those who self-selected themselves out of the research project. The 
proportion of cases affected in this way could be high or low; there is 
simply no way of knowing.
I mentioned earlier the initiative in London Ontario did not just 
concern itself with the 'criminalization' of violence in the home. The
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'hardened' police response was part of a much wider initiative which 
included extensive victims support networks and counselling for men who 
batter. There is no way to separate out the effects of these other 
initiatives in the community from the effect of police using arrest more 
frequently in instances of domestic violence and this also has implications 
for the validity of the findings.
Despite these methodological problems there were concrete  
conclusions drawn from the research. In all cases in the study police 
action seemed to have had the desired effect and there was a perceived 
general decrease in the level of violence regardless of its nature. The 
effect of arrest as opposed to other police intervention measures is judged 
to be a deterrent, because both the quantity and quality of the repeat 
violence after police intervention was lower for that form of intervention 
than any other in the sub-sample population. These findings compared 
well with concurrent findings made by the research team of Sherman and 
Berk in Minneapolis. However, the Minneapolis domestic violence 
experiment did not have the problems with sample deterioration to the 
same extent as the Canadian work.
In fact, the Minneapolis domestic violence experiment was a very 
sophisticated piece of social-scientific research. For the first time in police 
research, a police department permitted experimentation with officers' 
responses to a situation involving a specific offence. The experiment was 
conducted between 1981 and mid-1982, prompted, it seems, by the desire 
to untangle the knot of options available to police officers confronting a 
'domestic assault'. Sherman and Berk explained that police officers had at 
least three conflicting options urged upon them by different groups with 
different theories:
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1) labeling theorists from both sociology and social 
psychology urge that m ediation would be th e  
response least likely to provoke further violence by 
getting at the underlying cause of the violence and 
avoiding the negative labeling denoted by police 
officers taking on their law enforcement role.
2) the traditional approaches of police officers 
which called for as little intervention as possible. 
This is based on the premise that the offenders will 
not be punished by the courts if they are arrested 
and that the problems are basically not solvable. As 
a short term  measure police may resort to forced 
separa tion  (ie. making the suspect leave the 
premises) as a means of achieving peace.
3) deterrence theorists who postulate that a rre s t 
would cause the most discomfort and mediation the 
least discomfort so that arrest would have the effect 
of deterring violent acts while mediation or non 
intervention would be of little use.42
In order to shed some empirical light on these conflicting 
recommendations, the American Police Foundation and the Minneapolis 
Police Department agreed to conduct a classical experiment. The design 
called for systematic use of arrest, separation and some form of mediation, 
with a six month follow-up period to measure the frequency and 
seriousness of violence after each police intervention. The researchers 
explained that:
"... the systematic use of these treatments, unlike a 
cross sectional survey of police actions and 
subsequent violence, is much more effective in 
holding other factors constant. With sufficient 
numbers of cases, the social characteristics of the 
suspects in all three treatm ent groups should be 
very similar. The only difference between them  
should be due to the police actions, not to pre­
existing d ifferences in the average group  
tendencies to commit violence. 43
The design only applied to simple domestic assaults (roughly 
equivalent to a section 47 Actual Bodily Harm offence in Britain) where
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both the suspect and the victim were present when the police arrived. The 
experiment included only those cases in which police were empowered, 
but not required, to make arrests under Minnesota state law. These legal 
conditions had been liberalized in the period leading up to the 
implementation of the experiment and required that the police officer 
have probable cause to believe that a co-habitant or spouse had assaulted 
the victim within the last four hours. Cases of life-threatening or severe 
injury, usually labeled as a felony (the equivalent of Grievous Bodily Harm 
in Britain) were excluded from the design.
The design required each officer to carry a pad of report forms, colour 
coded for the three different police responses. Each time the officers 
encountered a situation that fit the experiment's criteria, they were to take 
whatever action was indicated by the report form on the top of the pad. 
The forms were numbered and arranged for each officer in an order 
determined by a lottery. The consistency of the lottery assignment was to 
be monitored by research staff observers riding on patrol for a sample of 
evenings.
After a police action was taken at the scene of a 'domestic violence' 
incident, the officer was to fill out a brief report and give it to the research 
staff for follow-up. As a further check on the lottery process, the staff 
logged in the reports in the order in which they were received and made 
sure that the sequence corresponded to the original assignment of 
responses.
They employed what they describe as a "predominantly minority, 
female research staff' in anticipation of the "background of the victims". 
This research team conducted detailed face to face interviews initially and 
follow-up interviews by telephone every two weeks for 24 weeks. The
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interviews were designed to measure the frequency and seriousness of 
victimizations caused by a suspect after police intervention. In addition, 
triangulation was built into the design and research staff collected criminal 
justice reports that mentioned suspect's names during the six month 
follow-up period.
In common with all social-scientific investigations, the research 
planned was not the same as the research carried out. The researchers 
argued that while "there is slippage from the original plan" but that none 
of the difficulties "proved finally detrimental to the validity of the 
experiment." In order to gather data as quickly as possible, the 
experiment was located in two of Minneapolis's four precincts, the two 
with the highest density of previous 'domestic violence' crime reports and 
arrests. The 34 officers assigned to those areas were invited to a three- 
day planning meeting and asked to participate in the study for one year. 
All but one agreed. The conference also produced a draft order specifying 
the rules of the experiment to be approved by the Minneapolis Chief of 
Police. These rules created several new situations to be excluded from the 
experiment. Thus, when a suspect attempting to assault police officers, a 
victim persistently demanding an arrest, or if both parties were injured 
the case was not included as part of the experiment. These additional 
exceptions meant that the lottery process was violated more often for the 
separation and mediation treatments than for the arrest treatment. 
However, according to Sherman and Berk, a statistical analysis showed that 
these changes posed no threat to the validity of the experiment's findings.
The experiment began on March 17, 1981 and was to last one year, 
producing about 300 cases. In fact the experiment ran until August 1982, 
four months longer than anticipated, and produced 314 cases. Officers
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taking part in the experiment met with project supervisors on a monthly 
basis. During the course of these meetings it became clear that only 
between 15 and 20 officers were attending the meetings and turning in 
cases, which is why the experiment took more than a year to produce the 
required 300 cases. In an effort to obtain cases more rapidly 18 further 
officers were recruited, but, like the original group, most officers only 
turned in one or two cases. Apparently three officers produced a total of 
28% of the cases. As the researchers explained this was because "they 
worked a particularly violent beat and, in part, because they had a greater 
commitment to the study." Again a statistical analysis showed that the 
effects of police actions did not vary according to which officer was 
involved and since the lottery was by officer, this condition created no 
validity problem for the cases in the study in terms of the experimental 
design.
The researchers admit that officers occasionally failed, due to 
forgetfulness, misunderstanding or confusion, to fully follow the 
experimental design. On the question of officers intentionally biasing the 
research design they are less clear. They admit the possibility that police 
officers, anticipating from the dispatch call a particular kind of incident 
and finding the upcoming experimental treatment ’inappropriate1, may 
have, on occasion, decided to ignore the experiment. Such action would 
have systematically biased the experiment but the authors argue that 
"there is little reason to believe it actually happened."
Over all ninety-nine percent of the suspects targeted for arrest were 
arrested, 78 per cent of those scheduled to receive advice did and 73 per 
cent of those to be sent out of the residence for eight hours actually were 
sent. The explanation for this pattern is that 'mediating' and 'sending'
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were more difficult ways for police to control a situation. As such, there 
was a greater likelihood that officers would resort to arrest as a fallback 
position. For example, when suspects refused to comply with an order to 
leave the premises arrest would become more likely.
According to Sherman and Berk this pattern could have biased 
estimates of the relative effectiveness of arrest by removing uncooperative 
and difficult offenders from mediation and separation treatments. Any 
detrimental effect of arrest could be underestimated and, in the extreme, 
arrest could be shown to increase the chance of violence. In effect the 
arrest category would have had too many ’bad guys’ relative to the other 
treatments. Again, statistical analysis showed that the delivered 
treatments conformed very closely to the experimental design, with no 
problems of bias.
The design of the experiment was compromised again when it came to 
the follow-up interviews with victims. Only 205 (of 330, counting the few 
repeat victims twice) could be located and initial interviews obtained. 
That is a 62% completion rate. Only 161 victims provided all 12 follow-up 
interviews, a completion rate of only 49%. There was no evidence that the 
experimental treatment allocated to the offender affected the victim’s 
decision to grant initial interviews. Statistical tests showed there was no 
difference in victims' willingness to give interviews according to police 
action, race of victim or race of offender. Further, the recidivism rates as 
measured by the self report studies can be compared with officially 
recorded recidivism rates in criminal justice files which affords some 
opportunity of validation by triangulation.
The findings of the experiment as they were reported in a Police 
Foundation Report were interesting. The conclusions drawn from the data
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were that when police officers arrested suspects the recidivism rates over 
the following six months were 50% lower than for the other response 
methods employed. So, 10% of the men arrested repeated their offences. 
The suspects in 19% of those cases in which mediation was used did so and 
24% of those ordered to leave the premises were repeat offenders.44m
According to the then Director of the National Institute of Justice:
The answer appears to be that the police should use 
arrests more frequently in typical domestic violence 
cases if they want to reduce assaults. More research 
is, of course, needed before we can say that only 
arrest should be used in cases of domestic assault.
But the Minneapolis research is useful in guiding 
our way.4^
However, there were caveats to this conclusion associated with the 
paradigmatic nature of the research.46 The Minneapolis domestic violence 
experiment was carried out with the goal of testing the deterrence effect of 
arrest. As such there was no attempt to standardize the nature of the 
other 'treatments’. This means that some officers may have devoted 
considerable time mediating between individuals involved in disputes 
while others could have used a rather different form of mediation, perhaps 
simply threatening the disputants. These two possible forms of mediation 
could have quite different effects having major consequences for the 
construct validity of the experiment. The efficacy of arrest in the 
Minneapolis experiment is seen only in relation to the impact of the other 
interventions. As the content of the mediation or separation treatments 
change the relative impact of arrest will also change.
The authors themselves ended by favouring a presumption of arrest, 
stating that "arrests should be made unless there are good, clear reasons 
why an arrest would be counter productive". They did not, however,
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support a policy of mandatory arrest, granting that there was a need for 
some police discretion in these instances on the grounds that "arrest works 
far better for some kinds of offenders than others".47
Sherman and Berk included in their research reports interesting 
characteristics of the sample population which are seldom noted. The first 
of these is that the suspects in the sample had a 60% unemployment rate. 
The sample itself was drawn from a community with only a 5% 
unemployment rate overall. Further, only 25% of the sample had any 
education beyond highschool and there is a high proportion of ethnic 
minorities (particularly Native American Indians living on reserves). In 
addition, the suspects involved in the sample had a 59% prior arrest rate 
for a variety of offences, suggesting a high rate of involvement with the 
criminal justice system. These characteristics of the sample prefigure 
some important concerns for activists campaigning on behalf of battered 
women later in the decade, especially in Great Britain. These involved 
issues of policing ethnic minorities by a predominantly white male police 
force.
To conclude this account of the deterrence based police research two 
points need to be made. The first is that this research was built on an 
'incident' based conception of the problem. This is conceptualization is 
consonant with the survey based research and is particularly evident in 
the case of the Canadian research which which employed the Conflict 
Tactics Scale. The research is presented as a problem of policing 'incidents 
of violence'. In such an account both the process of the violent relationship 
and the process of policing disappear. Historic, organizational and process 
factors are held constant in this kind of account and understandings of the
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nature of the problem are subtly limited. These conceptual limitations 
may have profound consequences.
The second point to make is a rather different one and that is that 
these initiatives were prompted, at least in part, by feminist agitation. The 
Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment was directly influenced by the 
efforts of American feminists to sue police departments for their non­
involvement in violence against wives and this campaign was explicitly 
recognized as a motive for undertaking the experiment.48 The possibility 
then arises that battered women’s advocates would import the conceptual 
blinders of the deterrence based research into their own accounts of the 
issue.
Summary and Conclusion
What we have seen in the last three chapters is a fairly complex 
process. Wife battery was seen to be the initial discovery of 'refuge 
activists' the first group of which was Chiswick Women's Aid. From this 
initial base, activism on behalf of battered wives spread. The main 
strategy for intervention in the social problem was seen to be the 
establishment of an infrastructure of support built around women's 
refuges. Efforts to consolidate sue1* response were marred in Great 
Britain by external resistance by state agencies and their representatives 
(particularly in the Town Halls) and by internal struggle within the 
'Battered Wives Movement' over ideological and operational control. As 
the refuge movement lost momentum, feminist projects in other, more 
traditional institutions, particularly within the academy, began to 
articulate the problem with less emphasis on refuges and more emphasis
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on the possibility of intervention using established institutions; one of 
which was the police.
In the American context, battered women’s advocates grew 
increasingly marginal to the development of a systematic social response 
to domestic violence during the early-80s. Instead, an increasing amount 
of effort was being put into finding ways of policing the violence, partly 
inspired by efforts of feminist intellectuals campaigning for changes. Hand 
in hand with this, social scientists displayed an interest in studying the 
police response. Together, social scientists and police managers assembled 
a body of knowledge and practice which gave priority to the use of arrest. 
The public were told that 'booking has a bite' and were led to expect that 
the police were capable of service delivery in the best interests of victims 
of male violence in the home.
In Britain at that time (circa 1983) little interest had been shown in 
the policing of the problem. Indeed in the early part of the 1980s there 
were no feminists in Britain making criminalization of the problem the 
central concern. However, in the context of the Sutcliffe killings, and given 
the paucity of government support for the refuge movement, this was 
beginning to change. Some refuge activists were beginning to reconsider 
policing as a strategy. In addition, feminists within the social sciences and 
social welfare establishments were beginning to consider these issues. 
Changing police responses still remained rather lower on the agenda, after 
the issues of housing and refuge space, but interest was growing.
However, the police in the United Kingdom had given scant attention 
to the issue of the policing of violence against wives. There had been no 
research done, aside from the small monitoring project in Bedfordshire. In 
fact, when Kenneth Newman first talked about 'taking the issue of
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domestic violence seriously' in the 1984 Metropolitan Commissioner's 
Report, there is every reason to expect that he did not know anything 
about the developments in the knowledge of the problem. In order to 
understand how 'domestic violence' arrived on the police agenda it is 
necessary to have some understanding of the politics of the police and for 
that we need an understanding of the history of post-war British Policing. 
That is the subject of the next chapter.
1 This coverage of the day's events went on to say that "most women marching were from Women's 
Aid refuges and support groups, and there was a feeling of strength and sisterhood." However, 
the article also lamented that "there was not more support from the Women's Liberation 
Movement [from women not actively involved in Women's Aid] because the march clearly showed 
our identification with the movement" demonstrating the institutional fragmentation of the 
women's movement as a whole. See Spare Rib No. 64 Nov. 1977
2 Interesting to note here is the fact that this more militant protest was not organized through 
the infrastructure of Women's Aid. The 'graffittd bomb' tactics of 1980 were part and parcel of 
the broadening of participation in the politics of the issue, many of the people who took part in 
the Women against Violence Against Women conferences were not themselves refuge activists. 
See Dusty rhodes and Sandra McNeill Women Against Violence Against Women Onlywomen 
Press, London © 1985
3 This coincidence of the intensification of women activists anger and the serial killings is a 
knotty historical problem. There is no doubt that 'feminists' latched on to the Sutcliffe 
murders and used it as a rallying cry. There is also little doubt that, given the climate of fear 
created Sutcliffe (intensified by the media) women's collective action against male violence 
took on a new kind of intensity. The question arises if Peter Sutcliffe had died at birth would 
it have made a difference? The view that history is made by extraordinary individuals, the 
'great man theory of history', is a mistaken one. The point made by many feminists at the time 
was that Sutcliffe was not truly extraordinary. Certainly his violence against women was 
elevated above that of 'ordinary' male behaviour, but it was none the less violence against 
women, something which can be found in every nook and cranny of British society. Without 
Sutcliffe there would be another man's, or men's, brutality. However, it cannot be denied that 
the Sutcliffe sex-killings, and the intensity of emotion they created, did add a particular bent 
to develpoments in the growing politics of 'sexual violence'.
4 op. cit. rhodes and McNeill, 1985
5 ibid.
6 It was explained that legal remedies "have proved quite inadequate to solve the problem [of 
violence against wives]...they have been bedevilled, first, by a competing commitment to the 
preservation of the family unit and, second, by a failure to understand and to cater for the 
woman's own ambivalence about using them. Nor do they provide for her main needs, which are 
either to exclude the aggressor from their common home or to acquire a new home and
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Battered Women. Woman's Aid Federation and Department of Environment ©1981
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9 op. cit. Binney eta/, 1981
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London Published by Hutchinson and Co. with The Explorations in Feminism Collective © 1984
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12 Chambers G. and Tombs, J. The British Crime Survey Scotland HMSO 1984
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Yes its me and I'm drinkin’ again 
Tell everybody that I’m drinkin' again 
Doctor said i t ’d kill me 
but he didn't say when 
Have mercy I’m drinkin’ again
Yes i t ’s me and I’m drinkin’ again 
I’d like to dry out 
but I doubt i f  I can 
My baby said she’d quit me 
but she didn ’t say when 
’Cause I'm drinkin’ again
Working two jobs tryin' to get straight 
Don't need the money just tryin' to loose weight 
Gonna get you all the things that you lack 
A diamond ring and a pink Cadillac 
Came home drunk and pushed you around 
Don't you quit me baby don ’t you put me down 
I’ll never do it again I promise this time
Ryland P. Cooder
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Introduction
In the last three chapters much ground has been covered as the issue 
of violence against wives moved through a number of institutions. We saw 
that, in Great Britain during the early 1970s, the issue was the almost 
exclusive preserve of 'feminists', particularly activists in the refuge 
movement. As the social problem was articulated by these women, it 
concerned 'battered wives'. However, alternative conceptions of the 
problem proliferated as the issue did not long remain exclusively in the 
hands of a 'battered women's movement' and was taken up by 
professionals in the social sciences, the legal system and elsewhere, what 
Foucault would refer to as different 'institutional sites'.1 It was shown that 
this was more the case in North America where the issue was taken up 
rapidly by state agencies and relatively less so in Great Britain where 
there was seeming reluctance by many outside the 'battered women's 
movement' to engage with the problem. This is evidenced by the 
enormous amount of social scientific 'knowledge' about the subject in the 
U.S and Canada and the relative paucity of such 'knowledge' in the U.K. in 
the first decade of the re-emergence of the issue.
At the point we have reached in the historical development of the 
issue, it is about to become one for the British criminal justice system, 
especially its lower reaches in the police institution. As the issue of 
violence against wives began to intersect with the concerns of professional 
policing in the middle of the 1980s, it is important to recognize that the 
police establishment was moving on its own trajectory. The incorporation 
of the issue of 'domestic violence' on that institutional site need not be 
altogether straightforward and, indeed, a quite radical reconstruction of 
the discourse at this conjucture is likely. The process of incorporation of
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the category of 'domestic violence1 into the lexicon of policing cannot be 
understood outside of the parameters of this trajectory. Therefore, it 
necessary to make some attempt to come to grips with that history and 
that is the aim of this chapter.
The approach to history I am adopting here is inspired by Foucault 
who noted that, in the history of ideas, what is important is the notion of 
series. The archaeologist of knowledge identifies "different series" which 
are "juxtaposed to one another, follow one another, overlap and intersect, 
without being able to reduce to a linear schema."2 The metaphor he used 
conjures up, in my mind, an image of the endlessly crisscrossing lines of 
history. Accordingly, it suggests that, in order to understand any historical 
process, one must think in terms of process involving the intersection of 
many histories.
While I am drawing on a particular Foucauldian metaphor here, I am 
also conscious of the fact that this chapter on the police is not faithful to 
the methodological approach advocated and developed in the introductory 
chapter. While such a project is possible, due to the practical limitations of 
limited resources and energy it is not feasible to develop a deep 
understanding of the discourse of policing here. Because of these practical 
limitations I will have recourse to the secondary literature in trying to 
develop an understanding of the critical issues in the politics and practice 
of policing. While this technically betrays the theoretical perspective I 
have laid out, this approach has the advantage of at least creating the 
illusion of historical movement. The other alternative is to present a 'snap 
shot' of the circumstances of policing circa 1985, highlighting what I see as 
the relevant issues. Such an approach would put the incorporation the 
issue of 'domestic violence' into the lexicon of the policing in its context,
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but my personal preference is for historical movement. In order to 
develop a feeling of such movement I wish to lay out a brief chronology of 
the politics and practice of policing in Britain in the post-war era up until 
the mid-1980s. In doing so, salient issues in policing practice and the 
politics of policing will come to light.
Policing Britain in the post-war years-
the Golden Era and beyond
Concern with the history of the post-war British police has been 
located by reference to 'the golden era of British policing1. During this 
period (roughly from 1945 to the late 1950s) "the maximal possible degree 
of consent" for policing had been achieved.3 The subsequent history of 
the police has been written in order to explain the slow erosion of the 
consent to be policed, and possibly to point towards a rejuvenation of that 
consensus. The first official sign that 'policing by consent' was thought to 
be precarious is usually regarded as the establishment of the Royal 
Commission on the Police in 1960 and much subsequent analysis has 
focused attention on the 1960s, that 'era of permissiveness', in order to 
find the roots of the legitimacy crisis.4
During the 'golden era', policing in Great Britain did seem to approach 
the 'Dixon of Dock Green' image, at least according to police observers of 
the time. One portrayed the police as enjoying "popular confidence and 
esteem because the people know they will not overstep the safeguards to 
individual liberty provided under the law and rigorously protected by the 
courts."5 Michael Ban ton conducted observational work in Edinburgh in 
the early 1950s and his subsequent publication gives us some idea of what 
policing was like then. He found that the police and community were
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organically linked, sharing many of the same cultural values and norms. 
The officers themselves were part of a relatively homogeneous community, 
they patrolled on foot and knew their own beats and the people who lived 
within those boundaries well. Banton stressed that, in addition to sharing 
virtually all of the same cultural values as the community, the police 
officer of the time knew that he depended upon it's members trust and 
cooperation in order to carry out his duties. Interestingly, Banton notes 
that this led to an under-enforcement of the law, especially with regard to 
minor infractions.6 In many such cases the likelihood seems to have been 
some kind of informal action; a negotiation between disputants, with the 
police officer as adjudicator.
The primary role of the police at this time, at least according to 
Banton, was as peace officer. The smooth working of the system depended 
on the good use of the officers discretionary powers in order to ensure the 
continued cooperation and trust of the public he policed. Banton noted 
when he was writing in 1973:
Policemen, being subconsciously aware of their 
dependence upon these o ther m echanism s of 
control, prefer to work as peace officers and to see 
their role in these terms. There is in Britain a 
current of opposition to specialization in police 
work...which seems to rest upon the ideal of the 
policeman as a peace officer. ?
However, we should remain somewhat sceptical of the portrayal of 
this era as a 'golden age’. Banton's account does indeed affirm a society 
with good organic links between the police and public, however it might be 
that the situation in an urban centre such as Edinburgh does not 
correspond exactly with that of the more cosmopolitan metropolis of
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London. It is likely that London was much less homogeneous than other 
parts of the country which may have presented some difficulties for 
Banton's 'peace officer'.
We should also remember that, throughout the late 1950s, there was a 
slow seepage of stories into the press concerned with the corruption and 
illegal practices of police officers and these were by no means restricted to 
London.8 While no serious political challenge to the police practices 
emerged as a result of these scandals, it was possible to point out 
individuals amongst the nation's law enforcers in need of disciplinary 
action which detracts from the idea of a 'golden age'. In addition, some 
policing practices, for example interrogation 'techniques', also contradict 
Banton's cosy representation.9
In this period police corruption was the main pollutant capable of 
tarnishing the lustre of the institution, but it was a matter largely kept 
from public view. Current wisdom has it that the corruption was confined 
largely to the Metropolitan CID.10 However, problems in other borough 
and county forces were manifest and it seems likely that illegal activities 
by police officers at the time were largely a function of opportunity rather 
than a characteristic of a particular force. The establishment of the Willink 
Commission in 1960 is held to have been a direct response to the large 
number of scandals.11
It can be said that in the period immediately after the war British 
society settled into an exhausted stability in which policing was a 
relatively unproblematic task. However, there were nascent features of 
British civil society which pointed to emergent policing problems. For 
example, crowd control problems at football matches are not as recent a 
phenomenon as some might imagine. The first 'pitch invasions', now
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routinely considered to require police intervention, have been dated as 
taking place in 1950.12 Similarly racist attacks by white people against 
black minorities, now a matter of policing priority, began to emerge slowly 
during the period.13 It has been claimed that the rioting in Nottingham 
and Notting Hill in 1958 were preceded by years of persistent harassment 
of black people which, although it may never have been an issue for public 
and political debate, must have involved operational police officers from 
time to time.14 Also, at the end of the decade police began to encounter 
protest movements organized by middle-class participants. In late 1958 
forty-five demonstrators received national media coverage as their 
passively uncooperative bodies were carted away from a construction site 
in Norfolk where the military were setting up rocket launching facilities. 
Less than a year later the police had to look after a crowd of 10,000, 
mostly white, mostly middle class people marching on Aldermaston.15
What were, in the 1950s, only emergent trends in public order 
policing became one of the major issues in policing politics and practice in 
the following decades, but the major reference point emerged somewhat 
later when the Willink Commission published its Final Report in 1962. In 
it the authors noted that "the problem of controlling the police can be 
restated as the problem of controlling Chief Constables."16
The Report of the Royal Commission was criticized at the time for 
being too superficial. The Economist referred to the final report as 'frankly 
disappointing'.17 A critic in Public Law said, in a detailed commentary of 
the Report, that it was:
unrealistic, glamourized, and too general...We are 
constantly being taken back into the past for which 
the Commission has great respect; and u n le s s  
careful, we are mesmerized by verbiage and hollow 
phrases...Members of the Commission, and especially
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the Chairman, spoke at far too great length, instead 
of eliciting information from witnesses. Further, 
almost every time a witness referred to a particular 
happening, the Commission was reluctant to hear 
about it. But how else can a picture of what in fact 
happens in bad cases be built up?... Far too much 
time is taken up explaining why things are as they  
are: for instance, why the legal p osition  is 
uncertain and confusing. This is a largely pointless 
activity for a Royal Commission.1**
The 1962 Report, with ten members signing various dissents as well as 
the penning of a Minority Report, tended to be compromised, vaguely 
general and conflicting. The Commission was criticized most of all for the 
interpretations placed on a Social Survey conducted at the time. It was 
pointed out that the findings were available more than a year before the 
final Report was produced, giving plenty of time for assimilation, but that 
the conclusions took inadequate account of the findings.
The findings indicated that 42.4% of the public thought that some 
policemen took bribes, 34.7% that the police used unfair methods to get 
information, 32% that they might distort evidence in court and 17.8% that 
on occasions they used too much force. In addition the number of people 
who claimed they had personal knowledge of serious misconduct by a 
policeman was equivalent to 65,000 cases per annum.19
It could be pointed out that such a survey only gathers opinion and 
what the Commission needed was facts. Such a criticism is certainly 
supported when the construction of the survey sample is put under 
scrutiny. The sample was constructed from the electoral register which 
meant that, not only were persons under the age of eighteen years not 
represented but that the sample tended systematically to under represent 
young people. The 18-21 age group, for example, formed only 3.8% of the 
sample whereas it constituted 6.4% of the population. Had this sampling
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bias been overcome t±ie findings would likely have produced even more 
extreme results.
It has also been said that the investigative activities of the Willink 
Commission were hampered by the fact that its members did not have any 
expertise in the interpretation of social scientific ’facts'.20 Thus, the point 
has been made that the Commission ignored findings that 51.9% of police 
officers questioned thought that the standards of recruits entering police 
service had dropped and, further, that 89% wanted measures taken to 
improve their relations with the public and gave suggestions for doing so. 
Further, and despite that fact that the Commission was established in order 
to investigate the problem of police accountability, they failed to collect 
any evidence of either disciplinary charges or convictions against 
policemen. The Commission expressed anxiety about the attitudes of 
young people to the police, but did not hear any evidence about this. Most 
interesting, especially with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, was the 
revelation that many police officers thought that ’coloured people' had 
grown more resentful of them in recent years. Criticism of the time 
pointed out that "there was no sign that the Commission investigated this 
fact", or considered that there was "not one coloured professional 
policeman in Britain".21
Despite the problems stemming from inadequate attendance to the 
rules of social-scientific inquiry the authors of the Final Report confidently 
stated:
(para 338) The findings of the social survey 
constitute an overwhelming vote of confidence in 
the police...We therefore assert confidently, on the 
basis of this survey, that relations between the 
police and public are on the whole very good, and 
we have no reason to suppose that they have ever, 
in recent times, been otherwise. This is a finding
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which we believe will give great satisfaction to Your 
Majesty, to the police, and to the public.
(para 350) A study of this valuable report reveals 
an attitude of mind on both sides that augurs well 
for the continuance of good relations between the  
police and the public for years to come.22
The Police Act, which followed two years after the Report in 1964, was 
modelled on the recommendations of the Willink Commission. This 
established the tripartite structure of governance for the police, consisting 
of local government, central government and the police themselves, and it 
has been within this institutional framework that subsequent questions of 
police autonomy have been fought over. It has been noted that this 
system further shifted power towards central government and the police 
and away from the local state.23 Responsibility, however, was never 
delegated to a specific body. Thus, while under section 5 of the Act, local 
police committees appoint and ’retire' chief constables as well as their 
deputies and assistants, the Home Secretary has the final say over any 
decision taken. Similarly, if a police committee is dissatisfied with a 
particular aspect of the policing of its area it can require a report to be 
submitted by the chief officer under the provisions of section 11. 
However, this is also subject to the proviso that the chief officer can appeal 
to the secretary of state who will decide if such a report is necessary or 
advisable.24 In addition police committees were not mandated to concern 
themselves with 'operational matters', but only with regard to broad policy 
decisions and funding. In practice the distinction between broad 'policy' 
and narrow 'operations' has always been imprecise and the distinction has 
operated in favour of preserving the autonomy of chief officers.25 If I 
might be perm itted a somewhat childish simile; the tr ip a r ti te
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arrangements established by the Police Act set up a game of piggy in the 
middle with the smallest sibling, local government, always chasing the ball.
Essentially then, the official reaction to the problems and concerns of 
policing emerging in the 1950s served to insulate the office of Chief 
Constable. The foundation of the tripartite system made it difficult to open 
the police institution to both scrutiny and outside pressure. At the same 
time the Police Act 1964 did not properly address the problem of police 
officers’ discretion and autonomy, the source of much of the internal 
problem in the first instance. The authority of the office of constable 
remained "original, not delegated and is exercised at his own discretion, by 
virtue of his office."26 The autonomy of police constables has been a long 
held tradition and has given rise to the often cited paradox of police 
organization that officer's discretion increases as one descends the internal 
hierarchy.
The Police Act made some attempts to address this. Section 48 made 
the chief officer responsible for the wrong-doing of any of his 
subordinates. However, since he is insulated from a thoroughgoing 
accountability, the provision has been criticized as inadequate. It has been 
noted that, as a modem and bureaucratic governmental system, the huge 
autonomy given to police officers at all levels of the organization causes 
problems of legitimacy.27 Again with 20/20 hindsight, it would seem that 
in order to secure the long term legitimacy of the police it would have 
been necessary to tighten the reigns of control on the institution (in other's 
parlance 'increase their accountability'). The real paradox seems to be that 
this would have had the effect of preserving the institution's sovereignty. 
The passage of the Police Act in 1964 left the institution largely unfettered 
by the concerns of the public being policed, but left the institution open to
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possible control, or at least manipulation, by central government through 
the Home Office. Perhaps this was not as easy to see in 1964, certainly 
other issues obscured the debate during the 'swinging sixties'.
Public order policing was only embryonic in the 1950s, but the 
problem was to increase during the following decade. In looking back at 
the 1960s, whether it was 'Mods and Rockers', CND protesters, the 
continuing invasions of the pitch by football fans, the newly discovered 
radicalism of British students, or the continuing problems of racist violence 
one cannot help but see developing three distinct types of problems for the 
police. The first of these was a question of how to address confrontations 
between members of the public. During this period violence, both in terms 
of individual acts of violence and large scale confrontations, was on the 
increase drawing the energy of the police.28 Secondly, and perhaps an 
associated problem, were the increasing confrontations between large 
sections of the public and the police.29 Lastly, there is the concomitant 
withdrawal of consent to be policed by many members of the public.30
We know something of the changes in operational policing of the time 
because of the observational work of Maureen Cain which can be viewed 
as a follow-up study to Banton's earlier work.31 Her study, which 
examined both urban and rural police forces in 1962-63 (with some 
follow-up work in 1965) showed that the 'peace-keeping role1 was not 
dead. This was particularly the case in the rural forces where the police 
were still well integrated into the community. Her work did, however, 
chart the decline of that role in urban police forces as the predominant 
style of policing.
What this observational work showed was that the rural officer, 
coping with a large variety of tasks, many of which brought him into
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friendly contact with inhabitants on his beat, was maintaining organic links 
with the community he was policing. In contrast, the urban officer was 
subject to greater specialization such that, most crime related incidents 
were handled by the CID; vice and drug offences were handled by 
respective specialist departments; traffic violations were the preserve of 
officers patrolling in automobiles; and so on. Cain noted that:
The result was that the man left walking the beat 
had little of interest to do by way of responding to 
requests for emergency services. Nor could he fall 
back on the more rewarding peace-keeping role of 
the rural police man. There was an acute shortage 
of men on the beat, brought about both by wastage 
and by low recruitm ent, and by the hiving-off of 
men into specialist departments. As a result men 
were not usually posted to the same beat for a long 
period, and two or three beats were combined into a 
single patrol...thus 'preventive initiation' or peace­
keeping was impossible; emergencies and public 
in itia ted  actions were dealt with by o th er 
departm ents or the cars; crime was taken out of the 
beat m an's hands once it was reported. the 
uniformed patrol man was thus left with a residuum 
of individually meaningless and low status tasks.
It seems that police officers in this position were left with three 
options. Beat officers could fall back on the traditional ’intelligence 
gathering1 tasks and establish personal contacts with people on their beats; 
something which was militated against by the newly increased size of the 
’patches' and the high rate of turnover that the officers experienced. The 
second alternative, which Cain christened 'easing behaviour', was to seek 
out the local 'tea spot' (or pub, which was more dangerous) for 'rest and 
relaxation' while on duty. Easing behaviour, especially if it involved 
consumption of alcohol, required the cooperation of fellow constables in 
order to facilitate concealment from senior officers. We can say, again with 
hindsight, that this had the effect of consolidating some negative aspects of
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police occupational culture.32 The third alternative was to seek out some 
marginally legitimate arrests and Cain found that people of no fixed abode 
were especially vulnerable.33
Cain’s study highlighted important changes which were beginning to 
occur in British policing. However, her study took place before the full 
introduction of unit beat policing which occurred after the passing of the 
Police Act in 1965. The changes that she noted were accelerated after the 
passing of the Act and the the Police Force took on a more specialized and 
differentiated organizational structure. Interesting to note in this regard is 
the formation of the SPG in 1965.34 Originally a body of one hundred 
officers trained in the use of public order strategy and tactics these officers 
were given specialist training in new weapons technology such as the use 
of CS gas and plastic bullets, as well as firearms. The formation of this 
police specialism pre-dates most of the serious violence at public 
demonstrations of the post war period. The subsequent history of public 
order policing seems to follow that, as police increased their capacity for 
organized violence, so too increased the frequency and intensity of 
confrontations between the police and public. As issues in the 
maintainance of public order grew, so too grew the political contestability 
of policing.
It seems to me that 1965 marked an important watershed in the 
history of British policing, possibly the most important of the post-war era. 
At that time policy makers concerned with the shape of policing made a 
number of choices which led policing towards an increasing dependence on 
specialization, technology and policing with a 'hard edge1. At the same 
time the tripartite structure of decision making laid out by the Police Act 
also insulated the police institution giving it a considerable degree of
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institutional autonomy. The sovereignty allotted to police managers as a 
result of the Act did little to soften the impact of changing police practices. 
All the while, significant sections of the public were growing increasingly 
hostile to ’hard' policing.
Throughout the decade the issue of police corruption was to feature 
prominently in the media. This contributed to the image of a police force 
gone wrong. In the early part of the decade the most notable of these 
black marks on the shirt collar of police legitimacy was the Challenor 
affair, a now well worn story of police histories of the era. This particular 
drama involved a police officer being publicly charged with ’fitting up' a 
suspect.35 Detective Sergeant Harold Gordon Challenor was, however, 
deemed unfit to stand trial because of mental instability. How Challenor 
could have managed so long in the police, and even obtain promotion, 
given his propensity for illegal methods and his mental instability were 
obvious questions to ask. An official inquiry headed by A.E. James QC was 
established under S. 32 of the Police Act to ask just these types of 
questions. However, the official report which emerged from this inquiry 
exonerated both police and medical officers of any blame, Challenor was 
eventually retired on full pension and the three other officers implicated 
with him were made to resign from the Force and were given jail 
sentences.
Corruption was to continue playing a major role in the construction of 
a negative police image however. This is because of the curious historical 
contingency surrounding Robert Mark's accession to the office of 
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. Dick Hobbs has produced an 
interesting theory about the use of corruption charges against the CID by 
Mark, while in the office of Deputy Commissioner. According to him, there
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was a need to purge the Police Force of the entrepreneurial policing style 
favoured by old-fashion 'thief takers' and a parallel need to introduce, 
what was conceived of as, a 'militaristic style' brought about by the 
increasing role of the police in dealing with large scale public order 
problems.36 As Hobbs pointed out "Mark heralded the beginning of an era 
that would introduce militarist, technological and tactical innovations 
which would make the war against the CID an inevitability."37 Hobbs went 
on to say that, in this regard, "Mark's close contact with the military, and 
particularly his involvement in Northern Ireland and with the Working 
Party set up to review the army's policies in respect of aid to the civil 
power in 1970, suggests that the Home Office required him to gain as much 
experience as possible of the utilization of military force in conjunction 
with police operations."38
It may be, on the other hand, that Mark's use of corruption charges 
against the CID was merely a matter of personal ambition as he cleared the 
way for his personal accession to the position of Police Commissioner. 
Regardless of the motives, Robert Mark, in his position as Deputy 
Commissioner, mounted a campaign to vilify the CID which was conducted 
largely in the quality press. According to Hobbs, Mark's campaign against 
the CID led to demands in the quality press for another Royal Commission 
into the Police which the then Home Secretary Reginald Mauldling wished 
to circumvent. Given the reputation Mark had established for himself as a 
CID 'basher' it was only natural that he be appointed Commissioner over 
the head of John Waldron in order to head off the press campaign before it 
got too dangerous 39
Hobbs pointed out that "although there is no firm evidence for such a 
claim, it does appear that both Jenkins and Callaghan were making a
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conscious effort to impose the will of the Home Office upon the self- 
perpetuating hierarchy of the Met."40 Even if this was not the case, it is 
important to note that the charges of corruption leveled by Mark during 
his period as Deputy Commissioner, led to demands for another Royal 
Commission. In other words, the emergent challenge to the institutional 
autonomy of the police institution posed by the threat of another Royal 
Commission, came about as a result of factors internal to the institution, 
namely a struggle for power which gave rise to corruption scandals that 
may, otherwise, have remained hidden behind a facade of official police 
investigations into police wrongdoing. The other important point which 
Hobbs drew attention to, is that the appointment of Robert Mark as 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner greatly facilitated the growing 
,militarization, of British Policing which was to have consequences for 
police/public relations throughout the 1970s and on into the 1980s.
Policing the 1970s-
beyond policing by consent
Cain identified some interesting trends in police practice in the mid- 
1960s and she ended on a rather hopeful note. She suggested that the 
adoption of a unit beat policing system might re-assert the peace-keeping 
role.41 In fact, subsequent observational work on the police confirmed the 
opposite; the unintended consequences of the system were to strengthen 
those aspects of the occupational culture of the ’street cop’ that militated 
against the values that would sustain such a role. Instead the institution 
was inculcated with notions of police 'professionalism' which Simon
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Holdaway, a police officer and covert observer of police working practices, 
noted was based on three major principles:
First, the acquisition of specialist knowledge of 
particular aspects of policing and the restructuring 
of the organization into specialist units, in order to 
provide a framework for practice. Secondly, to a 
significant extent, specialist knowledge was based  
on the use of technology. Knowledge of vehicular 
policing, telecommunications and com puterization 
became relevant to the development of systems of 
policing. Thirdly, although discretion has always 
been an in tegral fea tu re  of policing, t h e  
developm ent of professionalization lead to the 
principle of 'informed discretion'. A stress was 
placed on the collection of evidence prior to, rather 
than after, arrest.4 2
As Holdaway explained it, it was hoped that a system of policing 
organized in this way would naturally lead to a greater adherence to the 
rules of due process and hence to a more accountable police service. The 
'managerial professionalism' of those officers charged with the 
administration of the service and the supervision of street level officers 
was to trickle down to constables and sergeants and manifest itself in 
'practical professionalism'. The unit beat system itself was to provide a 
practical framework for the principles of such police professionalism.
Under this system each police sub-division was divided into 'home 
beats', each of which was the responsibility of a 'home beat officer' who 
would undertake to establish links with the community through the 
schools, community organizations, contact with shop keepers and the like. 
His role was to gather 'intelligence' about known or suspected criminals 
and generally know 'the ground'. Further specialization existed within 
sub-divisions in the form of mobile patrols. Panda cars in contact with the
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sub-divisional station using radios were to respond to calls for police 
assistance.
What Holdaway saw and wrote about in his covert study of policing 
was an exaggerated version of Cain's earlier observations. He recorded an 
almost absolute separation between the police and public, observing the 
belief that 'proper policing' could only be done using cars and pointing out 
that officers were less than keen to get out of their cars and meet the 
public. According to him:
Fun and excitement, generated by the use of cars 
and radios, has replaced the cup of tea and chat in 
the local shop. The contacts between the police and 
the population policed which Cain found h av e  
diminished rather than increased; this is a change 
which is contrary to the principles of professional 
policing.43
The dynamic that was established seems to follow that the action 
orientation of police officers, centring around the use of automobiles in 
particular but also other manifestations of new 'technology', replaced the 
interests of many street level police officers in the older style of easing 
behaviour. In addition this reliance on technology meant that a variety of
non-crime related contacts between the police and public were totally lost,
leaving contacts involving inquisitorial and potentially coercive relations as 
the most common form of police-public contact.
Holdaway offered an interesting argument about the widespread 
adoption of interpersonal radios as leading to the increased hedonism and 
interdependence of police constables. According to him, exciting incidents, 
such as brawls, were normally broadcast so that all officers could hear 
them and, potentially, respond. In addition, officers tended to put out calls
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for assistance from other constables "at the slightest hint of trouble."44 
Holdaway's observations in this regard are neatly summed up, in 
criminological parlance today, by the phrase: 'fire-brigade policing'. The 
gradual emergence of this style of police practice went hand in hand with 
the rise of the SPG and other similar police innovations in the area of 
public order policing.45 This style has since been criticized as contributing 
to the further alienation and resentment of those sections of the public 
that the innovations were supposed to control.46
Trends in incidents of 'police brutality' during this period probably 
best serve to indicate the direction that the changing character of British 
policing was taking. One way of measuring these trends is to look at 
deaths in police custody. Between 1970 and 1979 there were 274 such 
deaths recorded, but these are not evenly distributed. They rose from a 
low of eight, in 1970, to a peak of forty-eight in 1978. Another method of 
measuring trends in 'police brutality' is to examine complaints citizens 
make against the police for allegedly assaulting them. The official figures 
show that, in 1970, there were 1,093 complaints of assault by police 
officers. This increased by a factor of three, to 3,178 by 1979.47 At the 
same time, the effectiveness of procedures for complaints against the 
police was demonstrated to have deteriorated. Steven Box reported that 
"the tendency throughout the 1970s was for the investigated proportion of 
all recorded complaints to drop - as indeed it did from 68 per cent to a 
mere 38 per cent" between the years 1970 and 1978.
The development of 'fire brigade policing', the apparently 
overwhelming characteristic of the unit beat system, can be directly linked 
to the development of 'hard' public order policing innovations such as the 
SPG and other paramilitary predispositions of the 'Markist' era. The
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consolidation of this style of policing was easier to achieve because of the 
autonomy of chief officers under the Police Act of 1964, which meant that 
such innovations were left almost entirely in the hands of police decision 
makers.
The context of the policing of 'industrial disputes' intensified the 
politics of policing practice. This politicization was exacerbated by other 
'popular protest movements’ at the time.48 While there seems to be 
agreement amongst observers that, from 1965, the facets of British 
policing most often in the limelight were the 'harder', more militaristic, 
ones, it should be remembered that the development of the SPG could not 
prevent serious 'industrial unrest' from having supreme political 
consequences.49 The Heath government was brought to its knees by 
'industrial action'. This perceived weakness in their ability to control the 
situation at the Saltley Coke depot led to the implementation of a number 
of innovations in the event of future similar occurrences. Chief amongst 
these was the establishment of a national police intelligence unit at 
Scotland Yard in November 1 9 7 3 .5 0
However, as the decade progressed the waters were further muddied 
by new corruption scandals coming under scrutiny in the press. In 1978 
the ill-fated Operation Countryman showed just how muddy policing could 
get. This inquiry was established to investigate allegations of widespread 
corruption, particularly in the Robbery Squad. It had been alleged that 
police officers had been aiding and abetting armed robbers, and officers 
from provincial forces were brought in to investigate the dealings of the 
Metropolitan Police. The true story of Operation Countryman may never 
be told. When Arthur Hambleton, the Chief Constable of Dorset and 
original investigation director, suddenly retired, he made public his belief
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that over eighty officers were under suspicion and that he expected at 
least twenty-five of them to be charged. The corruption was by no means 
restricted to any particular rank either. It was revealed that a list of 
suspects contained 78 officers from Scotland Yard and 18 from the City of 
London, including four commanders, four chief superintendents, eight 
superintendents, fifteen chief inspectors and six inspectors.51
The whole issue of police corruption, which Operation Countryman was 
intended to examine, was further complicated by the use of the 
’supergrass’ in the investigations. This involved known criminals, who 
could themselves have been tried on very serious charges, being granted 
near immunity for their own offences (a practice which involved both the 
police and the courts), in return for information leading to the conviction of 
other persons for other offences. As Brogden et al note "the dangers of 
the ’fit up’ in these secretive, murky, complicated deals, the dubious 
morality involved in overlooking sometimes even numerous serious 
offences in the prospect of clearing up an even greater number of similar 
offences, all but obliterated the mythical line, between the ’straight’ world 
and the underworld, that the 'blues' protect.52 Operation Countryman and 
the connected issue of police corruption did much to damage the the public 
face of the police. Coming, as it did, in conjunction with the emergence of 
para-military policing of public events, civil protest and industrial disputes 
as well as rising crime rates made for a situation in which the institution 
looked very bad indeed.
Whatever the relative weight assigned to any of these factors there is 
no doubt that by the end of the decade discussion about the policing of 
Britain had become highly political. As social tensions along class, race, 
gender and age lines intensified during this period so too did the coercive
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efforts of the formal agents of social control and, perhaps, at times the 
control efforts of the police outstripped the demands being placed on 
them.53 Police spokesmen attempted to articulate their concerns in a non­
political manner asking: ’what is political about crime?1. However, such 
attempts to keep the discussion within the realm of 'operations1 rather 
than 'policy' and so keep the debate focused on technical rather than 
political questions were successful only in a limited way. At the turn of 
the decade there were concerted efforts being made on a number of fronts 
to undermine the autonomy of the institution.
At this time, police decision makers made attempts to counteract the 
bad publicity directed at the institution, primarily by talking about rising 
crime rates. The use of crime statistics in this way has been referred to as 
a 'hegemonic project’ and, further, the history of policing during this era 
has been seen in the context of 'the social history of a moral panic'.54 What 
Hall et al try to demonstrate, in what is perhaps the most widely known 
contribution to criminology of the era, is that in the face of a crisis of 
consent about policing, police managers skillfully used the mass media to 
manufacture a 'moral panic' about 'black muggers'. It must be said that 
they found a willing audience for their stereotypical images of violent 
black men but the generalizations made went beyond mere reflection of 
widely held racist attitudes.55 The cacophony of racist rationalizations 
served to take up media space that might otherwise have been devoted to 
documenting police malpractices. At the same time, and this is more 
important, it created an image of a fettered police force doing the best it 
could in the face of insurmountable odds. Police spokesmen presented 
rising crime statistics in general as justification for increased police 
resources throughout the 1970s with varying degrees of success.56
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It should be mentioned that, during this period, there does seem to 
have been a rise in street robberies involving violence and, further, that 
black over-representation in arrest statistics for this type of crime cannot 
be seen exclusively as the product of police prejudice.57 None of this is 
denied in Policing the Crisis ,58 Their point is rather a different one; that 
mugging became a symbol and a justification for increasing 
authoritarianism, hence the drift towards the exceptional state.
Efforts to articulate the police position in terms of fLaw and Order' and 
the 'Rule of Law' were partially successful. Nevertheless, by the end of the 
1970s issues confronting policing had become hotly politicized and this is 
the main point to be drawn out. As this account enters into the decade of 
the 1980s the political contestability of the policing institution reached a 
high point not seen since the establishment of Peel's 'Blue Locusts' in 1829. 
However, the police institution, through the Police Federation, had a 
relatively secure position by attaching itself to the fortunes of the 
Conservative Party.59 When the Conservatives swept to power in 1979 
they implemented the full terms of pay indicated by the Edmund-Davies 
Report (commissioned by the previous Labour government), terms that 
were initially intended to be phased in. The Conservative Government was 
strongly committed to strengthening the police and doing more to combat 
crime. Its desires were testified to by a willingness to spend money. 
During its first four years in power spending on law and order and the 
protective services rose by 6 per cent per annum, at a time when total 
government expenditure grew by only 2 per cent per annum in real 
terms.60
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The politics of policing in the
1980s - feint, thrust and parry
There are important differences between the police research 
conducted in the 1980s and research from earlier decades. Formerly, 
serious empirical studies of the police in Britain were sporadic. By 1980 
research on the police had become a minor industry within criminology; a 
discipline within a discipline. Indeed, in the early part of the decade the 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner himself was to commission a major 
observational study of the police by independent researchers. The 
resulting PSI Report (Policy Studies Institute) was not always favourable, 
but it did not spoil the newly developed police appetite for research, 
especially ’policy oriented' research.61
Probably the most important document to consider the state of British 
policing of the era was the Scarman Report, which was commissioned in 
the wake of the disorders in Brixton. According to Kettle and Hodges, a 
police-initiated policy of what they referred to as 'occasional saturation 
policing' designed to maintain what the police saw as the 'Rule of Law' was 
directly implicated in the outbreak of disorder.62 Lord Scarman's 
subsequent inquiry highlighted the loss of confidence in the police by 
certain sections of the community and the hostility directed towards the 
British Bobby by many young blacks.63 The Report noted:
the ’h a rd 1 vigorous polic ing  d irec te d  
particu larly  against street crime, using 
m ethods which caused offence a n d  
apprehension to many. The three methods to 
which objection was taken were; use of the 
SPG on the streets; use of the ’sus' law (being 
a suspected person loitering with intent to  
commit an arrestable offence); and the 
exercise of the statutory power to stop and 
search...unlawful, and, in particular, racially
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prejudiced, conduct by some police officers 
when stopping, searching, and  arresting 
young blacks suspected  (o r allegedly 
suspected) of street crime.64
Some attention was focused on the SPG, the argument being that its 
deployment on the streets, while securing a temporary lowering of street 
crime during its presence on the streets, did not address the underlying 
social problems, displaced crime to areas not affected by specialist police 
operations, and provoked the hostility of young black people irrespective 
of innocence or guilt. While this was a strong critique of 'saturation 
policing' methods, it did not represent a rejection of the accoutrements of 
'hard' policing. It was explicitly stated that protective clothing and 
helmets as well as CS gas, baton rounds and water cannon should be 
available in reserve to the police and which may be used as a last resort.65
The argument developed in the Scarman Report followed a fine line, it 
was noted that the police, by virtue of their specialist skills and their own 
codes of behaviour, were risking becoming "set apart from the rest of the 
community".66 The increased use of technology exacerbated this tendency:
Technological advances have offered new ways of 
preventing and fighting crime, of protecting life 
and property, and of quelling disorder without the 
necessity of maintaining close personal relations 
with the community. Indeed, not the least of the 
problem s the police now face is how to take 
advantage of their technological aids w ith o u t 
destroying the human factor, so essential if policing 
is to command public support.67
The target was the 'reactive style' of policing in the inner cities, what 
was termed 'hard policing', and the aim was to provide the "political thrust 
in the general direction of consensual policing"68 In doing this, it seems to 
me that the observations made by police researchers for many years were
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echoed in the report. ’Community policing', best epitomized by the 
friendly bobby-on-the-beat that Banton knew so well, was advocated. It 
was claimed at that time that this policing style was in practice in the 
Devon and Cornwall constabulary under the leadership of John Alderson. 
However, it was also noted, that Home Beat Officers were denigrated as 
'hobby bobbies' in the occupational culture of the lower ranks and there 
were parallel problems in the senior ranks where it was believed that 
'community policing', while a possibility in quiet country market towns, 
was unsuitable for the harsher reality of crime in the inner cities.69 These 
observations seem little different than those made by Holdaway half a 
decade earlier.
Despite these problems and contradictions, 'community policing' was 
put forth as a broad approach to gain (or perhaps regain) the "active 
consent and support of the community" for the continuation of policing.70 
Scarman stated, further, that he believed that senior officers had, after the 
Brixton disorders, come to "fully appreciate the importance of what has 
come to be known as community policing."71
However, it seemed to remain impossible to reconcile the tension 
between 'hard' policing and 'community' policing in a substantive way. 
The future use of 'hard-line' tactics were to continue to be a matter for the 
'professional judgement' of the police.72 What the Scarman Report could 
not erase was the emphasis on the detection and arrest of criminals, what 
was pejoratively labeled the 'capture culture', or the organizational 
entrenchment of specialist squads, both of which contributed to the 
perpetuation of the reactive style christened 'fire-brigade policing'. 
Scarman did give incentive to adopt programs in the community relations
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field, but it was as if this was to be added on to what was to remain 
essentially unchanged reactive hard policing strategies and tactics.
Observers of the police institution of many different political stripes 
have made similar observations. Reiner has noted that the development of 
'community relations units' fits in neatly with the fashion for specialist 
squads and further that:
the encouragem ent of the service role was an 
effective device in police legitim ation. The 
devaluing of it by rank-and-file culture, as crime 
fighting became elevated to its glorified pedestal - a 
process encouraged unintentionally by Unit Beat 
reorganization  - was problem atic for p o l ic e  
legitimacy. The response of many Chief Constables 
was to set up specialist community relations units to 
provide an artificial surrogate for what tradition 
has regarded to be part of basic constabulary duty.7^
Reiner goes on to point out that these specialist liaison units began to 
proliferate in the late 1960s, after the Force amalgamations when 
specialisms of all kinds began to crop up. Other observers have attributed 
far more sinister qualities to this gradual historic shift:
community-policing initiatives are in practice a far 
cry from progressive police-community relations.
The use of such a strategy to ’gain the confidence' of 
other agencies, key workers in the community and 
the people themselves, provides the opportunity for 
a level of surveillance which no previous strategy 
could offer. Coupled with the proven lack of 
political accountability, it has not only consolidated 
police autonomy but has also laid the foundation for 
a form  of to ta l policing w ithout effective 
consultation and with no check on the use of police 
discretion.74
This objection emerged primarily from a concern about how to make police 
decisions accountable to the public which those decisions then impact 
upon, in light of the fact that such decisions are subject to a wide degree of
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discretion at all levels of the organization. Attempts in the Scarman Report 
to address the issue of police discretion were made on two levels, the first 
being training and supervision and the second being police/public 
consultation.
Training for street level officers, linked with enhanced supervision by 
mid-level management (that is Sergeants and Inspectors), was intended to 
ensure that the nature of discretionary decisions by 'street level' officers 
did not overstep the bounds of propriety. As it was put in the Report the 
problem was one of ensuring that police recruits "receive proper guidance 
and supervision in discharging their difficult, delicate and indispensable 
function."75 Training was intended to ensure that police practice 'on the 
ground' was directly in line with 'operational goals' defined at the policy 
level. It was hoped that by linking this training with enhanced and on­
going supervision (that is surveillance) that it might be possible to 
overcome some of the negative aspects of police occupational culture.
Crucial to this was the establishment of an infrastructure for 
police/public consultation. The argument was that the Brixton disorders 
proved the need for such a rational infrastructure to 'enhance' the 
definition of operational goals. 'Swamp 81' and like police operations, 
which were decided upon as a matter of operational priority by police 
decision makers, created hostility amongst the public subjected to the 
operations. It was reported that senior police officers in Brixton had not 
been prepared to enter into consultation about police priorities or about 
such operations because they saw "consultation as a danger to the success 
of the operation, as well as an intrusion upon their independence of 
judgement as police officers."76 The Report argued that mechanisms of 
consultation and accountability were important mechanisms through which
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the police could "keep in touch with" and remain "responsible to the public 
they police"77
It was too late to 'keep in touch' for some. Labour MP Jack Straw, 
introduced two private members Bills into the House which failed. The 
legislation he proposed was drafted as amendments to the 1964 Police Act 
intended to establish and extend the powers and duties of police 
authorities in respect of the operations and organization of police forces, 
shifting the existing tripartite arrangements for control of the police 
between the police, police authorities and the Home Office.78 The stated 
intention was to take power out of the hands of law enforcement officials 
and place control of policing policy and practice in the hands of 
representatives of 'the community'. This was a much more radical 
challenge to the sovereignty of police decision makers than Scarman's 
plans for consultative groups and, although futile, is testimony to the hotly 
contested nature of policing during the period.
At the same time local governments were also mounting concerted 
campaigns around the issue of police accountability. In London the GLC 
funded police monitoring. The establishment of this committee meant 
that the only British local authority with no powers to affect decisions 
within the police also became the only one to employ administrative staff 
working full time on policing.79 Here again, the establishment of such 
monitoring is testimony to the political contestablity of the policing 
institution during the period.80
These challenges to the autonomy of police decision making were not 
without effect. Spokesmen emerged revealing the wide spectrum of 
opinion within the institution itself. James Anderton, Chief Constable of 
Manchester, frequently spoke to the nation through the press. He was the
192
Chapter Five
® i ? D © ( ?  I M D s S ® ^  © I f  I P ® O B © l l [ f D ( D  ( P ® D O G O © @  mQ ( ° ]  I P i r g K S M © ©
self-styled spokesman for 'hard' policing and his statements were always 
calculated to undermine the credibility and desirability of police 
monitoring efforts. His public statements were known for their alarmist 
rhetoric. A clear example is his response to criticisms of the use of police 
personnel and equipment in strike breaking activities. Anderton stated:
I sense and see in our midst an enemy m ore 
dangerous, insidious and ruthless than any faced 
since the Second World War. I firmly believe that 
there is a long-term political strategy to destroy the 
proven structure of the police and turn them in to  
an exclusive agency of a one-party state. I am also 
convinced that the police service is now a prime 
target for subversion and dem onstration. The 
people must not be tricked into dropping their 
guard or their standards, and chief constables must 
ensure tha t their forces are not infiltrated  by 
undesirable people who could wreak havoc in the 
year ahead.81
This 'reds under the beds' kind of reasoning is a potent bit of oratory, 
but the value he was attempting to underscore was the idea that police 
officers of all ranks should only be held accountable to the law itself.82 He 
was a kind of 'Fordist' of the thin blue line, believing that the police had a
job to do which was keeping the country from sliding into chaos. This, he
believed, could be most efficiently done by a small number of Chief Police 
Officers planning and co-ordinating the policing strategy and tactics for the 
nation. To put this position in context it should be pointed out that T.A. 
Critchely, regarded as one of the more 'conservative' police historians, felt 
that the reduction in the number of forces, and the accompanying 
shrinkage of top level decision makers, eroded the mechanisms of 
accountability.83
Anderton was not alone in making such views public. Eric St. 
Johnstone, a former Inspector of Constabulary echoed these alarmist
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statements. Indeed, St. Johnstone amplified the implications, suggesting 
that if local police authorities were becoming too insistent on local 
accountability, perhaps the time had come to elevate policing to a national 
level where real professionals could make informed decisions, and thereby 
diminish the effect of ill-informed lay people.84
However, there also emerged spokesmen who spoke the same 
language as Lord Scarman. Such ideas were put forward most eloquently 
by Anderton's polar opposite John Alderson. I have previously mentioned 
that Alderson had reorganized the Devon and Cornwall force in what was 
put forward as a radical alternative to 'fire-brigade-policing'. This 
reorganization emphasized more 'direct involvement' by the police in the 
day-to-day affairs of the 'community' and made the police 'more visible'; it 
was 'soft' policing. To reiterate; the idea was that, by putting police back 
on their regular beats the community would come to know 'their' police 
officers bringing mutual trust and friendship. Alderson re-asserted the 
social service role of the police officer, in so doing the notions of a 'Police 
Service' as opposed to a 'Police Force' began to emerge.85
With this came the notion that police 'services' should be more closely 
tied to the services of other agencies; social services, housing, health 
visitors etc. Inter-agency cooperation, or 'the multi-agency approach' as it 
came to be called, was developed by Alderson as an ideal situation where 
social workers, doctors, priests, community workers, teachers, academics, 
voluntary organizations and other experts could meet together with the 
police in order to identify problems in the community and, through shared 
information and collective enterprise, respond in the best interests of their 
clients.86 Alderson's program was intended as an antidote to the reactive 
style that had developed in policing which had, in Scraton's words, "the
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finesse of a sledge-hammer", but it was never meant as a total 
replacement. Alderson's programme states:
Communal policing offers an alternative strategy to 
the power of ever-b igger police batta lions, 
increased dependence on technology and u n d u e  
reliance on the system of criminal justice as a 
preventive force . . .  it provides a complementary 
element in a total police strategy which includes 
preventive patrols, incident cars, task forces and 
criminal investigation.87
What was needed was a leader who was capable of working towards 
this 'total police strategy'. That leader was Kenneth Newman a man who 
personified both 'hard' and 'soft' policing. On the one hand, the new 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner had his 'hard' side which included 
experience in Northern Ireland with the RUC. Less often noted, but also 
evidence of his experience with 'hard' policing was his para-military 
experience in Palestine during Israel's war of independence.88 However, 
Newman also seemed to have his 'soft' side. Reiner notes that he "avoided 
the high-profile politicking of his predecessors", while at the same time 
redirecting Force Policy "in the Scarman spirit." 89 This soft side also 
extended to entertaining ideas of Alderson's about the social service role of 
the police and 'community policing'.
Newman's soft side became most noticeable in the mid-1980s when he 
spoke about the criminal victimization of ethnic minorities and women. In 
the 1970s when these issues were being thrust into the media through the 
efforts of special interest groups like the Women's Aid Federation and 
Women Against Violence Against Women, the police had little to say on the 
matter. Indeed, neither did Newman when he first became Metropolitan 
Police Commissioner. In his 1983 Annual report he listed 'domestic 
violence' as a secondary duty and it was suggested that these calls for
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service be diverted to social services.90 In his first years as Commissioner 
Newman talked about 'the pursuit of excellence' and the 
'professionalization' of policing in relation to police-community relations. 
Initially Newman's energy was directed towards trying to 'harness public 
co-operation in reducing crime'. This meant a concentration on developing 
Neighbourhood Watch Schemes, police Consultative Committees and 
expanding the 'multi-agency approach'.91 However, the kind of crime that 
Newman targeted initially were the 'traditional' kinds of crimes, that is: 
robbery, burglary, and autocrime.92 His main attention was directed 
towards more traditional policing concerns, even if the language he used 
was somewhat of a departure. He noted that:
The police service has, to a large extent, become 
trap p ed  in a reactive role, based upon  an 
understandable and conventional preoccupation 
with crime committed. Last year I urged the Force 
to move towards a greater feeling for the preventive 
role, which accords readily with well documented 
research locating the vast majority of police w ork 
in the "service' functions peripheral to crim e 
investigation.9^
His earlier year end reports indicate a creeping awareness of other 
avenues of action. For example, in his Report for the Year 1984 he noted:
Awareness of the compelling need for change in  
a ttitu d e s  was h e ig h ten e d  by m an ag em en t 
conferences, the monitoring of complaints against 
officers and by close scrutiny of media coverage of 
the Force. Our own observations were confirmed by 
the detail of the Police Studies Institute R ep o rt 
(Police and People in London November 1983) and 
by other research findings. Although there is a 
rew arding solidarity of support for the police 
service in general, including the M etropolitan 
Police, there is evidently scope for improvement in 
a corporate sense. We have addressed this need 
robustly.94
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According to Newman, an example of this entailed "recognition by the 
Force of the problem of racially discriminatory behaviour by some 
officers." He stressed that the police must "make a conscious effort to 
assess the problem and to construct solutions." In all Newman declared 
that the Metropolitan Police had made a clear step "towards being a 
leading proponent of equality and human rights".
The 'soft' side of policing recognized that "police service plays a 
significant creative part in the community, fully complementary to its 
detective role."95 The report for 1985 took the notions of 'service' even 
further. Racial incidents, that is crimes against the person with some 
'racial motivation', were given a mention for the first time in that year. 
Newman stated that the "presence of racial motivation is an aggravating 
circumstance in any incident, justifying a high level of response by the 
police and is therefore regarded as having maximum priority by police 
managers when faced with conflicts in deploying their valuable 
resources."96 In that same year he commissioned a police working party to 
investigate the problems of 'domestic violence'. The report for the 
previous year, 1984, did not recognize battered wives as a particular class 
of victim 97
At the same time that Newman was talking about 'community 
relations' he was also involved with a reorganization of the structure of the 
Metropolitan Police. This 'restructuring' was partly a consequence of a 
growing trend in policing towards 'professionalization' of management. 
There also is some certainty that the motivation can be traced, at least in 
part, back to the Conservative Government's desire to apply quasi-market 
discipline to the public sector. In 1983 the Home Office issued police
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forces with Circular 114/1983 on manpower, effectiveness, and efficiency 
in the police service’. This reversed the trend, evident since 1979, which 
singled out the the police institution among public services for special 
treatment in terms of pay, manpower and total expenditure.98 As an 
aside, circular 114 can be interpreted as another, perhaps the most serious, 
challenge to the sovereignty of police decision makers coming from the 
Home Office. The reorganization can also be said to include the growth of 
the 'community liaison branch’, another method of 're-establishing links 
with the community'. This organizational shuffle threw the police 
institution into a state of flux making it difficult to evaluate many of the 
changes made during the period.
Of course, restructuring is not even the most significant change in 
policing of the 1980s. Policing in the middle part of that decade was also 
profoundly affected by the passage of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
(1984). Senior police officers stated at the time that the Act did not 
significantly change policing practice, claiming that it merely formalized 
standards of behaviour, conduct and method that were long standing. 
However, the Act was heavily criticized, in particular by the GLC Police 
Monitoring Unit, as an indication of a decisive shift away from police 
accountability. The contentious nature of this legislation is evidenced by 
the fact that it had to be drafted and brought before Parliament three 
times before it was passed. Lord Salmon stated publicly, after the second 
version of the Bill was announced in 1983, that the powers being granted 
to the police were far too extensive, likening the emerging status quo to a 
"police state". "Looking at this Bill" he said, "I don't even think it could be 
redrafted."99 Robert Reiner notes that the final version of the legislation 
pleased neither police decision makers nor police critics.100
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In 1986, the year the PACE went into practice, Jock Young eta l noted 
a two pronged strategy of 'hard' and ’soft’ approaches to policing in the 
1980s. The hard measures included the PACE and increasing reliance on 
technology, especially as it related to computers and criminal intelligence. 
The ’soft’ measures, those which were "designed to increase police contact 
with the community", included initiatives like the ’multi agency approach’, 
Neighbourhood Watch, and community liaison panels. According to their 
analysis these were the two types of innovations "intended to deal with 
the crisis".101
It is important to remember that virtually every commentator on the 
police during this period, and they had multiplied beyond counting, made 
reference to the ’crisis in police legitimacy’. This sense of crisis was 
heightened during the period as the country watched the Miner’s Strike of 
1984-85 unfold. The nightly scenes of police battling with flying pickets, 
projected a very harsh version of the reality of policing in Britain.102 
Following, as it did, on the heels of the Brixton disorders, the idea of the 
British police was more associated with the Nato helmet than that of the 
Bobby. I personally recall fire in the streets at night when the SPG, and its 
variants, ’policed’ Wapping.
It is transparent that, faced with the enormous amount of bad 
publicity that policing earned in the first half of the decade, the 
manufacture of good publicity had become a matter of strategic necessity. 
It is a matter of conjecture whether a decision to manufacture such 
publicity was ever actually made, more so still, to speculate about the basis 
on which such decisions may have been arrived at. However, it should be 
noted that it was reported in the Newstatesman/Society in 1989 that the 
Metropolitan police had spent £150,000 pounds on a "glossy package from
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a firm of corporate identity consultants" one year previously and that 
there were plans to spend £2 million on "non-recruitment publicity" in the 
following year.103 Reportage on matters relevant to policing had also 
changed with the times. During the ?golden age1 it was scarcely necessary 
for police policy makers to target such areas for expenditure and, at that 
time, critical news coverage was restricted to sporadic reports of police 
malpractice. By the 1980s such news coverage encompassed not only an 
expanded awareness of the traditional areas of police malpractice and 
ineffectiveness but, also new concepts had been added to the critique; 
words such as 'sexism’, 'racism'.
Further complicating matters was the rise of social scientific enquiry 
into the police and policing during the whole period. The number of 
studies of the police had increased enormously by the middle of the 1980s. 
When Ban ton conducted his field work in the 1950s, his was virtually the 
only such study. As such, in the absence of competing explanations, it 
could maintain an appearance of some kind of objectivity. Not so in the 
1980s when 'police science' really came into its own. Not only did this 
engender the emergence of competing explanations, police policy makers 
also had to make sense of this cacophony. Further, many sought to 
contribute to it. Any account of specific changes in police practices during 
this period that does not take into account, in a fundamental and detailed 
manner, the growth in social scientific enquiry into policing, and its impact 
on policy makers, must be considered trivial.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have sought to narrate the history of the politics and 
practice of the police in the post-war era. What emerged is a fitful, but I
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hope not capricious, summary of some of the more salient issues in 
policing. While there may be gaps in this history it would seem that the 
trend towards a police force that is increasingly alienated from its social 
basis is evident. It seems that the structuring of police decision making by 
the Police Act in 1964 followed by the actual workings of the tripartite 
arrangements for the governance of the police at least partly contributed 
to this growing institutional isolation. It is also evident that the 
unintended consequences of the adoption of technological innovation and 
attendant structural change, exemplified by the installation of the unit 
beat system, also had their effect. Then too, the complex dynamic set up 
between formal agents of social control and criminal rule breakers in a 
period of extended overall economic contraction deserves a mention. 
Whatever the relative weight which may be assigned to any of these 
variables the resulting trend is hardly contestable. 'Legitimation crisis', 
that well worn phrase, is, after all, frequently on the lips of those who 
study the police. They, too, must be given consideration. Over this period 
the large growth in commentary on the police and policing, some of it 
critical some of it aggrandizing, not just in the journalistic realm but also in 
the academic and policy making circles, also contributes to the general 
climate of change.
It was in this maelstrom that the issue of the policing of domestic 
violence emerged. In the next chapter I shall consider the treatment of 
the issue of the policing domestic violence in a number of reports, by 
interested agencies and in the media, as it emerged in 1986. This 
constitutes, in fact, the final translation of the issue of 'domestic violence' 
into the language of 'crime and policing'.
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1 Foucault M. The Archaeology of Knowledge translated by Sheridan Smith, Tavistock Publications 
©1972 pg. 51
2 ibid. pg. 8
3 Reiner R. The Politics of the Police Wheatsheaf Books, Harvester Press Ltd. © 1985 pg. 4
4 op. cit. Reiner, 1985; also Morris T. Crime and Criminal lustice since 1945 Basil Blackwell 
© 1989
5 quoted in Banton M.'Law Enforcement and Social Control' in The Sociology of Law V. Aubert ed. 
Penguin, Harmondsworth © 1973 pg. 138-9
6 One is tempted to imagine the implications of this for instances of violence within family units. 
My own field work brought me into contact with a retired police officer who served in a 
northern police force in the 1950s. He recounted the usual approach to incidents of wife 
battery which 'always involved drink.' The usual tactic was to drop the drunken and irate 
husband off on the other side of the city. "On a Friday morning at three o'clock the town centre 
would be alive with them as they crossed the city on foot on their way home. But by the time he 
got there he'd be sober." (from field notes)
7 op. cit. Banton, 1973 pg. 131
8 Between 1956 and 1959 chief officers in Cardiganshire, Brighton and Worcester had been 
arraigned for maladministration and criminal offences. The Chief Constable of Nottingham was 
sacked by his Watch Committee only to be reinstated by the Home Secretary. In the House of 
Commons the Home Secretary himself was criticized for trying to buy off a litigant who had 
brought an action against a Metropolitan police officer. During the parliamentary exchanges 
that followed these events of the late 1950s the appointment of a Royal Commission was 
announced.
9 See: Mark, R. In the Office of Constable Collins London © 1978 where he affords a view of police 
interrogation 'techniques' stretching back to the pre-war years. Indeed, during the late 1930s 
he seems to have had little fear of being accused of unwarranted police brutality. He 
apparently carried a concealed rubber truncheon as a matter of routine with which he admits to 
breaking limbs.(pg.28) In the post-war years interrogation was no less violent and Mark 
records that at times his 'hair stood on end'. Ultimately, these malpractices were 
understandable, at least according to Mark, 'in the context of policing at the time'.(pgs. 51-55) 
See also: Hobbs D. Doing the Business Clarendon Press Oxford © 1988
10 Morris T. Crime and Criminal lustice since 1945 Basil Blackwell Oxford © 1989 pgs. 62-64. 
Morris goes on to say that "the idea was abroad that there was a potential conflict between 
police powers and civil liberty, and the constitutional implications were almost self-evident." 
meaning that the revelations about police malpractice led directly to consideration of the need 
for a Royal Commission.
11 Reiner records that the immediate trigger for the Royal Commission "was none of the grave 
matters". Rather, it was a Whitehall farce involving a comedian named Brian Rix, a speeding 
car, an un-named civil servant, and a PC Eastmond. While it is undoubtedly true that this 
incident provided the immediate 'trigger' I am sure that the previous scandals were the real 
cause. In this sense any causality assigned to the 'Rix Affair' is akin to the assassination of 
Archduke Francis Ferdinand starting World War One.
12 Ian Taylor "Soccer Consciousness and Soccer Hooliganism' in Images of Deviance. S. Cohen Ed. 
Penguin Books © 1971
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13 This is a largely undocumented part of recent British social history. There is room here for a 
substantial contribution to be made by oral historians since many of the victims of this kind of 
harassment are still alive and living in Britain. Most discussions of racial harassment of black 
people by indigenous whites begin in the 1960s since it is then that Black people began to 
organize to make their victimization public. It is also at this time that overtly racist 
organizations and personalities began to get public attention. Until an investigation of the 
facts of black peoples lives in England is made it must be assumed that the conditions that gave 
rise to the intense political debate of the 1960s were manifest much earlier and, further, that 
these conditions did create problems for operational policing, although the number of visible 
ethnic minorities in the early 1950s was not that great outside a few metropolitan regions.
14 Kettle M. and Hodges L. Uprising! The Police, the people and the riots in Britain’s cities Pan 
Books ltd. © 1982 pg. 43 It is worth pointing out, as Stuart Hall has done, that the race riots of 
1958 were the focal point of two issues: 'race' and 'youth' and were the product of two 
histories. One being the development of 'popular racism', the other that of the panics about 
post-war changes generally, "for which the term 'youth' had by then become a vivid social 
metaphor." See 'Racism and reaction' in Commission for Racial Equality. Five Views of Multi- 
Racial Britain. CRE, 1978.
15 The anti-nuclear movement was subject to 'overpolicing' almost from the veiy beginning. In 
April of 1961 3,000 policemen were detailed to police a meeting of 2,000 anti-nuclear 
activists. Although the focus of the movement at the time was centered on non-violent protest 
the police still found it necessary to arrest 800 of the demonstrators. See Manwaring-White S. 
The Policing Revolution: Police Technology. Democracy and Liberty in Britain Harvester Press 
Ltd.
© 1983 pg. 20
16 Royal Commission Report on the Police 1962 paragraph 102
17 quoted in Whitaker B. The Police Penguin Harmondsworth © 1964 pg. 13
18 ibid. pgs. 13-14
19 ibid. pg. 15
20 ibid. pg. 14
21 ibid. pg. 15
22 both quotations cited in Whitaker pg. 15
23 McCabe S. and Wallington P. The Police Public Order and Civil Liberties Legacies of the 
Miner's Strike Routledge London © 1988 pg. 39
24 Phil Sera ton reported that "In practice, reports are rarely refused but their content and 
thoroughness is dictated by chief constables' discretion." See Scraton P. The State of the Police 
Pluto Press London © 1985 pg. 53
25 In 1968 Lord Denning ruled that a chief constable "is not a servant of anyone save the law 
itself. No Minister of the Crown can tell him that he must, or must not, keep observation on 
this place or that; or that he must, or must not, prosecute this man or that one. Nor can any 
police authority tell him so. The responsibility for law enforcement lies on him. He is
answerable to the law and the law alone." Quoted in P. Hewitt, The Abuse of Power. Martin
Robertson London © 1982
26 R vs Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn (1968)
27 op. cit. McCabe and Wallington 1988 pg. 41
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28 For a discussion of trends in interpersonal violence see Kinsey R., Lea, J. and Young, J. Losing 
the Fight Against Crime Basil Blackwell Oxford © 1986. An interesting discussion of student 
use of political violence is Paul Rock's and Frances Heidensohn's 'New Reflections on Violence' 
which can be found in a collection edited by David Martin entitled Anarchy and Culture: the 
Problem of the Contemporary University Routledge and Kegan Paul © 1969 The reader has 
already been referred to sources dealing with policing soccer fans (footnote 5), black people 
(footnote 7) and CND protesters (footnote 9).
29 For some insight into the problems of racist violence and the intense alienation between the 
police and members of virtually all 'visible ethnic minorities' see Kettle and Hodges 1982 , 
pgs. 64-97
30 According to Robert Reiner the loss of confidence of "certain small but crucial sections of the 
influential and articulate 'talking classes', what may be described roughly as The Guardian 
reading circles" is of particular significance in this respect. Reiner 1985 pg. 81-82
31 Cain, M. 'On the Beat: Interactions and Relations in Rural and Urban Police Forces' in Images 
of Deviance Stan Cohen ed. Harmondsworth Penguin © 1973
32 Some amusing tales regarding the lengths that police constables would go to to cover each 
others easing behaviour, especially as it regarded drinking on duty, have been recounted by 
Mike Seabrook in Coppers - An Inside View of the British Police Harrap London © 1987 see 
especially pgs. 75-80
33 During my own field work I came across mention of such behaviour. One police officer 
recounted to me a story of being a young probationer in the company of a more experienced 
officer on early morning patrol. It seems the teacher gave an interesting lesson one particular 
morning. He purchased a crate of milk which he took and distributed to a large group of 
vagrants camped out under a bridge. The two officers returned shortly after the gesture of 
goodwill whereupon the vagrants were all arrested for theft of the milk. The officer recounting 
the story noted the fact that each person arrested was charged with theft, rather than the entire 
crate being considered one theft. In this way there were as many arrests as there were 'bodies', 
making for a high count which boosts arrest statistics. Theoretically this is good for an 
officers promotion prospects.
34 The shoulder insignia of members of the SPG, CO, indicated that their direction came from the 
Commissioner's Office. Their original brief was to provide highly mobile support units which 
could be brought in to saturate the scene of any serious public disturbance. Details of the 
existence of the SPG were never made public until after the fatal shooting of two men by armed 
SPG constables in 1973. Throughout this period of secrecy, between 1965 and 1973, the SPG 
were deployed and utilized at every major public order disturbance including the student 
disorders of 1967 and 68, the industrial disputes at Upper Clyde ship builders, and the 
Saltley Coke Works, and other such events too numerous to mention here. See: Manwaring- 
White 1983 pgs. 41-47 see also Hobbs D. Doing the Business Clarendon Press Oxford © 1988 
pgs. 79-83 for very interesting and accessible discussions of this history.
35 The details of the Challenor scandal have been documented elsewhere. See Ascoli, D. The 
Queen's Peace Hamilton Press London © 1979; Critchley, T. A History of Police in England and 
Wales 1900-1966 Constable Press London 1978; Morris T. Crime and Criminal lustice since 
1945 Basil Blackwell Oxford © 1989 and Hobbs D. Doing the Business Clarendon Press Oxford © 
1988
36 Hobbs D. Doing the Business Clarendon Press Oxford © 1988 pg. 79-83
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37 ibid. pg. 80
38 ibid. pg. 80
39 ibid. pgs. 70-71
40 ibid. pg. 68
41 Cain, 1973 pg. 94
42 Holdaway S. Inside the British Police. Basil Blackwell, Oxford © 1984 pg.121
43 ibid. pg. 126
44 ibid. pg. 128
45 Most provincial forces now have units similar to the SPG, although under different names (eg. 
Territorial Support Group TSG), all of whom are specially trained in riot control, the use of 
firearms, CS gas and other crowd control technology. Since 1974 all forces have formed Police 
Support Units (PSU) for the control of crowds, strikes and demonstrations. Each comprises 23 
officers (an inspector, two sergeants and 20 constables), all of whom are most usually engaged 
in more mundane aspects of policing, many as Resident Beat Officers. However, through the 
coordination of the National Reporting Centre which was established in 1972 at Scodand Yard, 
the PSUs are readily mobilizable and deployable anywhere in the country. See Manwaring- 
White, 1983 pg. 41
46 It has been noted that officers organized in the SPG view the activities of members of the 
public through a different 'normative prism' than do resident beat officers (RBOs), that is, 
officers engaged in routine beat work. The differences in the 'normative prism s' 
operationalized by these different types of officer account for complaints by SPG officers that 
divisional officers frequently 'ignore' offences and, from the divisional side, that SPG officers 
'arrest for nothing'. The thrust of this argument is that officers trained and deployed in the 
SPG, or other similar 'hard' policing units, are more likely to arrest for what are trivial 
offences. One implication can be drawn from this, that, as the British police became more 
relatively devoted to this type of policing, so too did the relative number of officers sharing 
the normative prism of 'hard' policing. See: Grimshaw R. and Jefferson T. Interpreting 
Policework: Policy and Practice in Forms of Beat Policing Allen and Unwin London © 1987 pg. 
164. What has not been asked, in the context of concrete sociological field work, is the nature 
of the 'normative prism' of officers who do both kinds of work, as in the officers who make up 
the PSUs.
47 Steven Box also noted that in 1970 only 25% of the verdicts in police custody were categorized 
as 'misadventure' and 'accidental', such verdicts had risen to 50% of the total returned by 
1980. Box also tried to build a case that this police brutality is disproportionately directed 
against economically marginalized populations, in particular 'black' and other 'ethnic' 
minorities. Unfortunately, statistics pertaining to police violence against members of the 
public by race are not available in Britian. Box had recourse to American statistics, which he 
argues may be different in magnitude, due to the ubiquitiousness of firearms in American 
police forces, but that the pattern would not "differ greatly from that in England and Wales 
because the social structures, i.e. economic and ethnic inequalities are not dissimilar." For a 
discussion on police brutality see Box S. Power Crime and Mystification Tavistock Publications 
New York and London © 1983 pgs. 82-90
48 The reader will recall that this is the era in which Women Against Violence Against Women 
became active, resulting in a series of minor confrontations between the police and members of 
that 'movement'. See chapter four.
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49 The week-long confrontation at Saltley, involving nearly 1,000 police and up to 15,000 
pickets, at times produced a fierce battle. Brendan Sewill, special adviser to the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer said at the time: "Many of those in positions of influence looked into the abyss 
and saw only a few days away the possibility of the country being plunged into a state of chaos
not so very far removed from that which might prevail after a minor nuclear attack this is
the power that existed to hold the country to ransom: it was fear of that abyss which had an 
important effect on subsequent policy. See: Scraton P. The State of the Police Pluto Press 
London © 1985 pg. 142-143
50 This unit was to coordinate a national response to large scale industrial unrest. It included 
not only steps to insure coordination of large numbers of suitably equipped police officers but 
also the introduction of new strategies and tactics in public order policing. See: Manwaring- 
White 1983 pgs. 37-38
51 op. cit. Box, 1983 pg. 108
52 Brogden M. Jefferson T. and Walklate S. Introducing Police Work Unwin and Hyman Ltd. 
London © 1988 pg. 87
53 As an aside, the effects of an empire in decline are an unarticulated and a priori assumption 
here. It is no secret that, a macro-social and macro-historical level, the British Nation State 
has been contracting at an accelerated pace since after World War Two. I assume that this 
contraction implies the intensification of social divisions as the competition over scarce 
resources becomes more fierce. Probably this assumption should be tempered with a notion of 
'relative deprivation1. Then, too, such problems are likely to be exacerbated in London 'that 
cesspool into which all the dregs of empire drain.' We must remember that many of these 
problems were felt much more intensively in London than elsewhere. This means that the 
problems, such as they were, may have been felt by only a minority of the British population. 
But if that minority lives in London and is vocal enough it can make waves. Such a line of 
argumentation has also been pursued by Robert Reiner. He discusses 'structural pressures for 
conflict' pointing out the "de-incorporation of sections of the working class population who are 
being defined out of the edifice of citizenship". He notes an attendant weakening of 
'traditional normative controls' all of which means that any changes in police style cannot hope 
to achieve their relegitimation without an attendant reversal of the structural pressures. See: 
Reiner R. 'The politics of police research in Britain' in Police Research: Some Future Prospects 
Mollie Weatheritt ed. published in Association with the Police Foundation by Avebury, 
Aldershot England, © 1989 pg. 7
54 Hall S., Critcher C., Tony Jefferson T., Clarke J., Roberts B. Policing the Crisis Mugging the 
State and Law and Order Macmillan Education Ltd. London © 1978
55 There are some important objections that can be made to this line of argumentation. For 
example, it has been pointed out that white citizens' racial prejudice may make victims label 
attackers disproportionately as black, leading the police to search for black suspects. A 
senior policeman remarked during the Scarman Inquiry, "if an offender is described as black 
the police do not look for a suspect who is white." (quoted in Waddington P.A.J. 'Black Crime, 
the "Racist" Police and Fashionable Compassion' in The Kindness That Kills D. Anderson ed. 
SPCK London © 1984 pg.42) Further, it has been argued that the police are unjustly vilified for 
what are essentially reactive interventions and, also, that if studies of police culture reveal 
hostile attitudes to minority groups this is the product, not the determinant, of police work. 
What has also been intimated is that ethnic minorities that are criminalized, in particular
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young black males, are as a social group, subject to a higher degree of deviancy (see 
Waddington P.A.J. Are the Police Fair?. Research Paper No. 2 Social Affairs Unit, London 
1983). None of this, it seems to me is contradicted in substance by the thesis put forth in 
Policing the Crisis. In fact, Hall e t al put forth a cultural argument about the nature of 
resistance in the Afro-Caribbean community which shows in detail how the subordinate 
position of black people in the labour market, the housing market, etc. leads quite naturally to 
such a situation. The difference is, of course, that Hall et al show a modicum of sympathy for 
’the hustle' that other commentators eschew.
56 Robert Reiner records that "we have now moved to a position where the police, at all levels 
from Chief Constable down to the rank and file, seek to set the terms of debate on law and
order and social policy." According to him this change was "heralded by the 'Markist'
revolution at Scotland Yard..." (emphasis mine J.S.) Reiner, 1985 pg. 73
57 Pratt, M. Mugging as a Social Problem. London, Routledge © 1980
58 Hall e ta /, 1978 pg. 390
59 Reiner reports that "in 1975 the Police Federation launched an unprecedented campaign for 
'law and order'" aimed at harnessing "the public's growing concern about the state of crime and 
public order in Britain into a program for positive action." He goes on to say that the campaign 
was relaunched again in 1978 with the specific intent of influencing the 1979 election. He 
points out that, although police spokespersons were careful to deny any affiliation to a 
particular party there were "close parallels between police statements and the Conservative 
Party's declarations on law and order during the campaign." Police statements included a 
£21,000 series of advertisements in most national newspapers which "... proved to be an 
investment which reaped handsome dividends" according to Reiner who goes on to point out 
that, on the first working day after the election, the new government implemented the full pay 
increase recommended by the Edmund-Davies committee resulting in a flood of new police 
recruits. See Reiner, 1985 pgs.73-76
60 See Morgan R. and Smith D.J. Coming to Terms with Policing - Perspectives on Policy. 
Routledge London and New York © 1989
61 Simon Holdaway has reflected on this point, making the observation that "Universities are 
increasingly dependant upon external funding for their research work and are partly 
evaluated by the University Grants Committee according to the ability of their staff to attract 
research grants from external sources. Understandably, scholars now spend increasing 
amounts of time writing research proposals. 'Relevance', 'evaluation' and 'monitoring' form 
the sacred canopy of this academic age." See Simon Holdaway 'Discovering structure; studies 
of police occupational culture' in Police Research: Some Future Prospects Mollie Weatheritt 
ed. published in Association with the Police Foundation by Avebury, Aldershot England, © 
1989 pg. 66 Although Holdaway's assertion is undoubtedly true, his argument, as far as it 
pertains to the stress on 'policy driven' research as opposed to police research driven by 
'sociological theory' is not compelling. The problem, at least as it appears to me, is that he 
fails to connect changes in the practice of police research and changes in police 'occupational 
culture', particularly in management circles, at the theoretical level. Because his sociological 
perspective leads him to concentrate on the self understandings (and, perhaps, 
misunderstandings) of social actors he cannot not illuminate the connection between police 
research and the practice of policing. In particular, Holdaway seems to have missed the point 
that police research, particularly but not exclusively that which is carried out by police
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managers, can be an important mechanism of surveillance of ’front line' police officers. The 
point I wish to make here is that police research and policing are covalent. Foucault's 
metaphor of the 'carceral archipelago', where all social subjects become the object of 
survelliance and, indeed, participate in their own survelliance, is applicable here. To ask 
that police research not allow it's 'sociological foundations', by which Holdaway seems to 
mean 'sub-cultural theory', to be erroded is to miss this point. Even if such research is 
allowed to proceed unfettered, which, for Holdaway at least, seems likely, such research will 
still continue to be an important part of a larger social machine dedicated to surveillance and 
control of its subjects. Gone are the heady days when sociologists could assume the 
intellectual space of an anthropologist from a different 'world' peering at the police 
institution. Police science has been thoroughly incorporated, it is in its very essence, a 
'discipline'. Any investigation of the police and policing must give full attention to the 
connections between that institution and apparently independent social scientific edifice 
which 'studies' it.
62 Kettle and Hodges 1982 pg. 93
63 Scarman, Lord the Brixton Disorders, 10-12 April 1981, London HMSO 1981 pg. 46 para 4.1
64 ibid. pg. 46 para 4.2
65 ibid. pg. 98 para 5.74
66 ibid. pg. 75 para 5.3
67 ibid. pg. 75 para 5.3
68 Baldwin, R. and Kinsey, R. Police Powers and Politics Quartet Books London © 1982 pg. 245
69 Scarman 1981 pg. 88 para 5.45
70 ibid. pg. 88 para 5.46
71 ibid. 68 para 4.80
72 ibid. pg. 67 para 4.75
73 Reiner, 1985 pg. 77
74 Scraton 1985 pg. 139. It should be also be noted that some police researchers make the claim 
that empirical investigation does not verify such a pessimistic view. See 'Policing by Consent: 
legitimating the doctrine' by Rod Morgan in Coming to Terms with Policing - Perspectives on 
Policy. R. Morgan and D. Smith eds. Routledge, New York and London © 1989
75 Scarman, 1981 pg. 85 para 5.36 and pg. 86 para 5.37
76 ibid. pg. 67 para 4.73
77 ibid. pg. 93 para 5.57
78 Reiner, 1985, pg. 194
79 Kettle M. 'The Police' in Developments in British Politics Drucker H., Dunleavy P. Gamble A. 
and Peele G. eds. Macmillan London ©1983 pg.203
80 The GLC initially funded the Police Committee Support Unit until March of 1986. After the 
abolition of the GLC this work was continued by the Police Monitoring and Research Group of 
the London Strategic Policy Unit. Between July 1982 and March of 1988 a regular monthly 
news letter running anywhere from 16 to 28 A4 sized pages was produced. These newsletters 
represent a continuous source of alternative and highly critical information about the police. 
Importantly, these newsletters concentrated attention on 'racism' and 'sexism' as problems for,* 
and of policing, as well as more 'traditional' concerns such as 'police brutality'. Included was 
information about police weaponry and its uses and abuses. The GLC monitoring efforts also 
produced a number of official Reports and several Guide Books including: Briefing Paper No. 1
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The Police Response to Domestic Violence © 1986, Briefing Paper No. 2 Police Accountability 
and a New Strategic Authority for London circa 1986, Briefing Paper No. 3 Policing Wapping 
and Account of the Dispute 1986/7 circa 1987 Briefing Paper No. 4 Police Complaints A Fresh 
Approach. © 1987. These publications gave details about the structure of the Metropolitan and 
other 'insider' details seldom available to members of the public. Other publications were 
produced about the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (and its precursors) and the structure of 
the Metropolitan Police. Altogether, these Reports, Guides and News Sheets made the practice 
of policing more open to public scrutiny than it had ever been. Senior level police officers 
have told me that many GLC publications were read and discussed, although the police never 
publicly acknowledged this "because it would have meant acknowledging the accountability 
issue" (personal communication). One officer told me that the GCL Police Committee's 'Guide to 
the Met' was used as a training document in Intermediate Command Courses at Bramshill 
Training College. The production of this information by the GLC was seen as a 'political 
challenge' according to several officers with whom I have spoken. In Christian L. The Police 
and Criminal Evidence Bill - Policing bv Coercion GLC Support Unit © 1983 pg.8-9, the 
practical aim of this information war was to completely restructure the decision making 
apparatus for the police.
81 quoted in Scraton, 1985 pg. 85. The use of police equipment and personnel apparently 
extended to the use of police helicopters to airlift in armed police personnel and airlift out 
'supplies' from a factory which had been effectively closed by workers picketing.
82 Anderton also claimed publicly to talk to God and there may be some who would take this to 
mean that he advocated that Chief Police officers should be held directly accountable to an even 
higher power.
83 Critchely T.A. A History of Police in England and Wales Constable Press London © 1978 see 
also Scraton, 1985 pg. 122
84 Scraton, 1985 pg. 122
85 On this point it should be remembered, as Reiner points out, that during the nineteenth 
century " the encouragement of the service role was an effective device in [securing] police 
legitimation." (pg.76) Perhaps Alderson's 'community policing' could be regarded as a replay 
of policing strategies of the late 19th century during which, as Ignatieff noted, "street by 
street individual police officers negotiated a complex, shifting largely unspoken 'contract"', 
Ignatieff M. Police and People: The Birth of Mr. Peel's Blue Locusts pg. 444-45 (quoted in 
Reiner 1985)
86 It is hard not to share Cohen's visions of the Leviathan growing in strength as it installs itself 
in the shop fronts of the community when confronted with this vision of the 'multi agency 
approach'. See Cohen S. Visions of Social Control Polity Press Cambridge © 1985. The most 
important point to should remember is that Anderton's 'liberal' vision did not include 
demobbing the SPG or the PSUs. His vision of community policing never included diminishing 
the power of the police 'Force' in order to enhance the power of the police 'Service'.
87 op. cit. Scraton, 1985 pg. 125
88 op. cit. Hobbs, 1988 pg.81
89 op. cit. Reiner, 1985 pg. 76
90 Police Monitoring and Research Group Briefing Paper No. 1 The Police Response to Domestic 
Violence © 1986 The London Strategic Policy Unit
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91 Of some interest here is the implementation of Neighbourhood Watch schemes. It has been 
reported that these schemes were rushed into implementation without first conducting pilot 
studies. The official explanation at the time noted that, while "pilot schemes would in 
ordinary circumstances be desirable and provide some valuable lessons for the future, the 
urgent need to make an impact on residential burglary and at the same time take advantage of 
the perceived public enthusiasm is paramount." As a result Neighbourhood Watch was 
launched on a Force wide basis six months after the results of the original fact finding mission 
to the United States were published. Findings of independent investigation two years after 
implementation indicated that there were "no improvements in reporting rates; clear-up rates; 
the quantity or quality of telephone contacts from the public to the police; fear of personal 
victimization; perceived probability of victimization or public evaluation of the police." The 
investigations were conducted in two areas and it was reported that "there were no 
improvements in Acton in home protection behaviour and no improvements in Wimbledon in 
fear of household crime or sense of social cohesion." In their conclusions the authors indicate 
that the problem seems not to reside with the theory of Neighbourhood Watch but rather with 
poor implementation. They report that "In many ways the police have found it hard to provide 
the resources necessary to manage these schemes and in many areas they are finding it 
difficult to deliver the goods." The implication seems to be that, in the rush to be seen to be 
doing good, Neighbourhood Watch was, in fact, a hastily implemented program. The results 
were held to be a poor reflection on their North American counterparts. See 'The 
Neighbourhood Watch Experiment1 by Trevor Bennett in Coming to Terms with Policing 
Perspectives on Policy R. Morgan and D. Smith eds. Routledge London and New York © 1989
92 The Report of the Commissioner of the Metropolis for the Year 1984, Her Majesty's Stationary 
Office, London 1985 Cmnd. 9541 pg. 129
93 ibid. pg. 19
94 ibid. pg. 18 It should be noted that this rather bland summation of the PSI Report is in 
contrast with other, widely circulated, broad summaries. One general history of the era 
commented on "a report on the Metropolitan police by the Policy Studies Institute, a 400-page 
document which had been commissioned by the Metropolitan Police Commissioner himself, 
[which] condemned them as bigoted, racist, sexist, bored, dishonest and often drunk." See Sked 
A. and Cook C. Post-War Britain Penguin Books © 1979 pg. 353
95 Commissioner's Report for 1984, pg. 20. In this respect it is interesting to note that the SPG 
was expected to take an active role in 'community involvement': "Operational involvement in 
searches and major crime enquiries has been supplemented by participation in police open 
days and school visits. The Group's officers have been involved with charities for a variety of 
good causes, and these kinds of activity, together with their more active role in crime 
prevention, have helped to establish the Group in local communities as an effective and positive 
element of policing." pg. 76.
96 The Report of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis for the Year 1985: A Police for the 
People Her Majesty's Stationary Office London 1986 Cmnd. 9790 pg.22-23 It should be noted 
that the format of the Commissioner' Report changed drastically in this year. The drab 
traditional blue covered year end report was replaced by a glossy brochure. For the first time 
the Report had a photograph on the front cover. The one chosen is instructive; it featured a 
uniformed WPC and a Black PC laughing and chatting with two mothers and their toddlers in an 
idyllic setting.
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97 The Commissioners report for 1984 revealed that forty percent of all recorded offences of 
violence against the person involved persons related or known to each other. Other than noting 
that these cases provided "serious complexities of evidence and a substantial level of 
paperwork" there is no indication of any awareness of ’domestic violence' as a problem. The 
Commissioner's Report for the following year (1985) announced that a 'working party' had been 
formed to investigate the issue of 'domestic violence'. According to an officer I spoke to who 
was in the Community Relations department at the time, the Commissioner's primaiy concern 
when he commissioned the Working Party was about the number of officers injured during calls 
relating to 'domestics' (personal communication to author) This would seem to indicate that 
the issue was not, in the first instance, a matter of concern about 'community relations'. 
Rather, it, too, emerged out of a 'traditional' concern of police managers about the safety of 
front line police officers. In 1986 the year end report announced that Dr. Susan Edwards "a 
national expert in this field" had been carrying out research into the problem over the 
previous two years and that policy guide-lines would be forthcoming in the following year. In 
1987, Peter Imbert's first year as commissioner, it was noted that the "average monthly figure 
for domestic disputes with female victims formally recorded by the police rose from 84 to 199 
in the second half of 1987" after the announcement of a 'Force Order' pertaining to the 
recording of such incidents. However, in that year the statistics for violence against the 
person did not include specific details of 'domestics'. In 1988 the statistics pertaining to 
violence against the person were still presented without detailing victim-suspect 
relationships. However, the Commissioner was able to report in that year that, because of the 
new emphasis on "follow-up visits and close contact with the victim and increased confidence 
in police activity" there was a 42% rise in reported incidents. Additionally it was reported 
that the clear-up rate had risen by 83%. However, the statistics for violence against the person 
were still presented without reference to the relationship between the victim and suspect.
98 The conservative government had been elected, at least partially, on a law and order platform. 
One of its first acts after coming to power in 1979 was to implement in full the Edmund-Davies 
recommendations on police pay. The result was that in the four years to 1984-85, pay in the 
police service increased by 16 percent in real terms. Police manpower also grew at a much 
faster rate during these years than the rest of the public sector rising an average of 11% from 
1978-82. See Horton C. and Smith D. Evaluating Police Work: An Action Research Project 
Policy Studies Institute © 1988 pgs. 6-13
99 Quoted in Christian L. The Police and Criminal Evidence Bill Policing bv Coercion GLC Police 
Committee Support Unit © 1983
100 op. cit. Reiner, 1985 pg.169 He goes on to note that accountability cannot be foisted upon the 
police and that heavy handed attempts to do so may have a counter-productive effect pg.178
101 Kinsey R. Lea J. and Young J. Losing the Fight Against Crime Basil Blackwell Ltd. Oxford © 
1986 pg.35
102 The National Council for Civil Liberties almost produced a report on the miners strike. The 
results of the investigations were subsequently published independently by the investigators 
themselves. The central thesis of their report is that "the system of policing is in urgent need 
of review." They go on to say that "The problem has two major strands. Evidence as to the 
policing of the miners' strike during 1984 and 1985, supplemented by subsequent 
developments, indicates mistaken emphases in the approach to policing situations of potential 
disorder, especially industrial disputes, embracing training, assessment of priorities and
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policing strategies. In short we shall argue that the police are pursuing the wrong priorities. 
Underlying this is the second and more serious concern: the collapse of the tripartite system 
of police accountability. This together with continuing weaknesses in the control of improper 
police behaviour by means of courts and thorough, independent investigation of complaints, 
leaves the British police almost uniquely, and dangerously excluded from effective democratic 
accountability." Perhaps it should be pointed out that the report's authors are not easily 
accused of left wing bias, including as they do a Leverhulme Emeritus Fellow and former Senior 
Research Officer at the Centre for Criminological Studies at Oxford a former Police Chief 
Constable, and a former General Secretary of the National Council for Civil Liberties. See 
McCabe S. and Wallington P. with Alderson J. Gotsin L. and Mason C. The Police Public Order 
and Civil Liberties Legacies of the Miners' Strike Routledge London and New York © 1988 
103 'Polish for the Copper's Face' Newstatesman/Society vol. 2 No. 447, April 1989 Such 
'corporate identity packages' including 'mission statements' and measures to improve public 
image were, by no means, restricted to the Police institution during this period. When 
accounting firms, not noted for promoting glamourous images of themselves, such as Authur 
Young, and large stock brokerage firms such as Merill Lynch can be seen spending large sums 
of money on developing an improved corporate identity and the board rooms of Multi-National 
Oil Companies debate the relative merits of this or that new logo it is probably safe to say that 
such spending is part of a larger social trend.
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Sugar babe sugar babe 
It's all over now 
Went down town bought me a line 
Whipped m y baby 'til she changed her mind 
Sugar Babe I'm tired o f you  
You don't treat me like you used to do 
Sugar Babe Sugar Babe it's all over now
Mance Upscomb
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Introduction
Looking at the issue of wife battery, we can see that it evolved slowly 
as it was articulated by different people from different institutional stand­
points. The reader will recall that Erin Pizzey, the first figurehead of the 
battered women's movement, explained in Scream Quietly or the 
Neighbours Will Hear how the role of the house in Belmont Terrace 
developed. According to her, it was not immediately apparent to the 
women involved that there was a need for a service for battered women. 
Beaten and bruised women began to trickle in, in need of shelter and 
protection from violent husbands, with no money and no place to go. As 
these women arrived, Chiswick Women's Aid became something really 
new: a Women's Refuge. The idea of refuges for women as a means of 
addressing the violence of men within the nuclear (some would have said 
patriarchal) family setting, dominated the efforts of feminists organizing 
on this issue, particularly those in Britain, up until the early-1980s. 
Refuges were to provide a living space for women victims of violent men, a 
space where they could overcome the physical and emotional scars of that 
violence and gain the skills necessary to make lives for themselves; all in 
cooperation with other victims of male violence. It was a strategy for 
overcoming violence which was not predicated on punishment of the 
offender, rather, it was based on the idea that the most fundamental need 
was to 'empower' the victim.
By the end of the 1980s the issue of domestic violence had become an 
issue of 'law and order'. In her book Policing Domestic Violence, Susan 
Edwards put forward the new version. In her words, the "first step sought 
by most feminists (and there does seem to be agreement here) is the
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criminalization of all cases involving evidence of injury."1 It was shown in 
chapter four that some social scientists in the United States and Canada 
claimed to have proven that arrest, in and of itself, was a deterrent to 
further violence in cases of wife abuse, lending credence to the argument 
for criminalization.
If this development in the discourse is seen in the light of section 80 
of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984) which, when it was put into 
general practice in 1986, made spouses compellable witnesses in cases 
involving their partners, certain consequences for the concept of 
'empowerment1 emerge. The compellability clause caused some 
consternation in the media when its use resulted in the jailing of a 24 year 
old secretary for seven days for contempt of court when she refused to 
testify against her former boy-friend in an assault case.2 The issue of 
violence against wives, as it was first manifest in the 1970s, was based on 
an ideological position that male violence could be overcome only by the 
active participation of women in that process. Upon entering the 1990s we 
find the the issue of domestic violence articulated in a different way; it has 
been translated into the discourse of law and order. It appears that the 
issue is no longer predicated on 'empowering' individual women, or even 
women collectively, rather, the power of the legal system is invoked. 
Women are no longer 'empowered', they are 'protected'.
The task of this chapter is to re-create the historical moment when 
this translation, from a predominantly refuge based practice, based on the 
concept of 'empowerment', to a predominantly law and order based 
practice, based on the concept of 'protection', was achieved. In chapter 
four I showed that, during the first years of the 1980s, the 'Battered 
Women's Movement' in Britain was motivated very strongly by the
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Sutcliffe murders, and particularly by the media portrayal of them. At the 
same time, the movement was beset by internal problems of factionalism 
and by limited cooperation, if not outright hostility, from state agencies. 
Faced with an apparent urgent need to fget something done1, many 
feminists in Britain began to consider how to use State organs, in particular 
the criminal justice system, to address the problem. Some feminists began 
to put concerted pressure on the police at this time but, as we saw in 
chapter five, the history of police politics and practice was moving on its 
own trajectory. This historical moment as far as it pertains to the police, is 
the 'post-Scarman eraf, an era of profound challenges for the legitimation 
of policing.
Politics, policing and domestic violence
in the post-Scarman era.
In the last chapter we saw the emergence of 'community policing' as a 
recipe for overcoming the problems that beset the institution. Kenneth 
Newman, the first Metropolitan Police Commissioner of the 'new age', was 
particularly concerned to tap "that sense of civic responsibility essential to 
a police service which sees itself firmly rooted in a consenting community 
rather than as a police force imposed upon an unwilling people."3
Newman's task, to rekindle the faith of the British public, was not a 
simple matter. Perennial announcements of rising crime statistics, coupled 
with falling 'clear-up rates', and the enduring problems of police 
malpractice bedevilled efforts at 'public relations'. At the same time, the 
increasing paramilitary role played by police was disconcerting, at least to 
some sectors of the British public. When the Home Secretary announced in 
1983, in response to a parliamentary question, that 5,000 baton rounds
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(plastic bullets) and 1,000 CS projectiles 'of a type suitable for public 
disturbances' were held by police forces around the country it served only 
to reinforce this squeamishness.4 Then too, 1934 was the year of the 
miner's strike and police action in Yorkshire mining villages had done 
much to alienate a section of the working class which had no tradition of 
anti-police fervour.5
In 1962 the Report of the Royal Commission had argued that British 
liberty did not depend upon dispersal of police power, that freedom did 
not and never had depended upon any particular form of police 
organization.6 That position seemed tenable at the time but, by the 1980s, 
it had become highly contestable. One indication of the challenge were the 
amendments to the Police Act suggested by Jack Straw which were 
intended to redress the balance of the tripartite arrangements and place 
more decision making power in the hands of local Police Authorities. The 
bill failed, but the argument that liberty did, in some respect, depend on 
the institutional organization of the police had been made. At the same 
time, the Labour controlled GLC advanced a much broader challenge to the 
institutional autonomy of the police. The GLC police unit could be 
characterized as an anti-police propaganda machine and, indeed, senior 
police spokesmen were inclined to do so. It produced a barrage of 
information with the goal of establishing new standards of police 
accountability and challenging what was seen by local government 
representatives as a united 'law and order lobby'.7
It was in this context that the issue of the policing of domestic 
violence emerged. This issue was one of a handful used by the GLC Police 
Unit (later the London Strategic Policy Unit [LSPU]), used to challenge 
policing practices of the Met as well as its institutional autonomy. The case
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as it regards domestic violence was put forward in a Report by the LSPU 
made public in 1986.
The Report of the London 
Strategic Policy Unit on the 
Policing of Domestic Violence
The GLC funded Strategic Policy Unit announced in 1986 that "as with 
women's general position in society, the police force is unrepresentative of, 
and unaccountable to, women."8 What was clear to the report's authors 
was that "women’s priorities are unlikely to be recognized or represented 
by the force as currently constituted."9 Their conclusion was that poor 
police practices with regard to crimes of violence against women, in 
particular domestic violence, militate "against effective prevention, 
thereby exposing more women to further risk.10
The Strategic Policy Unit's report The Police Response to Domestic 
Violence made good use of the concurrent information being produced by 
police researchers. They cited the Islington Crime Survey as a way of 
establishing 'the extent of the problem'. They also cited the work of Susan 
Edwards in this regard. The problem was large:
Recent research in London has shown that domestic 
violence is a very serious problem both in terms of 
the number of incidents and the degree of violence 
inflicted on the women attacked. A survey of crime 
in Islington gave a figure of 2,500 such incidents in 
the borough over a year. This suggests a figure for 
the capital of over three quarters of a million.
Research on M etropolitan police response to  
domestic violence has indicated that over 1,000 
women a week in London call the police for 
assistance.11
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The police were not doing a good job at servicing this immense 
demand for action. Integral to the analysis put forth by the Strategic 
Policy Unit was the PSI report on the Police and People in London in which 
a police 'occupational culture' described essentially as a 'cult of 
masculinity' was identified. The LSPU Report stressed this aspect of the 
PSI's findings and the conclusion drawn was that "a policeman is more 
likely to identify with the wife-beating man than the besieged woman."12 
The PSI report was cited to the effect that officers dealing with rape 
"sometimes imply not only that the woman probably enjoyed the 
experience but also that they would have liked to have committed the 
offence themselves."13
The Police Response to Domestic Violence pointed out that police 
officers traditionally did not regard 'domestic disputes' as police work. The
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police's 'action plan' for 1983, which
listed domestic violence as a secondary duty, was cited; along with findings 
in the PSI study to the effect that 'domestic disputes' were regarded as 
'rubbish' by front line police officers. But the LSPU's anonymous authors 
also noted that the times were changing:
At senior level the Met is now aware of the 
widespread dissatisfaction with its performance in 
response to domestic violence. A working party was 
set up to look at this area of work and has now 
p ro d u c e d  a d ra f t  r e p o r t ,  i n c l u d i n g  
recom m endations. In his report for 1985, the 
Commissioner promised that the findings of this 
working party would be published during 1986. The 
seriousness with which the Met hierarchy takes up  
th is p roblem  will be gauged first by th e ir 
publication of, and their response to, the findings 
and recom m endations of their own working 
party .14
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The Working Party Report was never published in its complete form. 
However, recommendations from that Report were to be made public. The 
Strategic Policy Unit itself came up with sixty-eight recommendations. 
These went beyond demanding changes in police practice to cite the need 
for more refuges, changes in existing legislation (recommending, among 
other things, that rape in marriage should be outlawed) and some, few, 
changes in local government, DHSS and National Health Service policy and 
practice. In all, thirty of the sixty-eight recommendations (44%) dealt with 
police practice, the single largest category. The LSPU was particularly 
interested in changing the recording practices of police vis-a-vis domestic 
violence, but other practical suggestions were made. For example, it was 
suggested that specific training with regard to domestic violence be 
undertaken for both probationers and officers already in service. Such 
training held out the hope of counteracting the 'cult of masculinity'. The 
most far reaching suggestion was that:
Where a woman has been physically attacked, the 
offence should be correctly recorded as ABH or GBH, 
if appropriate and not as common assault, as in the 
majority of cases. Police should seriously consider 
arrest and women should not be advised to 
undertake a private prosecution; and where the 
woman is in danger of physical attack, police should 
consider using other powers of arrest eg. under the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1985, Breach of the 
Peace
However, the LSPU Report stopped short of recommending automatic 
arrest as the most appropriate policy for the Metropolitan police to adopt. 
To this end they cited Jan Pahl's findings from interviews with victims who 
had taken refuge. According to information gleaned from Pahl's interviews 
the police were considered to be 'helpful' when they listened to the 
account of the situation given by the victim and responded on that basis.
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"Some women wanted the law enforced, but others simply wanted their 
husbands calmed down; some wanted to be taken to a place of safety, 
while others wanted information about their legal position if they 
remained at home."15 While the report can be read as providing an 
argument for criminalization, it is an argument tempered by other 
considerations which, while not assigned primary importance, were not 
allowed to slide off the agenda altogether.
The LSPU Report criticized the police approach to domestic violence on 
the basis of the ’masculinist subculture1 of policing. In the final analysis 
suggestions for appropriate police action contained in the report boil down 
to a demand that police officers tailor their actions in response to specific 
instances of domestic violence in accordance with the woman victim’s 
feelings about what should be done. By this analysis it was actually 
unthinkable that the issue could ever be something which would show the 
police institution in a positive light. By the LSPU's reckoning it was 
impossible that an essentially sexist subculture could meet the demands 
being placed on it over this issue. According to this rationale, the issue of 
the policing of domestic violence was a good one on which to challenge the 
institutional autonomy of the police. But, police officers had already taken 
up the challenge.
The Metropolitan Police Report 
into the Policing of 
Domestic Violence
The Metropolitan Police investigation into the policing of domestic 
violence was produced in the same year as the LSPU's. It noted that, while 
the remit of the Working Party was to examine Police Practice with regard 
to domestic violence, recognition "of the very limited facilities offered by
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ot±Ler statutory agencies" had to be made.16 The author of the report, Chief 
Inspector Paul Green, jousted with critics who would use the issue of 
domestic violence as a weapon with which to hold the police accountable. 
The report noted that:
The problems posed by marital violence are deep 
seated in society, and the response of the caring 
professions is not beyond reproach. These problems 
are exacerbated when the only specific provision 
for women wishing to leave the marital home, the 
actual refuges for battered women, mostly provided 
by Women’s Aid, are voluntary and depend in part 
on funding from the G.LC. The implicit threat to the 
continued existence of refuges will ensure that the 
problem s of m arital violence will be sharply  
focussed over the coming year.17
However, police policy makers were not content simply to point at the 
deficiencies of other agencies. Neither were they interested in dwelling on 
the 'masculinist occupational subculture’ of policing. What they were 
interested in was improving the police role in responding to the violence. 
In this respect the Report noted that "the future is not entirely gloomy in 
that on a daily basis over London, support is given to battered wives by 
police, whether through criminal prosecution or their primary peace­
keeping role."18 Police officers in policy making positions were confident 
that the issue of domestic violence could illuminate the positive side of 
British policing.
What was needed was something that could elevate police 
intervention in ’marital violence' beyond mere "support". In this respect 
the findings of the research team headed by Peter Jaffe in London, Ontario 
was particularly influential. This research, which purported to validate the 
deterrence value of arrest in cases of domestic violence, was brought to the 
attention of the Working Party by the director of Chiswick Family
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Rescue.19 A Canadian herself, Sandra Horley introduced the findings of 
this deterrence based research into the discussion. The final version of the 
Working Party Report contained a three page synopsis of the Canadian 
findings.20 It was noted that in Ontario since 1981 "the onus has been 
placed on police to lay criminal charges in cases of wife assault where 
reasonable and probable grounds exist that the assault took place."21
In the British context such an approach was not really possible until 
the advent of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (section 80, sub-section 
3). The report noted that:
it is now feasible to pursue such a policy as once the 
in itia l statem ent has been obtained, then  if 
necessary, the wife can be cross-examined on that 
statement as if a hostile witness.22
"The advantages of such an approach", the report explained,
"would be a clear demonstration of Force policy to 
give maximum protection at law to battered wives. It 
recognizes their special needs as a vulnerable group 
and reduces the pressure felt at the moment when 
the victim continues to cohabit with her assailant 
pending prosecution. It does not remove from the 
wife the wider police support, or initial peace­
keeping role, as it still requires the woman to make 
an initial commitment to a prosecution and to 
provide a statement. Once a statement has been 
provided, then the responsibility for the ensu ing  
prosecution passes to police, even where the woman 
seeks to change her mind, as the evidence for 
assault has not altered."23
The report's author was worried about the 'anti-libertarian' and 
possibly 'sexist' implications of a predominantly masculine organization 
taking such decisions away from citizens. However, it was felt that any 
such allegations would be offset if it could be shown that such an approach
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resulted in 'lowering the rate of domestic violence'. The 'Canadian 
experience' was referred to in this regard.24
The research of Dr. Susan Edwards, which heavily influenced the LSPU 
Report, was also referred to. Her study, conducted in Hounslow and 
Holloway police stations, had revealed that many victims initially indicated 
a desire to prosecute but then subsequently withdrew the complaint. It 
was felt that many women were not continuing with their complaints 
because of the violence itself. In the final version of her research findings, 
discussed in the next section, Dr. Edwards noted the American version of 
the deterrence research discussed in chapter four. However, as in the 
LSPU report, Dr, Edwards did not make any specific recommendations 
beyond that of changing recording procedures.
Of course, the Working Party Report did not go quite as far as to 
recommend automatic arrest. The reason for this was a legal technicality. 
As has been explained previously, police officers, as agents of the law, 
have 'original authority' under the law. That is, police officers, at any level 
of the organization, cannot be told how to enforce which laws in what 
circumstances; in a word they have 'discretion'. Thus, with respect to any 
given call for service, front line police officers must make their own 
decision with respect to the best course of action.
Given this kind of institutional constraint, most of the 
recommendations of the Working Party Report had to be put in the form of 
'suggestions' and 'considerations'. For example the Police were to "consider 
adopting a higher profile approach whereby Police conduct prosecution 
where there is sufficient evidence, even if the witness becomes reluctant.25 
However, there was one aspect of the Report's recommendations which 
was specific and definite, and this had to do with recording practices. like
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the LSPU Report, the Metropohtan Police view was that it was essential to 
improve police recording practices with regard to domestic violence. The 
report contained 'preliminary' recommendations given by Susan Edwards, 
virtually all of which dealt with recording practices.26
The message contained in both these reports is somewhat blurred and, 
it must be said, not uniform. The Strategic Policy Unit's main aim was to 
criticize the police for their inadequate handling of violence behind closed 
doors. This led to a strong focus on the 'masculinist sub-culture of policing' 
in the analysis. The Metropolitan Police Working Party Report was 
concerned to find ways of changing the police response which would 
deflect criticism that they were not responsive to the needs of the public 
which they served. As such, that report focused on the 'Canadian 
approach'; research which claimed to verify the deterrence value of arrest. 
Both reports were similar in their recommendations. It is not surprising 
that, as with the LSPU Report, discussion focused on the policing of the 
problem rather than services delivered by other agencies which were 
considered only tangentially. In so far as the recommendations focused on 
policing, the main concrete demand was for changes in recording practice. 
Although it was suggested continually that arrest might be considered the 
most appropriate avenue of action it remained just that - a suggestion.27
Researching the Policing of
Domestic Violence
The Working Party Report and the LSPU Report shared a common 
feature and that is reference to social scientific research into the policing of 
domestic violence. Both Reports referred in particular to the findings of 
The Police Response to Domestic Violence in London, by Dr. Susan
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Edwards. The findings of the research team from the Polytechnic of 
Central London which examined two London Police Stations, Hounslow and 
Holloway, were made with the cooperation of the Metropolitan Police.28
The research report which emerged from this investigation was 
intended "to discover ways of improving police response to domestic 
violence that further abuse might be deterred and a better service to and 
protection of victims ensured"29 The author had made some effort to 
integrate the research goals with the concerns of the Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner. She stated that the "overall endeavour reflects the 
commitment expressed by the Police Commissioner to 'extend the 
knowledge of officers in dealing with the emotive issues of child abuse, 
domestic violence and mental illness1"30 The aims of the study were to 
uncover five basic areas:
1) public and victim reportage
2) police recording practice
3) police prosecution practice
4) police referral practice
5) police attitudes
The main contribution of this research to the corpus of knowledge 
about domestic violence concerned the recording practices of the police, 
although there was also some effort to incorporate an understanding of 
police attitudes. The picture that emerged was of a police force 
systematically avoiding involvement in calls for service generated from 
domestic violence situations. It should be noted at this point that no 
observational work was carried out of police behaviour in responding to 
particular calls for service and no judgement was made on the so-called 
'peace-keeping role' of police officers.
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In fact, the principle target of criticism was the practice of 'no- 
criming’. This is a book-keeping entry made by police officers in official 
records to indicate that a particular call for service had been responded to 
and that no criminal prosecution was expected to result. It was claimed, 
on the basis of other research, that police officers actively discouraged 
complainants from pursuing criminal charges and that the practice of ’no- 
criming' was denying women 'protection'.31 The question was asked: "Are 
the police perceiving themselves only as prosecutors when they should 
perceive themselves as protectors?"32 It was held that the practice of no- 
criming indicated that they were neither.
No-criming was the principal target for change, but this was part of 
broader changes sought in methods of record keeping. It was perceived 
that, as the police recording was then organized, the use of 'no-crime' 
served to mask the prevalence of domestic violence. For example, in 
Holloway out of a total of 449 initial calls for service regarding domestic 
incidents over a six month period, only 20 were recorded as Major Crimes 
(either section 18 or section 20 offences under the Offences against the 
Person Act 1861; commonly known as GBH, Grievous Bodily Harm) and 
only 37 were recorded as Beat Crimes (section 47 offences; commonly 
known as ABH, Actual Bodily Harm). Of these, 18 of the Major Crimes and 
28 of the Beat Crimes were no-crimed.
The record keeping routine used in London’s police stations meant 
that most of the calls for service received and responded to did not become 
part of the official criminal statistics.33 It was clear that police were 
responding to a vast number of calls, but that the recording practices 
intended to take account of the demand for service did not adequately 
reflect that demand. Accordingly the primary recommendation emerging
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from the research was to revamp the record keeping system so that an 
adequate reflection of the demands on police time regarding domestic 
incidents could be published.
The author's criticisms of the practice of no-criming are bound up with 
concerns about offering protection to women victims of assault within the 
home. However, her principal discussion of police protection for victims is 
contained in her consideration of the compellability clauses of the PACE. 
In The Police Response to Domestic Violence in London, Dr. Edwards avoids 
making any direct argument for automatic use of the compellability 
clauses in the PACE. She notes that:
The new arrest powers are feared because of 
possible abuse. But the fact remains that the police 
will be able to arrest a man - for violence or the 
threat of violence towards a wife - thus removing 
him from the situation whilst not charging him 
with an offence. This power to remove men for a 
length of time must lead to protecting m ore 
women.34
However, she also noted that "where the assailant and victim are 
married or cohabiting, domestic violence assault poses grave and complex 
difficulties relating to prosecution and effective management."35 She 
quoted from The Report o f the Commissioner o f the Metropohs for the 
year 1984 in which Kenneth Newman stated:
In nearly 40 per cent of all recorded offences of 
violence against the person in 1984 the assailant 
was related, or known, to the victim. These cases 
still provided, however, serious complexities of 
evidence and a substantial level of paper work.
Edwards then suggested that "some of the difficulties relating to matters of 
evidence might be potentially resolved by the Police and Criminal Evidence
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Act, part VIII section 80(2) and (3)" which makes spouses both competent 
and compellable to give evidence.36
Edwards clearly stated her own position on the issue of compellability 
two years later in 1989 :
The dilemma facing the police, prosecutors a n d  
courts is how best to pro tec t  a victim of m arital 
violence - whether to allow her some degree of 
choice in the prosecution of an assault against her, 
or to spare  her completely from having to make 
what must inevitably be an invidious decision.
[emphasis mine J.S.]37
In this formulation "female victims of marital violence were put at a great 
disadvantage in not being compellable".38 Taking away their choice in this 
matter was seen to be for their own good. The recommendation is made 
that the police could do something to improve matters further:
Officers should arrest in all cases where there is an 
allegation of physical violence. Custody officers 
should keep the arrested man in detention while 
charges are considered. Charge officers should 
press charges where there is evidence of physical 
injury, irrespective of the views of the victim, and 
cases should be reported to the prosecutor.3 9
The media presentation of the issue
The deliberations of domestic violence experts emerged in the media 
soon after the LSPU report and the Working Party Report were completed. 
This is the most visible version of the new discourse and, in many ways, it 
is the most important because the public never saw more than that. 
Sandra Horley was the first to speak publicly about the whole discussion. 
Late in 1985 she was quoted at length in the Weekend Observer.40 In that 
article it was reported that she had "just received a Canadian Government
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research paper" which showed that prosecution of men who are violent 
towards their wives acts "as a disincentive to further violence". Sandra 
Horley was a vociferous campaigner for criminalization. She wrote in 
Social Work Today at the time that
...in 1982 the Canadian Solicitor General instructed 
the Canadian Police to prosecute vigorously in cases 
of domestic violence. Thus it was no longer left to 
an intim idated wife to add the struggle of a 
prosecution to her problems.
A follow-up research study shows the victims 
reported a decrease in violence when police laid 
charges.
The same study shows that when no charges were 
laid, the level of violence increased41
Horley justified universal application of arrest procedures by 
reference to psychological battering. She explained that violence 
perpetrated by husbands on their wives caused physical harm at times 
but, men's abuse could also cause emotional damage. She restated the 
'battered wife syndrome' hypothesis, according to which the victim's self­
esteem and confidence are seen to be so eroded that judgement is 
impaired. By implication, victims are unable to look after their own best 
interests. It was seen as necessary for police to intervene and bring the 
case to court in such instances, in order to protect them from further 
abuse 42
She encountered some opposition, particularly from black women and 
civil libertarians, but she countered emphatically:
Some women may be unwilling to testify against 
their husbands, and ethnic groups may become the 
target of the police, but I feel justice will be better 
served in the long term if we treat domestic violence 
as a criminal act. Civil liberty groups complained it 
would be a loss of liberty, but I ask: whose liberty 
are we preserving?"
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Statements made by chairman of the Metropolitan Police Working 
Party, Chief Inspector Paul Green, also began to trickle into the press at 
this time.43 His comments were initially confined to figures; particularly 
estimates of how much domestic violence the police deal with and how 
much the arrest rate would rise were victims to pursue their allegations. 
In this regard he mentioned that "one issue facing the police is whether 
the wish of the victims not to take a complaint further should continue to 
be paramount".44
Susan Edwards, contributor to both the LSPU Report and the Working 
Party Report also made public statements which were, like Chief Inspector 
Green’s, largely confined to figures.45 In particular she mentioned that 
around 60,000 domestic violence calls were received by the Metropolitan 
Police per year. She added that less than 2% of these reached court and 
only 0.2% resulted in a custodial sentence. While she strongly implied that 
something was awry with standard practices for policing this type of crime 
she refrained from directly advocating arrest.
The consensus that domestic violence was primarily a concern for the 
police seemed to have been achieved in that year (1986). The trial for the 
murder of Blawant Kaur Panesar had just come to a close. The murderer, 
her husband Bhagwant Panesar, had been jailed for life with the 
recommendation that he serve at least 25 years of that sentence. The 
details of the case were widely reported.46 City Limits magazine made an 
explicit connection between the Metropolitan Police Working Party Report, 
The LSPU Report and Blawant's murder.47 The LSPU Report was 
paraphrased at length and the police were hotly criticized. In particular it 
was pointed out that:
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The police will not enforce an injunction unless 
there is a power of arrest attached; even then they 
rarely arrest the offending man. This is despite the 
fact that police inaction can, and has, led to the 
death of the woman at the hand of the m a n
concerned.4**
Throughout the Spring of 1987 Sandra Horley was prom inently 
featured in the press. Like her precursor Erin Pizzey, she made good use 
of the smaller ’community papers'.49 She stressed many times that 
domestic violence was a crime, that they had proved in Canada that arrest 
was a deterrent and that, since victims of violent men are incapable of 
making the proper choice because of their traumatized state, what was 
needed was a pro-arrest policy.
In June, the Metropolitan Police announced their new guide-lines on 
the policing of domestic violence which became front page headlines for 
the first time on June 24th 1986.50 It was announced that "wife beaters 
were to face tough action under new guide-lines on domestic violence." 
The public was informed that due to "criticism of police procedures by 
women's groups" a new attitude was being adopted making assault within 
the home "as criminal as an attack on the street."51
Paul Green the main author of the Metropolitan Working Party Report 
had been transferred out of the Community Liaison Office prior to 
announcing the Force Order. Occupying his position was Commander 
Walter Boreham who stated:
Nothing is more insidious than the circumstances of 
a woman subjected to violence in the one p lace  
where she expects to be safe - her own home.5 2
It was left to his subordinate, Inspector Jane Stitchbury, to explain that the 
police had, in the past "adopted the role of mediators between couples" and
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that "it was very much felt that the home was a private place and that 
police should not interfere in a intimate relationship." The reporter 
explained that the new policy "follows a report by a working party set up 
by Scotland Yard in June 1984 and new powers under the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act which provide the opportunity to compel a spouse to 
give evidence, thus taking the onus of prosecution away from the victim." 
It was explained further that "the working party recommended that 
criminal proceedings should be started against the violent party even 
when the victim was reluctant to pursue the matter in court, providing the 
necessary evidence was available and the officer felt it was in the victim’s 
or the public's interest."53
Chief Inspector Green continued to give public statements himself. He 
was quoted in The Guardian to the effect that the new policy would be an 
improvement because it took prosecution out of the women’s hands. His 
reasoning was that "the man's anger would be directed away from the 
woman, against the police and courts."54
The mid-1980s saw the consolidation of a new way of articulating the 
issue of domestic violence. The terms of discourse had been shifted and a 
new paradigm erected. The establishment of this bounded discourse was 
aided by people in several institutions. Social scientists, refuge activists, 
local government representatives, and police officers all contributed to the 
manufacture of a consensus. The consensus? The issue of domestic 
violence had become police 'property' and officers were expected to 
'protect' victims of violence in the home. In June 1987 criminalization 
became "the clearest sign to society that to batter your wife is 
unacceptable."55
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The submerged discourse
Neither the Metropolitan Police Working Party into domestic violence 
nor the London Strategic Planning Unit could be accused of ignoring the 
efficacy of the refuge movement in the social response to domestic 
violence. Both had included mention of refuge provision as an integral 
part of their analysis, although it must be said that at times mention of 
refuge provision was more of a way of scoring points against each other 
than serious advocacy for the role of the Women's Aid Federation. 
Certainly Sandra Horley, as director of what had been re-christened 
"Chiswick Family Rescue", could not be accused of denigrating the role of 
women's shelters. However, the weight of evidence gathered in the 
process of debates around the issue of domestic violence at this time 
served to eclipse the strategies adopted by the battered wife movement, 
strategies which revolved around the central tactic of providing women 
victims of violent men safe refuge. This is not to argue that the police role 
necessarily conflicts with the strategy of refuge provision or that battered 
women's advocates were in competition with the police over this. Indeed, 
battered women's advocates, in particular Sandra Horley and Susan 
Edwards, had played direct roles as moral entrepreneurs at this time 
serving to facilitate the transformation of the discourse. What is being 
argued is that the importance of establishing an infrastructure for support 
for victims of violent husbands was overshadowed by the issue of 
criminalization.
The Women's Aid Federation also produced two reports during this 
period and the fate of these reports is instructive in this regard.56 WAFE 
representations were concerned to point out that statutory agencies
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implicitly recognized the need for refuges by routinely making referrals to 
them. This was certainly true, as Women’s Aid representatives were 
anxious to point out, of social service agencies. At the same time, it was no 
less true of the Metropolitan Police who had, by the mid-1980s, issued 
patrolling constables with calling cards with the London Women’s Aid 
’hotline number' on them. On these grounds the WAFE Reports argued that 
refuges were
not a frill or an extra, but an essential provision 
which are best run  by voluntary groups of local 
women com m itted to and experienced in this 
particular area. All too often women are poorly, or 
even wrongly, advised by solicitors, housing 
officers, or social workers. Bed and Breakfast, or 
tem porary accomm odation provision costs local 
authorities a great deal more money and is no 
substitute for refuges - even if a family gets a visit 
from an overburdened social worker once a week. 
Women isolated in Bed and Breakfasts are rarely 
able to cope with the multiple pressures on them. 
Usually with children and in great fear, they have 
left their homes, friends, possessions, schools and 
often their extended families too. All too often they 
will return  home, only to leave again and again. 
Refuges have a preventative role. If a woman is 
properly  advised, supported  and if necessary 
rehoused, this takes recurring pressure off Social 
Services, Emergency Housing Units and Educational 
Welfare and forestalls women and their children 
being reduced to psychiatric patients.57
WAFE attempted to argue that refuge provision provided an effective 
preventative measure at low cost. They also attempted to argue that the 
role that refuge activists played in the social response to domestic violence 
facilitated women making choices on their own:
Only women's support groups can unequivocally 
support a woman's decision to leave physical or 
mental or sexual violence; offer her a place to stay 
while she sorts out her problems and choices; help
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her to get rehoused if necessary; support her in 
s ta rtin g  a new life with her children and in 
rebuilding their damaged self-confidence and self- 
respect. Domestic violence is a particu larly  
isolating experience. A refuge is un ique  in 
providing the company and support of other women 
with the same experience, what women in refuges 
value m ost - despite overcrowded and often 
inadequate living conditions - is the absence of fear, 
and the realization that they are not alone. 5 8
The plea, emotive at times, was for more money in order to establish 
more refuges. It was pointed out that the recommendations of the 
Parliamentary Committee in 1975 for one refuge space per ten thousand 
population had not been met and that in order to meet that level of 
provision some one thousand refuges were needed nationally. At that time 
there were less than three hundred. It was also pointed out that the 
Department of Environment’s Urban Aid grants were the major source of 
funding for most refuges and that they were due to be cut off in March 
1986. There were no plans to develop an alternative and the WAFE 
infrastructure continued to exist on only £100,000 per annum.59 To 
understand how the refuge discourse was 'submerged' or 'eclipsed' by the 
criminalization discourse in a different way we can look at government 
finances. It could be pointed out that, during the early 1980s, total 
government public expenditure grew by only 2% per annum after 
controlling for inflation. In contrast, expenditure on police services was 
grew by 6% during the same period. Simply put, it is only the police 
institution which had the financial resources to give an enhanced response 
to domestic violence during this period.
Some WAFE activists also felt that, in the absence of an infrastructure 
of support for victims, criminalization was a potentially retrograde step. 
Such arguments were put forth and did emerge in the press, but WAFE
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spokespersons were not as successful at propagating their views as those 
advancing the criminalization paradigm. One Woman's Magazine, Girl 
About Town , ran a feature article about the refuge movement. It noted 
that "the most worrying thing is the step back marked by the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Police can now compel a woman to give 
evidence in court, to re-live her disturbing experiences in court in front of 
the man who caused them."60 Other reports in the press noted a cautious 
welcome by members of 'women's groups' to the announcements made by 
the Metropolitan Police regarding their new policy. One refuge activist 
who declined to be publicly identified, commented that:
To press charges where the woman agrees or not 
could backfire if the man starts taking it out on her 
and she's nothing to do with it. It could lead 
potentially to the woman being subjected to even 
more danger.61
Jane Stitchbury, from the community liaison branch at Scotland Yard 
had the last word on that issue, however. She stated in response to this 
comment that "we have studied this system in other countries. It has 
proved to be a very successful system in compelling women to come 
forward and give evidence."62
Conclusion
In this chapter we have seen the consolidation of a linguistic- 
authority-structure, a bounded discourse, around the issue of domestic 
violence. The establishment of that paradigm was brought about by the 
participation of individuals articulating their concerns from the stand­
point of several institutional sites. It seems that the consolidation of this
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version of the discourse, which prioritized policing as the most important 
requirement for the social response to domestic violence, was facilitated 
because of the political conjuncture in which the British Policing institution 
found itself during the first half of the 1980s. It is somewhat ironic that 
the GLC’s effort to criticize the policing of domestic violence, and thereby 
challenge the sovereignty of the institution, actually helped lay the ground 
which enabled police policy makers to capitalize on the issue as part of a 
'community policing' initiative calculated to help preserve that institutional 
autonomy. Indeed, the critique that the LSPU offered allowed the 
Metropolitan Police to appear as the second stage in a dialectic which could 
only reify the discourse of criminalization. The LSPU did not wish to 
endorse an overly simplified response to the problem of wife battery and 
held back from a blanket advocacy of arrest in such instances. Similarly, 
police policy makers could not contemplate such a policy because of the 
legal status of police discretion. However, as it emerged in the nation's 
press the entire discourse had the appearance of a stem law and order 
response.
The difference between the two versions is, perhaps, only a semantic 
one. However, what counts is that the great weight of attention given to 
the issue of domestic violence was focused on its policing to the virtual 
exclusion of any other possibility. The notion of 'empowerment' had all 
but disappeared and in its place we find the concept of 'protection'. With 
that subtle change in vocabulary the refuge movement was eclipsed.
In the next chapter I will consider what effect this had on the internal 
organization of the policing of domestic violence. However, before bringing 
this chapter to a close I would like to consider, briefly, how the emergence 
of the issue impinged on the public perceptions of the police. The reader
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will recall that the most important changes brought about by these 
considerations were changes in record keeping practices. The policy 
recommendations put forth began, almost immediately, to swell the 
number of officially recorded cases of domestic violence. But this was not 
an uncontrolled 'moral panic'. Indeed, police managers had become adept 
at staving off such panics.63 What emerged was a controlled moral 
outrage, an outrage against men who beat their wives. This served to 
validate the image of police men and women as valiant 'protectors' of weak 
women. The pathetic image of the beaten-wife as unable to make any 
decisions of her own made the need for enhanced police powers seem all 
the more real.
In the 1970s Robert Mark was adept at presenting ever rising 
burglary statistics as justification for a myriad of institutional 
requirements. The need for more money, manpower and equipment as 
well as safe-guarding the institutional sovereignty of the Metropolitan 
Police were all partially justified with reference to these statistics. In the 
1980s the statistics of choice were no longer for burglary or 'mugging', 
instead there was 'domestic violence incidents' or 'incidents of racial 
harassment'. Having achieved hegemony over these issues, mention of 
official statistics relating to them had the effect of showing the police in a 
positive light; as doing the best of a bad job.
According to some, these statistics were verification that police policy 
makers took seriously the circumstances of the public they were 
responsible for. The translation of the issue of domestic violence into a law 
and order discourse is not a matter for concern if it can be shown that in 
doing so it makes it possible for victims of violence in the home to derive 
some concrete benefit. The task of the next section is to show the nature
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of the 'traditional' police response to domestic violence and detail the 
nature of the innovations brought about by the policy changes introduced 
by these considerations. This will answer the question: how did 
establishing domestic violence as a force priority effect operational 
policing? It will also help answer the question: how did criminalization 
effect the lives of women victims of violent men?
1 Edwards S.S.M. Policing Domestic Violence: Women. Law and the State Sage publications 
London © 1989 pg. 50
2 Judge James Pickles jailed an assault victim, Michell Renshaw, for refusing to give evidence in 
the trial of her boy friend and alleged assailant. Judge Pickels argued that Ms. Renshaw's 
reluctance to give evidence "was a deliberate contempt of court which has perverted the course 
of justice and maybe prevented a man being properly dealt with by a court." It was later 
revealed that Ms. Renshaw refused to give evidence because of being frightened by threatening 
telephone calls and harassment.
3 Newman K. Report of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis for the Year 1984, Her 
Majesty's Stationary Office, London 1985 Cmnd. 9541
4 Manwaring-White, S. The Policing Revolution: Police Technology. Democracy and Liberty in 
Britain Harvester Press Ltd. © 1983 pg. 137
5 See: Kinsey R. Lea J. and Young J. Losing the Fight Against Crime Basil Blackwell Ltd. Oxford © 
1986 pg.35. They report that the Chief constable of West Yorkshire was worried in the 
aftermath of the miner's dispute that relations between the police and community had reached 
a low ebb. It is also worth noting that after the negative press surrounding the Sutcliff 
murders Yorkshire Police had some work to do to recover the confidence of many women in that 
community.
6 Report of the Royal Commission on the Police. May 1962 Cmnd 1728
7 Christian L. The Police and Criminal Evidence Bill - Policing bv Coercion GLC Support Unit © 
1983 pg.8-9
8 op. cit. Briefing Paper No. 1 pg. 2
9 ibid. pg. 2
10 ibid. pg. 3
11 ibid. pg. 1 See also Jones, T. Maclean, B. and Young, J. The Islington Crime Survey. Gower 
Press London, © 1986 and Edwards S.S.M. The Police Response to Domestic Violence. PCL© 1986
12 ibid. pg. 2 see also Smith, D.J. and Grey J. Police and People in London. Gower Press, 
Aldershot © 1985
13 ibid. pg. 2
14 ibid. pg. 4 The Working Party Report referred to here noted that "it is arguable that if the 
Police show a greater preparedness to pursue a prosecution by taking it to court where there 
was reasonable evidence, even if the witness wavered, then there could be an increase of 
confidence in Police, not only in issues of Marital violence, but also over a wider area." 
(emphasis mine J.S.) See: Green P.A. The Report of the Metropolitan Police Working Party into 
Domestic Violence. Januaiy 1986 (unpublished document) 16.1.8
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15 ibid. pg. 36 See: Pahl J. (ed)Private Violence and Public Policy: the Needs of Battered Women 
and the Responses of the Public Services. London; Routledge and Kegan Paul © 1985
16 Green P.A. The Report of the Metropolitan Police Working Party into Domestic Violence. 
January 1986 (unpublished document) 8.1.2
17 ibid. 8.1.2
18 ibid. 8.1.3
19 Sandra Horley became head of Chiswick Family Rescue in 1983. She was at least as dynamic a 
spokesperson as Erin Pizzey had been, and seemingly as good an organizer. However, deep 
wounds heal slowly, if at all. There remained a deep seated antagonism between the WAFE and 
the Chiswick operation. She has told me that the root of the division is ideological and amounts 
to whether or not the (patriarchal) State can be depended on to intervene in male violence or 
not. She herself has a dirigist view of the State and state actors, so, for example, she has taken 
part in training programs for police officers at Hendon Police Training College since 1986.
20 Jaffe et a/'s findings were discussed at length in chapter four. It should be noted that none of 
the methodological short-comings of this research were contained in the Report of the 
Metropolitan Police Working Party. The three page synopsis, included as appendix ’H\ did not 
include details of the sample deterioration in the victim survey portion of the research (which 
was over 80%). The synopsis did note that Canadian police officers had been pessimistic about 
the effectiveness of arrest in deterring further violence but the version in the Working Party 
Report discounted this, pointing out that police "officers’ effectiveness is significantly higher 
than they give themselves credit for." Given the size of sample deterioration the effectiveness 
measure is probably spurious, indicating that police officers pessimism was probably the 
better measure of the effectiveness of the new ’treatment1. I have discussed the Working Party 
Report with Superintendent Paul Green and it is interesting to note that he had, at that time, 
the opportunity to speak, albeit informally, with police officers who were involved in the 
Canadian initiative. Superintendent Green spoke of their pessimism about the efficacy of the 
use of arrest as a deterrent, but also noted that straight forward arrest procedures made the 
decisions of front line police officers much easier. Other supervisory officers have also told 
me that emulation of the ’Canadian approach’ makes decision making on the part of front line 
police officers much more clear cut.
21 ibid. 11.4.2
22 ibid. 11.4.4
23 ibid. 11.4.5 Perhaps it would do, at this point, to presage readers and say that, in a 
replication study of the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment carried out in Omaha, 
which tested the efficacy of mandatory arrest in cases of domestic violence 60% of the 
respondents reported that they did not want the police to arrest suspects; that 65% of the 
respondents reported that suspects blamed them for the arrests; and that 21% of the 
respondents indicated that suspects threatened them because of the arrests. These 
developments will be addressed in chapter nine. See: Dunford F.W. Huizinga, D. and Elliot, 
D.S.’The Role of Arrest in Domestic Assault: The Omaha Police Experiment’ Criminology 28 
(2) : 183-206 1990
24 Working Party Report 11.4.6; 11.4.8
25 op. cit. Working Party Report 17.2.3
26 ibid. appendix ’G’. The sole exception to this was her final recommendation which was to the 
effect that officers felt assessment of their capability as Police officers was based on league
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tables of arrests/cautions and that 'domestic violence* did not figure high in this calculation. 
Edwards’ recommendation was that: "steps should be taken to change this image."
27 A third report which was also assembled during the same period largely reiterates the points 
made in these two reports. See: Women's National Commission Violence Against Women Report 
of an Ad Hoc Working Group 1986. This report was assembled by "an advisory committee to 
Her Majesty’s Government" which drew on the available information about domestic violence. 
Interestingly, no mention was made about the deterrence based research although this did not 
prevent the committee recommending a policy of arrest. In this respect the report noted that "a 
’soft’ and ’hard’ approach by police to domestic violence do not need to be alternatives. Both 
approaches are applicable: the first to the victim, who needs more advice, support, and concern 
for her saftey and that of her children. The second approach applies to violent assailants: if 
the police believe a serious crime has been committed, whatever the 'rights and wrongs' of the 
marital relationship and the provocation which may have been involved, the police should 
effect an arrest and seek to pursue a prosecution." In this regard the compellability clause in 
the PACE (1984) was cited and Dr. Susan Edwards was quoted to the effect that "it may have 
the effect of assisting police in their enquiries, resulting in a greater preparedness of the 
police to arrest and prosecute in the more serious cases and may indeed take the onus of 
prosecution away from the spouse who may be reluctant." (pg. 52) This report regarded all 
aspects of the social response to domestic violence (as well as discussing rape) including the 
use of the civil law and the role of the WAFE. However, policing and the criminal justice 
process are the major considerations of the report and its recommendations. In this respect it 
was noted that "the Working Group's Report is in five chapters. The most detailed, chapter II, 
discusses new approaches by police to the treatment of victims of rape and sexual assault. The 
Working Group was set up to study initiatives by the Metropolitan Police, and its enquiries 
have included the work of other police forces. The Working Group welcome the beginnings of a 
better quality approach to crimes against women by some police and court authorities, and the 
main purpose of their Report is to highlight good practice and to press for its wider adoption." 
(pg. 13) With regard to the WAFE the report recommended that steps be taken "to ensure that 
funds are maintained and increased so that refuges do not close" and also that steps be taken to 
establish a clear picture of funding arrangements for the future (pg. 11). The report also drew 
special attention to the needs of battered women under the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act and 
made the novel suggestion that violent husbands be rehoused "to make it easier for their wives 
and families to stay in their family sized accomodation" (pg. 12). However, there was no 
systematic attempt to evaluate the resources available to refuges. While the report did not 
ignore the wider social response to domestic violence, in particular the role o f women’s 
refuges, its overall focus on 'good police practice' did facilitate the submergence of that 
discourse. In this respect the Women's National Commission Report is no different from the 
other, more widely advertised, reports. It should be noted that, while both Chief Inspector 
Paul Green and Dr. Susan Edwards, as well as many other experts, contributed important 
information to the commission, Sandra Horley is not mentioned in the report, this may be why 
the deterrence based North American research received no mention.
28 The original research proposal was submitted in 1983 and was to be carried out by a research 
team headed up by David Cowell of the Polytechnic of Central London in conjunction with the 
Borough of Islington Police Committee. The project was conceived to focus on policing in the 
Borough of Islington. According to the original proposal the project was beneficial because 1) 
it would "encourage the police to treat calls for assistance in domestic disputes with more
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sympathy" and 2) it would "encourage those at risk to place more trust and confidence in the 
willingness and ability of the police to intervene effectively, thus, in extreme cases, saving 
lives, and rendering the police force more accountable to the community." (emphasis mine J.S.) 
Interestingly this original research proposal did not envisage criminalization as the goal for a 
changing police response. To this end Maurice Punch was quoted to the effect that: "In husband 
and wife disputes ... the woman may seek a visibly authoritative and symbolically masculine 
figure to intervene on her behalf against a violent husband whom she wants pacified but not 
arrested. The policeman has to learn how to code these expectations and how to attribute 
culpability by making a moral judgement on the conflicting accounts and on the image conveyed 
by the state of the house and the children . . . This area badly needs some analytical and 
conceptual precision to avoid overdue simplification in generalizing about incidents." 
Quotations taken from 'Domestic Violence in a London Borough - The Police Response' a 
research proposal drawn up by C. Cannan, D. Cowell, and Prof. R. Lees (unpublished document)
29 Edwards S.S.M. Edwards The Police Response to Domestic Violence in London , Polytechnic of 
Central London, July 1986
30 ibid. pg iii
31 Interviews with operational police officers indicated to the researchers that police officers 
who attend calls for service involving violence between spouses believe that such calls are 
unlikely to result in criminal proceedings. Research conducted in Scotland (Wasoff F. 'Legal 
Protection from Wifebeating. The Processing of Domestic Assaults by Scottish Prosecutors and 
Criminal Courts' International Journal of the Sociology of Law No. 10 1982 pgs 187-204) was 
cited to the effect that victims of domestic assault were no less likely to withdraw their 
complaint than were victims of violence perpetrated by strangers. It was acknowledged that 
some women might not wish to follow criminal proceedings but that "other women may feel that 
the police view of their possible reluctance to prosecute unfairly discriminates against them in 
the kind of protection they receive." Edwards 1986 pg. 14
32 ibid. pg. 14
33 This meant that when the Home Office published official statistics for 'serious offences 
between spouses in 1979 and 1980, a statistic never before published, they were found to be 
totally unrealistic. Thus in 1979 there were recorded a total of 5,447 woundings and serious 
assaults involving married couples in the country as a whole; a clear and enormous under­
estimate. Home Office Statistics 42 (R1266)
34 Edwards 1986, pg. 21
35 ibid. pg. 17
36 ibid. pg. 18
37 S.S.M. Edwards 'Stand By Your Man" Police Review May, 1989: 1016-1017 This position, 
outlined by Dr. Edwards at the end of the decade, is put in the wider context of feminist 
debates in chapter ten.
38 ibid.
39 ibid. It has also been argued that making individual victims of wife assault compellable 
witnesses will send messages to society at large. These messages, according to those who 
support compellability are that: 1) women would feel that police would use the full power of 
the law to protect them; 2) men who were violent towards their spouses would begin to see their 
actions as a criminal offence and thus realize that it is not acceptable in civilized society; and
3) like operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, domestic violence would be 
seen as a 'crime against society' rather than simply something involving individuals. These
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points are made by Bourlet, A. in Police Intervention in Marital Violence Open University 
Press, Milton Keynes © 1990 pg. 90. While I do think that widespread use of Section 80 sub­
section 3a, which specifies compellability in cases involving spousal violence, injury, or threat 
of injury, would 'send messages to society at large' I do not think that this message would 
necessarily remain within the confines set down by advocates of criminalization. For example, 
there is no guarantee that Black women victims of violence within marriage would welcome this 
kind of paternalism by a criminal justice system which, for many black people, represents only 
white man's (and woman's) law. In fact, these debates did not emerge until two years later. The 
debates are discussed at length in chapter ten.
40 Weekend Observer, Sunday 15, 1985
41 Social Work Today June 9, 1986
42 ibid.
43 The Times, September 22,1986
44 ibid
45 The Times, October 6, 1986
46 See The Daily Telegraph December 3, 1986; and The Guardian December 3, 1986 Blawant's 
murder is a gruesome tale. According to evidence given during the trial her husband had 
traced her whereabouts to the location of the Brent Asian Woman's Refuge and, with the aid of 
two hired men, attempted to break in. These men evidently changed their minds about 
participating in what they thought was a burglary when they saw Bhagwant was armed with a 
carving knife. According to the testimony these two hired men returned to the refuge the next 
day to warn the women and even 'escorted' one woman to the police to ask for 'protection'. 
Three days later Blagwant broke into the refuge on his own and murdered his estranged wife in 
front of their three young children. Witnesses saw him leave the bedroom with a blood stained 
knife and his fingerprints were clearly in evidence. He was sentenced to life for premeditated 
murder with the recommendation that he serve at least 25 years. He was also given an 
additional sentence of 18 months for conspiracy to commit burglary.
47 City Limits Magazine 11-18 December 1986
48 ibid.
49 The London Daily News carried several stories either about Sandra Horley or by her during 
this period. See the 1987 April 23, May 6th, June 24th and 25th editions.
50 The London Evening Standard announced that 'Yard Acts on Beaten Wives' (June 24th 1986) 
The Evening News was more extreme: 'Lock Up the Wife Beaters"
51 The London Evening Standard June 24, 1986
52 Daily Telegraph, Thursday June 25, 1987
53 ibid.
54 The Guardian May 19, 1987
55 This quote is attributed to Inspector Jane Stitchbury in The Guardian May 19, 1987
56 Report on the Funding. Premises and Staffing of London Refuges, unpublished document
submitted to the Association of London Authorities 1985; Report and Recommendations on the 
Funding of Women's Aid Refuges Nationally, unpublished document submitted to the 
Association of Metropolitan Authorities 1986.
57 ibid. 1986
58 ibid. 1986
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59 This sum was provided by the DHSS and was intended for the infrastructure on a national level 
only. The DHSS were not able to fund local refuges which obtained funding from local councils 
and charitable donations. It is difficult to calculate the total amount of financial resources 
available for refuge provision since this was not done from a centtral source nor was it done in a 
coordinated fashion.. The so called independent refuges had funding sources separate from 
WAFE, whose refuges each had responsibility for their own financial records. However, it was
clear from both the number of refuges and their poor conditions that financial assistance was
not adequate.
60 'Being Closed Doors' in Girl About Town September 6, 1986
61 The Guardian October 10,1987
62 ibid.
63 An interesting, if tangential, story illustrates the misunderstandings which enhanced record 
keeping practices can lead to. In September of 1987 a minor scandal hit the press in Canada 
and the Soviet Union which involved a wife battering Canadian and his victim, a Soviet emigre. 
It seems that a Canadian advertising executive, Kerby Inwood, had married a 31 year old Soviet 
woman, a teacher by the name of Tanya Sedorova., while on holiday in the USSR in 1986. After 
months of vigorous campaigning on her behalf Mr. Inwood managed to get permission for her to 
leave the Soviet Union and they set up a home in Toronto. Th<e scandal came to light some two 
months later when Tanya showed up in a Toronto women's shelter with a broken nose. Pravda 
took great glee in recounting what was admitted to be a sad story, saying that "Canadians often 
resort to violence on their partners." Challenged on this poSnt by a Canadian journalist the 
Pravda columnist, Vladimir Shelkov, easily proved his case. He referred to two sources: an 
editorial from the Toronto Globe and Mail and, for specific details, a short phone call to the 
Toronto Metropolitan Police for his facts. His answer came in the December 1987 English 
Language edition of Pravda. The headline was 'Family Violence Erupts in Canada'. The article 
consisted of a parade of statistics gleaned from Mr. Shelkov's sources and concluded: "The 
drama which took place in September 1986 in the Inwood's hoime and which ended up with the 
transfer of Tanya Sedorova and her son to a shelter was just another sad everyday occurrence." 
Mr. Shelkov's observation is true, of course, however the ques»tion arises as to what the reality 
behind the statistics is. In Canada where millions of dollars are spent annually on provision of 
resources to help battered wives the high statistical incidence of such violence has certain 
specific social consequences. In the Soviet Union, where no official statistics are kept and 
hence there is no apparent incidence of 'domestic violence' and, further, no money is dedicated 
to providing resources for women victims of violent men the statistical reality appears better. 
The underlying reality is, however, probably much worse. Itt would seem that in Britain the 
worst of both situations exists with high statistical incidence amd low provision of services.
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Look up on the wall baby 
Hand me down m y shootin ’ iron 
You can call your mother long distance 
Tell her to expect your body home 
If the city won 't bury you baby 
I believe the county will 
You made your last mistake 
Now your goin' out on Boot Hill 
Don't want to hurt you baby 
'cause you gave me m y first thrill 
But you did me so wrong 
now your goin’ way out on Boot Hill
Johnny Winter
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brought about by the ,prioritization, of the issue of the policing of domestic 
violence in the terms of practical policing.
The categories and the logic of which I speak may not be readily 
apparent, particularly to people not intimately involved with policing. I 
derived my knowledge of them from four sources. The first was a detailed 
content analysis of official police records for 110 cases of 'domestic 
violence' gathered over a two month period in one London Police Station. 
Case records for all police work are filed together, differentiated only 
according to the seriousness of the offence. This meant that these 
particular cases had to be identified in amongst all the other flotsam and 
jetsam of police work and copied, laboriously, by hand.1 This exercise was 
useful in that it allowed me to gain an understanding of how domestic 
violence fit in to the constellation of policing duties. A detailed content 
analysis of those files is the concern of the next chapter.
The time consuming nature of this task also facilitated the building up 
of field notes based on conversations with police officers in the station 
about their views of policing in this problematic area. These field notes 
form the basis of my second data set. These conversations were a useful 
exercise in themselves in that they allowed me to practice using the 
analytical categories that police officers themselves employ, thus insuring 
that my own use of those categories was not at odds with their use in 
operational policing. Officers explained to me how the case files were 
organized the way they were and, not infrequently, told me tales of their 
experiences. Together with the analysis of the contents of the case files 
these conversations allowed me to form a picture of the policing of 
domestic violence as it was carried out at this police station.2
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Introduction
In this chapter, I shall be examining the linguistic-authority-structure 
of operational policing as it applies to interpersonal violence and, more 
specifically, to so-called ’domestic violence’. In the context of a 
bureaucratic institution like the police, the application of the metaphor of a 
linguistic-authority-structure is somewhat different in that the 'authority' 
is organizationally defined. The bounded discourses about the issue of 
domestic violence that I have been concentrating on up until this point, 
discourses which are much more explicitly in the realm of politics, are 
contained within somewhat less rigidly prescribed analytical categories 
than we shall encounter in the context of operational policing. This does 
not mean that social actors in the milieu of coercive social control do not 
marshal their analytical categories in creative ways, as we shall see. 
However, their discursive practice remains systematic because the 
'community' that has recourse to those categories is 'uniform' in its 
practical interventions.
In this context I mean by the term linguistic-authority-structure the 
set of analytical categories, logical operations, and classificatory techniques 
that police officers are required to utilize in the performance of their 
duties. An examination of this semantic network is, therefore, also an 
examination of the formal processing accomplished by institutionalized 
policing. I intend first to outline this semantic network in its 'traditional' 
form, that is in its application before the Force Order on 'domestic violence' 
was issued in June 1987. I shall then go on to indicate some of the ways in 
which this 'traditional approach' has been modified. In particular I shall 
look at the functioning of three of the Met's 'domestic violence units'. This 
descriptive exercise will help me answer questions about concrete changes
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The third data source consisted of 43 interviews conducted with police 
officers of both sexes and varying ranks at two police stations in 1985, that 
is, before the issuing of the Force Order. I had no part in the designing of 
this questionnaire nor in the administration of the interviews since this 
project was carried out before I began my research in the area. I had 
access to full transcriptions of these interviews and, again, an analysis of 
them further developed my understanding of the semantic network 
employed by operational police officers in the performance of their duties. 
These interviews shed light on the policing of domestic violence 
uncontaminated by the climate surrounding the policing of domestic 
violence after the Force Order was issued in 1987, as such they were an 
invaluable guide to mapping the traditional response of the police.3
The fourth data source consists of semi-structured interviews with 
police officers involved with three police 'domestic violence units' in 
London. The interviews were with officers of all ranks, from Chief 
Superintendent down to Police Constable (in most cases Woman Police 
Constable), and reflect their differing understandings of policing as it 
pertains to this activity. These interviews, together with less structured 
conversations in the context of an examination of specific case files with 
officers in 'dv units', allowed me to understand the specific nature of the 
innovative interventions practiced by officers in these units.
The analysis of these four data sets enabled the identification of the 
central analytical categories available for policing interpersonal violence 
and the way in which they are employed when police process calls for 
assistance involving violence in the domestic setting. I use the word 
process quite deliberately here. What this examination is intended to 
highlight is the institutionalized aspects of the police response to 'domestic
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violence'. I am not so much concerned with the individual psychology of 
police officers and how that may affect their handling of what are often 
highly charged situations as I am with the regulated and supervised 
aspects of the problem. By identifying the central concepts employed by 
police officers in the execution of their duty I wish to cast light on the code 
through which some calls for assistance are translated into an object for 
policing; that object being a 'domestic violence incident'.
The central categories for operational
policing o f interpersonal violence calls
The classifying of calls for assistance to the police begins with the 
initial call to the dispatcher. These calls may come in either to the 999 
emergency number or direct to the police station.4 This initial stage has 
been characterized as one in which "a world of events perceived within the 
primary framework of the experience of citizens" is "selectively sampled 
by police calls." When the in coming call is received "messages are 
classified (encoded at the boundary of the organization) framed as relevant 
to police attention; and imaged as events based on sets or tacit 
expectations. Only messages accepted or seen by the organization exist for 
the organization as potentially valid work."5 At this point the dispatcher 
has to make a decision about how to classify the call. The first priority is 
to decide whether or not the call is relevant to the police, if it is, then it 
must be more finely delineated. The calls with which we are interested 
are labeled 'domestic' which may include violence between spouses, or 
other family members but also may include situations involving flat­
mates, lovers or former lovers. Occasionally landlord-tenant disputes or 
disputes between neighbours are classed in this category.6
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Once the call for assistance has been received and so classed it is 'in 
the police system' and a number of decisions with regard to classification 
must be made in order that it be exited from the system. Interviews 
conducted with officers in the communications room indicate that 
sometimes they deal with the situation over the telephone, but "if you hear 
glass breaking in the background you send someone out." One officer 
assigned to the communications room stated that "in ninety-nine out of one 
hundred cases you assign a unit." His exception to the rule was "unless you 
know the family and then you might be able to deal with it over the 
phone." He recounted the instance of a particular couple where the 
husband regularly hit his wife. In this instance the woman "just wanted to 
talk and I spent about twenty minutes on the phone with her."
The second decision made by the dispatcher, then, is whether or not to 
send an officer or officers to the venue. According to police officers this is 
a fairly automatic response.7 However, officers in the communications 
room did state that, at times, the numbers of personnel on relief prevented 
an immediate response.8 One officer interviewed added that, in these 
situations, calls involving violence had priority over incidents like burglary 
and that "domestic calls" were included in the former category.9
Having assigned a unit, police are then concerned with 'response time', 
that is, the amount of time between the first call for service being logged 
and the unit assigned arriving at the venue. In practice these response 
times are variable, but times between ten and fifteen minutes are 
considered average. The concept of response time has a special place in 
the lexicon of police officers assigned to the 'area car' or otherwise 
patrolling in automobiles. A fast response time is a primary motivation 
and provides criteria for judging officers on motorized patrol.10
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The second stage of processing begins with the arrival of the officer at 
the address. Once at the venue the officer will have to gain entry to the 
premises, which may be problematic. Prior to the issuing of the Force 
Order on Domestic Violence in 1987, officers attending such calls and 
finding the premises quiet and dark were likely to radio in to the 
dispatcher with the message fall quite on arrival1 and 'no call for police 
action1 effectively exiting the call for assistance from the system.11 The 
issuing of the Force Order in 1987 removed the official category 'no call for 
police action' (NCPA). However, my examination of official records at one 
particular station indicated that a large number of cases (approximately 60 
% of the sample) did not get processed any further than this stage.12 This 
was the largest single exit point from the system.
The fate of the category NCPA is somewhat instructive. This was a 
legitimate category prior to the issuing of the Force Order in 1987, 
although some officers indicated to interviewers that its use was a matter 
of laziness and/or inadequate supervision. Asked about the meaning of 
NCPA and the likely nature of a call that would generate so little in the 
way of official records one officer remarked that:
It means one of four things. First of all the victim 
doesn 't w ant to substan tia te  the allegation.
Secondly there is no evidence to substantiate the 
allegation. Thirdly there is insufficient evidence to 
substantiate the allegation, it could be bogus or she 
alleges injury but you can't trace it and a doctor 
can 't state what it is. Fourthly something is 
recorded where either through the victim's action 
or lack of actions, we can't contact her and we don't 
know where she is.
This is a similar type of reasoning applied at other exit points. It is
important to stress that, in some instances recorded as NCPA, there was
252
Chapter Seven
TFUd® © p o p a f i D Q i J Q a D  I P o Q D c s l l i J D g )  ® f f  E)®[wo@©Q[]© W0®0@[n)©@
clear evidence of injury. Some officers interviewed were quite candid 
about this. It seems that the attending officers greatest incentive to file an 
official report was "in case it comes back on us", that is, in cases where 
there might be further violence or where there is a possibility of an official 
complaint, either from within the institution or initiated from a ’civilian1. 
One officer claimed that she always followed the official recording 
procedures because, in the event of a serious call back involving the CID, 
they would require information from the initial incident and would be 
most unpleasant to her if it could not be supplied immediately.
The other point to stress is that the recording of NCPA in these 
instances does not necessarily mean that the police did nothing. It was 
pointed out during the interviews conducted in 1985 that, in some cases, 
the mere arrival of an officer on the scene was sufficient to calm the 
situation to the point where the persons concerned were unlikely to turn 
to further violence, at least on that evening.13 It was also pointed out by 
many officers that for incidents that they were recording as NCPA they 
were actually giving a considerable amount of advice to the persons 
concerned. The advice given was frequently to contact a solicitor or a 
citizens advice bureau.
From the accounts given by police officers prior to the banning of the 
category NCPA it seems that these calls classed in this category do not 
differ from the bulk of domestic violence calls, save that police officers do 
not record the details in the prescribed way. The filtering out of cases at 
this stage is attributed to the victim being unable or unwilling to 
substantiate the allegation of assault. This is the same logic applied at 
other stages during the processing to exit cases from the system.
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One of the concrete changes to come out of earlier research, of which 
the 1985 interviews were an integral part, was that NCPA has disappeared 
as an official category. One officer noted prior to the Force Order that such 
a move would not actually change the approach to policing these cases:
If you are going to say do an IRB [Incident Report 
Book] in every case I don't think that that is the 
cure. It is only going to be a record with no more 
fact. If you do a crime report you'll report it as an 
allegation of assault, with no evidence it will go 
away as no crime.
In fact it could be argued that the category has not been eliminated 
anyway, rather, it has been driven underground. Given that 
approximately 60% of cases in my own two month study still generated no 
formal record it could be said that the box still exists, but its name tag has 
been obscured.14 One officer said that "we get a hundred incidents per day 
here, if we recorded them all the station would burst with paper."
If the officer actually intervenes in the situation his or her first
concern is to "calm the situation down" and "ensure that a Breach of the 
Peace will not occur". Officers interviewed indicated that in many cases 
when they arrive the situation is already calm, thus this is not always 
problematic. However, officers also indicated that the arrival of the police 
could, in itself, make for a volatile situation. This was perceived to be the 
case most often when the caller was a neighbour or some other person not 
directly involved in the situation.
If the prevention of a Breach of the Peace is problematic at this stage 
an arrest can be made. There was some ambiguity in the way in which 
police officers understood the meaning of Breach of the Peace. Some 
officers flatly denied that such a charge could be used in a ’domestic
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situation'. Others claimed that they would use the power even if the 
'breach' happened "in his own sitting room". Most commonly police 
officers said that the person involved would have to be lured outside, 
either into the back garden, or out of the front door in order that a proper 
charge of Breach of the Peace could be pressed.15 Others indicated that 
they would use a charge of 'Threatening Behaviour' in its place.
When this category is marshaled an arrest can be made and one or 
both of the persons involved will be required to be present in Court on the 
following day. In these instances it seems that only the violent party 
(most often the man) would actually be incarcerated overnight. When the 
breach has been dealt with in court the case has been exited from the 
police system. This was the only exit point identified which did not 
involve the reluctance or readiness of the victim to press charges.16
In cases where officers had established control of the immediate 
situation their next task was to uncover what had happened. This involves 
questioning both the victim and suspect. The primary concern of officers 
at this point would be to determine the nature of the offence. Typically, if 
there was violence involved, the attending officer would determine the 
nature and the extent of the injuries inflicted and/or how they were 
inflicted. In these cases there were three main categories in which to 
classify the incident, those being: Common Assault (CA), Actual Bodily 
Harm (ABH) and Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH).17 In the interviews I 
examined some of the officers were asked how they differentiated 
between these three categories. As might have been expected, officers did 
not define them in exactly the same way. Some used criteria based on the 
extent of injury, so that, for example, one officer distinguished by "the 
amount of bruising and blood and the amount of harm that you can see."
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Other officers used criteria built around the nature of the attack. For 
example, several officers noted that for a charge of GBH to be brought a 
"weapon” or "implement" would have to have been used. Some officers 
conflated both kinds of criteria to explain the distinction. Because of the 
way in which this particular question was broached and the open ended 
nature of the response it is not feasible to try and scale these responses.18
While such a scaled measure might be interesting it is not altogether 
certain that it is an appropriate question to ask. This is because where the 
distinctions seem crucial there is ample evidence of 'collective thinking' in 
order to classify a given case. Particularly in incidents which involve a 
visible degree of injury and where there was some potential for criminal 
proceedings, the attending constable seemed to confer with fellow officers 
and, most often, with his or her duty sergeant. One officer who was asked 
about recording practices explained that a report "takes between half an 
hour and three quarters of an hour to write, then it needs to be passed to 
the station officer, who could always tells the PC to write it again if it is 
inadequate." I came across many examples of collective thinking. The 
following quote is taken from the questionnaires administered in 1985:
Q, How im portant are the signs of injury when you  
arrive, in the kind of action that you are likely to 
take in terms of immediate assistance and medical 
help to the victim and in terms of criming and the 
category of crime?
A. If it is obvious, that there has been injury, whether 
it is an actual cut and the female has insisted on the 
man being charged, the police do not necessarily 
have time to decide on the particular charge or the 
particular option. That would be suggested and 
decided upon by the duty sergeant or the CID upon 
arrival. But clearly there are the kinds o f 
categories of ABH which would cover the situation 
of a cut, GBH and a doctor would have to be 
consulted...It is often very difficult and the decisions 
are not always made in time, but after subsequent
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investigation as to what particular category will 
appear on the charge sheet.
I have myself observed officers conferring on matters of this nature. I 
think that the prevalence of collective thinking about these categorization 
procedures homogenizes the classifications made, although it must be 
acknowledged that this homogenization may be only local in character and 
may vary from district to district. Evidence of collective thinking does 
mean, however, that the classifications made by a particular relief can be 
expected to be fairly standardized despite the differences in definitions 
proffered by individual officers.
The collective nature of the application of the definitional hierarchy of 
violence did not mean, however, that the logic with which these categories 
were applied was always straight forward. Many variables were 
incorporated in decision making leading, in some instances, to a 'twisted 
logic1, that is, logic which is not straight forward. For example, on learning 
that a particular suspect had a prior arrest record for violent offences a 
sergeant recommended a charge of GBH rather than ABH, even though the 
injuries sustained by the victim fit more comfortably in the later category. 
The officers involved knew that the charge could be reduced any time up 
to, and including, the court stage. In doing this a message could be 
conveyed to the perpetrator; a message stating, in effect, "aren't we doing 
you a favour?"19 There were other instances of 'twisted logic', for example, 
I observed an officer arguing to bring the perpetrator in a domestic 
incident into custody 'for the protection of the victim'. It transpired, 
however, that by doing so the officer would be able to clock in several 
hours of overtime for his court appearance, revealing an underlying 
motive for the officer's eagerness to place the 'alleged offender' in custody.
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Twisted logic, then, gave the apphcation of the formal categories a kind of 
fluidity that belied the systematic nature of the application of the 
linguistic-authority-structure in specific instances.
Many of the details of the incident would be be established by an 
officer attending the venue some time after the initial call for service. 
Incidents classed as ABH and others classed as beat crimes, were generally 
followed up by a Home Beat Officer. Incidents classed as GBH and other 
'major crimes' were considered the province of the CID.20 Incidents were 
prone to slipping out of the system at this point as well. Crime report 
forms frequently testified to unsuccessful attempts at re-contacting 
victims in order to sort out details of particular incidents. These attempts 
took the form of phone calls or personal visits to the venue supplemented 
by correspondence through the mail.21 This slippage is discussed at length 
in chapter eight.
During the questioning of both suspect and victim, another very 
im portant question is asked about whether the victim wishes to lay 
charges, that is "substantiate the allegation". This may or may not be done 
before the classification of the assault has been finalized and, as I have 
already shown, a negative answer to this question may result in a 
premature exit at a much earlier stage. The whole processing of a 
'domestic violence incident' hinges on this particular question. In practice 
a number of answers may be received to it, but it is rarely an 
unambiguous yes or no. In fact most calls for assistance are exited from 
processing by this stage.22 This point is crucial to the processing of these 
incidents. In order to understand how these analytical categories of 
institutionalized policing (in particular: 'victim', 'suspect' and 'substantiate 
the allegation') are being applied by operational police officers it is
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necessary to have an understanding of the law as it pertains to domestic 
violence, and interpersonal violence more generally.
With respect to interpersonal violence the relevant sections of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act are quite specific. In general an 
arrestable offence is considered to have been committed if the potential 
penalty is at least five years.23 Any incident involving ABH or GBH is thus 
an arrestable offence. In addition, any offence for which the attending 
officer has reason to believe that serving a summons is inappropriate is 
also arrestable. In instances of domestic violence the service of a 
summons might be considered inappropriate if the attending officer has 
reasonable grounds for believing that the suspect may cause injury to any 
other person.24 This also links in with other provisions in the PACE which 
state that arrest can be used in instances where the police officer has 
"reasonable grounds for believing that arrest is necessary to protect a child 
or other vulnerable person."25
The important fact here is that none of these provisions for arrest 
compel the officer to arrest in practice. They only empower the attending 
officer to do so. The use of these arrest powers in all instances is left to 
the individual police officer’s discretion. With respect to the Force Order, 
these three provisions constitute the legal framework on which to pin 
arrests. Either the attending officer can grade offences into the ABH or 
GBH categories and arrest on the grounds provided, or the officer can 
arrest in order to protect the victim on the grounds that serving a 
summons is inappropriate. The PACE also has a provision to make wives 
compellable witnesses in such cases as necessary.
My own field work indicates that arrest is not the pre-eminent way 
for dealing with these types of offences.26 Instead, standard practice was
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that the victim would be asked whether or not she wishes to press charges. 
In most cases this was not what the victim indicated and the case is either 
dropped immediately, or was ’no crimed’ at a later date after the victim 
withdrew the charges.
This effect comes about because of the way that police officers 
marshal the analytical categories at their disposal. Of particular 
importance here are categories established as polarities: 'victim' and 
'suspect'; 'innocent' and 'guilty'; 'no-crime' and 'crime'. These terms are, 
perhaps, familiar to most people, but they perform a special function in 
this semantic network. Within the confines of this linguistic-authority- 
structure, in order for there to be an violent incident called a 'crime' there 
must be both a 'suspect' and a 'victim'. However, if the person with the 
most serious wounds in a given incident does not wish to step into the 
conveniently labeled box and from it point an accusing finger at the 
appropriate 'suspect' it is difficult to process the incident as a criminal 
one.27 Within the confines of this semantic network in such a situation it is 
impossible to see how a criminal incident has occurred. This is known as 
the 'victim failing to substantiate the allegation', an analytical category 
which functions like a hinge between the polarities 'victim' and 'villain'; 
'guilty' and 'innocent'; 'no-crime' and 'crime'.
Many officers interviewed made comments on the tendency of women 
to withdraw charges. Time and again they explained the same point that 
most often the victim was also the only witness in these cases. Without 
that person's cooperation no case could proceed to court and expect to win. 
One officer who was questioned about his changing attitudes after a case 
was taken to court by him, only to have the victim withdraw the charge at 
that stage: His reply was that:
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In the future I thought, I wouldn't waste my time. A 
lot of action groups, as well as being left wing are 
biased, think we are doing nothing, but if the wife 
won't charge, we can't do anything. We have to 
work within the framework of the law. The only 
victim we can deal with is the m urder victim  
because he or she can't say he/she doesn't want to 
charge. We have the same problem with rape or 
even a simple stabbing in the street. If the victim 
won't take it any further there is nothing we can 
do.
This officer's understanding of the law as it pertains to interpersonal 
violence is exactly the opposite of what is, in fact, the case. He 
understands his application of the categories of 'victim1, 'villain', 'guilty' 
'innocent', 'crime', and 'no-crime' as applying a legal framework. In fact it 
is a system of institutionalized conceptual categories which the police use 
to process incidents of interpersonal violence. In this respect police 
officers’ understandings are probably not all that different from the 
average citizen. I do not want to create the impression that all officers 
equate the categories of policing with "the framework of the law". Some 
officers were well aware that they have the power of arrest in these 
instances but they came back to the same point "if she doesn't want him 
arrested then you can't really arrest, because you will need her in court."
This is the final exit point from the police system. Either a particular 
case will be exited on the grounds that the victim is unwilling to 
substantiate the allegation, or the victim is willing to press charges and the 
case is forwarded to the Crown Prosecution Service. In the final analysis 
the operation of the linguistic-authority structure of operational policing 
depends on a decision made, not by the attending police officer but, by the 
victim.28
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The logic of the practice was explained to me by an Inspector in CID 
who claimed to have extensive experience dealing with interpersonal 
violence calls of all types. His example was "a dust up in the pub between 
two mates”. His position was that the way you decide the victim in these 
instances is by who has the greater injury, further, if this person did not 
wish to pursue a criminal case the incident would be 'no-crimed’. He then 
asked me: "What would you do?" Locked into the logic of the categories I 
could only answer to the effect that I would do nothing.
Trying to think outside the categories
Round Pegs and Round Holes
Much has been made of the nature of police officers discretion in 
operational decision making. It is a commonly received wisdom amongst 
police researchers that police officers have wide ranging discretionary 
powers and, by implication, make judgements. When the question was put 
to a Chief Inspector about the ability of younger officers attending cases of 
domestic violence "to make a crucial judgement" the interviewer got a 
surprising answer:
I am not entirely convinced they are making 
crucial judgements. We get there, if the m atter is 
serious and they are prepared to charge we do it. A 
police officer works in all jobs towards categories 
and putting that job into a category, if the 
categories are not available, we have to put it into 
one.
This particular reply was given by a manager. Operational policing is 
viewed from a fairly high vantage point from this position in the hierarchy 
and, perhaps not surprisingly, the systematic nature of the police response 
to these calls was readily apparent to him. It must be said that this officer 
made it clear that he did not place a great deal of importance on
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responding to domestic violence calls, stating that he preferred to see 
responsibility for these calls taken up by Social Services. With regard to 
the police role in instances of domestic violence, in this officer's view the 
problem was quite clear cut: if the victim wished to pursue charges the 
officer would be required to pursue a criminal investigation, ordered by 
the rules of evidence and police procedure. If not, it became the preserve 
of other agencies, perhaps the civil courts, the Citizens Advice Bureau, or 
Social Services.
This particular officer was inclined to see the systematic aspects of 
policing these incidents, however, he also acknowledged that "domestic 
violence is not a round hole into which we can fit one of our round pegs." 
In fact the interviews contain ample evidence of police officers thinking 
and doing things outside the institutionalized categories for processing. 
When we hear of police officers thinking outside the categories the 
application of the linguistic-authority-structure of operational policing 
shows its limitations.
Of course not all officers allow themselves to think outside the 
categories of 'the Job'. Such thinking is sometimes referred to as taking on 
a 'social service role' and it was evident that there were mixed feelings 
about how much police officers should be concerned with these 'extra 
duties'. One uniformed PC explained his job and how it pertained to 
domestic violence calls by saying "we deal with incidents, we respond to 
them and then we either advise or arrest, and we don't do anything 
further." By 'advise' this particular officer meant telling the persons 
concerned to contact any number of agencies including a solicitor or a 
Citizen's Advice Bureau.
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Other officers were aware that their response could go further than 
this. Such an awareness seems to arise out of the fact that so few of the 
calls for assistance involving domestics ever generate an arrest. Many 
officers explained the problematic nature of dealing with victims and 
suspects in what are often highly charged emotional situations. Much time 
has to be invested in order to achieve a situation which is calm enough to 
glean the details of the problem from the persons concerned. Officers 
stated frequently that they had to resort to encouraging a "cooling off 
period" before they could proceed with the business of classifying and 
ordering the situation according to the categories of ’the Job’. All of them 
were aware that generating an arrest from such a call was extremely 
unlikely. One PC explained:
You get rid of the old man into another room, then  
I'll tell him later what I have told his wife. Then I 
say 'I might nick you'. To the woman I just say, how 
many times in the past, when and why. It takes 
time to calm her down, I then give her t h e  
procedure. I say 'before I charge him, you have to 
be m edically examined, have got to make a 
statement and declare that you are prepared to go to 
court and give evidence. Also consider that you 
have got a marriage and one effect charging him 
would have on that is your decision.
Here the tension between the information collected to fulfil the criteria 
of the institutional categories and information gleaned from questions 
outside of the system are laid side by side. There is no room in any of the 
forms for official recording to make note of a past history of violence and 
none of that information will contribute to the formal decision of whether 
or not to arrest. What the police are attending is an ’incident’ and any 
statements that a woman might make with regard to a past history of 
violence will not affect the nature of the official police action taken. This
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particular officer used these types of questions as a sort of counseling tool 
and as a way of calming the victim in order to gain a proper statement 
from her, but in the final analysis his official response is no different from 
any other officer's. The decision to charge, that is to continue the 
engagement with the criminal justice system, is left with the victim.
One particular criticism that police officers have been open to is that 
they are very discouraging in advising women of the nature of the 
processing of their cases through the criminal justice system. One officer 
explained that the police "take statements for prosecution, always 
considering certain points for court." Many officers mentioned the need to 
do this in a "sympathetic manner". The problem for police officers is that 
the details of the incident, stripped bare of the historical details that may 
or may not come to the attention of the investigating officer, look much 
different when they are read in court some time later. This is particularly 
so if there has been no violence in the interim period. Police officers are 
acutely aware of this, particularly if they have had a long time in service. 
Many experienced officers have stories about particular incidents which 
they fought to process fully through the criminal justice system. For 
example one sergeant recounted the following story:
In one case, although there was no violence against 
the woman, the threats to kill were such and the 
intent was clearly there. So we took it through. I 
personally fought the CID who said 'you're wasting 
your time'. I felt sure the threats were real. So I 
pushed it; and push it meant me going to the 
magistrates court each week to keep him in custody 
and I had to give my reasons. I felt that it was a 
genuine threat where a couple of drinks he would 
a ttem pt to kill her or th rea ten  her. He was 
remanded in custody for five weeks, and so I would 
be in the witness box giving my objections to bail.
Then his solicitor produces in court a letter written 
to him by the wife-
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’I love you darling it is not my fault you are in I 
wish we were together'-
I looked an absolute idiot; and the threats to kill 
were dropped and he was done for possession of an 
offensive weapon - and spent five weeks in custody.
Scenarios like this are frequently recounted.29 Such occurrences seem 
to be a regular feature of the application of the linguistic-authority- 
structure of operational policing to calls for assistance of this type. This 
feature seems to produce a kind of cynicism about the role of police in 
responding to these calls. The following quotation is typical:
...occasionally when you have arrested your blokes, 
you go to the scene and try to take him away. She is 
adam ant she wants him arrested. Next day she 
wants him out, he's been pent up all night and we 
have done all that work. It seems a great waste of 
time. The end result is one arrest and no result and 
governors want results, I particularly want results 
as well for I could have been arresting for breaking 
into cars and criminal offences, rather for arguing.
Also when it is all said and done, it is his word 
against hers. With no witnesses it is difficult to put 
a case together. Who is to say that she was going to 
hit of kill him over the head with a frying pan?
You could feel sorry for some women, others you 
don't.
The more keen officers are to apply the systematic categories to 
incidents, the more likely they are to sound cynical. Officers who place an 
emphasis on the so-called ’social service role' of the police, rather than try 
to process a call for assistance as a crime, go beyond the categories of 
operational policing. By this, I mean that, in so doing, they do not produce 
the kind of paperwork that can be interpreted as "results". Such an 
approach may have its own satisfaction however:
...I think there a far more im portant things the 
police can do than just enforcing the law, especially 
in this area, and that is in the area of practical help 
and advice, and I think that practical help from
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officers, is more valuable to them then having him 
arrested...
The systematic processing of calls through the linguistic-authority- 
structure of operational police remains the primary consideration, 
however. Victims in these situations are given a simple choice, either 
pursue criminal proceedings or not. The high rate of withdrawals 
produced by this system is seen, not as a failure of the system, but as a 
failure on the part of individual victims. In one interview it was explained 
that police officers "try to get the victim to sign the charge sheet, otherwise 
we get costs against the police, so that we don't sign the charge sheet 
because if they withdraw after signing it, then it is between them and the 
court to sort out" This exonerates the individual police officer, but the high 
rate of withdrawal that the police encounter (and frequently bemoan) also 
indicates that the range of services that police are actually in a position to 
offer are, in fact, inappropriate, or at least too limited.
This is apparent to the officers themselves and some of them 
articulate the need for a wider range of services. For example:
There is no system that can't be improved but it is 
making a system that is better than the one we have 
got. There should be more facilities and agencies 
open to women. A lot depends upon the agency 
involved, social workers probably think that they 
are the agency that is doing that already. They are 
obviously overworked, they are not efficient at the 
moment, they need more investment.
Of course, not all officers' thinking outside the system portrayed the 
victims in a positive light and nor did all officers appear sympathetic to 
the plight of victims. Police procedure in criminal cases involving 
interpersonal violence involves scrutinizing the behaviour of all parties in 
order to establish who is 'guilty'. Some officers interviewed in 1985 noted
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that women "get what they ask for" and some indicated that some women 
"deserve" their ill treatment.30 Thinking within the formal categories may 
indicate that an arrest should be made, perhaps because the level of injury 
would support such a decision. Thinking outside these official categories 
may not lead to such a conclusion and officers have been observed 
rationalizing according to criteria of 'moral blameworthiness' in order to 
facilitate the exit of particular calls for assistance from the system.31
This aspect of police 'discretion' is most disconcerting to feminists who 
are active on the issue of policing violence against women. However, from 
the police point of view, any decision made from outside the official 
categories is unlikely to produce an anomalous situation. Such a decision 
could come back to haunt the officer if the victim were to call the police 
station and demand of his or her superior officer that an arrest be made 
(an unlikely occurrence) or if the situation erupted again after the initial 
call producing further injury or death. I would argue that street level 
officers' primary incentive would be to process calls through the official 
categories. This is evident in the idea that bringing in more 'bodies', that is 
getting 'results', leads to promotion. Making decisions outside of the 
linguistic-authority-structure of operational policing which exit cases from 
the system, running contrary to this logic, can be maintained only because 
there are so many official exit points from the system. Since the vast 
majority of cases are written off without an official action taking place, 
and, since the semantic network employed facilitates this state of affairs, 
any thinking outside the system, for example using notions of moral 
blameworthiness, can be viewed as a rationalization after the fact, made 
by individual officers to explain away an existing institutional pressure.
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Incident driven policing is actually a very limited, prescribed and 
bureaucratic response to what are, often, highly volatile and, always, 
unique occurrences. The complexity of individual calls for assistance 
mitigates against simple and straightforward classifications yet, trapped 
within a system which confines the police response to a call for assistance 
within a rigid set of questions and answers, that is exactly what police 
officers accomplish. Some police officers seem to be aware that any 
intervention into situations of domestic violence have to go beyond the 
role that they are trained to carry out:
I think m ore publicity  for Women's Aid and 
government support should go into it [domestic 
violence] and I think it is a spin off of bad housing, 
unemployment and all the problems consequent to 
that. This in turn can lead to problems with kids.
The big question is how do you put a stop to the 
problem in the first place, which has the spin offs 
which spin off domestic violence? I re m e m b e r  
there used to be a Women’s Aid in **** Road, and to 
be quite honest I am not sure whether it still exists.
Authoritative intervention, 
advice and referral
Police officers attending calls for assistance generated from domestic 
violence situations process these cases through a fairly rigidly defined set 
of institutional categories aimed at responses of criminalization and arrest. 
The decision to process any such call fully through this system rests with 
the victim, although police officers are empowered to carry any case 
through at their own discretion. The fact that so few victims in these 
circumstances take the decision to have their assailant arrested would 
indicate that such a single-minded approach is too limited. In fact, the 
police response is not entirely limited to this core response. Police officers
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attending domestic violence situations, in addition to trying to process the 
call through the formal categories of policing, frequently have to devote 
their attention to other tasks.
The first of these can be termed an authoritative intervention, by 
which I understand police officers intervening to put an immediate halt 
the violence or, as they explain it, "to prevent a Breach of the Peace". This 
is an important aspect of the police role in these situations. Their role as 
the legitimate manipulators of coercive force means that they are the only 
organized response to domestic violence which can act in this way. It 
could be argued that this is a formal role of the police and, as such, it is 
artificial to separate it from the processing I have already outlined. While 
it is no doubt true that this is a formal part of 'the Job1 and that the 'peace 
keeping role' is a long established one it does make a certain amount of 
sense to maintain the distinction. By doing so 'authoritative intervention' 
is seen as a precursor to (and in some instances instead of) a more formal 
and systematic response which is aimed at criminalization of incidents and 
an engagement with the criminal justice system.
A concrete example of this type of intervention was recounted to me 
by one constable. The scenario involved a family on Christmas Eve. The 
husband/father had become drunk and abusive towards his wife and 
children. The wife was asked if she wanted him arrested and her reply 
was that she did not because "he is a good father to the kids". The 
attending police officers were unwilling to leave the man in the house 
because they were unconvinced that violence would not erupt again. Their 
solution was to take the 'suspect' and drop him off on the motorway, with 
the intention that he would be sober by the time he arrived home.
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The officer recounting the story mentioned that this is not the kind of 
intervention which is officially sanctioned. This is quite far removed from 
the official processing which would gain ’results' in a way recognized by 
superior officers. Indeed this particular response could conceivably 
generate some very negative feedback for the officer concerned, but 
'authoritative intervention1 need not take such an unusual course. When 
an officer leaves a venue saying "I had better not have to come back here 
tonight or I'll arrest you", he or she is using a threat calculated to ensure 
that the immediate situation remains peaceable.32 By intervening in this 
manner, officers hope to ensure that a given case will not become a matter 
for official processing. Of course, this bid to control the situation is not 
always successful, and officers do have to re-attend venues because their 
first attempt at control did not work. Regardless, it is obvious that these 
authoritative interventions, while built on the police officer's legitimate 
use of coercive force, are not interventions calculated to produce results, 
rather, they operate as another exit from the system.
Operational police officers have other avenues of action as well. These 
are known as 'advice' and 'referral' which are frequently conflated into one 
idea. Referral means informing the victim of services available to her, 
such as a Citizens Advice Bureau, Women's Aid or other agencies. This 
became increasingly formalized after the Force Order in 1987, with the 
introduction of cards containing the relevant phone numbers and the 
routine dispensing of them to victims of domestic violence. However, this 
should not be seen as anything other than an addendum to the formal 
processing of calls. My own field work reveals that in cases which were 
processed fully as crimes there is little, if anything, in the way of referral 
to other agencies.33 By making this additional option available to police
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officers, a particular incident can be exited from the system, but the 
supposed ’referral1 means that that the victim has been put in touch with 
an agency which is, in theory, more suited to her needs. Nevertheless, this 
means that referral is being used only by way of exiting cases from formal 
police processing. The efficacy of these other agencies in these instances is 
worthy of discussion at length, but not in this thesis. In terms of the 
processing being outlined here it can be said that referral is an exit point 
from the police system and police officers attending calls for assistance 
used it as such. This point is touched on again in the following chapter.
Advice is often given to the victim at the same time she is being 
referred. It is most often associated with informing her about the 
existence and use of injunctions and exclusion orders. These are available 
through either the civil courts or the Magistrates courts and may or may 
not have a 'power of arrest' attached. Victims must pursue this avenue 
under their own initiative and police advice is often along the lines of 'see 
your solicitor'. The existence of such legislation creates a kind of 'strange 
loop' in the whole processing of these kinds of cases. Women must apply 
to the courts for an injunction and police responding to a call for service by 
advising the victim to see about doing so postpone any action to be taken. 
If the courts do not attach a 'power of arrest' to the order, police view the 
document as "useless" and "not worth the paper its printed on".34 This 
means that any calls for service made in the future are treated the same as 
the first one, unless, of course, the victim agrees to substantiate the 
allegation.
The question arises: should this 'advice' be considered as part of the 
systematic police response? I call this part of the police response a 
'strange loop' because it seems to bring the victim back to the same
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position she was in when she made her initial call to the police. This 
'strange loop' is a portion of the police response which is quite systematic 
since officers frequently advise victims to seek such injunctions and 
occasionally respond to calls for service where injunctions are in force. 
However, in terms of processing this 'strange loop' does not seem to move 
the case towards any resolution, nor does it necessarily change the 
circumstances in which the violence emerged in the first place.
There are several reasons for this. The first has to do with the 
attachment of the 'power of arrest'. The attachment of these powers is by 
no means automatic. There is some regional variation, for example in the 
year 1987 the figures for attachment of a power of arrest to these court 
orders ranged from 12% in North East England, to an average of 37% in 
London. Figures for the whole of England and Wales in 1987 indicate that, 
on average 28% of the court orders granted included a power of arrest.35 
As far this civil legislation effects formal police processing it only moves 
individual's cases through the system if a power of arrest is attached and 
this outcome is by no means a guarantied.
The other aspect of this strange loop has to do with the duration of 
exclusion orders. When the legislation was initially drafted there was no 
time limit imposed. It was envisioned that women who applied to have 
their husbands or lovers excluded from the family home because of 
violence would be getting a long term solution without making themselves, 
and possibly their children, homeless. When the legislation was put into 
practice, however, the case law which evolved made the exclusion order a 
short term measure. Case law reconstructed applications for protection 
and exclusion as devious attempts to deny husband's property rights.36 As
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a consequence these orders are for a short term only, usually varying 
between one and three months.
This particular legal option for victims operates through the civil court 
system and is unique in that it involves police in the enforcement of civil 
law. It operates beside the more traditional linguistic-authority-structure 
of the policing of interpersonal violence. It offers the opportunity for 
formal intervention over a period of time (in practice not exceeding three 
months), but most often seems to leave the situation unaltered. It does not 
change the conditions which engendered the violence in the first place nor 
does it guarantee any specific action by police officers in future instances 
of violence. Even with a power of arrest attached the existence of an 
injunction does not require the use of arrest. It is indeed a 'strange loop'.37
Authoritative intervention, advice and referral seem to operate as 
formal constituents in the lexicon of policing. They warrant a separate 
analysis, however, because their application subverts the application of the 
categories for criminalization. The evocation of all three offer 
opportunities to ease instances out of the system in the event that the 
victim is unwilling, unable or discouraged from substantiating the 
allegation of assault. In effect they lubricate the hinge.
Domestic violence units
The operational policing practices I have been discussing thus far have 
been what could be termed the 'traditional' police response. Although all 
police officers were affected by the issuing of the Force Order in 1987, 
none was compelled to use arrest as a means of intervention in cases of 
domestic violence. Police officers continued to have discretion in all 
operational decisions and, as I have shown, the main effect of the Force
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Order on police practice with respect to instances of interpersonal violence 
between intimates, was to tighten up record keeping practices. However, 
the high priority given to domestic violence by senior management at New 
Scotland Yard prompted the establishment of 'domestic violence units' at a 
number of police stations in the Metropolitan region. These units were 
established under the initiative of local officers at varying levels in the 
organization and did not reflect a centralized, coordinated effort by police 
management. Where these units were in operation the policing response 
was somewhat modified. I had the opportunity to investigate three 
domestic violence units each of which tackled the problem in different 
ways, reflecting the local character of the initiatives. In this section I 
would like to outline the ways in which the operation of these units sought 
to modify the already existing linguistic-authority-structure for policing 
interpersonal violence..
The first unit to be established, and now defunct, was set up by two 
women police officers in one of the police stations in North London.38 The 
officer in charge was a sergeant attached to the Community Liaison 
department. As such her role was not specifically established to deal with 
domestic violence. However, the Chief Superintendent at that police 
station gave her a wide brief and this created the space to organize a unit 
for the district in cooperation with a WPC (Woman Police Constable). In 
addition to the regular duties performed by community liaison officers, 
duties as diverse as organizing five-a-side football for young boys, 
speaking to children at schools and meeting with town hall officials, these 
officers attempted to act as a full time domestic violence unit.
The follow-up call was the central tactic that these officers employed 
in addressing the problem of how to police domestic violence. These
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officers worked a five day a week nine to five shift and most 'domestics1 
do not occur during office hours. Additionally, since the initiative was 
undertaken by officers ranking fairly low in the command structure of the 
police organization, there was never any question of actually compelling 
street level officers to change their handling of these calls for assistance. 
This meant that the initial call for service, taken by officers in the 
communications room and handled by officers on relief, continued to be 
processed in much the same way as outlined for the 'traditional' response. 
However, after the initial intervention at the scene, instead of passing the 
case to a Home Beat Officer (as in the case of a 'beat crime') or a CID officer 
(as in the case of a 'major crime’) who would then inquire if the victim 
wished to pursue the allegation in court; all domestics were passed on to 
the dv unit to make a follow-up call. During this stage, the victim could be 
interviewed at length about the nature of the offence and the history of 
the relationship. Inquiry could then be made as to what services she 
might be requiring. Typically, the officers in the unit raised questions 
about access to legal aid, short and long term housing needs, and sought to 
provide a source of emotional support. There was a concern to remain 
open to any special needs that victims might have. During the initial 
interview the possibility of pressing charges could also be brought up, but 
not simply in terms of: 'do you wish to press charges'. Rather, the focus 
was on helping the victim decide the most appropriate way to secure a 
safe environment. The officers in this unit worked on the premise that 
women victims of violent men do not find it easy to press charges for a 
variety of reasons, not least of which is fear of retaliation.39 Their 
approach to each case was slow and methodical, during which they taught 
the victims about the need to build up medical files and files in the local
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housing office. Such records are essential if the victim wishes to pursue 
criminal charges at a later date or if they wish to be rehoused by the 
council. Much of the unit's time was taken up helping women to establish 
these records.
It should be pointed out that the picture which is built up by this 
approach is not typical of policing; it is not the freeze-frame of a 'criminal 
incident'. Rather, the picture created as a result of each inquiry made by 
the unit more closely resembled a social work 'case'. The officers who 
made up this unit viewed domestic violence as a process, as a dynamic 
relationship between people who have an ongoing history. The services 
that they offered were not predicated on the details of a particular 
incident, although the details of particular incidents remained important to 
each case. Instead, the focus was broadened to include as much detail 
about the relationship as possible in order to help the victim define her 
needs.
One way of seeing this broadened focus is to consider the emotional 
support offered to the victims. If a decision to press charges was made in 
an individual instance, one of the officers would help to ease the case 
through all stages of the system including the trial. As such they 
performed as a police advocate on behalf of the victim.40 Such an 
approach to policing domestic violence is a difficult and time consuming 
one. Each case is seen in its uniqueness and the need for an individualized 
response in each instance is pushed to the fore.
One example of the individual touch of this dv unit, which may be 
anecdotal but is none the less illuminating, occurred during my time there. 
I had been talking to the officers in the unit amidst constant interruptions 
by the phone. One caller, who had been in touch with the police for some
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days, phoned up to tell the officers that she had decided to move into the 
local refuge where there was a place for her. The problem was that she 
was reluctant to leave her pet dog in the care of her violent husband and 
the refuge would not allow her to bring it. This, typically, would be the 
kind of problem that police officers could not deal with, it being outside of 
the confines of the normal bureaucratic management of such cases. In this 
particular dv unit, however, such a problem was put on the 'things to do 
list'. Rather than translating every case into the common vocabulary of 
'victims', 'villains', 'crime' and 'no-crime' in order to arrive at a solution, 
actions were guided by the unique needs of each particular instance. In 
the language of police managers the 'social service role' is accentuated 
rather than the 'law enforcement role’.
This does not mean that the traditional linguistic-authority-structure 
had been over-ridden. Police officers attending the original call for service 
continued to apply this semantic network and each incident was graded 
into the normal categories: CA, ABH, GBH or any others relevant. The 
difference came at a later stage in the processing when the victim was 
asked about her wishes regarding charging her assailant. At this stage a 
great deal of time was devoted to determining the specific needs of the 
victim. This is, in fact, the most important stage from the point of view of 
the victim, in which she is given the opportunity to explain and detail her 
specific needs. These may vary widely. The needs of a middle-aged Gypsy 
woman may be very different that of a young Afro-Caribbean or Asian 
woman. Living in privately owned accommodation presents different legal 
problems for rehousing than living in a council owned flat. Above all these 
women experience their victimization as individuals and their greatest 
needs often stem from their social isolation. By emphasizing the delivery
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of social services, the police officers in this unit directly confronted the 
individual and unique aspects of each case.
Arrest and conviction remained the primary focus of this police 
activity and, like the traditional model, the decision to pursue an allegation 
of a crime continued to rest with the victim. The difference is that in the 
traditional model the police offer little or no support in its pursuit. Rather, 
the details of the incident are recorded and relevant evidence is gathered, 
but no more. The value of the alternative approach is that the 
criminalization of a particular incident proceeds in the context of support 
for the victim, and with attention to the particular needs of the individual. 
However, there is a problem with this model from the police point of view, 
in so far as it is difficult to manage the vast number of calls for service 
that the police receive in such a labour intensive and time consuming 
manner.41
The model established by London's first domestic violence unit, what I 
have been calling the 'North London Unit', need not, however, be such a 
labour intensive enterprise. I had occasion to spend some time with 
another dv unit, which was set up along the same lines as the prototype 
discussed above, hence, I will refer to it as the 'copy-cat' unit.42 Perhaps 
not surprisingly, this unit was also established through the auspices of the 
community liaison office, under the supervision of a male Inspector. The 
unit itself, referred to as a 'dedicated domestic violence unit', consisted of 
two female officers, one at the rank of sergeant and one at the rank of WPC 
with plans to obtain another officer.43 The unit had been in operation 
seven months at the time of my first visit. At that time there had been 
little success in replacing the 'traditional' system. That is, many calls for
279
Chapter Seven
TTte @[o)®[r©GS®ffOgiD P@DB©D(JDg) @0 ®@[jiro@©Q[]© Wfl®0@[jfl©@
service were not met with an arrest at the scene and only a small 
proportion were actually followed up by the officers in the unit.44
The sergeant in charge of the day-to-day running of the unit indicated 
that arrest at the scene was somewhat problematic for two reasons, the 
first being that attending officers were not grading calls for service into 
the appropriate categories (ie. arrestable offences; ABH, GBH, Threats to Kill 
etc.). The reason cited for this was that "bruises take time to show up". 
The problem of classification is an intractable and recurrent one. 
Provisions under PACE do not require such visible signs and arrest could 
be considered appropriate even where no injury is apparent (as in the case 
of an extremely distraught victim or where there is a need to protect a 
vulnerable person for example). Senior officers have referred to this 
problem of classification as "lowering the threshold of ABH", teaching relief 
officers to class incidents into this category with less evidence of actual 
injury.
However, this was not the biggest problem. Officers on the unit 
indicated that they did not have a great deal of success getting victims to 
pursue criminal allegations in court and, further, that officers on relief 
used this as a justification for not arresting at the time of the original call 
for service. The argument put forth by relief officers was that arrest is an 
option only if the case was expected to proceed to court. According to the 
officers in the dv unit the relief officers were uncooperative with efforts to 
"respond more positively to domestic violence". Relief officers made the 
argument that their job was to arrest offenders and bring them to court 
and further, if this was not going to happen in a particular case, it was not 
properly part of their job to arrest. According to the sergeant who 
supervised the day to day running of the dv unit, "they [the officers on
280
Chapter Seven
TFte ©[o)@[?g]ft|]®[fQS}Q tP®QQ©B[n]g] @0 ®@[m)@©G[]© Wfl®0®[fD©@
relief] know that the CPS will not compel witnesses". She stated further 
that she thought using the compellability clause was "a good idea because 
it takes the pressure off the victim." The picture that emerged was that 
policing (as far as it involves the simple criminalization of particular 
instances of violence, the arrest of an offender and the testimony of a 
victim/witness) reaches an impasse because victims are reluctant to 
pursue a criminal allegation.45
In fact, the officers in this unit indicated that most of their efforts, as 
regards specific incidents, were channelled into helping victims obtain 
injunctions. Reliance on this civil legal remedy begs the question as to how 
far this approach actually differs from the 'traditional' approach. It may 
be seen that the traditional linguistic-authority-structure has not actually 
been subverted. The success of this model relies on the personal energy of 
individual officers aimed at getting victims to pursue criminal allegations 
in court, to gain results. The officers from the North London unit estimated 
they spent on average seven hours per case, whereas the officers in the 
'copy-cat' unit indicated on average only one hour for each incident. In the 
absence of high levels of motivation a 'dedicated domestic violence unit' 
need not be any better at service delivery to victims than one which 
leaves the responsibility for follow-up calls in the hands of the CID or 
Home Beat Officers.
This is an oversimplification of course. There is an im portant 
difference, between what I have termed the 'traditional' response and the 
what is accomplished by a 'dedicated domestic violence unit'. As 
mentioned, with the 'traditional' response follow-up calls would be given 
either to Home Beat officers or someone in the CID, depending on the 
severity of the offence. When such follow-up calls become the property of
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a dv unit, this may or may not result in a more rigorous pursuit of the case 
in question, depending on the motivation of the officers involved. 
However, it does ensure that those crimes will be accounted and 
documented, usually resulting in a crime 'cleared-up', whereas in the 
traditional response this would usually end up classed as ’no-crime’. The 
difference here is that crimes cleared-up are maintained as records and 
show up in official police statistics released to the public whereas crimes 
classed as no-crime simply disappear from the record altogether.
The differences between these two dv units illustrate the point that 
police management is concerned with "efficiency" and "value for money", 
usually assessed in terms of the 'clear-up rate’ and the number of arrests 
rather than helping people and service provision to victims. As such, 
police managers tend to want to find a more standardized and bureaucratic 
approach to organizing the police response based on the former criteria. 
Some interesting innovations in keeping with these strictures have been 
implemented in another of the experimental dv units set up in London.
This unit was established in South London by a Superintendent, that 
is, an officer with a great deal more seniority than the officers who 
established the unit in North London. This officer established a dv unit 
after being transferred to a new division where monitoring the police 
response to domestic violence had already been established. This 
monitoring had been organized by Susan Edwards, an independent 
researcher. With her cooperation, a dv unit was set up altering the police 
processing of domestic violence incidents in order to 'prioritize the use of 
arrest'.46 Unlike the unit established in North London or its copy-cat 
version, this unit was the initiative of a senior police officer who could 
order the modification of the response of street level officers.
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Discretionary powers involving the use of arrest in any case involving ABH 
or GBH are in the hands of street level officers and the policing approach 
used in South London was built on this legal power. This approach 
required two things. Firstly, incidents must be classed into the appropriate 
categories since police are not empowered to use arrest in cases of 
Common Assault. Managers at this particular station were particularly 
interested in getting their officers to classify more incidents as cases of 
ABH, that is: "lowering the threshold at which charges would be made in 
cases of domestic violence" In this regard, the classification of ABH was 
widened in accordance with the provisions of PACE and included not only 
bruises and other signs of physical attack, but also the infliction of pain or 
even ’psychological pain'. The Chief Superintendent informed me on one 
occasion that "if the police officer arrives and the woman is in hysterics, 
that can be considered Actual Bodily Harm". In addition to widening the 
scope of incidents which are potentially arrestable, police officers are 
encouraged to follow it up with an arrest removing the alleged assailant 
from the scene. In these instances, the suspect is arrested and taken to the 
station for a 'cooling off period. During this time he is fingerprinted. I 
was informed that this was done because of its ’symbolic function’. It was 
reasoned that the suspect must be shown that this is a serious breach of 
the law and that formal charging procedures would have this effect. 
Following this 'criminalization ritual' the suspect would normally be 
released after a two to eight hour period, subject to the provisions that he 
admitted his offence, had no record of previous assaults on his partner and 
that the victim did not wish to pursue the allegation herself.47
What followed was a two month monitoring period. Police would keep 
in touch with the victim to check that the violence was not being repeated.
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After the two month period was concluded the suspect would be 
interviewed again by a senior officer, in uniform, and required to sign a 
form admitting his offence. Following that, the suspect would be released 
with a 'formal adult caution', that is, a record of his offence. This again was 
intended to have an important symbolic function, impressing upon the 
assailant that he had committed a crime. In contrast with the dv unit in 
North London, and in common with the 'traditional' approach, this unit 
focused on the details of the incident and sought to make an impact on the 
suspect. Follow-up interviews were conducted with victims, but these 
were primarily in the context of evaluating the deterrence value of arrest 
and not with assessing her needs or in providing her with social services. 
The police in this dv unit did provide referrals to social service agencies 
and, in this respect, carried on practices associated with the traditional 
approach.
The approach adopted in the South London dv unit is very efficient 
from the police perspective. It consists of a simple modification of the 
traditional linguistic-authority-structure, classifying more incidents into 
the ABH category and using the legal powers associated with it. For 
ground level officers who receive the initial call for service, it provides a 
relatively simple procedure which relies on legal thinking and the old 
categories of institutionalized policing. From the police management point 
of view it is particularly attractive. Reliance on legal thinking and the 
institutionalized categories of policing mean that it is much less likely that 
police officers will be inclined to use moral judgements in incidents 
involving domestic violence.48 It also meant that it is easier for 
management level police officers to maintain surveillance of their front 
line officers, since all calls for service were to be recorded in the
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appropriate maimer. The result of this system is the provision of a service 
which is 'uniform’ and, although it represents an increased involvement of 
the police in these cases, one which does not take account of the unique 
aspects of each individual instance.
In terms of service delivery to the victims of domestic violence this 
model in not much better than the traditional response.49 It relies heavily 
on the notion that arrest by itself is a deterrent to further violence; that 
booking has a bite. The evidence to support such a claim is at least 
questionable (see chapter four), but, more importantly, this type of 
intervention cannot be expected to impact on the situation in a way which 
changes the circumstances which produce the violence in the first place. It 
has been pointed out by refuge workers that men can control their 
violence resorting to more sophisticated and subtle means of intimidating 
their partners. There may be a period of years in which violence is not 
utilized and other controlling behaviours used instead. Police intervention 
predicated on the use of cautioning cannot address these problems.50
Summary and conclusion
In this chapter, the general categories of operational policing 
employed in processing calls for assistance involving interpersonal 
violence were outlined. These categories included the classification of 
incidents into 'common assault', 'actual bodily harm' and 'grievous bodily 
harm'. In addition, such notions as 'criminal damage', 'threatening 
behaviour', and 'breach of the peace' were also seen to be utilized on 
occasion. It was also noted that the logic with which these categories were 
applied was not always straightforward and two examples of 'twisted logic' 
were cited. The central concepts for processing these incidents were the
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notions established as polarities: 'victim' and 'suspect', 'not guilty' and 
'guilty' and 'no-crime' and 'crime'. These polarities are bridged by 
substantiation of the allegation by the victim. The phrase 'victim unwilling 
to substantiate the allegation' takes on the status of an official category for 
operational policing which functions like a hinge between these polarities.
The existence of what has been referred to as 'remedies in civil law' 
and their effects on the application of the linguistic-authority-structure of 
policing interpersonal violence in instances involving intimate couples was 
also addressed. Frequently the application of this addendum to the official 
lexicon resulted in a 'strange loop' which brought all parties concerned 
back to their original starting point. The notions of authoritative 
intervention, advice and referral were also addressed and it was argued 
that the application of these notions serves to ease the exiting of calls for 
service from the system.
In addition to explaining how the official lexicon of operational 
policing is employed to process calls for service I also showed examples of 
officers thinking outside the official categories of policing. In showing how 
officers think around the categories of 'the Job', some of the shortcomings 
of simple criminalization of domestic violence were illuminated and the 
need for other services, particularly refuge provision and intervention by 
other social service agencies, was brought to light. In addition it was 
shown that officer's thinking outside of these official categories did not 
always portray victims in a positive light. However, it was argued that 
issues of moral blameworthiness did not contradict the logic of the 
linguistic-authority-structure which, on the whole operated to facilitate the 
exiting of calls for service from the system without recourse to its ultimate
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sanction. Further such thinking 'outside the system1 operated as a 
rationalization by police officers after the fact.
Having outlined the 'traditional response' to such calls for service, the 
operation of three 'domestic violence units' was described. The first unit to 
be established in London, termed the 'North London Unit', used a labour 
intensive and time consuming approach which assured that, even in cases 
where a criminalization response was not achieved, police officers were 
intensively involved with the victims helping them to assess their own 
needs and advising them on how to go about realizing them. This unit took 
responsibility for follow-up calls away from the Home Beat Officers and 
CID who normally limit their enquiries to whether or not the victim wishes 
to pursue a criminal charge. Another unit which employed this same basic 
line of action was also described. This second unit did not give as much 
time to individual cases and, where criminal allegations were not pursued, 
police officers limited their role to helping victims obtain injunctions. 
Given the propensity of these injunctions to create a 'strange loop' in 
which, after the terms of an injunction lapse (usually three months), the 
victim finds herself in an unchanged situation, it is not altogether certain 
that this is a positive advance.
A third dv unit, what was termed the South London Unit, was also 
described. This unit was shown to be genuinely different from the first 
experimental unit in North London. Arrest at the scene was the primary 
focus of this police activity, followed up with deferred decisions and the 
use of formal cautioning of suspects. The workings of this unit were 
organized around the notion that 'booking has a bite' and that the 
'criminalization ritual' would have a deterrence value in and of itself. This 
unit's modus operandi did not necessarily overcome problems of service
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delivery to victims. The decision making process remained focused almost 
entirely on the suspect. However, this initiative did ensure a relatively 
homogeneous response which virtually guarantied that suspects will be 
detained in the first instance.
In terms of comparing the responses of these three units, it can be 
said, unequivocally, that the North London Unit could be expected to 
achieve the best results over the longer term. However, it would be 
hopelessly idealistic to imagine that this model, fueled by the energy of 
such dedicated officers, could be generalized to the whole of London. What 
is more likely is the emergence of versions much like the 'copy-cat' unit. 
It is difficult to see how this unit is much of a change from the more 
'traditional' approach, except with reference to record keeping and, 
possibly, with reference to helping the victims obtain civil injunctions. 
Neither unit was successful at making arrest at the scene a matter of 
routine; which is in direct contrast to the South London Unit. The efforts 
there were aimed almost totally at giving priority to the use of arrest in 
the first instance and the role of victim support was seen as somewhat 
tangential. Given the nature of organizational constraints in the police 
institution it is possible to say that both the 'copy cat' unit and the South 
London Unit are generalizable, however, given the nature of calls for 
service involving domestic violence it is not altogether certain that 
accomplishing this would be of substantial benefit to victims.
1 Defining 'domestic violence' is a difficult task since there are so many definitions available. 
For the purposes of gathering data I defined 'domestic' in the widest possible sense in order to 
capture the widest range of variation. This meant encompassing a definition which included 
not only incidents between husbands and wives but also lovers and ex-lovers, as well as 
incidents involving other family members. I also decided to take some notice of incidents 
involving neighbours, landlord-tenant disputes and people sharing accommodation, although 
these disputes are not taken account of in the sample itself. Incidents between couples with
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some kind of 'intimate bond' formed the vast majority of all of the cases in the sample, 
accounting for 76% (84 out of 110 cases).
2 There is some question as to how far these findings can be generalized. Some of the central 
categories that police officers employ are general to policing and, as such, these findings might 
be generalizable to any police force. However, there are some mitigating factors. For example, 
the station I studied was in a cosmopolitan urban area and policing in this milieu is different 
than it would be in a rural area where officers might know the civilian population they police 
on a more intimate basis, which may affect police action. Differences in the milieu policed may 
account for some variation in police practice, however, there are also some differences in the 
actual analytical categories available to police officers in different locations. During 
conversations with officers from other forces I learned of such categorical acronyms as CST 
(caller seen and thanked) ESTC (early shift to call) and PB (police baffled) used for recording 
the processing of incidents. These particular acronyms were not encountered in the 
Metropolitan context. It must be said, however, and the analysis bears this out, that these are 
very minor differences in the lexicon of policing.
3 I am grateful to Professor David Cowell and Dr. Susan Edwards for giving me access to this data. 
These interviews were part of an initial evaluation of the policing of domestic violence in 
London conducted by these researchers from the Polytechnic of Central London in 1985.
4 It has been pointed out that "incidents requiring police action originate not only by phoned 
communications to police departments, but also by citizens calling upon the police to act in a 
field location, by personal appearance at a police station, or by police officers observing 
behaviour or incidents as they occur." Black D.J. and Reiss A.J. 'Patterns of Behaviour in 
Police Citizen Transactions' in Studies of Crime and Law Enforcement in Maior Metropolitan 
Areas Vol 11 Office of Law Enforcement Assistance 1965 pg. 4. In my study, telephone 
communications proved to be by far the most frequent method of obtaining police assistance in 
cases involving interpersonal violence between intimates. Field mobilizations by citizens in 
these situations accounted for very few incidents and officers did not appear to initiate any 
actions based upon their own observation of ongoing incidents. Citizen complaints direct to the 
police station were also rare. Specific quantification is not possible due to unreliable record 
keeping. Police records concerning serious offences contain no information as to how incidents 
came to police attention and CAD records do not contain information about field mobilizations. 
It is only in IRBs that mention of method of mobilization is mentioned and it is from these 
records that my rough estimations were made.
5 P. K. Manning 'Organizational Control and Semiotics' in Control in the Police Organization ed. 
M Punch © 1983 published by the MIT Press Cambridge Mass. pg. 174
6 It should be noted here that the term 'domestic' has historically had only semi-official status 
as a policing category. Although all officers at all levels of the organization knew and used the 
word it did not have a formal place in the lexicon of operational policing. This meant that, 
historically, there has been no special record keeping practices associated with domestics, 
they have been filed and treated the same as other calls for assistance involving interpersonal 
violence.
7 Other researchers have noted that the response can only be considered automatic in cases 
which can clearly be defined by the officer taking the message as something which concerns the 
police. This can create problems when the caller and the dispatcher have differing 
understandings of matters which call for a police response. Generally, police only respond
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when there is an indication that there is a public order problem or an offence has been 
committed. MacCabe and Sutcliffe note that calls for assistance which come to the station over 
the phone are likely to result in police attending the venue because such calls cannot be 
properly evaluated without an enquiry at the scene. McCabe S. and Sutcliffe F. Defining Crime 
A Study of Police Decisions published by the Oxford University Centre for Criminological 
Research © 1978 pg.40
8 Of particular importance here is when large numbers of officers are mobilized to police public 
events, such as football matches. In these situations 'the patch* is often left with a shortage of 
police personnel.
9 It seems, from talking to officers, that situations in which the offence is on-going are always 
given priority. So, for example, a reported burglary is different from a report of a burglary 'in 
progress' and requires a quick police response. The content analysis of police files reveals 
that domestic disputes are reported to the police after the fact either over the phone or, on 
occasion, directly to the police station. In these instances a rapid police response is not 
required. Instances where the dispute appears to the dispatcher to be on-going seem to be the 
kind which are prioritized in this manner.
10 Older police officers whose training was conducted before the introduction of personal radios 
and the CAD system told me that this technology changed the attitude about the need to 'get 
there fast'. Previously, under the 'fixed point system', when an officer would respond to 
messages received on the old 'Dr, Who telephone box', there was an inclination to walk to the 
venue, giving the situation time to cool down before the arrival of the police. It seems that, 
after the introduction of automobiles officers became motivated to get there as quickly as 
possible as they are judged on their 'response times'. This has been mentioned by Simon 
Holdaway in Inside the British Police. Oxford Basil Blackwell © 1983, with regard to the 
potential for exacerbating tension in police-public encounters. A corollary of the need for fast 
response times, not mentioned by Holdaway, is the perceived need by officers assigned to 
patrolling in vehicles to 'finish the job' expediently in order to be ready for the next 'job'. 
This haste may have negative consequences, as is brought out in chapter eight.
11 There are four relevant response categories: 1) NCPA, No Call for Police Action; 2) LOA, Left • 
on Arrival of Police; 3) AQOA, All Quiet On Arrival; and 4) ASNT, Area Searched No Trace. 
All of these categories mean that the call has been exited from the police system.
12 According to a study conducted by a research team from Central London Polytechnic in 1985, 
this particular police station processed 131 calls out of a total of 449 incoming (29.1%). This 
same police station, ten months after the issuing of the Force Order, fully processed a total of 
38.2% of incoming calls. So, while the category of NCPA had not been totally eliminated its use 
has been somewhat curtailed.
13 There was also contradictory evidence offered about the presence of police officers. It has 
been mentioned to me by a number of officers, and some responses in the 1985 interviews bare 
this out, that women have 'had a go' at police officers when they arrive on the scene and appear 
to be taking stern measures against their husbands. Michael Chatterton's observational work 
on policing and assault charges indicates that people initiating these calls for service clearly 
expect police officers to play an adjudicary role. Adjudication is not, however, a component in 
the linguistic-authority-structure of operational policing and the conflicting expectations of 
police officers and the parties involved around this issue give rise to problems, see M.
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Chatterton 'Police Work and Assault Charges' in Control in the Police Organization M. Punch 
ed. published by the MIT Press Cambridge Mass. © 1983 pg.198
14 In fact the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) System has four numbers for coding the response 
to calls for service (numbers 40, 42, 44, 46) which correspond to the old acronyms NCPA, LOA, 
AQOA, and ASNT.
15 One female PC talked about this particular tactic calling it a "naughty" but effective way of 
dealing with instances where control of the situation was proving difficult.
16 From these data, assessment of the role of Breach of the Peace in these instances is somewhat 
problematic. The content analysis of police files revealed that BoP was not used in any 
instances which could be defined as domestic in any sense (including incidents occurring 
between couples in public places). This may have been the result of local practice. The 
interviews conducted in 1985 consistently asked police officers about their use of BoP powers 
in connection with giving short term "protection" to the victim. Given that nearly all the 
officers interviewed were asked this question it may be that the interview itself made an issue 
out of something which was not normally one for police officers. However, none of this changes 
the fact that BoP is an official police response which can be activated in these instances and 
which, if invoked, exits the call for assistance from the system.
17 Often times the call for assistance will involve damage to property rather than an assault 
against the person. In such instances a charge of Criminal Damage would be used. Also, 
offences classed as GBH may include Section 20 offences defined as "unlawful or malicious 
wounding or the infliction of grievous bodily harm" or Section 18 offences which are slightly 
more serious since they include assaults "with intent to maim , disfigure or disable". Any 
incident involving a Common Assault should generate a report in an Incident Report Book. 
Incidents involving ABH are classed as 'beat crimes' and incidents involving GBH are 'major 
crimes'.
18 Such an exercise could conceivably be of interest in order to compare definitions between 
male and female officers and perhaps to see if length of service changes perceptions of the 
boundaries of the categories. In order to do so a standardized questionnaire would have to be 
administered.
19 This particular episode was told to me by police officer on the crime desk in a police station. 
The aim was not clear to me, but it seemed likely that what was hoped for was a guilty plea to 
the lesser charge.
20 Thus, the division of labour is itself reflected in the linguistic-authority-structure.
21 At the time my field work was being carried out officers used a standardized form, Form 142, 
for correspondence with victims in these instances. The most frequent message contained on 
these forms was for the victim to recontact the police station so that further details could be 
obtained. It was not uncommon for incidents to be exited from the system at this point because 
the victim did not respond to the request. One particular case file indicated that the Home 
Beat Officer made four attempts at re-contact without success.
22 In my examination of 110 case files fully 71.5% of all cases which could be classed as between 
spouses or former spouses, lovers or former lovers and which involved a degree of injury 
sufficient enough to warrant recording in the crime files were closed in this manner.
23 Police and Criminal Evidence. The College of Law Lecturers; © 1986 The College of Law, St. 
Catherines Surrey
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24 Lambert, J.L. Police Powers and Accountability. © 1986,Croom Helm Ltd. New Hampshire 
U.S.A.
25 op. cit. Police and Criminal Evidence © 1986
26 Only 18% of cases classed as Beat Crimes and 50% of cases classed as Major Crimes between 
intimates in my study were ’crimed'.
27 "The cynical view on the new Force Order", one Police Sergeant told me, "is that we're 
supposed to do a bit of verbal GBH to get the woman to lay charges." This particular officer 
told me on another occasion that the Force Order had not really changed the way the PCs he 
supervised did things, except with regard to paperwork. He said that "before the new policy if 
the victim wanted to pursue the matter we certainly did, but without the victim's cooperation, 
it [the Force Order] doesn't seem to make much difference."
28 Some police officers I talked to put the blame for this state of affairs on the CPS. The 
implication being if the courts were more lenient about the standard of proof then police 
officers could process more cases. However, the CPS was not in operation in 1985 when the 
first interviews were conducted but the same logic was being applied with the same rigour. 
This logic is a product of incident based policing, a logic which fits easily with the system 
further along in the criminal justice process.
29 During my time with one of the 'domestic violence units' one officer recounted a case that she 
had nurtured all the way to court, only to have the charges withdrawn by the complainant at 
that stage. I remarked to her that this was the kind of case that made officers cynical about 
dealing with these kinds of cases. Her reply was "Yes, I try not to get discouraged but in that 
particular case I was, very. In fact, I had to leave the court because of what I would have said to 
the woman. If she comes to us again I would still help her because that's my job, but then I'm 
very dedicated to this particular issue." She went on to admit that it was unlikely that every 
officer could successfully guard against internalizing the cynicism inherent in these episodes.
30 After the Force Order was issued it became virtually impossible to hear police officers 
making statements of this nature. I was made aware of this when Christmas shopping in 1989 
near Camden market when I was the subject of a 'stop and search' by two officers of from 
Kentish Town Police Station. The search did not reveal anything untoward and I was able to 
turn the discussion around to the policing of domestic violence. I was surprised to hear these 
two burly police officers assure me that they took domestic violence "very seriously". They 
were, however, unable to tell me how many refuges were on their 'manor'.
31 Chatterton observed one particular case where the attending officer used criterion of moral 
blameworthiness in order to make a decision to exit the case from the system. The level of 
injuries sustained in the case in question were sufficient to provide the grounds for arrest. 
However, the suspect in this case pointed out that the victim had not been doing her domestic 
chores. The officer seeing that "there was no fire in the place despite the fact that it was a cold 
night, and the unwashed breakfast pots on the table. There was a bundle of dirty washing in 
the corner of the room..." talked the aggrieved party out of pursuing charges, in Chatterton M. 
'Police Work and Assault Charges' in Control in the Police Organization M. Punch ed., 
Cambridge Mass., MIT Press © 1983
32 MacCabe and Sutcliffe also note specific examples of police intervening in this same manner. 
They also note with reference to domestics that police business is understood by many officers 
to be concerned with what happens after an offence has been committed rather than the 
prevention of crime itself, op. cit. Defining Crime pgs. 44-45
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33 This is particularly true in cases which are filed as major crimes. Content analysis of the 
Major Crime File reveals that incidents involving serious damage to property and injury which 
could be fully processed as crimes were never accompanied by the advice and referral which 
were ubiquitous in cases not proceeded with. This would indicate that 'advice and referral' are 
an addendum to police practice only when the full criminalization process cannot be invoked, 
acting to ease the exit from the system. There is a role that advice and referral can play even 
when cases are 'crimed'. Victims need information about insurance claims compensation for 
injuries sustained and rights to protection in the future. It appears that instead of such advice 
being offered as a way of providing a service to victims it is being used as a way of hiving off 
responsibility to other agencies.
34 From the interviews and from talking with police officers it appears that they regard the 
attachment of a 'power of arrest' as a guarantee that the courts will take the case seriously if 
the injunction is breached. Since their main criteria for proceeding is whether or not they can 
build a case which will succeed in court, injunctions without such powers lead police officers 
to pre-judge cases and exit them from the system. In such a situation the woman concerned is 
no further ahead in obtaining any concrete help despite having called the police and attended 
court.
35 Judicial Statistics for England and Wales Annual Report, 1987 London HMSO table 5.17.
36 Edwards S.S.M. Policing 'Domestic' Violence. London, Sage Publications, © 1989 pgs. 72-73
37 Although, as is shown in chapter eight, the existence of an injunction can create the 
intellectual space for an authoritative intervention, even when the specific instructions 
contained in it are ambiguous.
38 In fact this unit, as it is described here, was in operation for only one year. During that time 
it was given extensive media coverage including two television documentaries. Both officers 
involved were said to be 'high fliers' by other police officers with whom I have spoken. In fact 
the sergeant who initially established the unit went on to do a higher degree at University (by 
her own reckoning this was unusual for officers only at the rank of sergeant) and the WPC was 
promoted and placed in charge of a 'child protection unit' at another police station. There is 
every reason to believe that the distinctive style of this unit departed with these officers.
39 I talked at length with the officers on the unit about the problem of continued harassment of 
victims by their husbands. One of the problems that police often encounter in such instances 
is that many cases are dropped by the victim at the court stage. The implication is that victims 
are intimidated into withdrawing the charges. This particular unit had a contingency plan for 
these instances which required close liaison with the Crown Prosecutor. It involved arranging 
that the CP would immediately request an adjournment if the victim tried to withdrawn the 
charge in court. He would then get in touch with the DV Unit. It was explained to me that "we 
can then get in touch with her and make sure that she is withdrawing for the right reasons. 
Quite often what we find is that her husband has put pressure on her, but once she finds out 
that we will support her we can usually do something about it."
40 This enhanced victim support by police officers is particularly important in the British 
context where the infrastructure for responding to the needs of women victims of violent men is 
very under-developed. This is why the focus on helping women establish medical files and 
with the local council is so important. Such work does not necessarily impinge on any 
subsequent decision to press charges nor is it of any help should the case be pursued in court, 
however it does provide concrete assistance to victims which may help them to leave the 
violence should they wish to. It should be pointed out that while the officers in this unit
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devoted a great deal of time to the support role, 'social service work' in police parlance, it 
should not be assumed that other units in London do the same.
41 The sergeant in charge of the DV Unit informed me that on average each case took seven hours 
of the unit's time to process completely. If the results of the first Islington Crime Survey are 
extrapolated to the Capital as a whole this suggests around 750,000 assaults per year by men 
on women with whom they had present or past relationships, see Jones, T., Maclean, B. and 
Young J. The Islington Crime Survey Gower Press © 1986. Other studies indicate that police 
receive roughly 58,000 calls for service per year regarding domestic violence, see S.S.M. 
Edwards 'Police Attitudes and Dispositions in Domestic Disputes: The London Study' in the 
Police Journal, July 1986. Domestic violence exhibits a considerable potential to absorb 
police time.
42 Interesting to note is that the relations of command in this second unit was somewhat 
different than the prototype. The 'North London Unit' was established by the two women 
officers concerned and, although they were technically answerable to a superior officer, their 
work in the unit was essentially defined by them. Not so in this second unit where the 
traditional relationships between ranks was much more in evidence. The 'copy-cat unit' was 
set up by an Inspector in charge of 'community relations' who also supervised the work of the 
Home Beat Officers. The work of the dv unit owed more to his direct supervision. Incidentally, 
the label 'copy cat' is not intended to be derogatoiy.
43 It is interesting to note the prevalence of women police officers in these units. The WPC in 
the unit told me that the last two WPCs at this particular station to get pregnant were offered 
posting to the domestic violence unit but turned it down. She herself was a new mother and 
indicated that working regular office hours suited her owns needs very well. Women police 
officers, including the two in this unit, argue that they are more appreciative of victims 
circumstances than their male colleagues. There is some tension here, if not complete 
contradiction; I have also heard a number of female officers express the fear that making 
'domestic violence' the exclusive preserve of female officers may serve to marginalize the work.
44 The officers indicated to me that of the 24 incidents which had come to their attention over 
the preceding two weeks they had personally visited victims in only three instances.
45 The sergeant in charge of the day to day running of this unit recounted her problems in 
getting a "training session" for the officers on relief. The session was delayed two times before 
she was given ten minutes to give a talk during parade. The relief was unreceptive to her 
message because of the problem of not being able to get cases to court. According to her 
account, at this point in the discussion an Inspector intervened with the message that "we have 
got to take this sort of crime seriously". Officers on relief were still not persuaded by the 
Inspector ("who has a degree") because, in the absence of the victim pursuing a criminal 
allegation and in the absence of the CPS utilizing the compellability clause in the PACE, arrest 
was considered by them to be inappropriate.
46 The Superintendent who set up this initiative was veiy much concerned that policing domestic 
violence should remain within a generalist procedural model. As such, he did not wish to 
acknowledge that a Unit had been established, nevertheless he had detailed two female officers 
to collate statistics on domestic violence and this has led people to refer to a dv unit. Indeed, 
the only person who did not refer to it as a Unit was the Superintendent who set it up.
47 Strictly speaking the 'criminalization ritual', insofar as it included finger-printing, was 
illegal.
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48 It was a perception held by both management level officers and researchers involved in this 
unit that police officers were 'taking the side* of the assailant in instances of domestic 
violence; that officers would be given details about what had led to the assault which would 
lead them to make judgements about the moral blameworthiness of the assailant. The changes 
instituted in the South London unit with respect to charging were calculated specifically to 
prevent this from happening. On moral blameworhtiness in police decision making see M. 
Chatterton 'Police Work and Assault Charges' in Control in the Police Organization M. Punch 
ed.© 1983 pg. 212-13)
49 It may be objected that incarceration for a period provides an important 'cooling off period 
during which the victim is protected from the suspect. However, my field work indicates that 
police officers have improvised 'cooling off measures in the past some of which were at least as 
effective as this one.
50 Sandra Horley 'A Caution Against Cautioning1 in Police Review, March 9, 1990.
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Hey Joewhere you goin' with that gun in your hand? I'm goin' out to shoot my baby 'cause I caught her messin' with another man
Hey JoeI heard you shot your old lady down Yes I did cause I caught her messin' ’round town
Jimi Hendrix
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In troduction
In the last chapter I systematically laid out the discursive processing 
that police officers undertake when they take a call for service involving 
interpersonal violence between intimates and turn it into an object for 
policing, that object being: a ’domestic violence incident'. In this chapter I 
would like to present a content analysis of 110 police files gathered from 
one police station over a two month period. I have several objectives in 
doing this. The first is that the data contained in these files will tell the 
reader something about the nature of the domestic violence calls that 
police are called to since, even though all of the accounts are filtered 
through the linguistic-authority-structure of operational policing, the 
records contain many specific details about a variety of domestic settings 
and situations that are of intrinsic interest. The second aspect of this 
presentation, perhaps the most obvious one, is that it will reiterate the 
practices of policing already discussed, thus giving the reader another 
chance to see the application of the analytical categories of policing. These 
two aspects of the presentation, taken together, will make both the content 
and form of the policing of domestic violence less opaque.
More importantly, this content analysis will give an opportunity to 
display domestic violence within the constellation of other policing duties 
and doing so should further clarify the logic that police officers employ. A 
connected task is the quantification of the contents of these files, giving 
the reader some notion of overall frequencies. This exercise in 
quantification is a fairly high level abstraction from the discursive 
practices of front line officers, but it is also more than that. Similar 
exercises are conducted everyday by police managers in many positions in 
the organization. Such quantification is a systematic representation of the
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'knowledge' of policing most often carried out by police officers 
themselves. As such, carrying out this task will lend insight into the 
manufacture of police statistics, itself, an essential part of modem policing 
practice.
However, before embarking on this project, it is necessary to briefly 
mention the changes brought about by the Force Order in the police station 
from which this sample of files was taken. At the time of my field work, 
there was no domestic violence unit in operation nor were any other 
special procedures in general practice. This meant that the traditional 
response, as presented in the previous chapter, provided the model for 
police intervention in all instances of interpersonal violence. However, 
there was a considerable stress on record keeping practices involving 
domestic violence and Instruction 15/87 , which came out of the Chief 
Superintendent's office at this police station on June 25th, 1987 required 
officers to pay "particular attention to the full reporting of such incidents" 
in order "to enable statistical and factual retrieval to take place." This 
concern is evident in the table on the following page.
As can be seen from the overall totals and percentages, police officers 
were recording more calls for service than previously. A two fold increase 
(as a percentage of the total) in incidents classed as Beat Crimes is notable. 
This increase conforms with the desires of the instigators of the force 
policy on domestic violence who, it will be recalled, wished to see more 
cases classed as ABH (an arrestable offence) rather than the lesser charge 
of common assault. Incidents classed in the lesser category also increased 
significantly. The minor drop (as a percentage of the total) in cases classed 
as major crimes is a statistical anomaly brought about because of the 
inflation of the lesser categories. Yet, in absolute terms, this category also
2 9 8
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experienced an increase. However, as this table indicates, the issueing of 
the Force Order was not an unmitigated success. It appears that over sixty 
percent of incoming calls still remained unrecorded.
Table One
Year 1985* 1988
Total Number of 
Calls for Assistance 449 (over six months) 654 (over six months)**
Occurrences 
Beat Crimes 
Major Crimes
74 (16.4% of total) 
37 (08.2% of total) 
20 (04.4% of total)
126 (19.2% of total) f 
102 (15.5% of total) t  
24 (03.6% of totaljj
Total Processed 131 (29.1% of total) 250 (38.2% of total)f
* Figures come from 'The Police Response to Domestic Violence in London'
Dr. S.S.M. Edwards (unpublished)
** Figure derived from one month's incoming calls multiplied by a factor of six
t  Figures derived from documentation covering a two month period
Three levels of 'incident' 
the Occurrence Book file
In the previous chapter, the idea that police officers grade calls for 
service into different categories was introduced and the examples of 
'common assault', 'actual bodily harm' and 'grievous bodily harm' were 
cited. All of the tables that follow display the contents of three different 
files which correspond to this graded hierarchy of violence. These files are 
labeled the Occurrence Book file, the Beat Crime file and the Major Crime 
file respectively. By and large, those instances filed in the Occurrence Book 
file were cases in which the relief officer originally called to the scene 
dealt with the case, whereas those filed as Beat Crimes were normally be
2 9 9
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forwarded to a Home Beat Officer for follow-up calls. Instances filed as 
Major Crimes were most often followed up by an officer from CID.
In the Occurrence Book file there were a total of forty two incidents 
which conform to the operational definition of 'domestic violence1; that is, 
violence involving the police in disputes between persons in an intimate 
and cohabiting relationship, either present or past. A further ten cases 
were outside this formal definition, but could be included within a wider 
understanding of violence in private settings. Of the domestic violence 
incidents, twenty-eight involved couples cohabiting at the time of police 
intervention. This can be seen in Table Two.
Table Two
The Occurrence Book File 
March/April 1988
Definition Classification March April Total
domestic dispute 
(cohabiting couple) 12 16 28
Domestic
domestic dispute 
(non-cohabiting couple) 8 5 13
Violence
breach of injunction 1 1
sub-total 20 22 42
Other Child at Risk 1 1
Family Familial Violence 3 3 6
Violence Other — 3 3
sub-total 4 6 10
Total 24 28 52
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The specific information recorded in an occurrence book is often very 
detailed. It was explained to me on a number of occasions by police 
officers that there is a good incentive for this. Patrolling officers are 
worried that a given situation which they have responded to will flare up 
again resulting in serious injury or damage or that the situation may ’come 
back' on them in some way not foreseen. It will also be remembered, from 
chapter seven, that occurrence book reports are often the subject to 
scrutiny by supervising sergeants which is an incentive to accurate 
recording. This incentive is keenly felt by young officers, hence, when 
completed, the records can be quite meticulous. The following is an 
example taken from these records:1
On Thursday 10th March 1988 at about 2:30 pm I was 
on patrol in Full Uniform accompanied with WPS 22, 
Hill in Blockhill Rd. N4 We were approached by a 
woman I now know to be Miss Madeline MacDonald 
of 69 Blockhill Rd. Miss MacDonald said: "I was in 
the house when Jonathan James Migillicutty and 
Warren Lyons, and David William White kicked in 
the door and entered the house there was an 
argument and Jonathan James Migillicutty punched 
me on the right side of my face, then left the house.” 
On arrival at the house 69 Blockhill Rd. the door was 
open and the lock broken and lying on the floor 
beside some wood splinters. On entering the house 
with Miss MacDonald and a man with her whom I 
now know to be Mr. Terrence Scranton of 67 
Blockhill Rd. N4 we saw two men whom I now know 
to be Mr. Gerry Dooley the occupant of this address 
and Mr. David William White of the Doncaster Hotel, 
Queens Drive N4. In my presence and hearing WPS 
22, Hill said: "What has happened here Mr White? 
He replied: "I broke the lock on my door and I'll fix 
it." I then spoke to Miss Madeline MacDonald. WPS 
22 said : "How did he hit you?" She said "He punched 
me" I examined her face and saw no a p p a re n t  
injuries medical aid was declined. I referred her to 
Highbury Corner Magistrates Court re g a rd in g  
possible summons procedure. Also present in the 
room was Madeline MacDonald's 11 m onth old 
daughter, she appeared capable of looking after the 
child. Approximately 3:00 pm Sister Jane Kone of 99, 
Cloudy Green Rd. Community Care arrived and spoke
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to Madeline MacDonald and they all left together to 
keep an appointment which Madeline MacDonald 
had with her social worker.
Note the narrative style adopted by the reporting officer and the 
careful attention to details involving times, places and identities. Details of 
the accusation are provided as is a description of the injuries sustained and 
action taken. This particular example is interesting for two reasons. First, 
the initial call for service is not, as one usually imagines, initiated over the 
phone. Rather, it is a classic field mobilization. In instances like this, 
supervising officers do not know of the initial call for service since it is not 
processed through the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system. Usually 
such an encounter would be left unrecorded, however, since Social Services 
were involved there was some incentive to record the incident. Secondly, 
note the number of people involved, whether as witnesses, protagonists or 
both. The competing explanations makes for a complicated narrative and 
it is not even clear who made the assault. Indeed, this incident had the 
potential for complications which, it seems only because of the arrival of 
social service workers, were taken out of police hands.
In Defining Crime. McCabe and Sutcliffe remark on many domestics 
which do not obtain any substantive intervention because "the extent of 
the injury was not regarded as serious enough to justify police action." The 
standard advice in such instances is for the victim to "seek remedy" by 
contacting a solicitor or through the courts.2 In the last chapter I made 
the point that the conceptual apparatus employed by police officers does 
not allow them to take cognizance of the history of violence that a 
relationship might have and instead focuses on the details of the particular 
incident. The following example, one of the sixteen 'domestics' involving
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cohabiting couples in April, is illustrative of both points. I have omitted 
the preamble which regards the time and place of the incident.
...we went inside and saw a man I now know to be 
Stamford Raffeles. Miss Monica Monterey said in 
Raffeles' presence "This man has cut the wires to 
the telephone and hit me. Last week he cut my head 
and this week he hit me and caused this black eye. 
I’ve had enough and want rid of him." I examined 
her injuries she claimed she had and found no signs 
of a cut on her head but there was a slight bruising 
to her left eye. Raffeles said in Monterey’s presence 
and hearing "This woman has caused me nothing 
but trouble. I've been arrested 4 times because of 
her. I've been here six months and I'm leaving 
tomorrow. I've never laid a finger on her, she 
caused the bruise herself and she's drunk." Miss 
Monterey was advised that if she wanted any action 
taken it would have to be done at HCMC through a 
summons. Advice re- arguing between couple 
given.
In this instance both 'suspect and 'victim' give testimony about the 
long standing nature of the violence. However, since the level of injury 
was deemed by the attending officer to be slight, the officers' response was 
to advise the couple and, further, to tell the victim to seek redress in the 
courts if she so wished.
Of the twenty-eight cases in these files involving disputes between co­
habiting couples in eighteen cases the official records contain mention of 
claims or evidence of physical abuse. In three of those instances the male 
suspect left the premises. No mention was made of where the suspect 
went in the two cases, in the third he conveyed to the local YMCA. In 
another four instances the female victim left the premises. In three of 
those cases the haven was with relatives, in the forth, space was found in a 
"women's hostel". In the remaining eleven cases no separation was 
achieved, rather the couple were 'advised'. The advice mentioned usually
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referred to various legal proceedings, the availability of marital 
counselling, the location of the citizen's advice bureau, or the phone 
number of Alcoholics Anonymous. Police officers also resorted to personal 
counseling themselves, often recorded as: "advice re: arguing between 
couple given" or "advice regarding future conduct given".3
Victims are not always passive and some appear to successfully use 
the police as a resource. Consider the following case:
...I was approached by a member of the public. As a 
result of what she said I attended Hawn House at no.
19 on the balcony I saw a female who I now Know to 
be Miss Julie Julip. She appeared in a d istressed  
state. Upon entry to no. 19 1 saw on the sofa in the 
living room a Mr. Vincent Cunningham. Beside Mr.
Cunningham  sat a young boy Richard Anthony 
(D.O.B. 13/10/83) the son of Ms. Julip. Also in the 
house was Allan Cunningham (D.O.B. 3/4/86), son of 
Mr. Cunningham and Ms. Julip. In the presence and 
hearing of Ms. Julip Mr. Cunningham said: "Over
the past few months Julie has been going out all 
night leaving the children unattended. I came 
home last night and the kids were on their own, 
they can fiddle with matches and the gas fire." In 
the presence and hearing of Mr. Cunningham Miss 
Julip said: "I never leave the kids alone, my Mum 
looks after them, or Martin Mulrooney does. Last 
night Vincent made an arrangem ent with Martin 
over the phone and Martin baby-sat. He lives at 
Crouch End go and ask him. I did not stay out last 
night but when I returned Vincent was at home and 
everything seemed okay. I took the children to the 
park, when I returned Vincent had been drinking.
He was drunk. He was angry that I stayed out all 
night. He head butted me, hit me with his trouser 
belt, kicked me and punched me. He also pulled my 
hair and one of the punches he threw hit Richard 
on the head. I don't want to take criminal action.
I'll get an injunction." Miss Julip had a cut on the 
left hand on the back at the base of the little finger 
and on the back of her right hand and forearm were 
a total of 5 raised red marks between 2 and fo u r 
inches long. Medical aid declined. Miss Dowse then 
took the children with her to No. 10 Stunebury Rd.
N17, her mothers address, advice to her remedies 
having been offered.
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It is, of course, a matter of conjecture as to what went on in this 
instance since we are limited to the account of the attending police officer. 
From that account it appears that the level of injury was substantial 
enough to warrant a classification of ABH. However, it seems that the 
victim did not wish to pursue an arrest at the time of the initial police 
intervention, preferring instead to take action through the civil courts. In 
fact, this particular case was recorded in the Beat Crime file several days 
later when it was recorded that the victim changed her mind and decided 
to press charges. Again, the logic of the linguistic-authority-structure is 
apparent; there can only be a ’crime' if there is a 'suspect' and for there to 
be a 'suspect' in an instance of interpersonal violence someone needs to 
inhabit the 'victim' box on a crime sheet.4
Violence behind closed doors can embrace any member of the family. 
The following is an example of what has been termed 'parental abuse'. In 
terms of police intervention the pattern is similar to those already 
discussed. As the preceding analysis has shown, in the absence of visible 
injuries, police prefer to refer protagonists to other agencies.
...upon arrival I spoke to a woman who I now know 
to be Mrs. Brenda Bland. I asked her what had 
happened and why she had called the police. She 
told me that her son had tried to strangle her but he 
had left the house when she told him police h a d  
been called. I asked her who lived in the flat. She 
said "Only myself and my son. He forced my 
daughter out because she was scared of him." I said 
"What did he do to you earlier?" She said "He 
grabbed me around the throat with both hands and 
shook me." I examined Mrs. Bland's th roat for 
injuries, but found no signs and no a p p aren t 
reddening of the skin. Mrs. Bland declined m edical 
treatm ent. I said "Why did he do that then?" She 
said "I asked him to get me some cigarettes from the 
shop because I had run out. He swore at me and 
grabbed my throat." Mrs. Bland was referred as to 
her civil remedies in the matter, namely to seek 
advice from a Citizens Advice Bureau or Law Centre
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in Horn Rd. N7 When we left the scene her son Paul 
Bland had not returned. 5
One of the most disturbing features of violence between intimates is 
that it does not necessarily come to an end when a couple ceases to 
cohabitate. Several examples of incidents concerning men pursuing 
estranged girl-friends or wives are contained in these files. In one 
particularly frightening example, it is recorded that, as the victim was 
leaving her premises in the morning to go to work, she was met by her ex­
boyfriend who "ran around the comer" and pushed her back into her flat. 
He proceeded to "shout and scream" and "slap the victim around the face". 
When she fell to the floor he proceeded to "kick her in the back 
repeatedly" after which he "threw items of her clothing out of the 
window". This was the most recent event in a situation which had been 
going on for some time and the complainant was able to produce an 
abusive letter as evidence of this. She was advised to contact a solicitor 
for assistance and she was also told about injunctions and proceedings to 
obtain a summons for common assault.
Recall the concept of a strange loop which I introduced in the 
preceding chapter. It would seem that in this instance there was sufficient 
evidence to believe that a crime had been committed. Further, given 
enough support by police this may have resulted in a successful 
prosecution, after all it is apparent that the victim has suffered long term 
harassment. Instead, perhaps because the assailant had left prior to the 
arrival of the police, the attending officer referred the victim to take legal 
action herself. This is a matter of the attending officers discretion, but 
given the propensity of civil injunctions to create strange loops it is not 
altogether certain that his judgement was sound in this instance.
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Altercations between estranged couples need not always be a matter 
of physical danger. Many involve disputes over property or access to 
children, The following example shows something of the former type:
...there I saw a woman I now know to be Mary 
Fraser. She said "My boyfriend and I split up. We 
bought a car together, both of us got a loan to buy it. 
Today he stopped me in the street shouting 
hysterically. He told me he wanted the car for 
something. I said that I would buy him out in 
monthly payments for the car. He said that he 
needed the money right now and he took the car 
saying he would write it off." Miss Fraser was very 
upset. I ascertained that the car, a magenta Morris 
Mini,belonged to both parties. Miss Fraser was 
advised re: civil remedy and police involvem ent 
should the car become her property in the future.
Police officers are anxious to avoid being used as intermediaries for 
resolving petty disputes, however, the principles of preventative policing 
are also caUed for here.6 Writing off a vehicle for insurance purposes is 
potentially a matter of police interest. In this case the officer obviously 
determined that this was a 'civil matter' and advised the complainant 
accordingly.7 In all five cases contained in this sample involving disputes 
between recently separated couples over property or money, the attending 
officer declined to become involved and referred the complainant to a civil 
proceeding. These cases involve various infractions: an estranged husband 
secretly selling off family furniture and moving to France; a boyfriend, 
banned by an injunction, removing all of the electrical fixtures (including 
light fittings and switches) from his former girlfriend's flat to give 
examples. In these cases, the attending officer referred the complainant to 
a solicitor as it was a 'civil matter'.
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It is helpful to see these kinds of calls for service in the broader 
context of policing. Such disputes are, on the surface, not dissimilar to 
disputes between shop-keepers and their customers, which also involve 
police officers from time to time. Consider the following example:
...where I met a man I now know to be Donald 
Fitzroy. He said "I bought a car battery from him 
and when I took it home it wouldn’t work and he 
won’t give me my money back." We proceeded to a 
garage at 11 Flatbush Rd. where I met the owner 
Evan Thornton who stated that he was willing to 
exchange the battery for another but he would not 
give a cash refund. Mr. Fitzroy explained that his 
brother-in-law had promised him a battery over the 
phone that afternoon and that he wanted his money 
returned. Mr. Thornton explained that it was not his 
policy to give cash refunds. Both parties advised re: 
civil remedies and to contact a solicitor on the 
matter.
To a street level officer, mobilizations regarding altercations between 
separating or divorced couples over property appear quite similar to those 
between shop keepers and their customers. However, there are 
differences which are noteworthy. When the electrical fittings are 
methodically removed from a flat in the context of an acrimonious 
separation, the intent is not merely to deprive a person of her belongings it 
is to harass. However, police officers are not predisposed to making this 
kind of differentiation. In this sense, the discourse within which they 
operate leads to a kind of myopia. Police, operating within the confines of 
a particular linguistic-authority-structure, cannot make these subtle 
distinctions and can, quite rationally, justify non-action. The question 
arises as to whether it is possible, or even desirable, to cure this myopia. 
Further, if the police are not the agency to help women in instances of such 
subtle harassment what agency can be considered appropriate?
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Incidents between estranged couples also involve disputes over access 
to children. Such disputes also involve the police periodically, as in the 
following example:
...who I now know to be Miss Wanda Baker of 22 A 
Ferriman Rd. N7. I said what has happened. She 
said: "I am getting an injunction order out on him 
because of what has happened in the past. Today my 
solicitor phoned saying that the case comes up on 
Friday and that he had been informed. I said that he 
was supposed to be picking up the kids today. But 
the solicitor said that he must not have the children 
until after the court hearing. Later on he cam e 
around to my flat and followed me to school he 
pushed me up against the wall but he did not hurt 
me. He was very angry and kept shouting. He was 
calmed down by the school officials. He went 
downstairs and left." I said "Are you alright, he did 
not hurt you?" She said "No". I said "Is there an 
actual injunction at the moment stopping him from 
coming near you and the children?" She said "No, 
tha t’s why we have to go to court on Friday and is 
why he is so upset." I then talked to the ac ting  
headm aster Mrs. Theosophista Sergies. She stated  
that "He was very angry and aggressive but after 
the man you just saw had a word with him he left. I 
don’t know if he is still hanging around." I then 
escorted Miss Baker and her two children to 22 
Ferriman Rd. where they went inside and there was 
no sight of Mr. Jack.
This particular instance should be seen as one of good practice. The 
attending officer escorted the woman and her children home thereby 
insuring a modicum of protection. In the example above, much emphasis 
is placed on obtaining a civil injunction. It has been argued elsewhere, and 
discussed in chapter four, that this avenue is not a straight and true path 
to a solution for the victim and that applications are problematic. 
Commentators on the workings of the court system have argued, in this 
regard, that the system for obtaining injunctions is weighted against the 
woman and is designed to be discouraging.8 Further, it is not uncommon to
309
Chapter Eight
A  C o o t e m i t  A inifflllysls ®ff P®lo©<s F i te ®  R e g a i r d l in ig  D o m e s t i c  V io lsifi)© ®
hear police officers say that injunctions without the power of arrest 
attached to them are "not worth the paper they are printed on." However, 
injunctions do, on occasion, allow for a qualitative change in police 
response as in the following instance:
...where I saw a man I now know to be Mr. Kevin 
Rambone. I said "What is your name?" He said 
"Kevin". I said "What are you doing here?" He said 
"I've just come to deliver a message to my wife." I 
said "Come with me and we shall go and speak with 
her." I knocked on the door of num ber 3303 and a 
woman I now know to be Mrs. Alice Rambone 
answered. I said "Have you called the police?" She 
said "Yes, this is my ex-husband. He has been 
knocking on the door for the last half an hour. I 
have an injunction." She then showed me the 
injunction. This says that Kevin Rambone must not 
molest or assault any of his three children [details of 
three children] . All three children were in bed and 
were unaware of what was happening. I said to Mrs.
Rambone "Do you want Kevin to stop visiting you 
here." She said "Yes" I said to Kevin "I suggest you 
go home and if you have any problem s regarding 
your rights you should contact your solicitor." Mr.
Rambone then left the scene. I said to Mrs.
Rambone "If you want to stop Kevin visiting you 
here you will have to re-apply to the court and get a 
different injunction." She said "Yes, I am going 
next week."
In this case the attending officer’s discretion was employed to the 
benefit of the complainant. Where police officers are given a directive, 
such as an injunction, they seem to be able to intervene, even if the 
directive is, ambiguous. This is not to say that they do in every case, as 
we have seen in previous chapters women have been murdered by their 
spouses while injunctions and non-molestation orders have been in effect. 
However injunctions seem to create a category within which authoritative 
intervention can take place. The problem is one pointed out by 
researchers in the area, that such court orders are difficult to obtain.
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Indeed, it may be that the woman involved in this case had this particular 
injunction, not because of assaults against the children (although such 
assaults may have been an element) but because it is easier to get a court 
order when children are involved and much less likely when the complaint 
is limited to assaults against "the wife".
The third case in this file involving a breach of an injunction resulted 
in an arrest. This Occurrence Book entry did not cross reference with any 
Beat Crime or Major Crime file entry and there are few details in the IRB 
itself. The case did, however, show up in the custody records. The 
information available is cryptic, but it seems that the victim was 
hospitalized with severe injuries as a result of the breach and that the 
suspect was arrested at the hospital outside of her ward. It is not possible 
to make any judgement about this case because the available evidence is
so scanty. It does serve to remind us, however, that obtaining an
injunction is no guarantee of safety.
The Occurrence Book file also reveals another type of problem that the 
policing of domestic violence raises. In multi-cultural England it is not 
uncommon for 'family violence' to include the extended family and, further 
to present language difficulties for the attending officer. Consider the 
following example:
Notes made on Sat. 30/4/88 at 9:30 in front office in 
NV- Abdu Amhadi attended NV at 9:20 pm and said:
"At about 7:50 pm. I was with my daughter taking 
her back to my wife's address at 123 Tufnell Rd. N7 
and when I was outside the Tufnell Park T u b e  
Station my brother in law Mr. Mustapha saw me. He 
was with my wife's sister's husband and some o ther 
relations. They all chased me and Mustapha pushed 
me to the floor and hit me on the mouth and kicked 
me." Medical aid declined. I noticed a slight 
swelling to lower lip. Advised re: civil rem edies.
Person concerned at the time of the report was
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giving complicating stories and seemed incapable to
give clear details.
It would seem that the problem here is one of language difficulty. The 
reader may well imagine the difficulties of trying to explain complicated 
extended family ties in a foreign language (in this instance English) to a 
police officer asking prefabricated questions and expecting short 
prefabricated answers. In this case the problem becomes that of the 
complainant who is "incapable of giving clear details".
Extended family relations give rise to many complications. In another 
example the matriarch of a large household wanted to expel a 16 year old 
daughter who did not give her "enough respect". She called the police in 
order to achieve her ends and demanded that they "throw her out". The 
police declined to intervene in precisely this way and attempted to smooth 
the problem over by inquiring if, perhaps, one of the other daughters 
would put up their younger sister. None of the other daughters were 
willing to cross their mother and the attending officers attempts to 
negotiate the settlement failed. They did, however, calm the storm to their 
satisfaction and attempted to leave. They did not to get away so easily. 
The daughter in question was forcibly locked out of the house as the 
officers approached their vehicle. They had no choice but to convey her 
back to the police station where they attempted to involve social services 
who declined to "take her into care". She was eventually ensconced in the 
house of one of her sisters. From the point of view of the attending police 
officers, who are taught to allocate merit on the basis of the general 
linguistic-authority-structure of policing, this must have been a frustrating 
episode since it was so time consuming and, in the end, did not obtain a 
’result'. I discussed this particular IRB with a police sergeant who
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remarked, to the extent that, the attending officers might have got a good 
story out of it but would never receive any official recognition of a job well 
done.
These two examples raise questions about the nature of 'domestic 
violence’ calls into households which are neither British in custom nor in 
language. Such circumstances present special difficulties for police officers. 
Cultural differences were not considered when developing new Force 
policy with regards to 'domestic violence'. It is evident from these 
examples that careful reconsideration must be given to changes in police 
practice if they are not to have unintended consequences for ethnic 
minorities. If policing moves towards more frequent use of arrest in cases 
of domestic violence this may have consequences for the politics of policing 
unforeseen by policy makers.
Three levels of incident-
The Beat Crime file
The Instructions which came out of the Chief Superintendent's office at 
this particular police station were quite specific about record keeping 
practices. The initial instructions contained in memo 15/87 were less 
informative about what police were actually to do in instances of domestic 
violence. Officers were informed that arrangements were being made to 
establish an 'inter-agency response' within the Borough to deal with cases 
of domestic violence, but until the option of such a response was made 
possible, officers were to refer victims the local Victim Support Scheme.
Three months later, after the implications of the Force Order were 
digested by the local police bureaucracy, a second memo was circulated. 
Dated 22nd of September, Instruction 19/87 gave additional steps which 
were to "be taken as the accepted practice in all cases of domestic violence
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arising on this Division." These steps included telling victims about a 24 
hour help line organized by London Women’s Aid and, in cases where 
"arrests are not effected" then "each adult victim of domestic violence will 
be discreetly informed that if she no longer wishes to remain on the 
premises alternative accommodation within refuges are available."
Officers were also informed that "although there is a fundamental 
assumption that the alleged victim will make her own decisions when the 
options are made available, in cases where there is a perceived threat to a 
woman (and possibly children) that makes immediate removal desirable, 
then Police will assist her to the station for arrangements to be made in a 
more secure environment."
The announcement concluded "where victims do choose to remain on 
the premises it may, however, be in their interest to receive follow up 
visits to ensure that they are not the subject of further violence or explain 
further the services available to them." This was to be the responsibility 
of Home Beat Officers and records of all follow up calls were to be kept.
Within institutions like the police, however, individual behaviour does 
not directly follow organizational dictates. Police officers 'on the ground1 
do not respond to instructions like these uniformly.9 Given that 
approximately 60% of the incoming messages recorded on the CAD system 
remained otherwise unrecorded after these instructions had been in force 
for a year, there is no reason to expect that the new policy was 
immediately put into action.
The instructions given out at this police station can be condensed into 
three concrete specifications. These are:
a) 'victims are to be informed about 
W om en's Aid and phone 
num bers are  to be made
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available; this is to be done 
discreetly ie. not in the presence 
of the 'suspect’.
b) if the safety of the victim or her 
children requires it arrests can 
be made or, separation can be 
achieved by escorting the victim 
from the premises.
c) follow-up calls are to be made by 
the Home Beat Officer in cases 
where the 'victim ' remain o n  
the premises and such calls are 
deemed necessary.
In summarizing the contents of the Beat Crime file, in Table Three on 
the following page, it is readily apparent that the use of arrest is not the 
pre-eminent form of police intervention. Twenty-two out of the thirty- 
four relevant cases were no-crimed. In these instances the case was no 
crimed because the "victim is unwilling to substantiate the allegation" 
(VUSTA), another analytical category of operational policing. As explained 
in the previous chapter, no-criming is an accounting procedure which 
allows these calls for service to be filtered from the system. In such 
instances where no crime is recorded the role performed by the attending 
police officer is said to be ’social service'. This category of action includes 
referring victims to appropriate agencies and giving advice, whether of a 
personal nature or practical.
The Force Order, as it was interpreted locally, did not over-ride the 
assumption that victims in these situations would make their own 
decisions. Police are taught that their role is one involving co-operation 
with others in the creation and maintenance of a way of life in the 
community which strikes the optimum balance between the interests of 
citizens and the personal rights of all individuals.10 According to the logic 
employed if victims are unwilling to pursue the legal option themselves
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then the attending police officer can only offer advice and practical 
suggestions about other agencies which can offer other services to the 
victim.
Table Three
The Beat Crime File
M arch /A pril 1988
Definition Class. Relationship March April Total
crimed cohabiting 3 1 4
Domestic
crimed
arrest made
charge
dropped
non-cohabiting
cohabiting 2
2
2
2
4
Violence
arrest made
charge
dropped
non-cohabiting 1 1
no-crimed
VUSTA
cohabiting 5 7 12
no-crimed
VUSTA
non-cohabiting 6 4 10
transferred 1 1
Sub-total 18 16 34
Other D.V.
Family
Disputes
not
classified
3
1
3
1
6
2
Sub-total 4 4 8
T otal 22 20 42
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There is an important question that is not addressed when the 
problem is looked at in terms of the relative numbers of incidents classed 
as crime or no-crime. No-crime is an end result which allows a particular 
file to be put to rest. As we saw in the last chapter it is equally possible 
that a particular file could be put to rest by being crimed and classified as 
'cleared-up' using the same reasoning that "victim does not wish to pursue 
charges". Policing activities in the 'copy cat' domestic violence unit also 
made it evident that changing the book-keeping entry does not necessitate 
a change in actual policing practice in these instances. What is at issue, 
from the perspective of the victim, is the nature and quality of policing 
intervention and not how that intervention is accounted for in policing 
statistics.
What is at issue from the point of analysis is the logic with which 
these categories are employed. Notions of 'victim', 'suspect', 'guilty', 
'innocent', and the like, which play a central role in policing, lead to the 
question: "does the victim wish charges to be laid?" In practice police 
officers get a variety of answers to this question but it is rarely an 
unambiguous 'yes' or 'no'. Since no-criming is primarily a book-keeping 
entry, making an examination purely in terms of the accounting 
procedures steers the analysis away from questions about the actual 
nature of the service offered by police and the logic with which that is 
pursued. Such an approach also opens the way for the creation of a new 
book-keeping entry, such as 'clear-up' which does nothing to subvert the 
traditional logic of police practice.11
One of the main questions that arises, given the nature of the Force 
Order and the nature of the political pressure being generated over the 
issue is about the use of arrest. In the beat crime file being examined here
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there are a total of 34 cases conform to the operational definition of 
’domestic violence’ and out of those thirty-four cases, eleven resulted in 
arrest. The instructions given to police officers at Holloway included using 
arrest "if the safety of the victim or her children requires it." Arrest is also 
an option when the victim is "willing to substantiate the allegation" or, 
perhaps, demands that the police arrest the suspect and indicates her 
desire to proceed to court with the charge. These are two different 
criteria for arrest, one 'reactive' and at the behest of the victim, the other 
'pro-active' in order to protect the victim.
Police officers were not necessarily inclined to see such a distinction. 
One sergeant summed up the force order saying, cynically, that officers 
attending domestic violence calls were expected to use verbal violence in 
order to get the victim to press charges. This particular sergeant was 
inclined to see the Force Order as "politics", but, he also said: "policy or no, 
if the victim wants to pursue charges we certainly will." The official 
interpretation of the 'arrest for protection instruction' at this police station 
was laid out so that the injuries had to be very severe such that a charge 
of grievous bodily harm (GBH) could be laid. This yardstick routinizes such 
decisions, but it also means that instances of GBH might be 'down-graded' 
in order that a pro-active arrest need not be carried out.
I came across one incident which seemed to be a prima facie case of 
GBH. The case involved a woman who, according to the report, "had been 
badly beaten, with extensive bruising to the face and arms, her upper lip 
was cut open and her nose broken." I asked several police officers about 
this classification. One, a very young constable, told me that it was 
"leaning towards GBH." I asked him was it classed under the lesser charge 
and without hesitation he pointed to the form and said "because the
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victim is unwilling to pursue the allegation." I also asked the desk 
sergeant, who was unwilling to entertain the idea that the case had been 
mis-classified to begin with. Much later a Chief Inspector told me that in 
such an instance had the victim been willing to pursue the charge the 
police might well have classed the incident as GBH, however, given that it 
was going to go on the books with no ’body’ attached to it there was no 
sense in making the statistics for GBH look bad by classifying the incident 
in that category. This is example of the logic of the categories being 
applied by practitioners in ways not easily foreseen.
There was only one case in this file which could be said to have been 
pursued in order to protect the victim. This case is unusual in that it 
involved a firearm. The victim herself had sustained what the police 
referred to as "only minor injuries", that is: "two bruises to the face and 
bruising behind her left ear". But when she reported the incident to the 
police she also informed them that her ex-boyfriend was also in possession 
of a hand-gun. The suspect was later apprehended and a hand-gun for 
firing ’blanks1 along with forty seven blank cartridges was found on his 
premises. The suspect was charged with Actual Bodily Harm.
The literature on the policing of domestic violence suggests that the 
police attending such calls for assistance talk victims out of laying 
charges.12 While culling the files for examples of domestic violence I also 
kept a running check of interpersonal violence between strangers, 
pursuing the reasoning that similar arrest rates for both categories would 
refute this. I was also aware that some criminologists made the contention 
that police officers arrest infrequently in all cases of interpersonal 
violence, whether between man and wife or friends in the pub.13
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Serendipity played its role as I made this running count; the word 
'apparently1 was missing. This might seem an obscure observation so let 
me explain. In cases of domestic violence accounts of the situation 
frequently begin with the word 'apparently'. Additionally, the details 
presented were frequently prefaced with phrases such as "victim claims", 
"it seems that" and "victim alleges". In contrast incidents that did not 
involve persons with a 'romantic' attachment contained these phrases 
noticeably less often. It should be mentioned that in neither instance were 
the police likely to invoke an arrest response.
I tallied up the number of crime reports of 'stranger violence' over a 
one month period. Stranger violence is understood as distinct from all 
forms of domestic violence so that there is no intimate or family 
relationship between the protagonists. Incidents of stranger violence 
contained in this file were wide ranging including: a child shooting at 
another child with an air rifle; a vagrant attacking a shop keeper; a 
number of incidents which appear to be simply random acts of violence, 
although some could have been racially motivated (the forms do not 
explicitly ask such a question) and an incident stipulated as involving 
sexual harassment in a McDonalds. There were fewer of these types of 
incidents than of 'domestic violence’, only thirteen incidents over a one 
month period (roughly 40% fewer incidents). Out of these thirteen 
incidents only four were written up as 'victims claims', 'apparently' or 
'victim alleges' a ratio of approximately 1:3. In cases of domestic violence 
the ratio was very near to 3:1.
One explanation for this subtle difference was offered to me by a Chief 
Inspector. He explained that police officers were accustomed to see 
domestic violence as a civil matter and that, in. such cases, their role was
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somewhat circumscribed. According to him, until a particular charge is 
validated in a court of law it is an 'alleged* offence. I inquired as to why 
he thought the instance of 'sexual harassment' in the McDonald's 
restaurant was not prefaced by the phrase 'victim claims'? His 
explanation was that police utilize such terms when the victim is the only 
witness. However, in some of the instances of stranger violence the victim 
was the only available witness and still there was less likelihood of it being 
recorded as 'victim alleges’. The explanation offered by the Chief Inspector 
was that, in such instances the likely result was no-crime, not because of 
any reluctance on the part of the witness to prosecute, but simply because 
"the perpetrator got away".
The frequent use of phrases such as "victim claims" and the like might 
be seen to be congruent with those of Tony Faragher, among others, that 
police, by their mode of questioning, actively discourage women victims 
from pursuing allegations.14 Police officers resent being used as 
intermediaries in petty disputes and frequently testify to the belief that 
victims do not really wish to press charges.15 Survey results indicate that, 
from the victim's point of view, women view the police as uninterested 
and unsympathetic, particularly when the violence is within the 
household.16
If police officers appear sceptical or unsympathetic this will no doubt 
have an effect on the resolve of victims to pursue any allegations. This is 
something that could potentially be overcome by the operation of domestic 
violence units, if the individual officers in those units have the motivation. 
Attitudes of scepticism on the part of police officers are evident in these 
records and arrest was an unlikely option. Although arrests were made in 
eleven 'domestic violence' cases out of the thirty four; in five cases the
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charges were dropped, in two instances even before the suspect was 
shown into the charge room. In the cases where the charge was dropped 
the reason given was uniformly 'victim does not wish to substantiate the 
allegation'.
Further, in two cases where arrests were made and charges brought 
there were other outstanding charges against the suspect. In one instance 
the outstanding charge was for "failing to surrender to custody" and in the 
other it was for several burglary offences. In both instances the offence of 
ABH was added to the pre-existing charges. The likelihood of the police 
obtaining a conviction and the suspect being incarcerated seems to be 
quite high in these particular instances. These two cases can be viewed as 
inflating the arrests statistics for domestic violence since, the probability is 
that, these incidents would have been no-crimed were it not for the 
existence of other outstanding charges.
In one instance where an arrest was made and the charges later 
dropped the officer 'cautioned' the suspect. In this instance the suspect 
had thrown the victim through a window and then left the premises with 
money belonging to her. The police arrived and were informed that there 
was no wish to pursue charges but, since the victim intended to contact a 
solicitor in order to obtain an injunction, she wanted the matter recorded 
officially. The suspect was actually arrested and cautioned. The use of 
arrest in this case could be interpreted as police initiated to insure that the 
blameworthy are punished. However, the file makes it apparent that the 
complainant knew how to direct police intervention in accordance with her 
wishes. Although the use of arrest and caution appear to be the initiative 
of the officer, the victim's familiarity with police procedures facilitated this 
intervention.
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ABH has a standard definition which includes the infliction of pain, 
minor bruising and lacerations, a definition which is applied somewhat 
loosely. In order for such a charge to be brought all that is required is 
proof of injury and the logic of classification used in these files tended to 
be predicated on this. The analysis should also take some notice of the 
nature of the attack, because concentration on formal definitions leaves out 
many details which the files themselves contain. Many objects were 
thrown at these women, including a vacuum cleaner, a four foot long stereo 
cabinet unit and bricks. In several instances women were struck with 
kitchen implements and in a number of cases women were threatened 
with knives. The fact that some of these cases were not classified as more 
serious offences is almost an accident of fate.17 Any one of these weapons 
could have caused much more serious injuries.
To look at one case, observed and reported to the police by a third 
party, in more detail; it was reported to the police that a woman and a 
man were fighting in the street. The report, made by a neighbour who 
knew both parties, stated that the argument climaxed when the young 
man began throwing bricks at his girlfriend. The victim took refuge in her 
home whereupon the assailant continued to throw bricks, breaking panes 
of glass and damaging the wood work of the front door, before driving off. 
The victim of the attack declined to give a statement.
In this instance there was relatively little damage but, considering the 
weapons used, the situation could have been much more serious. Much the 
same can be said when the weapon used is a stereo cabinet. In that 
particular instance only "minor injuries" were caused to the head and legs. 
The victim declined to have her husband arrested but requested that he be
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escorted from the premises because he was drunk. The attending officers 
asked him to leave, which he did, and the matter was no-crimed.
When cases were no-crimed police action could take a variety of 
forms. In two of the cases in this file victims were conveyed to the 
hospital which effectively separated the protagonists. In another case the 
suspect had left the premises before the police arrived so the police simply 
took a statement. In two cases victims requested that the suspects be 
compelled to leave which the police obliged. In eight cases the victim and 
suspect were left together on the premises, although in two of those cases 
the victim had taken large doses of "medication" (in one case valium and in 
the other demerol) and were rendered effectively unconscious after the 
police left.
Police had to re-attend venues in two instances. One case is 
anomalous because the victim was male. The police had originally 
attended the venue but the "argument" they encountered seemed settled 
so they had left. They had to re-attend the venue when the wife attacked 
her husband with a bottle. On this occasion they arrested the so-called 
victim for being drunk, suggesting that, even though he was injured in the 
fracas, he was the main protagonist.18 In the other case where the venue 
was re-attended, the second police intervention followed an attack in 
which the female victim was hit in the face causing a cut lip. The victim 
did not wish to press charges and an arrest was not made.
Police utilized the 'arrest option' in eight of the twenty cases between 
co-habiting couples. In four of those cases the charges were eventually 
dropped, but it must be said that the police intervention at the time 
successfully prevented any further conflict, at least for the period of 
incarceration.
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The use of follow-up calls was considered to be integral to the police 
response to domestic violence and the local force instruction made special 
note of the role of the Home Beat Officer in such instances. The Home Beat 
Officer frequently had to make further calls on the victim, especially when 
no formal statement was obtained by the attending police officers 
responding to the initial call. No cases were encountered in this sample 
where it was recorded that a follow-up call was made in order to ’check on 
the safety of a victim’. Information pertaining to follow-up calls contained 
in these files is illuminating.
In some instances several follow-up calls were made (in one case 
there were four attempts to re-contact the victim and in many others 
multiple calls were made) often with the final outcome being a statement 
of withdrawal. This is not a rare occurrence, nor is it rare that the Home 
Beat Officer had to go to considerable trouble to contact the victim. Efforts 
were made be phone, by post and in person by the officer, often with no 
success. In cases where the victim could not be contacted the incident was 
no-crimed the reason given being "no further investigation possible."
One particular incident illustrates this pattern. Officers attended a * 
venue and found the victim to have a cut lip from at least one blow to the 
face. On questioning, the victim’s story appeared confused. The record 
stated that: "apparently, reason unknown, suspect is alleged to have 
pushed victim from behind. As she was pushed she turned around and 
was struck in the face by means unknown causing injury." The officer 
initially completing the paperwork recorded that "it is believed that the 
victim would drop the matter later" and no statement was taken at that 
time. This initial statement was taken by an officer on patrol in an 
automobile.
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The officer attending the initial call for service did not gather all of the 
information necessary to complete the Crime Report. On the following day 
the Home Beat Officer attended the venue in order to get this information, 
but, according to the report, there was "no reply to repeated knocking". 
The officer left a note for the victim asking her to contact him as soon as 
possible to which there was no reply. Three days later a further note was 
posted to the address requesting that the victim contact the station. Again, 
there was no reply and three days later, one full week after the original 
call for assistance, the matter was no-crimed, in spite of the fact that the 
initial crime report did not contain full details of the incident. If the 
victims unwillingness to come forth was not related to the violence 
experienced at the hands of her boyfriend perhaps it was related to the 
hurried nature of the initial response. In either case, the Home Beat 
Officer was powerless to accomplish anything, encountering, as he did, 
locked doors and unanswered correspondence.
This does not appear to be an isolated instance. Another case in the 
Beat Crime file also exhibits similar characteristics. The initial call included 
only sparse details but it appears from the record that the suspect had 
initially gained entry to the victim's premises by offering £50 "for the
children". After he gained entry an argument ensued wherein the victim
\
was struck on the hand with a saucepan. A partial statement was obtained 
and no further action was taken at the time although the record stated 
that, according to the victim, an injunction was held at the local Police 
Station. The police action in this instance amounted to telling the victim to 
"attend the Police Station" personally in the morning and, further, she "was 
advised re: letting her husband (ex) in."
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The venue received two follow-up calls from the Home Beat Officer, on 
both occasions the officer left a note to contact him at the Police Station. 
The victim did not respond to these attempts at follow-up calls and 
eventually the file was no-crimed and closed. Were this scenario to be 
enacted where a domestic violence unit was in operation to conduct the 
follow-up calls the most visible difference would be that the case would 
probably be classed as cleared-up. Without a response from the victim to 
the attempts at re-contact there is little else to do. However, there does 
appear to be room for improvement in the initial police response. In 
particular, in this case the victim mentioned an injunction. However, the 
attending officer made no effort to act on this information and, presumably 
because the alleged assailant had left the venue leaving little likelihood of 
further problems that evening, had taken the most efficient way to finish 
the call for service; advice and referral.
These examples illustrate that the initial call for service is aimed 
primarily at the restoration of order and there is little in the way of 
investigation and inquiry at the scene. Officers patrolling in vehicles 
perceive fast response times to be a central criteria on which they are 
judged and the facts of the case are often left for a Home Beat officer to 
gather. The primary problem, from a police point of view, is the apparent 
reluctance of many victims to re-establish contact with the police after the 
initial call for service. This results in wasted police time conducting 
unsuccessful follow-up calls. It also means that the situation which 
generated a call for intervention has not been fully investigated, which 
may mean further calls for assistance, perhaps with tragic consequences.
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’Family Violence' and 'Other'
Domestic Calls
There are eight cases in the beat crime file that do not conform to the 
operational definition of 'domestic violence'. Two of these cases were 
altogether unclassifiable, although there is a tenuous relationship to the 
issue.19 The remaining six could be termed 'Family Violence', by which is 
understood incidents between family members which involve the police. 
These cases illuminate policing practices in dealing with interpersonal 
violence more generally.
The six 'family violence' cases are interesting in a number of ways. To 
begin with in all six cases the suspects are male.20 The incidents include: 
1) a brother 'disciplining' his sister for being out too late, 2) three cases of 
sons attacking their parents, 3) a 'step common-law father' beating his 13 
year old step-daughter and 4) another case involving inter-generational 
conflict and custody of a child. Arrests were made in three of these cases 
and two were no-crimed. The last case, which involved the 13 year old 
girl, was transferred and I was unable to trace it. The two cases no-crimed 
were, as usual, put down because the victim did not wish to substantiate 
the allegation. One of these was a case of parental abuse which was no­
crimed after several follow-up calls which eventually gained an official 
statement of withdrawal. The other case involved an eighteen year old girl 
who was slapped by her brother for "being out too late". The injuries 
listed were "headache from being slapped". Before this case was no­
crimed it was down-graded from ABH to common assault. The victim was 
advised of her civil remedies and the file was closed.
In the cases of family violence there was a much greater tendency, at 
least when it is expressed as a percentage of the cases classed in this
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category, to use the arrest option. This does not seem to correspond to a 
higher level of violence, a greater prevalence of injuries, or usage of 
weapons. Nor does it seem that the arrest option was being used more 
because its use was requested. For example, in one case of parental abuse, 
the grounds for detention was recorded as the "likelihood of committing a 
further offence". In another case, the details were forwarded to the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) with a request for advice on how to proceed 
which eventually led to an arrest being made.
The information presented in the third case file is more detailed and a 
brief narrative can be constructed. In this case of parental abuse the 
suspect was detained initially, but was released. On his release the suspect 
returned to his home and proceeded to beat his parents again, apparently 
in punishment for calling the police in the first instance. The police re­
attended the venue. Both parents were adamant that they wished to have 
their son prosecuted and statements were taken to that effect. The suspect 
was arrested later that day by relief officers and held in custody to appear 
in Court. Attached to the report was a letter from the victims which stated 
that their son was "vicious" and thanked the police for their help. It 
concluded "since he had been bound not to come near the house or enter 
into the house we have had a peaceful life."
In two cases of parental abuse there was indication in the files about 
the suspects 'mental problems' and their propensity to violence. The use 
of this category in these instances raises some interesting questions, 
however, without a larger number of cases for analysis speculation is 
dangerous. It is, however, worth noting that the relative ease with which 
an arrest response was achieved when this category could be marshaled.
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Three levels of 'incident'-
The Major Crime File
McCabe and Sutcliffe have noted evidence of "confusion and 
sometimes irritation when uniformed police officers were asked to 
perform tasks which did not fall within the two categories of police 
business which they understood: the prevention and detection of crime 
and the maintenance of the Queen’s Peace".21 One would think that this 
would not be problematic for police officers attending cases of 'domestic 
violence' that end up recorded in the Major Crime file. Cases of 
interpersonal violence in this file may involve grievous bodily harm, rape 
and murder. Violence involving, as it does, broken limbs, deep lacerations 
and threat to life would be expected to warrant an unambiguous law 
enforcement approach. However, in contradiction to expectations, Table 
Four, on the next page, reveals that there is still a relatively high instance 
of no-criming (as a percentage of the whole) even where the level of injury 
is severe.
Two other interesting facts are immediately visible from this table. 
Firstly, incidents between non-cohabiting couples are far more 
predominant than cases involving co-habiting couples. Secondly, the non- 
operational category of 'domestic violence' contains the same number of 
incidents as the operational category. This sample indicates that, the focus 
of policing domestic violence at this high level, has shifted away from 
women in marriage like situations. Women are still the primary victims 
and men the primary suspects in these crimes, but the relationship 
between victim and suspect covers a broader range of definitions.
Contrasting the figures contained in the Beat Crime and Major Crime 
files poses a difficult question. The Major Crime file contains far fewer
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incidents conforming to the operational definition of 'domestic violence1 
than does the Beat Crime file. Over the two month sample period only 
eight incidents conforming to the operational definition were filed as Major 
Crimes, contrasting with the Beat Crime file which contains thirty four such 
incidents. However, both files contain eight incidents which are 'domestic' 
in nature but outside the scope of the operational definition. Further, 
incidents of 'stranger violence' between the two files are almost the same. 
Thus, over a one month period thirteen incidents of violence between non­
intimate persons were recorded in the Beat Crime File and fourteen 
incidents in the Major crime file. The question is: why does the number of
Table Four
The Major Crime File
March/April 1988
Definitior . Class Relationship March April Total
crimed cohabiting couple
crimed non-cohabiting 2 2 4
Domestic
no crimed cohabiting couple 1 1
VUSTA
Violence
no crimed non-cohabiting 1 1 2
VUSTA
transferred non-cohabiting 1 1
Sub-total 4 4 8
Other Family
Dispute 1 1 2
Family
Other 3 3 6
Total 8 8 16
3 3 1
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recorded violent incidents between ’romantic intimates' drop off so 
dramatically as the level of intensity rises? No simple answers to this 
question can be offered here, but, it might not be inappropriate to suggest 
that instances of domestic violence providing prima facie evidence for GBH 
but where the victim was unwilling to substantiate the allegation were 
more likely to be down-crimed into the ABH category. In contrast 
incidents classed in the 'Other Family Violence' category could not be 
down-crimed, particularly those which comprise charges of incest and 
child abuse. This is somewhat speculative, however, and the answer as to 
why 'stranger violence' does not exhibit this tendency to deflation is less 
clear.
Table Five, on the following page, shows the eight incidents in this file 
which conform to the operational definition of domestic violence. It is 
evident from this table that victim's statements were important to the 
classification of the allegation. In all three instances where the incident 
was no-crimed the victim had "failed to substantiate the allegation" (NB, 
the case which was transferred was also marked VUSTA). For example, in 
case number eight the victim, from her hospital bed, expressly denied to 
pursue the allegation stating she "still loves him and does not wish to make 
a statement or give evidence against him", and further that "in the past she 
has taken out injunctions against him which have successfully prevented 
any other assaults and that is the way she intends to deal with this 
matter." Love can be an important, if confusing, motivator for victims of 
this type of crime.22
In case number one the charge was pursued primarily because the 
suspect was wanted on another charge. The offence of Criminal Damage 
was included as an addendum, facilitating the fclear-upf of two crimes at
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once; one body two crimes accounted for.23 Cases two and six were 
examples of the straightforward procedures we would expect with such 
serious types of
Table Five
ALLEGATION OUTCOME COMMENTS
Criminal Damage
Criminal Damage
Rape
GBH
Charged with crimina 
damage and failing to 
appear
Criminal Damage and 
attempted GBH
no-crimed
transferred
GBH charged GBH
Attempted Rape charged Rape
Rape no-crimed
GBH no-crimed
suspect also wanted for 'failing to 
appear1 at HCMC on other charges 
detained and charged with both
victim 7 months pregnant. Suspect 
gained entry by smashing front door 
window and then assaulted victim
victim originally claimed boy-friend 
threatened her with violence in order 
to have sex. Later stated that she had 
made the allegation out of spite
suspect, ex-boy-friend, gained entry 
to victims flat. Did damage to 
property and assaulted victim.
Victim unwilling to substantiate 
the allegation
victim beaten badly by boyfriend. 
Suspect admitted offence.
Statement taken from victim
'boyfriend' attempts to rape victim 
Evidence taken: victims clothes and 
fingernail clipping from suspect
Allegation withdrawn. Victim 
changed claim while being 
interviewed. Stated that she 
wished to have help in obtaining 
an injunction against her ex­
boyfriend. Declined to attend 
courts or to prosecute
Victim stated she would apply for an 
injunction against her husband
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crime. The victims provided statements willingly and, in the case of the 
rape, cooperated with the gathering the forensic evidence. However, not all 
cases proceeded unproblematically. Case number four is illustrative. In 
this instance the injuries received included what was described as a "two 
inch gash to the left cheek below the eye" as well as "extensive scratches 
and bruising to the hands, arms and face". According to the file the victim 
was "unwilling to substantiate the allegation", and the case was 
transferred. It is difficult to know what, precisely, was happening in this 
particular instance but, it is usually the case that police officers want to 
establish a record of arrests, making them unwilling to give over cases to 
other officers if they are going to be able to record a ’positive result’. 
Given that the file for case number four was clearly marked VUSTA, 
however, it seems that they were not giving up a case that could be 
interpreted as results.
While one example of procedures with relation to allegations of rape 
contained in this file was unproblematic two others were not. In one of 
these instances (number three) the victim was taken to the divisional 
surgeon in order to gather forensic evidence, at which point she "became 
reluctant to pursue the matter". She later contacted the police station by 
phone and withdrew the charge saying that she initially "made it out of 
spite". In case number seven the file records that "the victim claimed to 
be having problems with her boyfriend because the relationship is ending". 
This file is ambiguous as to whether or not the victim ever denied her 
allegation of forced sexual intercourse, however, she declined to be 
examined by the divisional surgeon, stating that she "preferred to be 
examined by her own physician". The victim also declined to pursue the 
matter in court. This case was the only one in this file where police
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actively pursued a ’social service' role. The victim was told to contact 
Women's Aid and the Victim Support Scheme was also informed of her 
situation. The point can be made here that police procedures for inquiry in 
these instances are limited to details of the incident and obscure many 
details of the case. The procedures are aimed at gathering evidence of a 
crime the definition of which is strictly delimited to forced penetration. 
This means that, not only do the files not contain enough information for 
us to know really what happened but, further, that police procedures and 
the nature of the inquiry they pursue may not be commensurate with the 
needs of the victim. In this respect it is heartening to see that, in the 
instance where there was clear evidence of a sexual assault and where the 
victim declined to pursue the allegation, she was referred to other, perhaps 
more relevant, support agencies.
These files reveal that this is not always the case. Another example of 
rape contained in this file, but which was not counted within the 
operational definition of domestic violence because the relationship of 
'suspect' to 'victim' was not clearly stated, also illustrates the problematic 
nature of policing in cases where there is an allegation of rape. According 
to the details in the file the victim, who lived in a student hall of residence, 
initially told her room-mate about the rape. The incident then came to 
police attention. The physician who did the initial examination reported 
that she was in a state of shock and the attending police officers were 
unable to get a statement from her. It is noted in the file that the victim 
was "uncooperative" and further that "she has had a lot of mental 
problems brought about by this incident and previous sexual assaults by 
the same suspect over the last two years." The investigation of this crime 
took place over eight days. It involved the attention of at least three
335
Chapter Eight
A C©fflt(S(rT]ft AirallysD® ©f P© fc(§ FSDm  Rogsurdiinig D©m©©i© VIoloiniCG
police officers and three physicians including a qualified 'sexual offences 
police doctor'. The victim had, however, changed her clothes and bathed 
between the the time of the incident and the examinations and would only 
give limited co-operation. The findings of the physical examination were 
inconclusive and the incident was eventually no-crimed. Tragically, the 
victim was, apparently, not put in touch with any form of counselling 
service.
Examples of advice and referral in the Major Crime file are, in fact, 
rare. In these instances, where the criminal nature of the cases is not in 
doubt, police on the front line seem to forget the positive role that referral 
to other agencies can play. For example in cases two and five in Table 
Five, both of which ended in the arrest of the suspect, the victims were left 
with considerable damage to property in their homes as well as serious 
injuries. It appears from the files that no advice was forthcoming about 
insurance claims or possible restitution from the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Scheme.24 It seems that when advice and referral do not 
function as a way of filtering out cases they are easily forgotten.
While looking at the cases of 'domestic violence' in the Major Crime file . 
I decided to gather information of cases of interpersonal violence between 
non-intimates; essentially violence between persons who are not living in 
the same household and who do not have any kind of intimate 
relationship. In the month of March the police dealt with fourteen such 
cases, shown in the Table Six.25
As can been seen on the following page in Table Six, no-criming is not 
an infrequent an outcome for incidents of non-domestic interpersonal 
violence. Six of the fourteen cases in this table are no-crimed, the reason
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Incidents o f Interpersonal V iolence Between Strangers
____________________Holloway March 1988_________ Table Six_____
no. Allegation Cutcome Comments
1 GBH no crime Victim stabbed in the face with a broken 
bottle—failed to substantiate (VUSTA)
2 GBH no-crime Victim punched in the face over £ 5.00 
debt- VUSTA
3 assault/rape no-crime Took place in student residence. Brought 
to police attention by attending 
ohvsician -VUSTA
4 GBH no-crime Stabbing—victim failed to substantiate
5 GBH ABH apparent random act of violence, victim 
identified suspects when apprehended 
—Charged
6 GBH GBH Victim unable to supply details, attacked 
from behind.—no one charged
7 assault transferred Random act of violence
8
assault
indecent
assault
Common Woman ’man-handled’ by drur 
male 11:40 om.-susDect not aDDrehended
9 assault assault 4 year old girl assaulted in public park 
bv stranger. No witnesses. Not Dursued
10 serious
assault
Murder minicab driver stabbed in fare dispute— 
susDect aDDrehended and charged
11 GBH no-crime incident between friends/acquaintances. 
Victim received 5” cut to face. VUSTA
12 GBH no-crime fight between two I.C. 1 males over ’girl' 
VUSTA
13 GBH GBH IC 1. Male mid-20s attacked by group of 
IC 3 males. No witnesses. Matter not 
pursued.
14 ABH/
criminal
damage
GBH
Argument in DHSS office. Matter still 
under investigation, statement taken 
allegation pursued, Victim was office 
worker
being a failure to substantiate the original allegation by the victims of 
these crimes. In addition a number of other cases (examples six, eight, 
nine and thirteen) are laid to rest without an arrest. In these cases 
suspects could not be apprehended and no other witnesses to the crime 
could be found to further inquires so the files were closed. Unfortunately 
for the analysis, case number seven was transferred so it is impossible to 
follow it up. In two cases suspects were apprehended and charged, and
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finally in example fourteen the case was left open and the allegation was 
still being pursued when the field work had concluded.
The arrest rate for stranger violence is fairly low. The no-criming rate 
is almost 50% and many others were not pursued. Only two cases out of 
fourteen during the month of March resulted in arrests while one other 
remained open to question. What this table indicates is that law- 
enforcement, at least in cases of interpersonal violence, is most often 
devoted to devising ways of closing files when there is no possibility of 
charging a suspect.
'Family Violence1 and 'Other'
Domestic Calls
There were eight cases extracted from the Major Crime File which did 
not directly conform to the operational definition of domestic violence but 
fall within the ambit of a larger conception. In this file the larger 
definition includes new types of crime (incest, child sexual abuse), and also 
cases involving a high level of violence between persons not bound by a 
marital-type relationship. Of the eight cases in this section three were 
cases of incest/child sexual abuse, one was a case of rape which could not 
be properly classified under the operational definition, three cases of 
'family violence', and one case involved violence between flatmates.
The cases of incest/sexual abuse were all cleared up without criminal 
proceedings. Two of them were no-crimed and the other was classified as 
cleared-up. All three cases exhibit extensive communication between the 
police and social-services and were very time consuming investigations. 
In one of these cases the suspect was an eleven year old boy accused of 
inciting his step-sister into having sexual intercourse with him. This case
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had come to the attention of Social Services who had been informed by the 
mother. The boy was placed in voluntary care in a Children's Home and all 
of the children in the family were placed on the At Risk Register. In the 
second of these cases, also brought to the attention of police by Social 
Services, a father was accused of sexual abuse of a child. However, medical 
examination could not conclusively give "any positive evidence of sexual 
abuse" although there was "some evidence of interference in the genital 
area." The case was no-crimed for this reason. This means that it is a dead 
file as far as the police are concerned, however, all of this is contained on 
record should new evidence come to the attention of Social Services.
The third file is very extensive and reflects the complicated nature of 
this type of police investigation. It involves an accusation of incest by a 
teenage girl against her father which came to police attention through 
Social Services. The informant had made similar accusations previously 
which had not been substantiated. In this instance, she had told the social 
worker at the Children's Home she was staying in, that she did not wish to 
return home because her father had had a sex with her. She further 
claimed that her younger sister had been raped by her father.
The police officer attending the case was well aware of the informant's 
history and recorded in the file that he had reminded the case social 
worker that the informant had, on a previous occasion, claimed that she 
had been made pregnant by her father. According to the file, on this 
previous occasion she had refused any medical examination but, during the 
intervening period, it had become apparent that she was not, in fact, 
pregnant.
A medical examination was performed on the informant's sibling in 
order to determine if the accusation of rape was true. The examining
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physician confirmed that the girl's hymen was intact and that "no bruising 
or other injury was present in the vaginal area." The medical evidence 
was, according to the file, "entirely contrary to the allegation". Prior to 
taking action in relation to the allegation the officer assigned to the case 
attempted to interview the young informant but all he could obtain from 
her was a barrage of abusive language.
The incident was no-crimed due to "the past history of the informant 
and the medical evidence." The attending officer also recommended to the 
social worker involved that a Place of Safety Order not be made for the 
younger girl. In the file he records that his concern was that, should one 
be taken out, the girl would come under the influence of her elder sister 
and he did not consider this to be a desirable outcome.
All three cases involving charges of incest exhibit text-book 
thoroughness and co-operation between the Police and Social Services 
reflective of the official policy of these agencies to take these problems 
seriously. Social Services were compelled to involve the police in these 
instances, but it is not certain that the police contribution is a positive one. 
Indeed the victim in the case just discussed, indicated that she felt the 
police investigation to be a form of victimization itself and she did so in no 
uncertain terms.
In contrast to the cases involving possible sexual abuse of children the 
one dispute between "flat-mates" exhibits the, by now, recognizably typical 
police intervention in 'domestic cases'. The incident is between a female 
'suspect' and a male 'victim'. The report states that:
Apparently on the morning of the report as the 
result of a long standing dispute between these 
parties suspect approached victim with a large 
curved blade making threats. Victim decided to 
leave the venue. Suspect hurled a piece of pottery
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of indeterminate description at the suspect out the 
window. The piece of pottery struck the victim 
causing injury [deep cut to first toe in from Big Toe, 
also believed broken].
This injury has apparently been inflicted upon the 
victim as the climax to a long standing dispute 
between the two parties. The subject of the dispute 
is, apparently, the victim's brother and the suspect’s 
involvement with him. It may well be of note that 
the premises concerned in this report are a squat 
and the premises have been the venue for most of 
the dispute.
The incident was later no-crimed for the reason that the victim "was 
unwilling to attend court and give evidence." The police disposition in this 
case was no different from what would be expected in a similar case 
between co-habiting intimates.
Police dispositions in cases classed as Other Family Violence are no less 
typical but the incidents themselves are none-the-less interesting. In all 
three cases victims 'failed to substantiate the allegation1. However, this led 
to only two of the cases being no-crimed. The third case was recorded as 
an incidence of grievous bodily harm and put down as "record crime only", 
a novel classification, but with the same practical outcome.
This variation of book-keeping entry is interesting. In this instance 
the victim was the nephew of the suspect but he refused to give the police 
any particulars. The file is devoid of any concrete information. In fact, 
having mentioned this to police officers, it was pointed out to me that it 
may be the lack of information that prompted the attending officer to 
"record it as a crime only" rather than no-criming it. Thus, if the case has 
to be re-opened as a result of further instances of violence the attending 
officer could not be accused of neglect.
The second of these incidents involved a dispute between a father and 
son over domestic finances. The son in this case was thirty-seven years
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old and his father sixty-eight. In this instance the son had made specific 
threats to kill the father and mother, although, there were no injuries. The 
attending police officer spoke with both parties. Advice was given 
regarding civil remedies (told to contact the Citizens Advice Bureau and/or 
a solicitor). The file states that "both parties satisfied with action taken; 
both parties advised re: reoccurrence. No further action necessary." The 
case was no-crimed.
The record of the last of these 'family incidents' is complicated by the 
fact that three peoples statements were incorporated in the file 
incorporating conflicting views of what happened. The incident to which 
the police were called was a dispute between two brother-in-laws which 
was apparently sparked off after one of them physically abused his wife, 
the sister of the other, causing a cut to her head. The fight between the 
two men took the form of a running battle which continued over a period 
of about twenty minutes. When the police arrived the two men were 
engaged in armed combat; one of the combatants was armed with two 
cutlasses, the other with a "martial arts type weapon incorporating a 
blade". The victim, as per usual, was the one with the most injuries and, 
perhaps appropriately, was the one who had initially abused his wife. His 
injuries amounted to "three cuts to the left arm causing serious muscle 
damage (40 stitches to left arm) and cut to right hand requiring six 
stitches." The victim declined to pursue the matter in court and the 
incident was 'no-crimed'.
Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter we have seen the application of the general linguistic- 
authority-structure pertaining to the policing of interpersonal violence to
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110 incidents of 'domestic violence'. In addition we have also seen this 
discourse applied to various other kinds of calls for service, from minor 
disagreements between shop-keepers and their customers, to cases of 
serious violence between strangers. This should have clarified the more 
abstract discussion in the previous chapter. In addition I hope that the 
reader will have gained some insight into the complicated nature of 
domestic violence. The 'reality' that is summarized by this abstract 
analytical category is by no means clear cut and straightforward.
But this is not an abstract philosophical exercise. Some concrete and 
important observations were made which have implications for police 
practice in this area. The more general of these is that the police brief, as 
it is circumscribed by the linguistic-authority-structure of the policing of 
interpersonal violence, is very narrow. This has implications for what its 
application can be expected to deliver. Given the narrow focus on order 
maintenance and the classification of 'incidents' into the categories of crime 
it seems that police intervention is, most often, unlikely to change the 
circumstances which produced the violence in the first instance.
Another practical finding from this data is that police officers must be . 
very careful that the application of the police discourse does not result in a 
form of secondary victimization. This is particularly the case with 
instances of rape or forced sexual intercourse where the focus on gathering 
evidence in order to apprehend a suspect may only be of secondary 
importance to victims. However, this is not only true for rape. In 
instances of GBH the practices of policing are also directed towards 
apprehension of the suspect and in such instances advice to victims, for 
example regarding insurance claims or the Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Scheme, is not forth coming. The content analysis of these files,
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particularly the Beat Crime file, reveals that 'advice' more often functions 
as a way to exit cases from the system when they are not going to result in 
an arrest than as a component in police service delivery to victims. The 
fact that the phrase 'advice given' is virtually ubiquitous in the Occurrence 
Book file and almost non-existent in the Major Crime file is evidence of this 
tendency. Giving appropriate advice to victims of serious crime, even 
when they do not proceed with criminal charges, putting them in touch 
with agencies which can help is essential. However, we saw in the Major 
Crime file instances of rape where no such advice was forthcoming, 
although, to be fair, one case which did not result in a prosecution did 
result in referrals to other agencies. The content analysis of these files 
reveals that police practice with regard to these 'social service' duties is far 
from standard. It also shows the potential for the police response to 
become a form of secondary victimization. Where there is evidently a 
problem involving some degree of violence and the version of events of a 
powerless, or less powerful, person is not, or cannot be validated within 
the confines of police discursive practices the usual police response is to 
exit the case from the system. This may be experienced as another facet of 
the victimization of the less powerful.26
However, this should not be construed as an argument for the 
criminalization of domestic violence. In this context, consider the few 
examples of 'family violence' within extended families of non-English 
origin. These are very complicated situations and the feelings of the 
individuals involved may not correspond to the interpretation placed on 
events within the dominant English culture. To argue for criminalization in 
these instances is not only ethnocentric it may create potentially disastrous 
circumstances, not only at the micro level where police officers are
344
Chapter Eight
A C©ffltt(SGn)tt A m l y s l s  ©f F©Qo©© F o ls©  R e g s iird i in ig  D o in n io s tllc  ¥ i© lsin i© ©
expected to intervene, but also at a higher political level where charges of 
racist practice may be leveled at the police institution as a whole.
One of the major lessons of this, and the preceding chapter is that so 
called domestic violence is a very complex social phenomenon. Indeed 
every instance which the police institution (or indeed social scientists) may 
classify as a case or incident of domestic violence is unique. As such we 
cannot pretend that there is a simple solution to the problem. In order for 
front line police officers to be able to adequately respond to the unique 
aspects of each individual case what is required is a wide brief that is able 
to take account of many factors which are not always predictable. 
However, the opposite is the case and front line police officers operate 
within the confines of a very narrow brief. The linguistic-authority- 
structure of the policing of inter personal violence obscures more about 
individual instances of domestic violence than it is allowed to illuminate. 
This effectively prevents officers from addressing the situation in many, if 
not most, instances in a way interpretable as appropriate by other social 
actors.
The problem, from the perspective of police management, is that . 
arguing for a widening of the police brief effectively eliminates any 
possibility of assessing and evaluating 'police effectiveness'. It also creates 
the space for undesirable outcomes to be hidden by both individuals and 
the organization. The alternative to widening the police brief is to argue 
that other agencies should step into the breach. In this regard, the most 
obvious choice would be the women's refuges. Unfortunately, these 
services are few and far between. The irony is that as the police began to 
take domestic violence seriously the articulation of a refuge based 
response to the problem was eclipsed. In the concluding chapter I will
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reconsider this paradox in the context of the British situation at the end of 
the 1980s. Prior to that, I wish to I wish to pick up the threads of the 
discourse in the North American context.
1 All names and addresses in these accounts have been changed.
2 McCabe S. and Sutcliffe F. Defining Crime. Oxford Centre for Criminological Research, Basil 
Blackwell 1978
3 The sensitivity with which individual officers may approach this aspect of dealing with 
domestics has been remarked to me by police researchers and police officers alike. Some 
officers spend a good deal of time 'counselling' the couple and getting them to 'talk out their 
differences'. Such officers will do the best they can in the circumstances regardless of the 
official force policy. Some police researchers have taken, as their mode of analysis, the 
development of typologies for describing the police officer's working personality. Examples of 
this type of analysis can be found in: Muir, W.K. Police. Streetcorner Politicans Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press 1977 and in Reiner R. The Blue-Coated Worker. Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press © 1978. In Muir's work, police officers' use of coercive power (and 
its corollary, 'negotiation') provides the focus of the study, and a four fold typology is 
developed to describe the adaptations to police work. I stress that my own study is not so much 
to assess what individual officers do when they encounter a 'domestic situation', nor is it 
intended to develop such a descriptive typology. Rather, what I am focusing on is the 
institutionalized police response for domestic violence calls. The question for me is: can there 
be such an institutionalized police response to violence against wives that substantially alters 
the situation for the victims benefit?
4 Richard Ericson has also examined policing in these instances pointing out that "decisions on 
whether or not to record a complaint, decisions on whether or not to charge and what to charge 
for are framed within the context of the dispute and organizational expectations about how a 
dispute is to be handled. Who are the disputants? What are their claims? Is invocation of the 
criminal law an appropriate way to reproduce order? Is there an appropriate criminal law that 
is usable? Can invocation of the law be justified to police supervisory officers? Can invocation 
of the law be justified to the crown attorney?...actions are framed, and ultimately bound, by the 
need to tailor conceptions of justice to the available justifications." See Richard V. Ericson 
Reproducing Order: A study of Police Patrol Work. University of Toronto Press, Toronto © 1982 
Ericson also points out that when victims can give accurate information about the perpetrator of 
a crime it is more likely to be 'resolved'. While all of this is no doubt true, such an account 
leaves out the interpretations of the victim and suspect. In this example we can see that the 
injuries were substantial enough to class as an ABH giving ample justification for recording it 
as a crime. However, the incident was 'resolved' by being 'down-crimed' and recorded only in 
an IRB, apparently following the wishes of the victim. When the incident was reclassified three 
days later the objective details of the crime had not changed, nor was there a need by police 
officers to 'reproduce order', rather, the woman involved made the decision to facilitate the 
processing of the incident by becoming a 'victim' and thereby allowing the other categories of 
the linguistic-authority-structure for policing interpersonal violence to be logically applied.
5 Maurice Punch has remarked on cases concerning 'private squabbles' which have got out of 
hand "whereby one or both of the parties is emotionally worked up." Punch became very
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attuned to the police perceptions during six months of intensive field observation and some of 
his comments exemplify the police view of these calls for service. With regard to 'interpersonal 
disputes' he has commented that "these disturbances arise from unusually long-standing 
differences of opinion which suddenly escalate and lead to a police presence. They symbolize 
the inability of some people to solve their own frictions and problems which, for some reason, 
move from the private to the public sphere." Punch M. Policing the Inner Citv: A study of 
Amsterdam's Warmoesstraat. London Macmillian Press Ltd. © 1979 pg.137
6 See M.S. Pike The Principles of Policing published by Macmillian Press Ltd. London © 1985 
in which he discusses both moral principles.
7 It might be objected here that since there was no violence, nor was the threat of violence 
recorded, that this case is not one of 'domestic violence'. Instances like this one inhabit a grey 
area which cannot be comfortably assigned to the 'domestic violence' category, however, given 
that intimidation was used it is technically possible to take note of 'psychological harm' which 
would enable the attending officer to class this incident as ABH.
8 Parsloe, S. 'Battered by men and bruised by the law', in The Law Magazine. Sept. 4, 1987
9 R. Grimshaw and T Jefferson Interpreting Police Work Policy and Practice in Forms of Beat 
Policing © Grimshaw and Jefferson 1987 published by Allen and Unwin London
10 The Metropolitan Police; The Principles of Policing and Guidance for Professional Behaviour. 
©1985
11 'No-criming' has also been objected to for rather different reasons. Both Sandra Horley and 
Susan Edwards, for example, have made the case that 'no criming', as a result of the victim being 
unwilling (or unable) to pursue the allegation of assault, is simply adding the burden of 
pursuing a prosecution to an already long list of troubles that a victim of domestic violence 
must deal with. According to this logic the use of the compellability clause (sec 80) of the 
PACE in these instances would spare the victim this agony. Further, these advocates contend 
that the practice of 'no-criming' as it is currently constructed contributes to a subtle form of 
'victim blaming' by which women who do not demand immediate arrest and agree to pursue 
prosecution through its lengthy process are seen to be sanctioning their maltreatment and are 
thus deemed undeserving of attention. This reasoning has lead both women to campaign against 
the police practice of 'no-criming' and for the criminalization of domestic violence.
12 See: N. Johnson 'The Police, social work and medical responses to battered women* , in Marital 
Violence , N.Johnson ed. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London © 1985
13 Sanders, A. 'Prosecuting Domestic and Non-Domestic Violence' Unpublished paper presented 
at the Oxford Centre for Criminological Research Nov. 1987
14 See: Faragher T. 'The Police Response to Domestic Violence Against Women in the Home' in 
Private Violence and Public Policy J, Pahl ed. Routledge and Kegan Paul © 1985
15 ibid. Pike The Principles of Policing © 1985
16 Radford J. 'Policing Male Violence Policing Women' in Women Violence and Social Control I. 
Hanmer and M Maynard Eds. Macmillian Press London © 1987
17 See S.S.M. Edwards 'Provoking her own Demise; from common assault to homicide' in Women 
Violence and Social Control J, Hanmer and M Maynard Eds. Macmillian Press London © 1987
18 In these instances the 'victim' is usually the one with the worst injuries.
19 One of these cases, which was transferred to the British Transport Police, involved a woman 
who was attacked and 'punched in the face and stomach' by a man on a Tube Station platform.
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The file records that the alleged assailant was known to the victim; "he is the man who raped 
her." Unfortunately this information cannot be followed-up because the case was transferred to 
another jurisdiction. The second 'unclassifiable1 case began with a simple domestic dispute 
between a husband and wife. Having attended the venue and finding everything calm the police 
left where upon the dispute flared up again. This prompted the downstairs neighbour to 
intervene punching the abusive husband in the face causing the loss of six teeth.
20 Deborah Cameron and Elizabeth Frazer point out that in cases of sexual violence, and indeed 
violence more generally, questions should not be focused purely on the nature of victims; what 
is in need of explanation is why the perpetrators of such violence are almost universally men. 
D. Cameron and E. Frazer The Lust to Kill, Polity Press, Cambridge © 1987.
21 McCabe S. and Sutcliffe F. Defining Crime Basil Blackwell Oxford, © 1978
22 Clearly the police are not the only people who see marriage relationships and marriage-like
relationships as important and pursue avenues intended to "patch things up". Sandra Horley, 
director of Chiswick Family Rescue, has recognized the problems that being 'in love' may create 
for women dealing with partners who beat them up. See: Love and Pain: A Survival Handbook for 
Women Bedford Square Press © 1988
23 This technique was explained to me by several officers. Another example of this kind of 
book-keeping was used to illustrate the point. Given a case of one person breaking into five 
Parking Meters; if you have a body it is five separate crimes recorded as five crimes 'cleared- 
up1, if you do not have a body it is one crime and only one crime 'not cleared'.
24 It has been noted by some researchers that there are few women taking advantage of the
provisions under this scheme. These remedies been criticized for reasserting "the central role 
of the police and the criminal process in the provision of remedies for the victims of family 
violence." M. Wasik 'Criminal Injuries Compensation and family violence', Journal of Social 
Welfare Law, 1983 pg. 100-108. It would seem that part of the problem with centralizing such 
provisions in the hands of the criminal justice system is that their agents (principally the 
police) forget to inform 'victims' of their ability to claim and pursue single-mindedly the ends 
of the criminal justice system.
25 I draw the readers attention to the 'identity codes' included in this table. I.C. is an acronym 
for 'identity code' a police euphemism for 'race'. There are six 'identity-code' numbers: 
l)W hite, 2)Dark skinned Europeans, 3)Negroid types, 4) Indian or Pakistani types, 
5)Chinese/Japanese types, and 6) Arabian/Egyptian types. This information is collected 
regarding all victims and suspects recorded in crime report forms.
26 An excellent discussion of secondary victimization from an explicitly feminist stand-point is 
contained in: Stanko E.A. Intimate Intrusions; Women's Experience of Male Violence' Routledge 
and Kegan Paul London and New York© 1985
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Be on my side, I'll be on your side There is no reason for you to hide It's so hard for me stayin’ here all alone When you could be takin' me for a ride You take my hand I'll take your hand Together we may get away This much madness is too much sorrow Its impossible to make it today
Down by the river I shot my baby Shot her dead
Neil Young
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Introduction
A Ph.D. thesis, seeks closure. Firmly grounded in the Aristotelean 
tradition of beginnings, middles, and ends, it seeks to enclose knowledge; 
to create a package of facts neatly wrapped it a tight argument; to offer the 
definitive version with a definite conclusion. To paraphrase the American 
philosopher Will Durant, such an approach lacks that Heraclitean sense of 
flux which justifies the conservative in believing that all permanent 
change is gradual, and justifies the radical in believing that no 
changelessness is permanent. Most Ph.D. theses in the discipline of 
Sociology seek to cast in iron the definitive version of a history, a process 
or social phenomenon . . .  but rust never sleeps.
In the remaining two chapters of this book I would like to pick up the 
threads of discourse where they were left in the mid-1980s and, by so 
doing, offer some indication of the developing trends. Many lines of 
articulation have been traced herein and many continue. What I will do 
here is review the salient developments of the discourses on 'domestic 
violence1 as the 1990s dawned. This is not intended as an exercise in 
prophesy. It is impossible to say what might constitute a new path of 
development and what may become a blind alley. Moreover, one cannot 
avoid missing what the historian, with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, can 
make seem so self-evident. Be that as it may, it is possible to identify the 
major platforms from which the issue was articulated at the end of the 
1980s and indicate the trajectories along which those lines of argument 
were aimed.
Some of those platforms will be familiar to the reader by now. The 
infrastructure of refuges that once bore the grand title of 'the Battered 
Women’s Movement' warrants attention. Developments in the social
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scientific enterprise remained salient throughout the period, especially 
with regard to the international trade in 'facts'. Police managers and 
researchers, who also trade 'facts' internationally, continued to exert some 
influence on the discussion, as did spokesmen emerging from a 
psychoanalytic tradition. The later, who were late arrivals on the scene, 
came with their own version of what needed doing and their plans to 
counsel men who batter did not always meet with approval. Also, in the 
British context, ethnic minority women developed their own constituency 
considerably in the late 1980s and produced their own version of the facts 
relating to the problem. All of these versions of the discourse continued to 
contribute to the historical development of the issue and laid the 
foundations for what was to come.
In this chapter I will concentrate on the North A m e r i c a n  
developments at the end of the 1980s with particular attention to the 
social scientific discourses. Some indication of the the status of refuge 
provision will also be provided, as will a discussion of the relevant 
developments in policing. The following chapter will be concerned with 
developments in the British context which, as before, fed off and built on 
North American ideas.
North American Social Scientific 
articulations of the issue of 
'domestic violence' - a new decade
Social scientific inquiry into the social problem of violence within the 
family unit developed in leaps and bounds since the (re)-discovery of the 
issue. Prior to this discovery of wife battery by the women's movement, 
circa 1970, there was relatively little in the way of scientific inquiry into 
the problem and what little there was tended to be in the psychological
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literature on 'pathological relationships'. It has been noted elsewhere that, 
in the United States, the early 1970s saw a great deal of publicity in the 
general media with popular magazines as diverse as: Time , Ms. , Rolling 
Stone, and Good Housekeeping all carrying articles about the issue.1 It is 
therefore something of a watershed when the Family Research Laboratory 
was established at the University of New Hampshire in 1975, one year 
before Del Martin's ground breaking book Battered Wives .
The work of Murray Straus and others associated with the Laboratory 
was best known for the introduction of the measurement tool known as 
the Conflict Tactics Scale.2 Efforts by these social scientists to quantify and 
measure incidents of 'family violence' included two National Family 
Violence Surveys conducted in 1975 and 1985, as well as on-going analysis 
of official statistics. In addition, the associates of the Laboratory conducted 
a number of local family violence surveys, longitudinal panel studies and 
in depth interviews with victims of violence within the home. Efforts to 
theorize from those measurements also continued apace. To date, Family 
Research Laboratory staff members collectively boast more than two dozen 
published books, one hundred and fifty journal articles and a virtually un­
countable number of articles in more popular forums. In addition the 
Laboratory hosted national conferences on family violence in 1981, 1984 
and 1987.3
Obviously, such a large body of work cannot be reviewed here. In 
truth it is somewhat difficult to summarize because the brief taken by the 
institution has been widened to include many aspects of 'family violence', 
including wife battery, child abuse, child sexual abuse, elderly abuse, 
dating violence, date rape, marital rape, violence between siblings, 
parental abductions and missing children. Straus and his colleagues
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support a "holistic view of family violence" and are "concerned with the 
interconnections and interrelations of various types of family violence". 
Some of their findings are as follows:
- 'abuse' can be generationally transm itted. Family 
Research Laboratory studies have shown that m en 
who beat their wives are more likely to have 
witnessed or experienced violence as children.
- victims of one kind of abuse are more vulnerable to 
other kinds of abuse, ie. women who are sexually 
abused as children are more likely to be abused as 
adults.
- the elderly are more frequently abused by spousal 
partners than 'care givers' 4
This research did not always achieve harmony with feminist concerns, 
although Straus, on occasion, referred to his work as such. A prime 
example of discordance were findings from the National Family Violence 
Surveys conducted in 1975 and 1985 which revealed a high percentage of 
assaults by wives on husbands. At one point Straus shied away from these 
findings stating that such assaults were conducted largely in self-defence.5 
However, as the 1980s progressed Family Research Laboratory researchers 
began to outline a somewhat different formulation. Straus and his 
colleagues began to argue that reduction of the high incidence of "minor" 
and "often ritualistic" assaults by women could "help prevent the severe 
assaults known as wife beating."6 Straus tried to minimize the affront to 
feminist colleagues by insisting that the first priority in primary 
prevention was to empower women. According to him steps to attain 
equality between men and women in the economy, the family, politics and 
other spheres of society, as well as eliminating the use of physical 
punishment in child rearing, were all called for. Ultimately what was
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viewed as necessary was to change male attitudes and behaviour about 
power and violence in the family. However, he also argued that, important 
as these steps were, they
are not sufficient because they do not address the 
implicit norm s to lerating  violence within the 
family by both men and women. Consequently, 
efforts to reduce the severe assaults which the 
public calls "wife beating" must also attend to the 
norms tolerating "minor violence" by both wives 
and husbands because these are part of the etiology 
of wife beating and spouse homicide.7
Prescriptions given by the Laboratory also included the abolition of 
physical punishment (ie. spanking) of children by parents. According to 
the experts at the Family Research Laboratory, spanking children increases 
the probability that they will become deviant, not only as adolescents, but 
also, that their deviance would continue into adulthood. According to these 
social scientists, wife-beating, child abuse and crime outside the family, 
such as assault and homicide, statistically correlate with the experience of 
physical punishment during childhood. The theory propounded by Straus 
and his colleagues suggested that "one of the steps needed to create a 
society with a minimum of crime and violence is for parents to avoid all 
use of physical punishment."8
Another of the interesting contributions of the New Hampshire School 
was their comparison of homicide rates from several countries. They 
noted, initially, that the percentage of homicides in which the victim and 
assailant are members of the same family varied widely between different 
countries. Comparisons between the United States, Denmark and Canada 
led to the discovery that, the lower the homicide rate overall the higher 
the percentage of homicides that are within families. According to their
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analysis, this finding also held in comparisons between American states. 
The data produced suggested that the family is an inherently violent 
institution and further, that males are the most frequent perpetrators of 
that violence. However, these researchers shied away from the drastic 
conclusions made by advocates for battered women in the 1970s; they 
made no argument for the dissolution of the ’patriarchal1 family, nor was 
there any explicit interest shown in refuge provision. At the same time, it 
was shown that violence within families, as exemplified by the homicide 
rate, was a characteristic of the family itself and not a phenomenon 
brought about by external structural factors. It was argued that:
The findings should not be taken to mean that 
poverty, urbanization, racism, violent subcultural 
group norms, and social disorganization have no 
effect on intra-family homicide; only that these 
characteristics have less effect, or less im m ediate  
effect, on family homicides, and probably must be 
examined in interaction with familial v a riab les .
Putting it another way, policies in tended  as 
'p rim ary  prevention of intra-family h o m ic id e , 
while they  cannot ignore the m ore general 
structural causes of homicide, must also address 
variables such as stress which seem to have a n  
especially im portant relationships to hom ic ides 
within the family . . . even in a society w h i c h  
succeeds in reducing the effect of the general socio­
cultu ral factors and in virtually e l i m i n a t i n g  
homicide, the relatively few remaining cases will 
tend to be within-family.
The idea of controlling 'stress’ within the family and between family 
members is an idea associated with counselling programs for men who 
batter which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. What is 
interesting to note here is that the efforts of social scientists could produce 
empirical evidence to validate part of the original thesis of the battered
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women's movement, that being: that the family unit is an inherently  
dangerous place for women.
As the 1980s entered its final quarter, it became very difficult, to 
distinguish, on an institutional basis, feminist approaches to the problem 
from purely social scientific ones. While social scientists like Straus did, at 
times, refer to their work as feminist, occasioning confusion, more 
confusing still were feminists formally attached to the New Hampshire 
School who challenged the hegemony of the School's paradigm. Both Kersti 
Yllo's and Michele Bograd's work are examples of this.9 Yllo argued 
elsewhere for a feminist methodological approach to studying wife abuse. 
She made the point that:
. . . virtually everyone who studies wife abuse and 
other violence against women wants to see an end to 
such abuse, we might regard all of this work as 
feminist in some sense. However, this is clearly not 
the case. Leaving aside the openly anti-wom an 
analyses of wife battering (usually provided by 
psychoanalysts), we see extensive research by non­
feminists (though not necessarily anti-fem inists), 
most of whom focus on families and wife abuse as 
part of that system of interaction. Since much of 
this work does not take gender or power into 
account as central factors, the focus is not feminist.
Further, methods used (usually quantitative surveys 
or psychological tests) have been questioned as 
patriarchal. 19
Yllo attempted to provide criteria for distinguishing between 'feminist' 
and 'non-feminist' (or 'anti-feminist') discussions of wife assault by 
distinguishing between the conceptual categories put into operation. By 
advocating the use of concepts like 'power' her analysis contained a veiled 
criticism of the New Hampshire School. At the same time, she also hinted 
that the use of purely quantitative measures could be considered at least 
suspect. Again, this was a somewhat veiled criticism of the Family
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Research Laboratory which was most distinguished for its quantitative 
research.
The distinctions made by Yllo were put somewhat differently by other 
(male) social scientists. For example, the work of the New Hampshire 
School was also attacked, from a ’feminist stand-point', in the work of some 
’left realist criminologists'. This critique was congruent with Ylld's 
assertion that the concepts of 'power' and, in particular, 'gender' were to be 
considered essential for a proper understanding of the problem of what 
was variously referred to as 'Woman Abuse' or 'Wife Abuse'. However, the 
work of the 'realists' did not eschew quantitative methodologies and its 
proponents actively employed survey research technology.11
The issue was not one of institutional affiliation since many of the New 
Hampshire School's critics had some tentative connection with that 
institution or occupied similar positions at similar institutions and carried 
out a similar kind of social science. Rather, the debate was more a 
question of the efficacy of employing this or that analytical category; those 
most often considered appropriate for a feminist analysis being the 'gender 
dimensions’ of 'power'. According to this reasoning 'non-feminist' analysis 
or, worse still, 'anti-feminist' analysis, was exemplified by gender neutral 
categories such as 'family violence’. It could be said that, at the end of the 
1980s, the dominant paradigm of the Family Research Laboratory had 
developed a Hegelian tendency.
The way these debates were drawn up it would seem that what was 
often seen to be at stake was the words themselves. The confusion of this 
war of words is evident in Richard Gelles’ version of the history. Gelles' 
The Violent Home was originally published as a monograph at the height of 
public awareness of the Battered Women's Movement.12 It was r e
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published in 1987, and in the preface to the updated edition, Gelles argued 
that his main contribution in the mid-1970s, apart from demonstrating 
"that researchers could overcome the obstacles of studying sensitive and 
taboo family topics" was that his study "represented the first theoretical 
effort in the study of wife abuse to offer an explanation not based on the 
mental illness of either the offender or the victim." According to him, 
"those who followed were not bogged down (as were those who studied 
child abuse) by myths that described wife abuse as rare and caused 
primarily by the offender’s mental illness or psychological problems"13 
Gelles went on to joust with his old foes Rebecca and Russell Dobash "who 
thought that the theoretical perspective in The Violent Home did not go 
far enough." Gelles vigorously defended his categories, terms like: 'spouse 
abuse', 'domestic violence' and 'family violence'. He saw the debate as 
"between those who explain spouse abuse as a function of the patriarchy 
vs. those who take a more traditional middle-range theory, [and a] rigorous 
methodological approach."14 The concepts of'gender', 'power' and 
'patriarchy' were certainly integral to the Dobashs' work but, in the latter 
half of the 1980s Yllo, Bograd and the 'left realists' had also begun to 
operate within this conceptual framework. The attack that Gelles 
ostensibly aimed at the Dobashs in 1987 rebounded on the new critics of 
the New Hampshire School.
There were important differences between these first and second 
wave feminist social scientists however. Gelles could not easily take to 
task the Young Hegelians for methodological imprecision, since many of 
them employed sophisticated quantitative measures of the kind he 
favoured. Throughout the 1980s he had accused the Dobashs of precisely 
such imprecision, although at times, it seemed that what Gelles was really
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criticizing was not the theory or the methodology but their advocacy of 
primary resource allocation for the women victims of violent men. The 
Dobashs advocacy for battered women and their active connections with 
Women's Refuges at that time certainly put Gelles' objectivity in a different 
light.
In truth, what was missing from Gelles' 1987 account of the early 
years is the role that the 'Women's Movement' played in defining the 
problem. While the war of words was waged, sometimes with great fire, 
what was most at stake was the establishment of an infrastructure of 
support for women victims of violent men. In those early days 
spokespersons who had the Women's Refuge as their institutional 
allegiance were seen to be in opposition to those who spoke from a purely 
social scientific institutional stand point.
By the end of the 1980s these issues of institutional affiliation did not 
appear as central. This is reflected in the growing paucity of information 
about refuges and their provision in the American literature. Indeed, at 
the end of the decade the most up to date list of refuges and other 
institutional support networks for women victims of violent men in the 
USA (at least, that has come to my attention) remained an appendix 
contained in Costa's 1983 volume on legislation, reporting and 
prevention.15 The major contributions to the public debate in the late 
1980s did not contain information of this kind. Further, when the 
contributions of refuges and other practical feminist interventions are 
mentioned, it is a passing note.16 Not surprising in this respect is the 
volume Coping with Family Violence; Research and Policy Perspectives 
which is a contribution of the New Hampshire Laboratory.17 Examining the 
Table of Contents of this book one is struck by the fact that there is only
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one contribution out of the twenty-one essays which considers Battered 
Women's Shelters at all, and then it is confined to an assessment of its 
'psycho-social impact' on victims. In contrast there are four contributions 
which consider the use of the criminal justice system in providing 
'protection' and two essays on 'treatment' for men who batter. With 
respect to violence against wives, over all, the themes expressed in this 
book do not advocate the perspective of the victim, rather, the ir 
perspective is evaluated. The weight of attention is focused on institutions 
which are not feminist in and of themselves, that is, the institutions 
focused on are not, primarily, services for battered women. Instead, great 
stress is placed on revamping criminal justice and medical interventions 
into the problem.
Feminist discussion also tended to focus attention on other issues, de­
emphasizing shelters and other primary resources for victims. Looking at 
the table of contents in Feminist Perspectives on Wife Abuse it is evident 
that refuges are not the primary consideration. There are two essays 
which consider refuges and the 'Battered Women's Movement' explicitly. 
The remainder fall under the rubric of psychological approaches to 
'treatment'; social science approaches to research on violence in the family 
(from a feminist perspective); or the more general question of feminist 
politics in relation to research in the area.
Central to Feminist Perspectives was "challenging taken-for-granted 
conceptual categories and stereotypes."18 However, a new tack was also 
developed in that volume. Approaches to the problem based in clinical 
psychology, particularly feminist or pro-feminist approaches to counselling 
men who batter, were a primary concern. James Ptacek's account of 
interviews with eighteen wife beaters is illuminating in this respect, both
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in terms of how it felt to be a researcher talking with men about such a 
sensitive subject and in terms of exposing the mental gymnastics that 
violent men are capable of in justifying, excusing and neutralizing then- 
own violence. Ptacek drew on Habermas' distinction between individual 
rationalizations and collective interests paraphrasing him to the extent 
that:
From everyday experience we know that ideas serve 
often enough to furnish our actions with justifying 
motives in place of the real ones. What is called 
rationalization at this level is called ideology at the 
level of collective action.10
From this perspective Ptacek could argue that "clinical and criminal 
justice responses to battering are revealed as ideological in the light of 
their collusion with batterers' rationalizations."20 According to Ptacek's 
analysis, when "police officers and judges encounter batterers, a mutual 
validation of victim-blaming and minimization occurs." Further, "while 
reform is proceeding among the various levels of the criminal justice 
system, an acceptance of batterers' rationalizations for their violence 
remains commonplace."21 He argued for what he called a 'critical social 
psychology' which would reveal "the class-specific forms of male 
entitlement, male anger, male subjectivity, and misogyny" from which "the 
resulting portrait of male domination becomes more difficult to deny."22 
The question is: which institution would buy that portrait?
One way of beginning to answer this question is to point out that 
virtually all of the federal funding for programmes cited as useful in 
effecting change in the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights report The Federal 
Response to Domestic Violence (see Chapter Three) were eliminated before 
the report was published.23 In particular, strong opposition from
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politicians kept federal funding for women’s shelters at a minimum. 
Senator Jesse Helms had set the tone of debate early in the decade when 
he argued against any federal funding for domestic violence shelters 
because they constituted "social engineering" which eliminated the 
husband as the "head of the family".24
Susan Schechter’s contribution to Feminist Perspectives entitled 
Building Bridges Between Activists, Professionals and Researchers offers a 
consise version of the history of the Women’s Shelter Movement in the 
U.S.. Her point of departure is the importance of the strategy of refuge 
provision to the public account of ’battered women’. She argued that - 
after years of painstaking lobbying by women activists - professionals, 
researchers and government officials had begun to take the refuges 
seriously. But, the recognition was bought at a price and Schechter went 
on to say that she was worried that official recognition had transformed 
the issues raised by grassroots women. Her specific concern was the 
professionalization of shelter provision. She pointed to the falling number 
of women working in shelters on a voluntary basis, the increased use of 
paid social workers and above all by the reconceptualization of ’battered 
women’ as 'clients'. According to her:
greater attention was paid to the individual woman's 
counseling needs and less to group sharing, peer 
support and teaching battered women to advocate 
for one another.25
She pointed out that the directors of most battered women's programs 
were hired from the ranks of the legal and social work professions and, 
further, that the movement leadership itself had been subtly transformed. 
According to her, "imperceptibly staff lost their connection to a movement
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in the process of learning their complicated jobs and becoming experts.”26 
This tendency was opposed by grassroots feminists who "assert that a 
movement is necessary to end violence against women, to keep the energy 
and anger of shelters alive, and to remind the government and men that a 
collective power is watching.27 However, given the conservative politics of 
the 1980s in which the "federal government has been intent on restoring 
the traditional male-dominated family, slashing social welfare programs, 
and redistributing wealth upwardly", it was not clear that shelters could 
remain an institutional basis for an autonomous battered women's 
movement.
According to Schechter, that outcome was still not clear at the end of 
the decade. She reported that in many parts of the U.S. in the late 1980s 
battered women had united in "task forces, frequently connected to 
statewide battered women's coalitions" providing a structure for them to 
"make demands on shelters and community institutions." She went on to 
say that "by uniting battered women can no longer be tokenized" and that 
they could "demand accountability from shelters and community 
organizations."28 If refuges had to be be lobbied by battered women's task 
forces it would seem that Women's Shelters no longer provided 
unequivocal support for them, rather, they had become an institutional 
barrier in opposition to them.
Schechter pointed out that much research had been "indifferent, if not 
hostile" towards battered women and that many social scientists acted in 
an opportunistic fashion, plundering data without care or concern for 
women victims of violent men. Although she refrained from naming 
names, she pointed to the "resurgence of social theories that blame 
battered women for the abuse they endure or assert that gender is
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irrelevant to the study of family violence and to the design of intervention 
strategies." According to her battered women's activists were in a position 
to offer researchers "sophisticated and intellectually rich questions" if only 
social scientists would "acknowledge that battered women and their 
advocates are experts about violence."29 By overcoming the "outworn 
accusations that activists are all anti-intellectual and that researchers all 
opportunists", by building bridges, Schechter hoped to build a new 
improved movement based on 'mutual trust' between activists, researchers 
and professionals "so that battered women, and all women, can be 
empowered."
The difference between the postion articulated by Schechter and her 
contemporaries in the late 1980s and the earlier position of the Dobashs 
seems clear. The Dobashs produced social scientific knowledge during a 
period when the refuge movement rode the crest of a wave. A decade 
later that wave had begun to ebb and the job for social scientists 
supporting shelter provision had changed. The emergent picture was that 
social science could no longer be the vanguard of the shelter movement, 
since the movement had slowly evaporated in the daily grind. Instead, 
social scientists and other professionals, had become medics responsible 
for nursing a wounded discourse, a discourse based on refuge provision.
Murray Straus had come to a slightly different conclusion in Coping 
with Family Violence . His view was that work of the Family Research 
Laboratory was:
illustrative of an im portant facet about the field of 
family violence: there  is a high level of
in te rd ep en d en cy  and  coopera tion  b e tw e e n  
researchers, p ractitioners and advocates. The 
relationships are not always congenial and views 
are not always identical. But more so than in many 
other fields of social science and social welfare
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there is an active partnership. This p a r tn e rsh ip  
bodes well for future breakthroughs in our efforts 
to respond more effectively and compassionatly to 
this painful social problem.3 0
Examining the successes of the partnership Straus referred to, it is 
evident that the initial discourse of battered women's advocates had been 
translated. The relative weight placed on the importance of refuge 
provision shifted away towards new concerns. In its place we find 
programmes for men who batter: 'treatment'. We also find treatment 
used with reference to battered women and in place of the provision of 
safe housing for women victims of violent men, attempts (usually 
successful) to involve the criminal justice system in 'protection'. Thus 
'treatment' could be linked with a strategy of 'criminalization', 'arrest' and 
'deterrence'. This is the consolidation of an altogether different paradigm 
from the initial project of the Erin Pizzeys and Betsy Warriors. This 
translation of the issue again eclipsed a discourse based on the 
empowerment of women victims of violent men through their active 
participation in the battered women's movement, offering instead 
'protection' and 'treatment'.
This shift of emphasis is very clear in The Domestic Assault o f Women 
- Psychological and Criminal Justice Perspectives in which Donald Dutton 
argued, cautiously, for a combination of psychological and criminal justice 
interventions and cited studies which purported to show the deterrence 
value of such an approach.31 Drawing on data he had collected in 
Vancouver British Columbia, he argued that incarceration for first time 
offenders in wife assault cases was extremely rare and that channeling 
such offenders, via arrest procedures, into treatment groups was not 
inappropriate. One of his findings was that "men in [court mandated]
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treatment rated the actual court appearance as the most severe event that 
happened to them". He argued, further, that since the widespread 
existence of court mandated treatment programs meant that police would 
be more likely to arrest and courts more likely to pass sentence it was 
necessary to expand treatment provision.
The evidence upon which he based his argument suggested that the 
prevention of recurrent violence was most strong when assailants 
experienced the triad of arrest, conviction and treatment. He cited a 
battery of studies which supported such a conclusion, including the work 
of Jaffe et al discussed in Chapter Four.32 According to Dutton, his own 
position was a middle path between those of the 'family systems theory' 
offered by the Family Research Laboratory, and 'feminist perspectives', 
both of whom, according to him, made faulty assumptions. According to 
Dutton the family systems approaches
err by emphasizing the current family system while 
disregarding the history of past relationships of the 
family's individual members. Detailed historical 
assessment might allow the detection of individual 
conflict-generators whose intrapsychic p rob lem s 
m anifest them selves in te rp erso n a lly  in the  
contem porary family. Ignoring this possibility 
unfairly  makes other family m em bers s h a r e  
responsibility for the intrapsychic pathology of one 
dominant member.33
On the other hand:
Feminist therapy tends to err in the other direction, 
viewing all male violence as systematic domination 
of women. Feminist therapy calls for resocialization 
of men in tre a tm e n t even th o u g h  th is  
resocialization may be at odds with the m an's 
primary socializing milieu and world view. If this is 
the case, the resocialization in treatm ent is unlikely 
to compete effectively. Feminist therapists seem to 
believe that because men have greater objective 
sociopolitical and economic power, their violence is
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always used in the protection of that power. In my 
therapeutic experience, assaultive males frequently 
feel completely powerless despite economic and 
socio political power. That they earn more money 
than their wives is irrelevant to them. That they 
feel incapable of living up to the economic demands 
of raising a family, winning an argum ent with 
their wife, fulfilling a life goal or earning as much 
as a relevant comparison person is more salient to 
their view of themselves as powerless. Clearly there 
is a vast discrepancy between objective power and 
subjective feelings of powerlessness.34
According to Dutton the proper approach would fall between these 
polar opposites. He advocated a "philosophy of personal responsibility" 
that is both "compatible with the criminal justice philosophy and the 
values of the broader culture in which it is nested". By his own admission 
this was a conservative approach which sought to change individuals to fit 
social systems rather than seek social change. He called it "essentially a 
pragmatic approach, a band-aid that requires buttressing by other 
therapeutic forms and by constant action for social change."35
It is with respect to "action for social change" that Dutton's approach 
could be found wanting. The refuge movement had, in the past, supplied 
constant action for social change and yet it received no mention in his 
work. Dutton speculated as to why battered women find it difficult to 
leave violent relationships finding it difficult to disentangle 'psychological' 
and 'economic dependency'. He ended by favouring the assumption that 
women are more likely to remain separated from their violent husbands if 
they are both economically independent and if their relationship was of 
short duration (thus minimizing 'psychological dependency'). The strategy 
of refuge provision which, ideally, provided both material support and 
peer group support, was intended to address these aspects of dependency. 
However, the strategy advocated by Dutton, which was focused on giving
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victims, but primarily assailants, the 'adequate care and attention' of 
medical, social service and criminal justice professionals had left out the 
need for such provision entirely.
Towards the end of the decade important new models for counseling 
men who batter were developed and put forth as a palliative measure for 
overcoming domestic violence. Some of these took the label 'pro-feminist' 
while others, like Dutton's, eschewed such associations. These new social 
psychological models were put forth as the pure law enforcement 
paradigm began to wane. Before elaborating the differences and 
similarities between these counselling approaches, it is necessary to 
address the developments in the criminal justice field in order to provide 
the proper context.
Criminal Justice and ’Domestic Violence’
in the North American Debates
As is suggested by the sub-title of Dutton's contribution, in assessing 
the impact of the paradigm of 'Family Violence Intervention', it is 
important to take cognizance of parallel developments in the area of 
criminal justice. Knowledge production in this area, particularly in the 
North American context, remained dominated by the American Police 
Foundation, The National Institute of Justice and various departments of 
Criminal Justice at institutions of higher learning throughout the U.S. Not 
surprisingly, their primary focus remained on the policing of domestic 
violence, especially in so far as it was linked with deterrence based 
research. The growth in knowledge production in this area was almost as 
explosive as that produced by the Family Violence Laboratory.
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The most significant development in this sphere was the replication of 
the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment. The first replication study 
results failed to confirm that arrest had any deterrence value. In the 
repeat of the experiment in Omaha, Nebraska, no differences by disposition 
were found in prevalence or frequency of repeat offending, using five 
measures of recidivism, assessing outcome six months after police 
intervention. Further, among the 97 victims who responded to questions 
about the arrest treatment, 60% reported that they did not want the police 
to arrest suspects, 65% reported that suspects blamed them for the arrest 
and 21% indicated that suspects threatened them because of the arrests.36 
The authors concluded:
that victims whose partners were arrested were no 
less likely to experience repeated violence from 
their partners than were victims whose partners 
received a random ized 'separate' or ’m e d ia te ' 
disposition from the police.37
At the same time, Lawrence Sherman, who had helped design the 
original Minneapolis experiment (see chapter four) conducted a replication 
study in Milwaukee. Unfortunately, as of this writing, the details of the 
findings have yet to be officially released. Nevertheless, Sherman stated 
publicly in late 1990 that the Milwaukee experiment reproduced the 
original Minneapolis findings.38
Research on the use of police by victims of domestic assault also came 
in on a slightly different tack. U.S. National Crime Survey data from the 
1978 and 1982 sweeps were subjected to secondary analysis and it was 
found that the simple act of calling the police meant that victims were less 
likely to be assaulted on a subsequent occasion. Thus, it was revealed that 
an estimated 41% of married women assaulted by their husbands who did
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not call the police were subsequently re-assaulted within six months. 
When women did call the police the rate of repeat violence was measured 
at 15%. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, calling the police was 
associated with 62% fewer subsequent assaults.39 This finding does not 
corroborate the deterrence value of arrest since the simple act of calling 
the police was deemed to be the deterrent factor. Nor does this finding 
contradict those from the Omaha experiment which found no difference 
between rates of re-offending after police action based on the three 
'treatment1 categories: 'arrest1, 'send' or 'mediate'.
These confusing findings notwithstanding, the American Police 
Foundation, under the Chairmanship of James Q. Wilson, continued to 
produce glossy brochures under the title 'A Scientific Approach to 
Improved Policing' claiming that:
Arresting an assailant in a domestic violence case 
significantly reduces the likelihood of f u t u r e  
violence. In the first scientifically controlled test of 
the effects of arrest for any crime, arrest was found 
to be the most effective of three standard responses 
used by police when responding to cases of domestic 
violence.49
It was explained in the pamphlet that "it may be premature to 
conclude definitely that arrest is always the best police response to 
domestic violence, or that all suspects should be arrested" and a number of 
caveats were listed, including:
• The study involved a relatively small sample of 
subjects
• Most suspects arrested for domestic assault in  
Minneapolis are jailed overnight. Arrest may not 
have the same impact in cities where suspects 
return home sooner.
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• The cultural context of other cities may differ from 
that of Minneapolis and thus produce different 
results
• Follow-up in terview s m ay have c rea ted  a 
"surveillance" effect that stopped suspects form 
committing further violence
• There were some inconsistencies between results 
based on official records of crime and those based on 
interviews with victims.4 1
While the pure deterrence paradigm was still being marketed as such, 
cracks were appearing and more caveats were placed on the Minneapolis 
findings as time went by. It is interesting to note that, concurrent with the 
deterrence research, new inquiries into the dangerousness of domestics to 
police officers were also being conducted.42 According to researchers at 
the National Institute of Justice in the United States these types of calls, 
while potentially dangerous to police officers, were not as dangerous as 
other types of work. They reported, using figures from National Institute 
of Justice data, that twice the number of officers were killed dealing with 
’traffic offences1 than were killed dealing with ’domestic disturbances' over 
the period 1973-84 inclusive.43
Of course, this goes against one of the initial tenets of domestic 
violence research, that such calls for service are the most dangerous for 
police officers. In 1976 the International Association of Chiefs of Police, 
using FBI statistics, warned that "the police officer is exposed to threat of 
personal injury every time he responds to a family disturbance . . .  Police 
officers must be aware of the danger involved in disturbance calls."44 
When the subject was touched upon by the New Hampshire School at the 
time the tenor of the warning was even more alarmist; they reported that
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"more police officers die answering family disturbance calls (22% of all 
police fatalities) than any other single type of call."45
This new finding was used to bolster attempts to change police 
intervention practices with regard to domestic violence. According to the 
NIJ this research removed "one of the factors which has inhibited police 
managers from exploring innovative strategies in dealing with this police 
assignment." Following this reasoning "when danger to the police is high, 
safety measures are naturally given more prominence in setting policy. 
But if domestic disturbances do not generate exceptional danger to the 
police, managers can focus officer attention on improving effectiveness of 
the police response to victim needs."46 How might police managers seek to 
improve the 'police response to victim needs'? The answer can be found 
in another study which echoed the NIJ findings 47 This study, having 
established the basic premiss that domestic violence was not overly 
hazardous for police officers, concluded that:
For too long the issue of domestic violence has been 
considered a private family affair. The increasing 
statistics of wife abuse and child abuse are a strong 
indicator that traditional methods of intervention - 
such as mediation, transporting the injured and 
advising victims of rights - are no t adequate .
Decisive police and judicial intervention is crucial.
Clear signals to offenders and society as a whole are 
needed to show that violence, whether in the home 
or on the street, is a criminal matter and will not be 
tolerated.48
Through all of this period a legal battle was waged on behalf of 
battered women to "alter criminal justice policy to ensure that violence 
within intimate relationships was treated seriously and similarly to violent 
crimes committed by strangers".49 Legislative, executive and judicial
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policies were implemented in many states to alter the treatment of family 
violence within the criminal justice system. To date, mandatory arrest 
laws for domestic violence have been enacted by more than a dozen state 
legislatures and numerous cities and towns throughout the United States.50
Grass roots feminists in the United States began to worry about how 
these mandatory arrest laws were effecting women victims of violent 
husbands. In particular they were concerned about what was referred to 
as 'dual arrest'. Their fear was that entrenched police practices would 
reinterpret the intent of the legislation, resulting in an increasing number 
of women being processed through the criminal justice system side by side 
with their violent husbands. While at first glance this may seem an 
exaggerated objection, there was evidence that that this was occurring. A 
study on the mandatory arrest laws in the State of Washington found that 
one third of arrests were dual arrests. Further, in fifty percent of the cases 
where an arrest was made the women was charged. Studies in Connecticut 
and Oregon also revealed dual arrest levels of 18.8% and 11% 
respectively.51 These findings seem to indicate that the criminal justice 
response to wife assault is still problematic.
To remain strictly within the confines of criminological enquiry into 
domestic violence is to remain within the confines of, if not an outright 
deterrence paradigm, at least within the bounds of a discourse based on 
criminalization. When the issue of wife battery was articulated in these 
terms the alternative discourse, based on refuge provision, was submerged 
underneath other concerns. As the efficacy of this form of intervention 
came to be questioned new forms of intervention, based on 'treatment' for 
men who batter, began to emerge. The provision of resources for battered 
wives, such as access to a secure source of housing and income, became
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tertiary. However, not all of the treatment models were based on the same 
premises.
Treatment Models for men who batter
During the later half of the 1980s a new debate on the social response 
to domestic violence emerged. Distinctions between the forms of 
treatment that began to emerge during this period can be made in a 
number of ways. As already mentioned, Donald Dutton drew on a 
treatment model for dealing with violent husbands seeking to connect 
counselling to the criminal justice response. He characterized his approach 
as mid-way between feminist and family systems approaches. While some 
approaches to treatment for men who batter, and Dutton's is an example of 
this, emerged as a result of the perceived failure of the criminal justice 
response, still others emerged as an adjunct to refuge based services for 
women victims of violent men. It was as a result of this that a new debate 
emerged. Previously, so called feminist approaches shunned targeting 
resources for assailants seeking, instead, to obtain resources for victims. 
Towards the end of the decade 'pro-feminist' treatment models for men 
were moved higher up on the agenda.
There were good reasons for this. Refuge workers and others working 
with women victims of violent men, had made the observation that many 
women did not wish to leave their husbands nor did they wish to see them 
incarcerated. Rather, they wished for a cessation of the violence. It was 
thus perceived that changing men's behaviour was an important part of 
the social response to the violence. The emergence of pro-feminist 
counselling programmes, some of which were attached directly to women's
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shelters, began to challenge the dominance of the traditional treatment 
approaches.
Six approaches to counselling intervention have been identified, one of 
which can be considered pro-feminist.52 The five non-feminist paradigms 
have been labeled the Insight, Ventilation, Interaction, Cognitive- 
Behavioural and Psycho-educational Models. Pro-feminist criticism varied 
according to the model it was directed at, but the overarching criticism was 
that all of "these approaches collude with batterers by using techniques 
that do not adequately address the violence or by adopting modalities that 
compromise the man's responsibility for change"53 So, for example, the 
Insight Model was criticized for "looking inward" and focusing attention 
exclusively on underlying emotional disorders usually seen as the result of 
childhood traumas. It was noted that such programmes frequently cite 
'increasing the batterers self esteem’ as a primary treatment goal while 
very little attention is given to having the batterer 'take responsibility for 
the violence'. This was hotly criticized and it was noted that by "becoming 
preoccupied by the presumed psychological etiology of battering, insight- 
oriented therapists also fail to recognize the utility, or purposeful nature, 
of violent and controlling behaviour."54
Similarly, the ventilation model was considered inappropriate . 
Encompassing such therapeutic techniques as 'mock fighting' and other 
cathartic techniques calculated to release pent-up aggression, the logic of 
this approach was that by providing a safety valve such therapy would 
lessen the incidence of violent outbursts. The pro-feminists countered 
with the claim that far from providing a safety valve, cathartic techniques 
should be considered addictive and reinforcing of tendencies towards
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violence. It was also noted that "men who batter their wives do not need 
permission from experts to continue to vent their anger".55
Interactive approaches were criticized for the 'neutrality1 of the 
treatment model. Such approaches saw violence as an interactive process 
with victims playing a role equivalent of, if not equal to, the batterer 
himself. It was claimed that such approaches "blur the distinctions 
between violent and nonviolent behaviour" and that they "also give a tacit 
message that battering is an understandable, though unfortunate, response 
to behaviour on the victim's part that the batterer deems 'controlling' or 
'provocative'.56 This was equated with neutralization techniques used by 
rapists and incest offenders to deny their own culpability by saying that 
the victim was seductive; that 'she led me on'.
The cognitive-behavioural and psychoeducational models were seen as 
providing the insight that violent behaviour is learned behaviour. The 
basic idea of both approaches was that poor social skills led batterers to 
resolve conflict situations with violence. The model advocated 're­
education' so that battering men would learn new, more appropriate, ways 
to resolve conflict. However, these treatment approaches were perceived 
to fall short of the pro-feminist approach since the model did not identify 
battering behaviour as situation specific. That is, that batterers frequently 
confront frustrating circumstances, stress and conflict but that reactions 
depend as much on the "status of the persons(s) with whom he is 
interacting as much as it does with his social skill level." It was noted that 
men who are violent when frustrated by their wives had a broader 
repertoire of responses when confronted with frustrations involving other 
men. According to advocates of pro-feminist counselling techniques, what
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needed to be injected into this model was an understanding of gender 
politics.
The primary insight of pro-feminist counselling approaches for 
batterers was that wife beating was seen as "controlling behaviour that 
serves to create and maintain an imbalance of power between the 
battering man and the battered woman."57 Because of the tendency for 
abusive men to replace physical violence with more subtle forms of abuse, 
such therapists defined the violence in very broad terms to encompass all 
forms of controlling behaviour. Violent men were observed to engage in 
'bargaining behaviour' with their wives and counsellors over how much 
and how soon they would have to give up their controlling behaviour. The 
ideal was that batterers in pro-feminist counselling programmes would be 
given a choice to comply with their treatment and safety plans or be 
terminated with notification to their partners. In addition, partners of 
men who failed to comply with treatment were encouraged to pursue legal 
measures and clients on court mandated treatment programmes were to 
be remanded for violation of probation.
To date there has been little in the way of independent evaluation of 
these treatment projects. The evaluation that has been carried out has 
been of the 'action research' variety and done by the operators of the 
programmes themselves. Nevertheless, treatment programmes for men 
who batter gained general acceptance towards the end of the decade. One 
such programme, in Duluth Minnesota, worked in tandem with services 
delivered to victims including refuges, the police and the courts. While 
claims to stop violent and controlling behaviour were somewhat 
circumscribed, the proponents of this programme pointed to the dangers 
women encounter when leaving violent men. Batterers in treatment were
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perceived to be less dangerous since treatment created an interlude during 
which separation could be negotiated more safely.58
While it does seem likely that the adoption of such programmes as an 
appendage of the provision of services to victims holds some promise of 
alleviating the violence, In the United States the vogue for funding such 
efforts is taking place amidst inadequate provision for victims of the 
violence. Where adequate services for victims already exist, such 
programmes hold out the possibility of expanding the response and 
thereby confronting multiple facets of the problem. Where such services 
do not exist, or are under-resourced, treatment for men who batter may 
pre-empt the establishment or embellishment of such services. Pro- 
feminist models seem to operate in tandem with services for victims, non- 
feminist approaches operate instead of such services. The attachment of 
such programmes to policies of presumptive arrest and court processing 
seems to be an increasingly dominant trend in the United States.59 This 
may, in certain localities, serve to undermine the provision of services to 
victims of male violence.
Canadian Debates on the Social 
Response to Wife Battering
The contradictory nature of the debate had a different twist in the 
Canadian context. When examining the discussion in Canada one thing is 
immediately apparent: the voices of the refuges themselves are much 
more prevalent in the discussions. Indeed, the number and quality of 
Canadian refuges, relative to the United States and Great Britain, is
378
Chapter Nine
H g K S O S  f t ®  QBq©  [FO flfiO fllP ©  P a t T t i  @ [ r Q ©
striking. This is because the Canadian Federal Government put relatively 
more money into refuge provision than either the U.S. or the U.K.. Indeed, 
Chiswick Family Rescue Director Sandra Horley reported in 1990 that the 
amount of money going into refuge provision in Canada was staggering. 
According to her:
under the government policy to provide adequate 
emergency shelters (women's refuges), 22 million 
dollars of federal money has been allocated to build 
five hundred new shelters this year [1990]. 25,000 
more women will be able to find safety. Shelters 
have 24 hour cover, trained counsellors, child care 
workers (two workers per child) and tra ined  
outreach workers.66
The level of provision for abused wives in Canada during this period 
was high; so high, in fact, that some feminists there spoke of the impact of 
the wife abuse movement on the State.61 This thesis was advanced by 
Jane Ursel, an academic and battered women's advocate in Manitoba. She 
divided the 1980s into three phases in discussing developments in the 
social response to domestic violence in that Province:
(1) Phase one (1983-84) during which the criminal 
justice system was revamped in order that it could 
handle the large amount of work that processing of 
cases of domestic violence represents.
(2) Phase Two (1985-87) in which the social service 
system was revamped in order to develop support 
services.
(3) Phase Three (1988-90) in which changes in bo th  
systems continued concurrently.62
The critical event in Phase One was an announcement by the Attorney 
General in February of 1983 criminalizing domestic violence. The directive 
required that in wife abuse cases, as with all assault cases, decisions to 
charge were to be based on evidence rather than the wishes of the victim.
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This produced over one thousand arrests that year for that Province, 
nearly all of which reached court.63 Subsequently, two days a week had to 
be set aside for the court to deal specifically with the increased volume of 
wife abuse cases. According to Ursel this was done in response to 
lobbying by the provincial wife abuse committee in November 1983. At 
this time Criminal Justice personnel complained that the innovations in the 
policing of domestic violence clogged up the court system. However, 
because the Provincial Government was pumping so much money into the 
issue, feminist activists were actually being paid to produce knowledge 
countering such complaints and Ursel was able to say that "as part of this 
funding a report was prepared and submitted to the Attorney General's 
office within days of the Judicial condemnation of the directive."64 This 
report not only countered the complaints by the Judiciary but also served 
to convince them that such complaints were unjustified and eventually 
served to secure their active cooperation. But, activity was not restricted 
to within the criminal justice system. According to Ursel, financial support 
for wife abuse services in Manitoba was at $51,800 in 1981. This rose to 
$315,800 by the end of phase one not including an additional $100,000 
which was earmarked for a public awareness campaign.
During Phase Two four new initiatives were introduced:
(1) Police training on the issue of wife abuse.
(2) The establishm ent of a W omen's Advocacy 
Programme which was to support women whose 
partners had been charged with wife abuse and 
provide a bridge between the Social Service and 
Criminal Justice System as well as facilitating the 
operation of the criminal justice system.
(3) The Growth of treatment programs for battering 
men.
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(4) The development of a court policy on reluctant 
witnesses which recognized th a t treating  a ll 
persons before the court equally would only 
perpetuate inequalities. This linked in with the 
Women's Advocacy Program me m entioned in 
initiative two.
Concurrent with these initiatives were more increases in social service 
provision. Ursel reported that the funding for wife abuse programs 
increased again to $1,739,000. This allowed for an increase in community 
based wife abuse services throughout the province, increasing the number 
of programmes provided from 5 in 1984 to 23 at the end of 1987. 
Facilities included 10 shelters, a number of non-residential programmes as 
well as second stage facilities. Naturally, an office within the government 
had to be created to administer this funding and service provision.
The creation of this office polarized what Ursel referred to as "wife 
abuse workers and agencies with divergent views on the desirability of 
state involvement" on the issue.65 Some worried that 'wife abuse1 was no 
longer the preserve of 'feminists' but had become the property of 'the
State'.66 These criticisms were soothed to some extent as state officials
kept up the pace of reform. This involved the introduction of a number of 
additional improvements to the system including: the provision of second 
stage housing for women who were forced to leave violent men; the 
establishment of the first native run wife abuse program and the first 
immigrant family violence service; secure financial arrangements so that 
women could move easily into women’s shelters; and, finally, an $800,000 
dollar training program aimed at training 20 'grass-roots' local women as 
wife abuse counsellors which paid wages and expenses for the women for 
two years of in service and class training. However, Ursel's contribution
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also gave vague details of a mini-purge of ffemocratsT as the state moved 
from "passive to active participant."67
Ursel described Stage Three as one in which the normalization of the 
changes introduced in the Criminal Justice System was secured and 
legitimated. She reported that the provincial budget for 1989/90 for wife 
abuse services stood at $4.3 million. The Women's Advocacy Program 
continued to function taking the complaints of women who felt they have 
been ill-served by the Criminal Justice System or Social Services to the 
public via the press.
This made all agencies anxious to be seen to be responding 
appropriately and Ursel argued, on the basis of this, that the Battered 
Women's Movement had a significant impact on the State in the Canadian 
context. Ursel based this conclusion on a specific measurement criteria. 
According to her "the battered women's movement should have as its 
primary criteria of success or failure the situation of battered women. One 
must develop a means of determining whether a battered woman or a 
woman at risk has more options and supports available to her today than 
was the case prior to state involvement."68
Not all feminists looked upon this as a success story, however, and an 
interesting debate amongst academic feminists, appeared during this 
period.69 According to the analysis of some 'socialist feminists' the process 
that Ursel charted represented the reconstitution of patriarchal hegemony 
through the terms of feminist discourse.70 According to this analysis, 
most observers, and presumably activists like Ursel, were caught off guard 
because the reassertion of patriarchy was not achieved in opposition to 
feminist discourse but through its own analytical categories. Thus, it was
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concluded, the growth in State interest in battered wives should not be 
seen as an unequivocal success.
This might have sounded like an abstracted and academic criticism, 
however, there was an empirical basis for it. One of the initiatives that 
critics of State involvement focused on was the so-called 'no drop' policy. 
This policy, adopted in Saskatchewan in 1985, was a version of a 
mandatory arrest policy. This policy made it difficult, if not impossible, for 
victims to withdraw allegations of assault once police had initiated charges. 
In a preliminary assessment, it was determined that in 35% of reported 
cases the victim requested that charges be dropped. Further, in 25% of 
reported cases the victim 'actively hindered' prosecution.71 While the 
researcher reporting those findings acknowledged that some of the non­
cooperation was due to the fear of reprisals, close observation also 
revealed that many of the apparently inconsistent actions pursued by 
battered women (such as the obstruction of prosecution, or obtaining 
injunctions against men who batter them only to invite them to breach the 
terms of the order, or calls for service to the police followed by a refusal to 
press charges) were, from the perspective of those women, rational means 
to achieve protection without terminating the relationship. The adoption 
of blanket 'no-drop' policies in these circumstances was seen in a rather 
different light, not as an aid to battered women, but as an insidious form of 
social control.
With regard to the proliferation of refuges, arguments similar to Susan 
Schechter's were made. The increasing professionalization of shelter 
workers meant that battered women became clients. Some Canadian 
feminists complained of a growing tendency to hire staff with formal 
educational credentials and professional qualifications. While it was
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acknowledged that this strengthened the credibility of shelter staff in the 
community and helped to link shelters with other professional services, it 
also served to create a division between community-based (ie. grass-roots) 
and professional feminists.72 These feminists worried that the opinions 
and perspectives of experts were coming to take precedence over those of 
battered women.
Given this perspective, the growing provision of social welfare 
assistance was seen, not in its immediately apparent form as a material 
benefit to battered women, but rather as "strengthening the very same 
processes and institutions which gave rise to the demand for justice in the 
first place."73 The argument went further. It was claimed that, by 
adopting some of the terms of feminist discourse and by creating the space 
for ’femocrats' within the interstices of State power, the State has also 
given the impression that it had dealt with the problem. The worry was 
that, eventually, these services would have to account for themselves along 
cost-benefit indices and their responsiveness to the needs of individual 
women would all but disappear.
If we place Jane Ursel's criteria for measuring the success of the 
battered women’s movement in the context of this argument and ask: 'will 
women at risk from battering have more options and supports available to 
them because of state involvement?' - the answer cannot be an 
unequivocal 'Yes'. The standardization of the social response to domestic 
violence through the provision of 'services’ to battered women by State 
funded agencies may actually rob them of choices that were only put there 
in the first place by the battered women's movement.
Ursel theorized that this movement by the Canadian State was part of 
a larger historical shift away from 'familial patriarchy' to what she
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referred to as 'social patriarchy'. She argued that as Canadian Society 
moved from an agrarian to an industrial society it moved from older 
patriarchal forms, characterized by the particular subordination of 
individual women to a male head of household, to the generalized 
subordination of women through centralized 'social patriarchal' structure 
embedded in broader political and economic institutions. According to this 
analysis wife battery, a symptom of the old patriarchal order, would give 
way as the new social order progressively asserted itself. She cited as 
evidence of this; the Married Woman's Property Act (introduced 
throughout Canada in the 1860s and 70s) and the Maintenance 
Enforcement Act (introduced in the 1970s). She argued that women and 
the State have a shared interest in dismantling the laws, practices and 
conventions of an old patriarchal order which have always been cosdy to 
women and have, over time, become costly to the State. Further, as the 
interests of women and the State converged, the establishment of 'social 
patriarchy' opened up the possibility of eliminating wife battery 
altogether.
Feminists critical of the State's involvement in the issue saw this 
historical process as a reconstitution of relations of domination and 
subordination. Far from seeing the expansion of refuges and the 
involvement of the criminal justice system and social welfare programs in 
the issue of domestic violence over the 1980s as an emancipatory trend 
they were sceptical of reform efforts:
As a public discourse, wife battery  has b e e n  
transformed from a critique of patriarchal power to 
demands for protection from male power. While the 
later is a documented real need, the problem is that 
its satisfaction has been equated with justice for 
women. The demands for re-distribution of social 
power, which can only result from radical social
385
Chapter Nine
H a s t e  f t ®  f t B a ®  t F o a f t a a c r ®  I P a r f t  © r a ®
change and which underscored the early w om en's 
movement, has been translated into demands for 
expansion of current institutions.74
The debates in Canada mirror those happening south of the border. On 
the one hand there are those who remark upon the changing response of 
traditional institutions to domestic violence, the rise in social awareness of 
the problem and the amount of resources put into addressing it, and 
encourage a positive view. On the other hand, there remained an 
argument that these reforms did not change the actual circumstances that 
produced the violence in the first place. This argument seems less strong 
in the Canadian context, however because of the relative importance 
assigned to primary resource allocation, in particular the provision of 
Women's Shelters and second stage accommodation, by State managers and 
politicians. In the U.S. it seems that relatively more emphasis was placed 
on criminal justice intervention and, towards the end of the decade, 
treatment for men who batter. While this was a component of the social 
response in both countries it was relatively less important in Canada.
The balance between the reform or revolution argument was rather 
different in the two contexts. Arguments for revolution seemed more 
appropriate in the American context where the notion that arrest equals 
deterrence, that ’booking has a bite', was promoted far above the need to 
provide resources such as refuges which could empower women victims of 
violent men. In those circumstances the needs of battered women were 
much less catered too. Instead, battered women were objectified in a 
process which served to consolidate the institutional practices of the 
criminal justice system. Reified as objects themselves, battered women 
could only serve to reaffirm the practices of policing. This discourse of
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domestic violence was not about changing the circumstances of battered 
women's lives, it was about reinventing the criminal justice system.
It is interesting, then, to see how the issue of violence against women 
emerged in public discussion in Canada. There was no Canadian equivalent 
of Jesse Helms to speak against the 'attack on the patriarchal nuclear 
family'. In fact, politicians in comparable positions of political power 
seemed much more willing to embrace the issue as a feminist one. This is 
clear from the decision taken by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1990, 
which upheld the so-called 'battered woman's syndrome' defence, in a case 
involving a spousal homicide. According to the Vancouver Sun the 
Supreme Court of Canada had delivered a 7-0 judgement upholding a 1987 
acquittal of a Winnipeg woman who had shot her husband.75 The acquittal 
marked the first successful use of the 'battered wife syndrome' defense in 
a murder trial. According to the news paper report the court ruling was 
welcomed by "women's groups" as "shattering the myths about abused 
spouses".76
While politicians and others holding state power seemed eager to take 
on board at least some of the tenets of feminist thinking other men in 
Canadian society were less enthusiastic. This had been made all too clear 
one year previous to the Supreme Court decision mentioned above. In 
December, 1989, fourteen women were murdered in a massacre at the 
University of Montreal, Quebec. Marc Lepine had walked into a class of 
engineering students, lined up the female class members and gunned them 
down. The motive for his crime, according to a suicide note left by the 
killer, was competition from increasing numbers of female students which 
had led to his own failure.
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Of course many men, as well as women, reacted with shock and horror 
to the news. The headline in Saskatoon's Star Phoenix on Saturday 
December 16th was:
WIFE BEATER SEARCHES SOUL IN WAKE OF MASSACRE
The front page of that city's only daily news paper was entirely given 
over to the testimony of a 'former batterer'. According to the story, this 
former batterer, who had brutally beaten his wife on many occasions over 
a period of years leading to the break-up of his marriage, had founded a 
counselling group for batterers. In that capacity he had given lectures to 
RCMP officers, Adult Education Classes and social work students at the 
University of Saskatchewan, in addition to running programs for batterers 
on three Indian reserves. In the wake of the massacre he had decided to 
"go public". He stated that there was little difference between Lepine's 
mass slaughter and wife beating and, further, that all men need to be re­
educated.
As a social barometer these two news stories are somewhat . 
instructive. The Canadian Government had placed considerable resources 
into the hands of activists working on issues of violence against women 
during the 1980s. While this did attract some resistance, it seemed, for the 
most part, to generate constructive engagement with the problem of men's 
violence towards women. The terms of discourse did not remain 
exclusively feminist, but neither did it seem to suffer the radical 
translation that was effected in the United States. Thus, while 'treatment' 
and the engagement of the criminal justice system were recognizable parts 
of the Canadian social response, refuge based programmes attracted equal 
attention and a considerable amount of resources. In those circumstances
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the balance of forces upheld some of the original terms of feminist debate, 
their insights were not negated wholesale and feminists could, indeed, talk 
about the impact of the wife abuse movement on the State.
Conclusion and Summary
This chapter has sought to identify the most salient developments in 
the North American discourses on domestic violence at the end of the 
1980s. It was noted that social scientific efforts to measure and theorize 
the problem have continued to grow. At the same time the criminal justice 
response to the problem was seen to be developing some ambivalence to 
straightforward deterrence theory and that presumptive arrest policies 
predicated on the notion that ’booking has a bite' and 'arrest is best' were 
beginning to look less tenable. As notions of the deterrence, power of 
arrest waned, interest in 'treatment' programmes for men who batter 
began to achieve common currency. Some programmes that emerged have 
been labeled 'pro-feminist', some of which run in tandem with refuge 
based programmes for the victims of battering. Court mandated treatment 
programmes oriented around the need to prevent recidivism seem more 
common. While it is difficult to determine if such programmes achieve 
their ends they have been criticized by pro-feminist counsellors for 
colluding with the motives of male batterers. However, there has, to date, 
been little in the way of independent evaluation of any approach to 
treatment and, although such programmes are increasing in popularity, it 
is not possible to tell what effect their widespread adoption may have on 
the prevalence of the violence.
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My own worry is that the emergence of these new programmes might 
serve to further undermine the provision of services for victims. This 
seems to be of more concern in the context of the United States where a 
reluctance to support shelter provision in the early 1980s stunted the 
growth in provision of such services. The Canadian developments ran 
somewhat counter to this and, although there was much criticism of 
tendency to undermine feminist versions of what was to be done, the 
growth in refuge provision and other services for victims in that country 
was substantial. In this context, the introduction of treatment for 
battering men and the revamping of the criminal justice system to suit the 
demands of this particular type of crime seem constructive rather than a 
deviation.
In the next and last chapter, I will consider the developments in Great 
Britain during this period. Again, the international trade in facts about 
domestic violence will be shown to be very important. However, 
indigenous factors also played a role and developments in the U.K. had 
their own trajectory.
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Early one momin' while making' m y rounds 
I took a shot of cocaine and I shot m y woman down 
I went right home and I went to bed 
I stuck that lovin' .44 beneath m y head 
Got up next momin' and I grab that gun 
Took a shot of cocaine and away I run 
Made a good run but I run too slow 
they overtook me down in Juarez Mexico 
Laid in the hot joint takin’ the pill 
in walked the sheriff from Jericho Hill 
He said Willy Lee your name is not Jack Brown 
Your the dirty hackett shot your woman down 
1 said oh yes m y name is Willie Lee 
if  you got a warrent just read it to me 
I shot her down because she made me slow 
I thought I was her daddy but she had five more 
When I was arrested 1 was dressed in black 
they pu t me on a train and they sent me back 
Had no friend for to go m y bail 
they stuck m y half dead carcass in the county jail 
Early next m om in' about half past nine 
I spotted the sheriff cornin' down the line 
He coughed and then he cleared his throat 
said come on you dirty hackett to that district court 
Into the court room m y trial began 
where I was held by twelve honest men 
Just before they started out 
I saw that little judge commence to look about 
In about five minutes in walked the man 
he held the verdict in his right hand 
The verdict read in the first degree 
I shouted Lawdy Lawdy have mercy on me 
The judge he smiled as he picked up his pen 
Ninty-nine years in the Folsom Pen 
Nine-nine years underneath the ground 
I can't forget the day I shot that bad bitch down 
Come on you men you gotta listen unto me 
Lay off that whiskey and let that cocaine be
Johnny Cash
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Introduction
Discourses on violence within the family have certainly shown 
remarkable growth over the last two decades. The discourse of social 
science has grown voluminously and beside it feminist inquiry has been no 
less vigorous. There is an important difference between the two. Feminist 
inquiry, held together by the cognitive glue provided by the concept of 
patriarchy, has tended to be the work of individuals, or loosely affiliated 
networks of individuals, and its progress, particularly with regard to policy 
implementation, has suffered because the work has been pejoratively 
labeled as ’political' or 'ideological'. In contrast, inquiry made by 'pure' 
social science researchers, perhaps best exemplified by the Family 
Research Laboratory at the University of New Hampshire, has actively 
cultivated a language of 'objectivity' and has followed a fairly well defined 
research agenda organized around a division of labour not dissimilar to 
that of the 'hard' sciences.1 This appearance of objectivity, very often 
explicitly contrasted with the 'political nature' attributed to feminist work, 
has facilitated the incorporation of this body of knowledge into the policy 
making process.
It has been shown in that, in the North American context, it is possible 
to make the distinction between 'pure' and 'feminist' approaches to social 
scientific inquiry, although the boundaries are frequently blurred and the 
differences are often contingent only on the conceptual categories 
employed in theorizing. In contrast, most of the social scientific discussion 
on the topic in the U.K. has actively embraced feminist theory and method. 
It is perhaps because there has been no inquiry into the phenomenon of 
violence in intimate settings purely based in a discourse of social science,
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that there has been no equivalent of the U.S. National Survey on family 
violence, nor has British sociology utilized the conflict tactics scale or 
similar measurement instrument.2 Then too, much of the research in the 
U.K. into what has been variously conceived as 'domestic violence', 'woman 
battering' or 'wife battery' (but not, it seems, 'family violence') has been 
the almost exclusive preserve of women and this has led to the complaint, 
within criminology, that it has been marginalized as a women's issue.3
All of this is not to say that the British discussion about violence 
against wives have been universally couched in feminist terms, for 
example, much of the discussion within the police organization has dealt 
with the issue in the terms of community policing, professionalism and 
operational efficiency. This thesis has traced the police policy 
development regarding domestic violence and special effort was taken to 
show how social science contributed to that policy formation. In doing so it 
was shown that British social scientific inquiry into domestic violence is 
not simply derivative of debates in North America. The difference in 
approaches to social inquiry on opposite sides of the Atlantic created the 
space for an international trade in knowledge about the issue, particularly 
as it informed police practice. Documenting this trade has been one of the 
principle tasks of this thesis.
This thesis has also sought to retrieve the history of refuges in some 
detail. Although it was not feasible to develop a systematic and in depth 
analysis of the refuge movement and refuge provision on a trans-Atlantic 
scale, an historical overview of North American developments was 
provided. The British movement has been examined in detail and its 
relations with social science, the local state, the police and other agencies 
were discussed. In relation to social scientific work on domestic violence it
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was shown that, fairly early on, social scientists allied themselves with 
refuge activists to promote provision of these services for victims of 
violent men. This unity was fragmented during the mid-1980s and much 
of the social scientific analysis branched out to examine other areas of 
practical intervention, in particular, although not exclusively, policing. 
Through this, the refuges continued to struggle, with some limited success, 
to maintain themselves as a distinct and autonomous infrastructure 
providing support for battered wives and, often as not, their children.
The task of this chapter is to pick up the threads of discourses on 
domestic violence from where they were left in 1987 when the issue 
became a force priority for the London Metropolitan Police. The work of 
social scientists, most of whom worked under the label of feminism, will be 
summarized first in order to map out the terrain of the academic debate. 
The concerns of refuge activists will also be outlined, in particular with 
regard to the importation of treatment models for men who batter, but 
also, a general overview of the state of the movement will be provided. 
This will include some details of provision of primary resources for victims 
as well as reactions to official government pronouncements. Also to be 
discussed are the articulations of some ethnic minority women who 
became increasingly organized and vocal on this issue during the later part 
of the decade.4 Their contributions to the public debate tended to be 
highly critical of criminalization as a social response to the problem of 
domestic violence and raise important questions about policing domestic 
violence. A discussion of the views of organizations who represent ethnic 
minority women, then, will lead back into a consideration of the issue as it 
relates to the police organization.
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In this chapter I will describe the state of flux around the issue of 
domestic violence at the end of the 1980s. As with the previous chapter, 
this summary will attempt to offer some insight into possible future 
directions and manifestations that the issue may take. Since the primary 
thrust of this thesis has been to show how, and in what way, this issue 
came to be one for the police institution, it is fitting that this account end 
by considering policing in this area.
British social scientific debates on
domestic violence at the end of the decade
Virtually all of the research on domestic violence conducted in the U.K. 
has been carried out by women, and much of the research has operated 
with some notion of patriarchy. The publication of Women, Violence and 
Social Control in 1987 presented a wide spectrum of the debates on the 
issue and analysis of the views offered therein allows much of the terrain 
of the social scientific debate to be mapped out. Contrasting the research 
with work conducted in the U.S.A. two points can be made. The first is that 
quantitative methodologies were much less influential in Britain. While 
lack of definitive quantitative evidence of the incidence of domestic 
violence was occasionally bemoaned, it did not lead to an interest in 
developing survey instruments for generating such estimates. Rather, the 
focus was on improving the collection of official statistics in order to 
improve estimate of 'the size of the problem1.5 Some of the social scientific 
inquiry took an 'action research' approach, seeking to actively engage with 
the provision of services in certain localities. Other researchers used 
qualitative methods of data gathering, focusing on small samples and 
amassing a depth of detail about women’s experience of male violence.
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These research practices have had practical consequences for the mode of 
theorizing.
The second point is that, because there were less resources put into 
quantification of the size of the problem, knowledge of the historical 
dimensions of the problem achieved relatively greater attention in Britain. 
British commentators' sense of history gave a different tenor to the 
discussion from that of the American debates, the most influential of which 
tended to focus on data derived from the 'here and now'. Many of the 
British writers on the subject made it explicit that the issue was part of 
women's politics a century ago and, again, this has had consequences for 
the theoretical development in Britain.6
Women, Violence and Social Control makes important empirical 
contributions to the study of men's violence against women. One chapter, 
provided by Jill Radford, gave findings from a survey of women's 
experiences of male violence in Wandsworth. This was, in part, a 
replication of an earlier study in Leeds conducted by Hanmer and 
Saunders (see Chapter Four). Radford began with the assertion that 
"men's violence to women is a political issue, expressing the basic power 
relations of patriarchy by maintaining and reproducing men's dominance 
and women's subordination"; a somewhat starker theoretical formulation 
than that advocated by feminists in North America.7 Radford's primary 
accomplishment was to provide many vivid accounts of women's 
experience of male violence, as well as its policing, using their own words. 
Her findings showed that male violence, in its broadest definition, is 
experienced by women on an almost daily basis. In presenting what her 
subjects have to say about their experiences, Radford showed how the 
ubiquity of male violence affects women's daily lives.
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Liz Kelly's contribution to the volume provided excellent 
accompaniment for Radford. She was also broadly concerned with 
women's experience of sexual violence and her experiences working in 
refuges with victims prompted her to introduce the concept of 'the 
continuum of sexual violence'.8 This was a powerful addition to the 
feminist conceptual armoury that allowed all forms of male violence 
experienced by women, from 'normal' sexual harassment on the street to 
more life-threatening forms of aggression, to be analytically connected. 
The concept was the very antithesis of a concept like the conflict tactics 
scale. Kelly pointed out that "the basic common character underlying the 
many different [violent] events is that men use a variety of forms of abuse, 
coercion and force in order to control women."9 Such a concept also 
allowed for the fact that there is no clearly definable analytical categories 
into which women's experience of male violence could be placed.
From the perspective of these researchers it was difficult to imagine 
using the existing structures of social control to address women's 
victimization since, according to their reasoning, such structures were 
predicated on patriarchal assumptions. Their objection was not a blind 
theoretical assertion either. Rather, it was based on empirical data which 
showed the difficulties an essentially masculine police force has in 
recognizing women's experience of male violence. For example one 
research subject stated:
I was flashed by a man who was following me. I just 
carried on, pretended I'd not seen, but it was 
disturbing. I met a policeman and told him and even 
pointed to the man. The policeman just looked at me.
They give you too many of those looks.10
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Women's experience of the policing of such violence is further elaborated 
in this more lengthy quotation:
My husband and I have been divorced for some time 
now. I had to go to Women's Aid because of his 
violence and he'd started to batter the baby who was 
a few weeks old. One evening last month, I came out 
of my front door with the baby . . .  He suddenly 
materialized from behind the hedge and snatched 
the child and threw a carton of orange juice on my 
hair and tried to make off. I snatched the child back 
and got kicked a lot. I managed to get him and 
rushed down the street to the phone box. I rang the 
police. They told me to stay in the phone box until 
they came - that was 45 minutes later. I got into the 
police car, one said, 'Don't be sick in my car', they 
took me to a friend's house and dumped me there 
without checking she was in. They wouldn't take me 
to my sister's, they said it was too far. As it 
happened my husband was there, upstairs in my 
friend's house, looking out the window. So I just had 
to walk back home feeling terrible. I've had lots of 
problems with him on other occasions too, with him 
prowling around the house and posting letters 
saying he'll kill the children. The police don 't 
usually come, they say it's 'domestic'. I'll try one of 
those injunctions, I don 't suppose it can make things 
worse, it might help, you never know.11
Radford ended her contribution with a prescription for action. 
According to her "the best way forward may be to continue to concentrate 
on drawing positively on women's energy and support, as evidenced in the 
activities of Women's Aid, Rape Crisis Centres, Incest Survivors and 
Women Against Sexual Harassment groups.12
Elizabeth Stanko's contribution to the discussion was also informed 
both by an understanding of the history of the issue and a concern for 
women's interpretations of male violence. In an earlier project she had 
explored how women make sense of male violence towards them, noting:
Understanding what it means to be female within 
contem porary British and American societies is 
understanding the meaning of male violence in
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women's lives. Many women's lives, in fact, revolve 
around strategies to avoid men's th re a te n in g , 
in tim idating , coercive or violent behav iour. 
C o n tem p o rary  fem in ists, not unlike th e ir  
n in e teen th  cen tu ry  sisters, have uncovered  
widespread experiences of male violence am ong  
women. Efforts to assist women affected by rape, 
incest, wife battering, or sexual harassment have  
led these feminist to see the endemic na tu re  of 
men's threatening or violent behaviour in many of 
women's everyday interaction with men. Yet there  
is a stony silence surrounding incidents of male 
violence. It is because women who encounter men's 
th reatening , intim idating, coercive or v io le n t  
behaviour are suspected of being 'unrespectable'. 13
According to Stanko the problem of male violence is frequently 
reconceptualized as a problem of women's respectability. She noted that 
this same problem confronted women struggling against male domination 
in the 19th century. Her empirical work showed how inquiry by the 
criminal justice system involving, as it usually does, male police, judges 
and prosecutors, handled men's 'indiscretions'. Her use of the word 
'indiscretion' was deliberate. According to her analysis, the process of 
inquiry engaged in by the Criminal Justice System could be considered a 
form of secondary victimization in which women's 'respectability' is on 
trial rather than men's violence towards them. She noted that:
the trial procedure is particularly upsetting because 
it is here that she confronts her assailant, endures 
cross-exam ination by a defence a tto rney  and 
experiences a publicly embarrassing and traum atic 
situation . . . women's fear of court then takes its 
nourishm ent from the same ingredients as their 
fear of men's threatening, intimidating or violent 
behaviour on the street: women know that it is
possible to have their account of their experience 
twisted around . .  ,14
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By 1987 Stanko's interest focused more directly on the policing of 
male violence against women, especially domestic violence. Her scepticism 
about policy decisions made by senior police officials was evident. Making 
use of the sociological literature on the police organization she showed that 
effecting change in police procedures is very complex, involving more than 
new training programmes. In particular she noted the need to encompass 
alterations in the system of internal rewards and inducements for front 
line police officers. She considered that, without this fundamental change, 
police officers charged with implementing new policy would not 
experience a shift in attitudes such that violence towards women could be 
perceived as criminal behaviour.15 However, even if this shift could be 
engineered there were other problems, as she was quick to point out. 
Again using the police literature, she raised concerns about differential 
enforcement of the law in a society divided along racial, class and gender 
lines.16 She quoted Robert Reiner to the extent that: the pattern of 
discrimination [in a society] and the map of the population found in police 
culture are isomorphic. They are both interdependent and bound within 
the wider structure of racial and class disadvantage."17 She warned 
advocates of presumptive arrest policies that police had been shown to be 
less responsive to the complaints of low income, minority women.18 She 
also raised the possibility of police officers arresting both husband and 
wife, that is ?dual arrest', as a ploy by a male dominated police sub-culture 
to undermine the intentions of policy initiatives in the area.19 This was 
seen as an entirely undesirable outcome as it would rebound on the 
victims of domestic violence, making things worse for them rather than 
better.
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While Elizabeth Stanko's reservations about the criminalization of 
domestic violence were evident, this is not the case with Susan Edwards1 
contribution to the debate. Edwards began with similar assumptions; 
paraphrasing her: 'the unequal treatment of women is perpetuated 
through the sexist organization of society and its corresponding legal 
institutions'.20 She went on to criticize the treatment of women victims in 
the courts, stating that "women's experience of the so-called remedies to 
violence within this context falls short of expectations."21 However, 
Edwards remained much more enthusiastic than her colleagues about the 
possibility of using the police to redress the violence and she upheld 
obligation of the police to provide protection. It was mentioned in chapter 
six that, by 1989, she was arguing that the criminalization of all cases of 
violence against women resulting in injury was the first step towards the 
abolition of domestic violence. She also claimed that this was a first step 
agreed on by feminists stating that:
In all such cases police should bring a prosecution 
regardless of the wishes of the victim . . . I would 
argue that the (civil) non-m olestation injunction 
should be replaced by a crim inal charge and 
prosecution.22
Arguing from a socio-legal perspective, Edwards focused attention on 
the higher reaches of the criminal justice system, deflecting criticism from 
the police. With respect to the police she noted that "already the police 
training centres in England and Wales are putting considerable emphasis 
on training recruits as well as junior and senior police managers."23 She 
applauded the commitment of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Peter 
Imbert, and quoted him to the extent that:
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the rise in the number of recorded sexual offences 
and domestic violence may be due, in part, to 
changes in police policy and procedure. We have 
sought to encourage victims to report these types of 
offences. In the past many such crimes were not 
notified to the police, and therefore have remained 
undetec ted . It is a reflection of the growing 
confidence in the police that victims are now 
coming forward and enabling us to take appropriate 
action and make more arrests than in the past.24
While Edwards presented a positive picture of police action based on 
the pronouncements of senior police officers, evidence from research 
conducted closer to the front line tended to see less evidence of change. 
One example of contemporaneous research was the Hammersmith and 
Fulham Domestic Violence Project.25 While these researchers were unable 
to interview any officers lower than the rank of Chief Superintendent, and 
these interviews tended to confirm Edwards' picture of changed police 
practice, the authors of that report noted that the "evidence suggests that 
the confidence expressed by the senior officers that things have improved 
since the introduction of the new force order does not correspond to the 
experiences of women in our sample."26 While the sample of women 
drawn upon in this study was refuge based, giving rise to questions of 
generalizability, the evidence contained in Jill Radford's study, amongst 
others, also seemed to confirm this.27
While there was no general agreement between the authors 
represented in this volume as to the efficacy of the Force Order pressure 
for institutional change within the police was kept up. Edwards, in 
particular continued to advocate strong police measures, including a 
rigorous policy based on arrest. She also advocated for reform in the 
higher reaches of the criminal justice system, noting that, under the Police
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and Criminal Evidence Act, spouses had become compellable witnesses. 
She quoted, with approval, Lord Edmund-Davies who stated that "it may 
well prove a positive boon for her to be directed by the courts that she has 
no alternative but to testify."28 However, according to Edwards
The new provisions must be taken together with the 
impact the Crown Prosecution system will have on 
such cases. Following the Prosecution of Offences 
Act, 1985, it will be up to Crown prosecutors to decide 
whether a case should proceed or discontinue, what 
charges to bring and the mode of trial (Section  
10{lH a| and{b})* However, since it is up to the 
police w hether to instigate proceedings, the  
discretion still lies with them. They may make 
decisions which go against the wishes of the victim 
and leave women more vulnerable to further abuse.
However, without a corresponding confrontation of 
the sexist attitudes displayed by the police and the 
courts to female victims of assault any change in 
p rosecution  policy and arrest powers will be 
unlikely. So long as women are blamed for the 
violence they sustain, so long as some women are 
considered less worthy of protection on grounds of 
race, sexuality or class, and so long as violence 
towards women remains a male prerogative, women 
will be victims of repeated common assault and 
ultimately homicide.2 9
New issues and old worries -the Refuge 
Movement at the end of the 1980s
Susan Edwards could not have predicted the furore over Michelle 
Renshaw's case, the first attempt to use the compellability clause of the 
PACE. Nor could Sandra Horley who, as we have seen, had campaigned 
consistently for the criminalization of 'domestic violence' since the early 
part of the decade, making her one of the more influential people in the 
British debate. It is important to assess her contribution at length because 
she was the most visible refuge based activist to put forward
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comprehensive suggestions for action. At the same time it is important not 
to ignore the viewpoint of the Women's Aid Federation, which did not 
always achieve harmony with those views expressed by the Chiswick 
spokeswoman.
In the wake of the Renshaw case, Sandra Horley put forth her own 
analysis of the problems of the court system. As always, her view was 
informed by what she knew about the situation in Canada. Horley 
explained that "what happened to Michelle Renshaw should not have 
happened" and that she was "sympathetic to Judge James Pickles' actions." 
Judge Pickles had told her that he was "anxious that women should be 
protected and that the men concerned should be dealt with properly" but 
that he could not do that "unless the women are courageous enough to 
come forward."30 She went on to say that: "Judge Pickles believes the 
freeing of alleged batterers because the woman involved withdraws her 
evidence gives the message to violent men that they have the power not 
only to pressure their partners into silence but to manipulate the court as 
well. I agree with him."31 Her venom was reserved for assailants and she 
defended Renshaw's ambivalence saying that "a woman should not be 
blamed for changing her mind". What was needed was "to understand the 
pressures that make her do so and look for ways of removing them." This 
could be done best by professional victim's advocates. Drawing on her 
knowledge of Canadian initiatives, Horley described the role of Victim 
Witness Coordinators there:
They explain the court process and  legal 
terminology; they can take a witness on a pre- 
hearing visit to the court to show them where the 
participants will be; and they can liaise with the 
medical and legal services.3 2
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She stated further:
In Canada, when judges were given powers to order 
witnesses to gaol until they decide to testify, the 
number of women coming forward did not decline 
but the withdrawal rate did - because of the Victim 
witness support. If women were given such support 
in Britain and the public also knew that women 
would be compelled to give evidence, I believe that, 
alongside a rigorous arrest and prosecution policy, 
inciden ts of dom estic v iolence w ould fall
dramatically. ^  3
According to Horley, in the final analysis, the problem in the Renshaw 
case was not compellability but the lack of support services for victims. 
Six months later she was able to outline the details of a case in which 
Section 23 of the Criminal Justice Act was invoked for the first time. This 
section made it possible for a written statement given to a police officer to 
be admissible as evidence in court even when the person who gave the 
statement was not present. According to the terms of the act, such 
evidence could be considered the primary evidence when the victim is one 
who "does not give oral evidence through fear or because he (sic) is kept 
out of the way."34 Horley reported on an instance where a man was 
convicted and sentenced to six months (reduced to three months on 
appeal) for assaulting his wife. According to her "neither the police, the 
crown prosecution service, the defending barrister or the judge seemed to 
have found any impediment to proceeding with the trial without the 
presence of the prosecution witness." She noted, rhetorically, that the 
suspect received a relatively short sentence which would have provoked 
public comment had the case been between strangers. The primary lesson 
she drew was that a more pro-active role by the court system would not
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provoke a hostile reaction by either the public or the people in the legal 
system.35
Sandra Horley advocated increasing the amount of resources targeted 
on men’s violence, but she also argued against offering treatment for men 
who batter. Reports of a counselling programme called Men Overcoming 
Violence (MOVE) began to seep into the press in 1989.36 It was reported 
that these counselling programmes had received some cautious support 
from refuge workers. Gaye Gerrard, one of the women who ran Bolton's 
Fortalice Refuge, went on record as saying that "after 12 years of working 
with battered women she had come to the conclusion that, although she 
and her colleagues can offer temporary respite and care to the women, 
they are unable to bring about lasting change in the men." It was revealed 
that Fortalice had a working arrangement with the MOVE scheme and that 
spokespersons from both "believe that by operating side by side they have 
the first real chance of ending the violence." Spokesmen from the MOVE 
scheme stated that the success rate for the counselling was 60%, but the 
reporter cautioned that there was no way of independently evaluating this 
estimate. However, "the feeling that the idea is at least worth giving a 
chance is backed by those working at the women’s refuge at Bolton." The 
report ended by saying that:
for 11 years of dealing with the problem it was just 
like putting ointm ent on the wound," says Ms 
Gerrard. This is the only glimmer of hope for a real 
change.37
Sandra Horley let her reservations be known very quickly. In a letter 
to The Independent, printed five days later, she stated that "the Bolton 
group's estimate of a 60% success rate is grossly optimistic" and that "even
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Canadian therapists (where there are over 100 programmes in operation) 
are having severe misgivings about the effectiveness of their work with 
batterers."38 She added that, in Canada, owing to a rigorous policy of 
arrest, domestic violence had been reduced by 25%.
The debate did not end there. The next round was in The Times . 
There, below two photographs, one of an earnest looking bespectacled man 
identified as Adam Jukes and the other of a serious and scowling Sandra 
Horley, a full page article began by revealing that:
The police, so often the butt of criticism from the 
victims and their champions, are actively re ­
working their approach to "domestics". But the new 
slant on an old problem, and one that is meeting 
with opposition from some workers in the field, is 
help for the perpetrators rather than the victims.30
Adam Jukes, a psychotherapist, had started a 'Men's Centre' in North 
London where he and a team of other professionals had begun counselling 
men who batter in 1988. Jukes described his approach as 'pro-feminist' 
and built on a foundation of Kleinian psychoanalysis.40 The techniques 
used ranged from getting the batterers to keep diaries, to role playing and 
re-enactment of tense situations and something which Jukes called a 'tough 
love approach '41 This was aimed at altering the male gender identity 
which, according to him, is formed, at least in part, by an 'exorcism' of 
feminine traits such as vulnerability, dependence and neediness.
It was also revealed that the Dobashs had also become involved in 
bringing counselling programmes for men who batter to Great Britain. The 
Times informed its readership that Rebecca and Russell Dobash had been 
awarded a £250,000 urban aid grant from the Scottish Home and Health 
Department to establish a programme in Scotland. The Dobashs wished to
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see court mandated programs set up, where men would be compelled to 
attend.42
Sandra Horley was quoted in the same article as saying:
We are not ready for this yet, in my view. It's a 
distraction. It's almost as if we're saying the m en 
are sick, not criminals. Many men get angry an d  
frustrated but they don't use violence to control 
women. Why do we feel we have to provide this 
help? Is it to assuage our guilt? We don't do it for 
any other sort of crime.45
Again, Horley drove home the point that, in Canada, a rigorous arrest 
policy had lowered the rate of domestic violence by 25%. She advocated 
television and radio commercials emphasizing that wife beating is a crime 
and telling women where to go for help. Her desire for criminalization was 
reinforced by Assistant Chief Constable for South Wales Police, Alan 
Bourlet, who was reported to be helping many police forces establish a 
code of practice for dealing with domestics.
Sandra Horley explained her position again in March.44 According to 
her analysis, woman abuse occurs on such a massive scale that it should be 
viewed as a social rather than as an individual problem. She intimated 
that a shortage of resources meant that counselling programmes for 
batterers were a luxury.45 Instead of such programmes she argued that 
resources should go into a 'National Family Violence Clearing House’ which 
would centralize and co-ordinate statistics and records and monitor 
research and developments. She ended with the worry that this was not 
an immediate likelihood and, further, that:
government proposals to change the way board and 
lodging benefits are paid will force m any of 
Britain's refuges to close at a time when we need 
more resources for women, such as housing, child­
care, legal and medical services.4^
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Despite Horley1 s criticisms, it appears that counselling agencies for 
men who batter will continue to attract attention over the coming years. 
Early in 1991 one such group established The Everyman Line* a telephone 
’hotline' service for violent men. The approach of the Everyman Centre is 
targeted at violent men specifically and seeks their participation on a 
voluntary basis, although the centre also welcomes referrals from other 
agencies. Currently, the organizers are cultivating ties with local housing 
and social service agencies as well as the police. These efforts are at the 
beginning stages, however, and it is difficult to say what impact they may 
have, either on the problem itself or the politics of the issue. There will 
soon be attempts to affiliate these programmes nationally.47 The work of 
Rebecca and Russell Dobash in this area is also attracting considerable 
attention and, although many activists are critical of targeting resources on 
violent men in this way, it seems that this is indicative of a general trend 
in the social response to wife assault48
Treatment programmes for men who batter were not the only new 
initiatives attracting attention. In June of 1990 Home Office Minister John 
Patten made an announcement regarding domestic violence.49 His idea 
was to initiate 'at risk registers' for battered women in the manner of 
those for abused children. The idea was criticized by Sandra Horley who 
said that "a woman labeled 'abused' is not a woman protected." To her it 
seemed ludicrous to create records of abused women and went on to say 
that "the truth is that the at risk registers are an irrelevance. If men who 
use violence are dealt with swiftly and publicly the first time they commit 
the crime, women wouldn't need their names on any police list."50
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Patten made his announcement with much publicity in August 1990.51 
The gist of his message was that police were going to be compelled to take 
domestic violence more seriously. According to Patten the police were 
going to have to give up their ’low key' approach to the problem, set up 
registers of women at risk and, wherever possible, arrest the alleged 
offenders. The Independent reported that:
He [John Patten] criticized the previous attitudes of 
police and society in general to the problem: With 
domestic violence we are where we were 10 years 
ago with rape." Today, all police forces take rape 
victims seriously, he said. 5 2
The announcement was greeted with some caution by representatives 
of the refuge movement. A spokeswoman for Woman's Aid said that while 
it was encouraging to hear government ministers speaking out on the issue 
women’s shelters were constantly "full to overflowing and many are in 
permanent financial crisis".53 Accordingly, what was needed was not a 
new policy, but more money for support services for victims such as crisis 
hotlines, refuges and second stage housing. However, the newspaper 
coverage tended to focus coverage on the police, in particular, more 
domestic violence units were called for.
Sandra Horley's analysis emerged in the Police Review where she 
advocated a cautious optimism. She pointed out that the idea of 'at risk 
registers' for women victims of violent men would "place an un-necessary 
burden on an overworked police force." She also stated that, although 
guide-lines had been given to Chief Police Officers no such statement had 
been issued to the Crown Prosecution Service which only meant that the 
police were "trying to contain the problem of domestic violence with one 
hand tied behind their backs", although she also reminded police officers
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about clause 23 of the Criminal Justice Act, which permitted "written 
evidence to appear in court where a witness is too frightened to appear."54
In this article, Horley made it abundantly clear that she was in favour 
of criminalization however, most of the discussion was devoted to the need 
for refuge provision. According to her analysis, police action itself could 
not eradicate domestic violence and, with the heightened awareness of the 
issue, the numbers of women seeking assistance would rise. The real 
tragedy was that "we have only one eighth of the refuges required. The 
numbers of assaulted women seeking bedspaces exceed six times the 
available places." Again, she warned that:
Recently, there have been changes in the way the 
Department of Social Security pays benefits, for 
example, the withdrawal of accommodation payment 
for children over eleven has led to substantial loss 
of revenue. Many refuges may be faced with 
closure; as things are it will be impossible to cope 
with increasing numbers.55
In general she welcomed the Home Office guide-lines but pointed to the 
need for more funding for both domestic violence units and refuges. She 
even went so far as to recommend that refuges and the police join forces to 
lobby for such funding.56 "Meanwhile" she stated "I cannot emphasize 
enough the need to continue a rigorous arrest and charge policy."
By this time Horley had changed her argument somewhat. Five years 
previous her public pronouncements had been exclusively aimed at 
criminalization. Backed up with North American deterrence based 
research, she had campaigned tirelessly for an increased criminal justice 
response. By 1990 her position had shifted and, although criminalization 
was still considered central to her position, police action had come to share 
the stage with other methods of responding to the violence. She spoke
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publicly about a ’three pronged strategy' which comprised ’enforcement1, 
’prevention’ and 'services’.57 Enforcement concerned the criminal justice 
response and focused on a rigorous policy of arrest and prosecution, a line 
of reasoning she had been pursuing for some years. Prevention was 
considered a long term policy. Built on education, not only for school age 
children but also for professionals working in areas involving female 
victims of violent men and broad based public education through the 
media, it was intended to raise public awareness of the issue. Such 
awareness, based on a "policy of non-sexism and the challenging of 
traditional attitudes" was calculated to create a climate which fostered 
social change. According to Horley "preventing assaults stems future 
violence."
The third prong was, in many ways, the most important departure. 
This was targeted at services for battered women. Horley had begun to 
speak out publicly on the need for primary resources for battered women, 
re-emphasizing the role of the refuges in the overall response to the 
problem. She mentioned the current state of service provision in Canada:
Under the government policy to provide adequate 
emergency shelters (women's refuges), 22 million 
dollars of federal money has been allocated to build 
500 new shelters this year. 25,000 more women will 
be able to find safety. Shelters have 24 hour cover, 
trained counsellors, child care workers (2 workers 
to 1 child) and outreach workers.
The Canadian government knows that confronting 
domestic assault stems the tide of human misery and 
material cost. This is why they can justify such 
massive spending. They can justify it because in the 
long term, costs will be reduced. By operating a 
progressive model, between 1986 and the year 2000 
savings are estimated at just under 390 m illion  
dollars! And that is just for one province.58
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While some of her figures may have been abstract, this did enable her 
to point out that the record with regard to refuge provision in Britain was 
not very good. According to Horley, fifteen years after the Select 
Committee on Violence in Marriage Report had made recommendations for 
minimum refuge provision, set at one refuge space per ten thousand 
population, British refuge provision stood at only 200 refuges nationally, 
about one eighth of that required. In November 1990 she pointed out that
In 1971, the world’s first women's refuge w as 
founded in Britain - we had the initiative then, but 
we failed to build on it. Last month, when Canadian 
refuge workers asked me what progress was being 
achieved  in Britain, I have to admit, I felt 
ashamed.50
There was much to be ashamed of. In 1989 a report had emerged 
detailing the state of refuge provision in London. This is the most 
comprehensive report on refuge provision available in Britain in the late 
1980s and, unfortunately, it is confined to an assessment of the situation in 
London, however, some inkling of national provision can be extrapolated 
from the report.60 Quantification from this report is somewhat 
problematic because not all of the forty refuge groups in London with 
houses responded to the request for information. This meant that the 
findings contained in the report were based on information from only 31 
refuges, roughly three quarters of the refuges in Greater London. It was 
reported that:
30 refuges had a total of 389 women's bed-spaces and 
about 500 children's spaces. Of these totals, 3 Asian 
women's refuges had 21 spaces for women and 25 
children's spaces Ujima, the black women's refuge 
has 6 adult and 9 children's spaces. There are 
probably about 525 adult spaces and approximately
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650 children 's spaces in the whole of G reater 
London (figures provided by London Women's Aid)
These are maximum amounts and refuges a re  
severely overcrowded when these numbers are in 
residence.61
It was estimated that the refuges in London had 2300 women and 
3400 children pass through per year. It was further estimated that 
individual refuges turned away between fifty and eighty five percent of 
the women requesting refuge. The report concluded that refuge provision 
needed to be increased sixfold.62
It was also revealed in the report that, although conditions in refuges 
were very overcrowded, standards were high. This was primarily 
attributed to the high motivation of the work force which put in many 
hours of unpaid overtime. According to the report, salaries for workers in 
refuges ranged from £9,000 to £13,576 per annum, but an estimated 1,307 
hours of unpaid overtime per week for the whole of the London refuge 
network contributed to the available labour power and lowered labour 
costs.63 In addition, many more hours of unpaid work were carried out by 
volunteers. The dedication of these workers meant that the service 
available was of high quality, especially given the severe shortage of 
resources.
One of the central preoccupations of this report was racism. It was 
revealed that the refuge movement as a whole suffered from 
institutionalized racism. This was reflected in the relatively poorer 
services and lower funding available to ethnic minority refuges. Evidence 
of racism in refuges was also mentioned in the report. The commitment to 
overcoming these problems was evident. It was recognized that awareness
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of ethnic and cultural differences were central to offering a service to 
victims of male violence.64
The centrality of racism in this report brings up another aspect of the 
public debate which was gaining increasing importance at the end of the 
decade. But, before turning to the subject of the politics of racism as it co­
articulated with that of sexual violence, it should be mentioned that the 
fiscal crisis of local government brought about by the central government’s 
aborted attempt to introduce the unpopular Toll Tax' and the consequent 
short fall of revenue in many localities exacerbated the funding shortfall 
experienced by many refuges. As of this writing, the London Borough 
Grants Committee has been unable to allocate funds for refuge provision in 
London. This has resulted in a severe crisis for refuge provision. Chiswick 
has made redundant all of its refuge workers and is only able to maintain 
its management infrastructure. Many other refuges are in danger of 
folding altogether. The future looks rather bleak for refuge provision in 
the British context, which is tragic since this is the only service which 
provides unequivocal support for women victims of male violence 
regardless of their circumstances.
Black Women and the issue
of domestic violence
There was some ambiguity in how both feminist academics and 
battered women's advocates felt about the issue of criminalization. One of 
the areas of concern was the issue of racism. Elizabeth Stanko had alluded 
to the problems of policing in a society divided along racial, gender and 
class lines and specifically noted that black women could potentially loose 
out under a policy of rigorous criminalization.65 Spokespersons from the
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Women1 s Aid Federation also made public their concern about the how 
they saw the issues of race, male violence and policing intersecting.66
Black women have to deal with the racism of the 
police at the  same tim e as coping with the 
emergency for which they are requesting help.
Police racism can be compounded if the assaulted 
woman does not speak English. In addition, black 
women's groups have pointed out how the police 
may use a supposed response to violence against 
women in o rder to increase surveillance of the 
black community.67
Other battered women’s advocates, for example Sandra Horley and Susan 
Edwards, showed less public concern about these issues. Pronouncements 
documented elsewhere in this book in favour of criminalization made 
throughout the 1980s show this to be of secondary importance to them. 
The resulting balance achieved by these contradictory impulses amongst 
advocates for battered women was a broad tendency to endorse the notion 
that increased police involvement was desirable. There was an attempt at 
cooperation and mutual aid between all parties. Feminist researchers 
participated in domestic violence projects which also involved the police; 
sometimes in conjunction with local Town Hall administrations.68 Refuge 
workers from Women’s Aid attended multi-agency meetings organized 
through the auspices of community relations officers at Station level and 
police have sought to create links with refuges in a variety of locations 
with some success.69
There were efforts by some black women to organize on the issue of 
violence in the home on their own behalf. The experience of ethnic 
minority people with regard to State involvement in the family violence 
had not been altogether positive and charges of racism were leveled
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against the police and other State agencies.70 Women campaigning on the 
issues of racism and male violence at the same time walked a tightrope as 
is evident from the position articulated by Southall Black Sisters71:
On the one hand, we are involved in campaigns 
against police brutality, deaths in police custody and 
immigration fishing raids. On the other, we are 
faced with the daily beatings, rape and sexual 
harassment. We are forced to make demands of the 
police to protect our lives from the very men along 
whose side we fight in anti-racist struggles . . . 
both struggles have to be waged sim ultaneously 
without losing sight of the consequences each can 
have on the other. Our demands must take both 
struggles into account.72
Feeling themselves marginalized both as women and as members of a 
subjugated ethnic group and confronting the police institution as an 
undifferentiated monolith their position came out sounding paranoid:
. . . we must recognize that the police force itself is 
becom ing increasingly  soph istica ted  in its 
operations and in setting its own priorities. It has 
taken upon itself the task of social control, and it 
has been campaigning vigorously for the pow ers 
and resources to carry out the task. It is our 
responsibility, in the light of our own experiences, 
to fight for the powers and resources of the police 
force to be redirected to meet our needs.7^
There were few Black female academics writing about the issue but, at 
the end of the decade, the most influential was Amina Mama.74 Most of 
Mama's criticisms were leveled at Social Services. However, with regard to 
the policing of domestic violence, she noted that there was little need for 
increased police powers since the main problem appeared to be the refusal 
of police officers to use those sections of the law already open to them in 
domestic cases which were "thought not to be proper police work". One
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central concern for her, with regard to responses by State Agencies more 
broadly, were the consequences of immigration law. She was able to show 
that some husbands use the threat of deportation as a means to secure the 
compliance of their wives and, further, that the high priority that police 
placed upon uncovering immigration infringements affected how they 
proceeded in incidents involving ethnic minorities. As a consequence, 
many black women felt reluctant to call the police. Mama documented 
that black women approaching local authorities for help were being 
required to prove entitlement to provision before being eligible for 
assistance. In some cases, women were advised by social service workers 
to leave their husbands or risk loosing their children; however, in some 
circumstances this meant that some women faced deportation by the Home 
Office. This had tragic consequences for mothers of British bom children 
who, rather than face separation from their children, went back into 
violent households. Mama noted that autonomous refuges appeared to be 
the only form of unequivocal support available to women victims of male 
violence and applauded the WAFE's commitment to anti-racism. She also 
noted that the provision of such services was low.
Independent women's refuges, particularly for Asian women, had 
been established in several communities in Britain by the end of the 
decade, although similar resourcing problems to that of the WAFE, 
compounded because of marginalization due to ethnic or cultural 
differences, were encountered. Black women also organized on the issue of 
wife battery in other ways. For example, Southall Black sisters 
campaigned on behalf of Kiranjit Ahluwalia who was imprisoned for the 
1989 murder of her husband Deepak Ahluwalia. This is significant 
because it represents the first political effort to invoke the so called
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’battered women’s syndrome defence' in a case of spousal homicide in the 
U.K. On another front, Camden Black Sisters had, by late 1990, formed an 
informal network for intervening in family violence situations in order to 
circumvent the need for police intervention.75
The involvement of ethnic minority women in the issue of m en’s 
violence produced contradictory impulses. On the question of State 
involvement in domestic violence, particularly with regard to the use of 
the police, ethnic minority women were unenthusiastic about pro-arrest 
policies. This is congruent with observations made to me by operational 
police officers that many ethnic minority women do not wish to involve 
the police.76 It seems that the strategy of refuge provision is somewhat 
less problematic, although the murder of Blawant Panesar in an Asian 
Women's Refuge earlier in the decade also highlighted women’s lack of 
safety and the continuing need for intervention involving, at times, the 
coercive power of the police.
Policing and domestic violence
at the end of the 1980s
The concerns of ethnic minority women over the policing of male 
violence mentioned in the last section, seem to naturally bring the 
discussion back to consider the politics and practice of policing. In chapter 
five, the arrival of the issue of domestic violence on the police agenda was 
located at an historically low ebb for the legitimacy of policing. The 
question arises as to how police legitimacy has faired over the course of 
the decade since the Scarman report was conceived. As it turns out, 
developments in policing over the past decade, such as the adoption of
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community oriented policing strategies, efforts to professionalize policing 
and the targeting of new types of crime, for example racial harassment and 
domestic violence, appear to have done little to assuage relations between 
the police and public. While it is certainly true that the majority of the 
British public rate the general performance of the police quite high:
Three sweeps of the BCS and independent opinion 
polls reveal there has been a steady erosion of 
confidence in the police. Since the first BCS in 1982, 
the percentage of the public giving them  the 
highest marks has dropped from 43 percent to only 
25 percent. Only a few have ever given the police 
extremely low ratings, but enthusiasm for their 
performance has been on the wane. This decline 
can be observed among most major social groupings, 
in almost all kinds of communities and among crime 
victims.77
Of particular relevance with regard to the policing of domestic 
violence, the British Crime Survey analysis revealed that, as a group, 
victims of crime coming into contact with the police exhibited a marked 
decline in confidence in them. This erosion of legitimacy, expressed as 
confidence in the police, has happened in spite of the declared 
determination of chief officers to improve the delivery of police services. 
For example John Newing, Chief Constable for Derbyshire, stated publicly 
in 1990 that:
I stand shoulder to shoulder with James Anderton 
when he said, in defining community policing, that 
when people are being beaten on the head what 
they want from police is protection ! . . . When 
women and girls are being raped and assaulted what 
they surly want is protection  . . . crime has to be 
detected and criminals caught and secured and 
nothing must turn the police away from that . . That 
is the reality of community policing.7 ^
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At the end of the decade, another attempt to articulate the community 
policing philosophy was made under the rubric of the 'Plus-programme'. 
This programme emerged in 1988 out of a report on the Metropolitan 
Police made by Wolff Olins. Corporate identity consultants were to lead 
the last attempt of the 1980s to realign policing around a more service 
oriented philosophy. Integral to the Plus Programme was the adoption of a 
"statement of common purpose and values" the text of which began to 
appear in foyer’s of all Metropolitan police stations in mid-1990. It read:
The purpose of the Metropolitan Police Service is to 
uphold the law fairly and firmly; to prevent crime, 
to pursue and bring to justice those who break the 
law; to keep the Queen’s peace; to protect, help and 
reassure people in London; and to be seen to do all 
this with integrity, common sense and judgement. 
We must be compassionate, courteous and patient, 
acting without fear or favour or prejudice to the 
rights of others. We need to be professional, calm 
and restrained in the face of violence and apply 
only that force which is necessary to accomplish 
our lawful duty.
We must strive to reduce the fears of the public, and 
so far as we can, to reflect their priorities in the 
action we take. We must respond to well-founded 
criticism with a willingness to change.79
The high ideals of the 'new' police philosophy, were contradicted by 
the reality of ground level policing. For example, Newing alluded to the 
scissure between the public and front line police officers when he stated:
. . . the people clearly favour the idea of community 
constables, patrolling on foot, with a c a r i n g  
approach and exercising discretion in en fo rc ing  
the law. This is set against the firm, p o s i t i v e  
enforcem ent approach preferred by a majority of 
police officers.8 ^
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What Chief Constable Newing euphemistically referred to as the 'positive 
enforcement approach' preferred by most officers were precisely the same 
police practices which had engendered the 'crisis in confidence' of which he 
spoke. Throughout the decade continuing scandals, and reports of police 
wrong-doing and mismanagement seeped into the press.81 This suggests 
that, despite the efforts of top level police management, they were able to 
make little impact on the realities of ground level policing.
As was explained in chapter five, community policing became central
to the police management agenda for organizational change during the
1980s. However, contemporaneous research did not reveal any deep
changes in the orientation of front line policing. While officers performing
community relations and crime prevention functions proliferated and,
despite the desire of senior management to develop a new philosophy of
policing, there was little indication that this had manifested itself in a
change in practice. So, for example, Herman Goldstein, well known for his
espousal of the 'problem oriented approach to policing', a policing
philosophy which did entail a fundamental realignment of front line police
practice, overthrowing the primacy of the arrest and clear-up rates as a
measure of police effectiveness, noted that:
the present structure of the Metropolitan Police is 
probably out of step with the approach and its [the 
problem-oriented approach] adoption would involve 
risk taking and the abandonm ent of some of the 
traditional expectations of line managers.8 2
Goldstein cited a number of characteristics of the Metropolitan Police 
that made the adoption of the 'problem oriented approach' or, one might 
add, any other re-definition of the police task involving realignment of the
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police function (for example towards 'social service policing') problematic. 
The characteristics cited by Goldstein were:
•The process may be seen as being in opposition to 
the centralized policy making which is likely to 
dominate a Force as large as the Metropolitan Police.
•The Organizational structure, and its expectations 
of m anagem ent may be in conflict with local 
problem solving.
•A Chief Superintendent's degrees of freedom are 
likely to be insufficien t to support rad ical 
initiatives.
•As a result of rapid personnel movements, the 
divisional management team is so unstable as to  
defeat long term problem solving.
•M anagement comm unications are designed by 
"line" or "territory" - not by problem.88
The findings cited by Goldstein had been first published in 1984. 
During the intervening years Metropolitan Police Commissioner Kenneth 
Newman and his successor Peter Imbert had made efforts to reduce the 
rigidity of the organization. Newman, in particular, had noted that there 
was a tendency to "try and cope with problems through superficial changes 
in the bureaucratic system, rather than looking for real solutions" and that 
"too much energy and effort are wasted in keeping the organization going 
instead of serving the mainline job of policing."84 What was required in 
these circumstances was a substantial restructuring of the organization 
amounting to (in Kuhnian terms) a revolution. In response to this need 
police policy makers adopted the notion of community policing, initially 
propounded in this country by John Alderson. This notion expressed a 
desire for 'personalized service' which could not be fulfilled by the 
bureaucratic/professional model of policing. Community policing required
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a change in the use of the law, and in the standards used to apply the law, 
as well as changes in the 'contract' between the police and public. In 
addition, structural changes in the police organization, relating especially to 
the de-centralization and de-structuring of the hierarchy and a 
reconceptualization of such matters as training, recruitment, evaluation, 
promotion and rewards would have had to be undertaken. Any such 
change would be exhibited by a radical reformulation of the linguistic- 
authority-structure of policing.
Efforts intended to help accomplish this shift were numerous 
throughout the 1980s. In this regard Newing drew attention to Crime 
Prevention, Neighbourhood Watch and multi-agency initiatives as 
examples of changes in approach. In the same breath he also noted both 
new legislation and new types of crime. In this regard the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act, the 1988 Criminal Justice Act, new firearms 
legislation and laws to control football hooliganism as well as the mandate 
to intervene in cases of child abuse and domestic violence were 
mentioned.85 One could also add community consultative groups, lay 
visitor panels and racial violence to the list.
Despite these myriad changes the comprehensive structural reform 
implied by the notion of community oriented policing was not brought 
about. Indeed, the fundamental tension between 'hard' and 'soft' police 
roles that Scarman spoke of were never really reconciled. The notion of 
community-based policing was of limited utility in re-forming the 
Metropolitan and, by extension, the British Police, because it avoided 
recognizing that the central core of policing is the ability to use force in 
maintaining order and enforcing the law.86 In so doing, the initiatives that 
characterized community policing: crime prevention officers; community
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liaison officers; and other specialized functions such as racial incident 
squads and domestic violence units, became separate units doing special 
tasks. This left the basic role of front line police virtually unchanged and 
front line police were able to view the roles performed by these specialist 
units as "not part of the job". In fact, the the practical initiatives of 
community policing served to reinforce the prevailing bureaucratic 
approach and the values of a military oriented professionalism, the very 
values that internal reformers were seeking to change in order to 
implement the community policing paradigm. In short, the traditional 
linguistic-authority-structure of policing was ratified by the entire process 
and no Kuhnian revolution was achieved.
What is evident from the field work portion of this study is that, with 
regard to domestic violence, for the ground level police officers the 
politically defined aim of the elimination of the problem of domestic 
violence was an unrealizable one, in part because of definitional problems 
of what constituted 'domestic violence’. To front line police officers, 
accustomed to viewing calls for service as varied as neighbour disputes, 
landlord tenant disputes and wife battery as 'domestics' it was never clear 
why disputes between husbands and wives should be elevated for special 
concern.87
Such special concerns were seen as being 'just politics', so that, at the 
same time that police were being reprimanded for misuse of the law and 
for ignoring the maxim that 'a person is innocent until proven guilty', front 
line officers were also encouraged to adopt a policy of presumptive arrest 
in cases of violence between husband and wife. To operational officers this 
was seen as purely contradictory. As was shown in chapter seven, a policy 
of presumptive arrest was, to the police officers charged with
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implementing it, contrary to their way of framing the law. In order to 
dissolve this contradiction, a re-ordering of the police task, and a 
consequent reformulation of this linguistic framework, would have had to 
be undertaken. That is, a substantive definition of the problem of 
domestic violence would have had to have been developed and a 
realignment of what police officers would be expected to do in line with 
that definition would have had to be developed.
However, instead of bringing practical police intervention in line with 
the needs of a particular understanding of domestic violence, attention was 
devoted to 'how it should look on paper'. Experimental domestic violence 
units did make attempts to modify police practice resulting in some change 
in the linguistic-authority-structure for policing interpersonal violence as 
applied in those instances, but this was only marginally successful. What 
tended to be accomplished, instead, was a reification of the traditional 
analytical categories for policing interpersonal violence. As a consequence, 
the long term achievement seems likely to be the development of 
alternative objectives by officers working in this area. These alternative 
objectives, unapparent to outside observers, relate to the existence of a 
rank structured bureaucracy which provides the members of each unit 
with organizational goals, usually summed up in terms of arrest rates and 
clear up rates. The manufacture of these statistics, related in fundamental 
ways to survival and promotional prospects within the rank structure, 
becomes an abstract exercise where the achievement of parity between 
arrests rates for different types of crime (ie. arrest rates for domestics are 
1% higher/lower than they are for burglary), and the manufacture of 
appropriately high clear up rates becomes the raison d'etre of policing in 
these instances. This raises questions about the creation, reinforcement
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and eventual strengths of such units; for once a squad is set up and the 
statistical justification is passed on to the media, the police institution is 
provided with a rationale for further expanding its resource base. This has 
not escaped the notice of police policy makers. For example, Chief 
Constable Newing stated that the innovations which comprised the recent 
initiatives to overhaul the police organization, of which innovations in the 
policing of domestic violence was an example, were all "expected to be 
police led and have considerable manpower implications."88
While progressive ideologies such as community oriented policing 
have served to secure the growth of the police organization they have 
helped less in regard to the legitimacy crisis. This rhetoric was designed to 
convince the public of ,effectiveness, by marshaling a language based on 
analytical categories which elicit the appearance of action. Such categories 
must also create the appearance of effectiveness. However, police policy 
makers only set a trap for themselves by building up public expectations 
about their ability to control crime.89 This is particularly visible with 
regard to the policing of domestic violence as it was presented in the mid- 
1980s. Drawing on notions of the deterrence power of arrest, official 
policy served to create the impression that the police were in a position to 
intervene decisively in a wide spread social problem and this was widely 
advertised. While this may have had an immediate pay-off in terms of 
police public relations, the irony is that police pronouncements on the issue 
served to eclipse political pressure to provide primary resources to 
victims, that is the refuges and other services, thereby undermining the 
overall social response to domestic violence. By so doing, police 
undermined their own ability to respond, and to be seen to respond, to the 
problem. Police efforts to address the problem of domestic violence served
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to inflate victim's and, more broadly the public's, expectations. At the 
same time, a more circumspect assessment of the broad social response to 
the problem would have indicated that provision was, at best, stalled at a 
fairly low level of provision or, at worst, actually deteriorating. It is small 
wonder, then, that victims of crime indicated a decline in confidence in 
police services over the course of the decade.
The considerable rise in rates of reporting and clear-up rates for 
domestic violence were looked upon, by police management, as a sign of 
improvement in police practice. However, the death of a woman which 
took place in the Stoke Newington domestic violence unit on April 29,1991 
made it clear to refuge workers that the proliferation of domestic violence 
units and the innovations in the policing of domestic violence that had 
taken place over the decade did not herald any watershed in the history of 
men's violence against women.90 While workers in the shelter movement 
and victims of domestic violence continued to draw on police services, in 
many instances positively, there remained much room for scepticism as 
police officers at every level in the organization continued to view the 
issue in terms of 'the figures'. At the same time that the figures were 
improving, given the entrenchment of the traditional linguistic-authority- 
structure for policing interpersonal violence, the police continued to 
provide a poor social service and inadequate, inappropriate and  
inconsistent law enforcement.
Concluding Remarks
The history of the issue of domestic violence continues to unfold. 
Currently, it appears that a new consensus, built around a new paradigm
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based on law enforcement combined with treatment for men who batter, is 
in the offing. This thesis has endeavoured to illuminate a complex political 
process whereby the social response to violence by men against women 
taking place in an intimate setting has been negotiated. That negotiation 
has not taken place between equals and it was shown that some have more 
power to define the problem than others. In terms of the cu rren t 
paradigm being being presented to the public, it seems that intellectual 
communities founded on practices of law enforcement a n d  
psychological/medical practices are making the major contributions to the 
new vocabulary and that refuge based articulations are likely to have even 
less influence than in the past.
This is illuminating with regard to the sociology of knowledge 
approach developed in the first chapter. With regard to the establishment 
of hnguistic-authority-structures it has been concretely demonstrated that 
such a bounded discourse need not have as its base a readily definable and 
unitary institutional base. In chapter six it was shown how such a 
bounded discourse, based on the deterrence value of an arrest response to 
calls for service involving violence between intimates, could be built up by 
individuals between institutions. Thus, social scientists, refuge activists, 
police policy makers, critics of the police, and other political pressure 
groups could all contribute to the forging of a specific version of a social 
problem.
The discursive practices of the social scientific community were of 
central importance in this. The primary contribution of social scientists to 
the development of the paradigm was the notion of the 'domestic violence 
incident'. This concept was the product of a specific research practice, that 
being the conduct of surveys of victims. The entrenchment of the category
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of 'incident' in the broad discourse about the issue of violence against 
wives was particularly important because it was covalent with how other 
social researchers, concerned with the practice of policing, as well as police 
practitioners themselves, conceived of interpersonal violence generally. 
This enabled the manufacture of an especially powerful version of 'what is 
to be done' emerging from research which utilized the experimental 
method. Various versions of deterrence based research were conducted, 
all based upon the notion that there were incidents of domestic violence 
which could be measured. Evidence of the possibility of controlling such 
incidents had a particular resonance when it reached the public, not only 
because the research conducted was carried out along lines laid down by 
'hard science', and hence wore the shroud of objectivity, but also because 
the notion of the domestic violence incident was firmly entrenched in the 
vocabulary prior to the conduct of such experiments. The grand, 
conspicuous notions of 'arrest is best', 'booking has a bite' and 'deterrence' 
were so potent because of subtle, unrecognized analytical categories 
already embedded in everyday language which shaped people's 
perceptions.
Of course, not all investigators subscribed to this conception. Some 
work attacked the notion of the social problem as incidents of violence in a 
sea of otherwise tranquil normality. The feminist version of the discourse, 
pejoratively labeled ideological by those who propounded the scientific 
view, tended to advocate a process of empowerment of women in order to 
overcome what was seen as the ubiquity of men's violence to women. This 
empowerment, particularly in the early days of the discourse, was to be 
achieved through institutions like Rape Crisis Centres and Women's 
Refuges. The eclipse of this practice was conterminus with the rise to
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prominence of the notion of the domestic violence incident. As the notion 
of domestic violence incidents which could be measured, controlled, 
manipulated, and eliminated rose to prominence in public discourse the 
notion that women's experience of male violence as the experience of 
everyday violence was gradually, although not totally, submerged. The 
notion of protection slowly emerged in feminist discourse in place of the 
concept of empowerment as many began to see the problem in terms of 
discrete instances of male violence subject to targeted intervention.
Of course, social scientists were not the only contributors to the 
discourse, many others, including police policy makers and refuge activists, 
contributed to the forging of the criminalization paradigm. The relation 
between these different spokespersons is important because, while the 
hegemony of a particular hnguistic-authority-structure may be achieved 
through articulations of many actors from many institutional sites, this 
does not necessarily imply conspiracy, or even agreement between these 
different people. The unfixity of meaning of abstract analytical categories 
guarantees that any linguistic utterance will say many things to many 
people. Thus, as was shown in Chapter Six, the emergence of the linguistic- 
authority-structure of the criminalization of domestic violence was brought 
about in the context of profound disagreement and the heightened political 
contestability of British policing. In this circumstance, competition, rather 
than cooperation, between actors on different sites of institutional power 
produced a bounded discourse about the nature of the appropriate social 
response to domestic violence.
All of the versions of the issue which contributed to the emergence of 
this bounded discourse purported to pursue popular goals presented as 
though the alternative were refusal to give the public what it wants.
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Authorities always expect the credit for their symbolic objectives, 
regardless of their actual accomplishments. Little surprise then, when 
domestic violence is 'prioritized' in a way that does relatively little to 
empower the victims themselves. The real alternative to symbolic official 
actions is not denial of popular goals, nor their redefinition, but their 
achievement in practice as well as rhetoric. The present, dominant 
linguistic construction of perception blurs recognition of alternative 
possibilities.
The obviation of alternative possibilities for the social response to 
domestic violence is nowhere more apparent than within the bounded 
discourse that circumscribes the actions of front line police officers. The 
process that produced the criminalization paradigm took little account of 
the discourse of operational policing. In chapters Seven and Eight the 
notion of bounded discourses was applied rigorously to data derived from 
the field work conducted within the police institution. Using the notion of 
a linguistic-authority-structure as a hermeneutic device, the patterned 
response of police to calls for service involving interpersonal violence was 
laid out and systematically deconstructed. The mutability of concepts was 
shown, but at the same time the structured nature of the police response 
was revealed. The limitations of this structured response were made 
evident primarily by showing how police officers attempt to think outside 
of the analytical categories of their intellectual community and also by 
showing police attempts at innovative responses to these calls for service. 
The shortcomings of the police response also tended to be confirmed by 
research conducted by sociologists studying victims of wife battery. Many 
studies cited in this thesis revealed perceptions of an overall poor police 
response held by victims of domestic violence.
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Any analysis which takes as its point of departure the changing, 
conflicting and problematic perceptions of reality remains within the 
classic terrain of the sociology of knowledge. Such an approach rejects 
what Neitzsche referred to as ’the dogma of immaculate perception1. It is 
an attempt to comes to terms with the whole range of "alternative 
symbolic evocations."91 To paraphrase Murray Edelman, the lesson is that 
the fundamental influences upon political beliefs flow from language that 
is not perceived of as political at all. Accordingly, there "is a level of 
politics that conventional political science rarely touches, but one that 
explains a great deal of the overt political maneuvering and governmental 
action that focuses public attention."92 When social scientists became 
involved in the study of men’s violence towards women they actively 
cultivated a language of objectivity, apparently rejecting political 
formulations of the problem. They would have done well to learn the 
lesson of Ivan in the Brothers Karamazov; that 'everything in this life is 
political'.
1 In this respect it is interesting to note Finkelhor D. Hotaling G.T. and Yllo Stopping Family 
Violence Sage Publications Beverly Hills © 1988. The stated goal of this book was to "foster 
more and better research into family violence" In fact, Stopping Family Violence is an 
attempt to set the research agenda for research in the 'Family Violence1 field for the 1990s. It 
contains over thirty research proposals, complete with research goals, design considerations, 
time scales and budget estimations. There were three different areas of research outlined: 
Physical Child Abuse, Child Sexual Abuse and Spouses Abuse. The authors noted that "some 
of the most serious obstacles to better research on family violence lie, curiously enough, not 
in the realm of resources or science but in ethical problems." (emphasis mine J.S. pg. 121)
2 In Britain, estimates of 'the size of the problem' have all emerged from more general criminal
victimization surveys. Thus, the British Crime Survey found that 10% of assault victims were 
women who had been attacked by present or previous boyfriends or husbands. Hough, J.M. and 
Mayhew, P., The British Crime Survey; First Report Home Office Research Study #76, London; 
HMSO ©1983. Estimates from the second sweep of the BCS indicate that one in eight incidents 
of assault involved family, lovers or ex-lovers; amounting to 200,000 incidents per year. 
Hough and Mayhew indicate that this is probably an under estimate. See Hough, J.M. and 
Mayhew, P., Taking account of crime; key findings from the 1984 British Crime Survey. Home 
Office Research Study # 85, London; HMSO © 1985. Other studies, such as the Islington Crime
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Survey have also provided estimates. Both sweeps of the British Crime Survey have been 
criticized by feminists for revealing low rates of women's victimization.
3 Edwards S.S.M. Policing 'Domestic1 Violence: Women the Law and the State Sage Publications, 
New York© 1989 pg. 11
4 Terminology relating to ethnic origin is currently highly contested. An example of the 
contestability of categories relating to ethnic origin is found in the 1991 British census form 
which provided three categories of Black: Black African, Black Afro Caribbean and Black 
other; in addition to several categories for people from the Indian sub-continent and some, 
minimal, effort to distinguish between people from various parts of the Far East. In relation 
to the issue of domestic violence the categories of ethnicity are no less problematic. Rather 
than trying to resolve these issues, I will simply resort to common sense distinctions while 
attempting to provide clarity and avoid racial stereotyping. However, for an interesting and 
comprehensive discussion of the terminological debate see: Bowling B. 'Racist Harassment and 
the Process of Victimization: conceptual and methodological implications for the local crime 
survey' in Realist Criminology: Crime and Policing in the 1990s J. Lowman and B. Maclean 
(eds.) Vancouver. Collective Press © 1991
5 General surveys of victims of crime did seek to tap incidents of domestic violence, of course. 
However, it was widely acknowledged that, with the exception of the Islington Crime Survey, 
general victim surveys had not provided the sensitive interviewing techniques thought 
necessaiy to uncover a true measure of incidence. In this regard, the argument for a national 
family violence survey could have been made in order to obtain a broader picture of the 
problem, in particular, with regard to domestic violence in a rural setting. To my knowledge 
no such proposal was ever made. However, much of the feminist work desirous of a measure of 
incidence did call for improved official statistics. One of the more recent reports to do this 
is: McGibbon A., Cooper L., and Kelly L. "What Support?” The Final Report of the 
Hammersmith and Fulham Council Community Police Committee Domestic Violence Project. 
The Polytechnic of North London, 1989 pg. 6
6 It is not, of course, true to say that American research has totally ignored the historical 
dimension. Important contributions have been made. One obvious exception to this is the 
work of Susan Schechter discussed in chapter nine. Another important example of historical 
work is: Pleck, E., Domestic Tyranny: The Making of American Social Policy against Family 
Violence from Colonial Times to the Present. Oxford University Press, New York, © 1987. 
With regard to the notion, developed in this thesis, that the issue of wife battery has been 
'translated' into an issue for policing, Pleck has noted that: "No social movement survives the 
process of community acceptance with all of its radical ideas intact. The battered women's 
cause had been considerably tamed by the coalitions and compromises it made in order to 
receive state and federal funding. Wife beating and rape became law and order issues. To be 
sure, there were some Victorian echoes in the periodic calls for the harsh punishment of 
perpetrators, although these cries for vengeance were considerably muted. Law enforcement 
agencies were concerned - as before - with strengthening their control over violent criminals. 
But the needs of women victims received a higher priority now than in the nineteenth century. 
Broadening the movement diluted its feminism and altered the character of battered women's 
shelters. The issue of wife beating has always had a protean character, appealing to divergent 
groups for different reasons. And yet the modem coalition of social casework, feminism, and 
law and order proved to be more successful than any preceding effort." pgs. 199-200
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7 Radford J. 'Policing Male Violence - Policing Women' in Women. Violence and Social Control J. 
Hanmer and M. Maynard (eds.) Macmillian Press, Basingstoke, © 1987 pg. 30
8 Kelly originally developed this concept in her doctoral dissertation. She makes it clear that 
the concept of a continuum is not related to a ranked hierarchy of violence with less severe 
forms of sexual harassment at one end and rape and sex murder at the other. For her all forms 
of male violence towards women are to be conceived of as a complex phenomenon and 
hierarchical ranking according to type would be to deny the subjectivity with which women 
experience male violence. The concept, as she conceives it, is related to the frequencies which 
women experience various forms of male violence. She stated, in her dissertation, that "every 
woman interviewed was aware of the threat of sexual violence and most had experienced sexual 
harassment, sexual assault and pressure to have sex in their lives. These forms of sexual 
violence were also more common in the sense that they were more likely to occur on multiple 
occasions." One interview respondent stated that "it is on the street all the time, it's almost a 
background of what going out of doors seems to mean." (pg. 132-33) It should be mentioned 
that her interview sample was obtained by a "multi varied approach to purposive sampling" 
(pg. 70); interviewees were contacted through articles in news papers a advertising through 
posters and through a series of talks given by the researcher. In all sixty women were 
interviewed. Kelly L. Women's Experience of Sexual Violence doctoral dissertation submitted 
to Essex University November 1985. (unpublished document)
9 Kelly L. 'The Continuum of Sexual Violence' in Women. Violence and Social Control J. Hanmer
and M. Maynard (eds.) Macmillian Press, Basingstoke, © 1987 pg. 48
10 ibid. pg. 37
11 ibid. pg. 38 This tale is mirrored in other contributions to the feminist discussion. 
Elizabeth Stanko drew upon the policing literature in an essay entitled 'Missing the Mark? 
Policing Battering' to show how the occupational orientation of police rank and file prevents 
the adoption of a simple solution to wife battery such as that of presumptive arrest policies. 
She reminded readers about the masculinist sub-culture of policing citing Skolnick to the 
extent that the occupational culture of policing is steeped with images and expectations of a 
'macho-style' masculinity. See: Hanmer, J. Radford J. and Stanko E.A. Women. Policing and 
Male Violence: International Perspectives. Routledge, London and New York, © 1989.
12 op. cit Radford, 1987 pg. 44
13 Stanko E.A. Intimate Intrusions Women’s Experience of Male Violence Routledge and Kegan 
Paul © 1985 . pg. 4
14 ibid. pg. 95-96
15 Hanmer, J. Radford J. and Stanko E.A. Women. Policing and Male Violence: International 
Perspectives. Routledge, London and New York, © 1989 pg.192
16 ibid. pg. 66-67
17 Reiner, R. The Politics of the Police. Wheatsheaf, London © 1985 quoted in Stanko E.A. 
'Missing the Mark? Policing Battering' in Hanmer, J., Radford J., and Stanko E.A. Women. 
Policing and Male Violence: International Perspectives. Routledge, London and New York, © 
1989 pg. 66
18 ibid. pg. 67
19 ibid. pg. 54
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20 Edwards S.S.M. 'Provoking Her Own Demise1: From Common Assault to Homicide' in Women. 
Violence and Social Control J. Hanmer and M. Maynard (eds.) Macmillian Press, Basingstoke, © 
1987 pg. 153
21 ibid. pg. 152
22 Edwards S.S.M. Policing 'Domestic' Violence: Women the Law and the State Sage Publications, 
New York © 1989 pg. 50
23 ibid. pg. 236
24 ibid. pg 236
25 McGibbon A., Cooper L., and Kelly L. "What Support?” The Final Report of the Hammersmith 
and Fulham Council Community Police Committee Domestic Violence Project. The Polytechnic 
of North London, 1989
26 ibid. pgs. 90-101
27 See also: Hall R.E. Ask Anv Woman: a London inquiry into rape and sexual assault. Falling 
Woman Press in conjunction with Women Against Rape. © 1985
28 Edwards 1989. pg. 168
29 ibid. pg. 168
30 The Guardian March 23, 1989
31 ibid.
32 ibid.
33 ibid. Other news stories were very pessimistic indeed. For example, The Sunday Times for 
March 19, 1989 reported the details of another case which was connected with Chiswick 
Women's Aid. As it was presented, the case of 'Edith' showed that women victims of domestic 
violence face an uphill battle if they wish to receive 'Justice' in the courts. Edith was 
attacked for the second time in April of 1986 leaving her with a crushed vertebra, a bald 
patch and recurrent breathing problems after her fiance had tried to strangle her. According 
to the newspaper report, when Edith attempted to report the assault to the police they refused 
to take a statement and told her that since it was a 'domestic' she would have to pursue it as a 
civil matter. Counsellors at Chiswick encouraged her to follow the case up and supported her 
in her efforts. The police were less than sympathetic and one officer was reported to have ■ 
said he often "felt like strangling his wife after a long day". It took seven months to persuade 
the police to take a statement. Eventually the case reached court and the ex-fiance was bound 
over to keep the peace and fined £250. This newspaper report also gave details of the Met's 
new policy on domestic violence, indicating that reported incidents of domestic violence were 
up by 142% and that arrests were up by 86%. According to a spokesman at Scotland Yard the 
problem no longer lay with the police, rather "the crucial period of time is between the arrest 
of the man and the case coming to court" a problem over which the police have no control.
34 Observer, Sunday 12, November, 1989
35 ibid.
36 The Independent Monday February 6,1989
37 ibid.
38 The Independent Saturday February 11, 1989
39 The Times Wednesday February 22, 1989
40 Personal communication to author.
41 Also personal communication to author, but see: The Times Wednesday February 22, 1989
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42 There is some difficulty with this. In my conversations with Adam Jukes he informed me that 
compelling men to participate in such programs was misguided. He pointed out that men can 
suppress their battering behaviour for months or even years and that what was really at the 
root of the problem was men's 'controlling behaviour'. According to him the violence cannot 
really be stopped without putting an end to the controlling behaviour and in order to do that 
it is necessary for the batterer to want to change. Hence, the efficacy of court mandated  
programmes is not clear cut. As an aside, Jukes indicated to me that it was this focus on 
men's controlling behaviour and attempts to overcome this that made his approach 'pro­
feminist', although the programme he had set up was not actually affiliated with any service 
for victims of male violence. With regard to the treatment focus, Jukes told me that all men in 
this society were socialized into believing that it was right and fitting that men control 
women. He also confessed to engaging in controlling behaviour with his wife and told me that, 
in all likelihood, I also exhibited such patterns with the women close to me. I did not deny it.
43 The Times Wednesday February 22, 1989. Interestingly, Sandra Horley makes a distinction 
between 'pro-feminist' and 'traditional' counselling methods. According to her 'pro-feminist' 
methods begin with the assumption that the violent behaviour of men arises out of their 
perceived need to control women and that the need to control comes out of sexist expectations 
generated in society at large. 'Traditional' approaches focus on 'fears of abandonment', 'unmet 
dependency needs’ and 'anger management'. According to her much of the counselling of male 
batterers in this country is 'traditionalist' masquerading as 'pro-feminist', (personal 
communication to author)
44 The Guardian Wednesday March 8, 1989
45 Sandra Horley told a meeting of the London branch of NAPO that "We are talking about matters 
of priority. Setting up Refuges has not stopped the violence - and running men's groups will 
not stop it either. But providing refuge for women, enabling them, and their children, to be 
safe from danger must take precedence over allowing violent men with criminal sentences to 
be at large in the community. Refuges are full to overflowing and cannot meet the demand. 
Bed and Breakfast hotels are also full and many women are being forced back into the danger 
from which they have fled." She revealed later in her speech that establishing a men's group 
in Lambeth cost the council £86,000; over half the £150,000 it cost to run Chiswick Family 
Rescue for a year.
46 ibid.
47 Personal communication to author. The Everyman Centre was established in the London 
Borough of Lambeth, with a three year grant, in early 1991. The paid staff are both male and 
trained in Kleinian psychoanalysis.
48 I was witness to a discussion between Rebecca Dobash and Jill Radford at a national 
conference held under the auspices of Crime Concern and partially funded by the Home Office 
on 'Preventing Crime Against Women' at Hammersmith Town Hall in April of 1991. Radford 
vehemently attacked the idea of counselling men who batter. Her reasoning was twofold: 1) 
such violence is a crime and should be treated as such, and 2) in view of the lack of resources 
allocated to victims it was unacceptable to be giving funds for projects for violent men. 
According to Rebecca Dobash, the model that was being implemented in Scotland under her 
guidance was based on the 'pro-feminist' programme in Duluth Minnesotta (see chapter nine). 
This particular programme had emerged from work in women's refuges as an adjunct to 
services for victims. Dobash's counter argument was that putting men in counselling
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programmes made them "safe to leave". According to her, many women do not leave their 
violent partners because of fear of further and increased violence. Apparently men in 
counselling are less dangerous because their attention is focused away from the woman.
49 The Observer Sunday June 17, 1990
50 ibid.
51 The London Standard August 1, 1990 announced: 'Get tough with the Wife Beaters'; on the 
same day that Today announced: 'Two Nights Instant Jail to Tame Wife Beaters'. In fact, 
every newspaper in London carried the story on John Patten's announcement that day. The 
Express announced: 'Blacklist to help police put wife beaters in dock'; The Star: 'Cops get 
tough on violence in the home - Families at war face Jail'; The Sun simply: 'Blacklist for 
bully hubbies'. The Times put it this way: 'Police to take harder line on domestic violence'; 
while The Independent was more cautious: 'Police are advised to give higher priority to 
violence in home'.
52 The Independent August 1, 1990 In fact, the initiatives adopted by British police in their 
efforts to improve their record in policing rape came as a result of a report drawn up by 
Detective Inspector Ian Blair of the London Metropolitan Police in conjunction with the British 
Police Foundation. This closely parallels the 'domestic violence story'. Initially, the police 
had come under fire for dealing poorly with this type of crime, particularly after the airing of 
Roger Graefs 1979 television documentary on the Thames Valley Police. This had included 
footage of a police interview with a rape victim, showing an apparently callous attitude by the 
attending officers. Suggestions for improvement in policing practices for the crime of rape 
came after Blair's fact finding mission to the United States which was published under his 
name. Blair I. Investigating Rape A New Approach for Police published by Croom Helm in 
association with the Police Foundation © 1985
53 The Observer Sunday June 17, 1990
54 ibid.
55 ibid.
56 I recall having a conversation with a PC attached to one of the Metropolitan Police Domestic 
Violence Units (one of the few men I came in contact with attached to such a unit) about the 
need for refuge provision. He jokingly suggested that such a facility be built on top of his 
section house. Perhaps he took Sandra Horley’s call for cooperation too literally. While this 
officer seemed to genuinely believe that refuges were a good idea his own awareness about 
local shelters was not deep. He was not on a first name basis with any refuge workers and 
admitted to having an awkward relationship with them.
57 This three pronged strategy was outlined on numerous occasions. This account is taken from 
a speech entitled 'Resources for Abused Women' given at the Crime and Policing After 1992 
Conference held at Islington Town Hall Nov. 26-27,1990 (unpublished document)
58 ibid.
59 ibid.
60 This report had been commissioned by the Women's Equality Group of the London Strategic 
Policy Unit in late 1987 and the data was gathered in the early months of 1988. The Report 
was published in 1989, after the dissolution of the Strategic Policy Unit with the assistance of 
Southwark Council. The document in entitled: Taking Stock Refuge Provision in London in the 
Late 1980s. by Marlowe Russell.
61 ibid. pg. 20-21
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62 ibid. pg. 21 It was further reported that "70% [of the refuges] are overcrowded a significant 
amount of the time." pg. 62
63 ibid. pg. 71-72 Estimates of the amount of unpaid labour in refuges are further complicated 
by the fact that many workers (an estimated 32%) were unable to take their full allotment of 
holidays in a given year. Further, many women worked for no pay at all, only to be 
remunerated informally, often by being given a place to stay in the refuge in return for 
providing 24 hour cover.
64 In this respect, the report drew heavily on the expertise of Amina Mama and, in the 
acknowledgements, the report's author thanked her for the opportunity to read The Silent 
Struggle before it's publication.
65 Stanko, E.A. 'Missing the Mark? Policing Battering' Women. Policing and Male Violence. 
Routledge London and New York © 1989 pg. 66
66 A connected worry was the policing of assault within the home in Northern Ireland. WAFE 
noted findings from a study they had carried out there which indicated that 95% of the 
respondents felt they had needed to call the police at one time or another but had not. Details 
of the interviews revealed the enormous problems of policing violence in the private family 
setting in the context of the on-going hostilities. The lesson seems to be that, police 
involvement in dealing with hostilities in public places (for example in Northern Ireland, 
Southall, Brixton, Toxteth, etc.) has profound repercussions for policing in a private setting. 
The implications that policing in public settings holds for policing in private spaces all but 
dissolves the distinction between policing the 'public' and the 'private'. See: Montgomery P. 
and Bell, V. The Police Response to Wife Assault: A Northern Ireland Study Women's Aid 
Federation © 1986
67 ibid. pg. 31-32
68 Susan Edwards' work has been done directly in collaboration with the police. This involved 
work at a number of police stations in the Metropolitan Area, recently, an attempt to evaluate 
the deterrence value of arrest with one of the new domestic violence units. Other work has 
been done under Town Hall initiatives for example: McGibbon A., Cooper L., and Kelly L. 
"What Support?" The Final Report of the Hammersmith and Fulham Council Police Committee 
Domestic Violence Project. The Polytechnic of North London, 1989.
69 Throughout the period of research I have attended numerous multi-agency meetings. Such 
meetings are organized at local level by officers in Community Relations. One striking thing 
about these meetings is that the police are always the most well represented group. Head 
counts are somewhat difficult at times because officers in attendance tend to wear civilian 
clothing, however I have been in meetings where 50% of the persons present were police 
officers. Private solicitors, Crown Prosecution Service, local health visitors, social service 
workers, housing officials and refuge workers, make up the balance of people in attendance, 
but at any given meeting the police were the single most numerous group. As regards my 
general impression, refuge workers attending at multi-agency meetings held by what I labeled 
the North London Domestic Violence Unit in chapter seven were veiy enthusiastic about the 
police response. Workers in attendance at the copy-cat unit's meetings were less so, but had 
also come to realize the limitations of the police response with regard to the decision to 
arrest. At these meetings I made a habit of asking refuge workers about what issues were a 
priority for them. To my surprise, criminalization was always the first thing mentioned and 
there was a high level of awareness about the deterrence based research. However, when I
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asked them about more funding for refuges there was markedly less worry. Indeed, I 
mentioned to one refuge worker that I had heard that some refuges suffered because of lack of 
money to which she replied: "A refuge is what you make it!"
70 Southall Black Sisters had criticized the police for unwarranted surveillance of the 
community. They complained that, during multi-agency meetings, police request information 
from local social workers, probation services, psychiatric nurses, the local victim support 
scheme, and local women's groups on 'problem families'. According to their analysis of such 
requests, domestic violence had been re-defined by the police from a social problem to one of 
'problem families' who would then become the subject of police attention. 'Southall Black 
Sisters - Two Struggles: Challenging Male Violence and the Police' in Dunhill, D., The Bovs in 
Blue Women's Challenge to the Police. Virago Press, London © 1989
71 Southall Black Sisters came into existence shortly after the 1979 uprising in Southall. Grant 
aided by Ealing Council, the group campaigned on a number of issues including violence in 
marriage, arranged marriage, policing of the black community and homelessness.
72 ibid. pg. 40
73 ibid. pg. 44
74 Mama A. The Hidden Struggle: Statutory and Voluntary Sector Responses to Violence Against 
Black Women in the Home published by the London Race and Housing Research Unit and the 
Runnymede Trust © 1989.
75 Camden Black Sisters, originally Camden and Islington Black Sisters Group, was first formed 
in 1979 after a conference for Women of Asian and African Decent. It has been a broad based 
group campaigning around the general issues of sexism, racism, and class differences. The 
group changed its name in 1986 and obtained office space a year later. They are grant aided 
by Camden council and provide a wide range of cultural events as well as informal social 
services and a platform for political protest.
76 Both the Bangladeshi and the Bengali communities were mentioned to me by police officers in 
this regard. However, from examination of police files, it has also been my observation that 
Chinese people and, indeed, many other ethnic groups from the Far East, are also unlikely to 
involve the police in domestic disturbances. This is not to intimate that relations between the 
police and these disparate sub-cultures are uniaxial, however, it does appear that there are 
significant barriers between the police force and some immigrant communities. This has 
profound implications for the social response to domestic violence, since, if people from these 
communities do not use police services, for whatever reason, then concentration on service 
delivery through the police force will fail to meet the needs of these victims. Under such 
circumstances other agencies may be more effective in service delivery.
77 The Police and Public in England and Wales: A British Crime Survey Report Home Office 
Research Study 117 London HMSO ©1990 pg. 49
78 Text of a speech given at a conference by John Newing QPM entitled Policing: A Crisis in 
Confidence? at the Crime and Policing After 1992 Conference held at Islington Town Hall Nov. 
26-27, 1990 (unpublished document) Newman blamed much of the negative view of the police 
on the Media and then went on to note the British Crime Survey findings.
79 The Guardian Wednesday Feb. 21, 1990 the author of this article, David Rose, explained that 
'participitative management' was central to the philosophy of the Plus Programme. Integral to 
that was a loosening of the command structure so that the constructive criticism made by 
operational officers could pave the way for internal reform. However, Rose saw this loosening
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of the command structure as somewhat chimerical since most officers were afraid of 'doing 
their legs'. He explained that 'to do your legs' means "roughly, to ruin your career, or have it 
ruined, by stepping out of line, by criticizing the wrong superior, or simply falling foul of the 
inertia-bound hierarchy by displaying excess initiative."
80 op. cit John Newing QPM; Policing: A Crisis in Confidence?
81 Such reports are too numerous to enumerate in any detail. However, to cite two examples; a 
brief report emerged in the Financial Times on Wednesday Dec. 6, 1989. It read in full: "A 
man who accused a police officer of lying when he said he had found cannabis on him was 
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secure an arrest, (see: The Guardian Dec. 6, 1989). Sir Peter Imbert appeared in the Daily 
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aggressive attitude in their relationships with people on the street." (Daily Mail Wed. Dec. 6, 
1989) Several weeks earlier,77ie Sun (Thurs. Nov. 24, 1989), which is not known for being 
overly critical of the police, had also noted the need to "clean up the cops". The article noted 
recent acquittals of the Guilford Four were noted, but more important were the wrongful 
convictions of the Chelsea Headhunters on charges of football hooliganism using evidence 
fabricated by undercover police. The item noted that "If ordinary people were treated with 
more courtesy and consideration by Mr. Plod, we would be less inclined to believe the 
allegations of corruption."
82 Hoare, M.A. Stewart G., and Purcell C.M. The Problem Oriented Approach: Four Pilot Studies 
London : Metropolitan Police, Management Services Department © 1984; quoted in Goldstein H. 
Problem Oriented Policing McGraw-Hill New York, © 1990 pg. 54
83 ibid. pg. 54-55
84 ibid. pg. 75
85 op. cit John Newing QPM; Policing: A Crisis in Confidence?
86 This observation was made by Bittner two decades ago and has since become a common sense 
truism of police research. See: Bittner, E. The Functions of the Police in Modern Society. 
National Institute of Mental Health, Chevy Chase Maryland © 1970
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89 This idea was developed by peter Manning in 'The Police: Mandate, Strategies and 
Appearances'. See: Manning P.K. and Van Maanen J (eds) Policing: A View from the Street. 
Goodyear Santamonica Calif. © 1978
90 The Sun , April 30, 1991. The front page headline read: Murder at Police Station. It was 
explained that "a husband had stabbed his wife in a police station . . .  after they had called in 
to sort out their marital problems. The woman was knifed 15 times when two police women 
left the couple alone in a special domestic violence unit." The Chief Superintendent in charge 
of the station was quoted as saying that "Officers dealing with domestic violence cases 
perform a difficult dual role of police officer and social worker and have a whole range of 
options open to them with such cases" and, further, that police "are allowed a great deal of 
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